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This Article traces, and examines policy issues related to, the
evolution of the law concerning corporate combinations in
the statutes and case law of Delaware, New Jersey, and North
Carolina, and in the provisions of the Model Business
Corporation Act. Additionally, on the basis of a detailed
reevaluation of the reserved power problem, it examines
constitutional questions involved in the issue of whether
enabling statutes of recent vintage can be utilized by
corporations in existence prior to their enactment in the
absence of a right of appraisal for dissenting shareholders.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate combinations, entailing the acquisition by one
corporation of control of the business of another corporation, have
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become commonplace in the modem American economy. This
Article examines the evolution of the law concerning each of three
means of effecting such a combination: (i) merger of the acquired
corporation with the acquiring corporation (or its subsidiary), (ii)
purchase by the acquiring corporation (or its subsidiary) of the assets
of the acquired corporation, and (iii) acquisition by the acquiring
corporation (or its subsidiary) of a controlling interest in the stock of
the acquired corporation.1
The treatment of the subject is partly comparative, involving the
evolution of statutes of three selected states-Delaware, New Jersey,
and North Carolina 2 -and provisions of the Model Business
Corporation Act. Delaware is included because of its twentieth-
century prominence as a state of incorporation; New Jersey, because
of its nineteenth-century leadership in the development of corporate
law; and North Carolina, because not one but two new versions of its
general corporation statute have been enacted since 1950-the most
recent based on the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act.
The treatment is also partly historical, involving two distinct
periods in the evolution. The first period covers developments in the
nineteenth century culminating in enactment by the three subject
states-in the six-year span 1896 through 1901-of comprehensive
corporation statutes. The second period covers the evolution
(including revisions and new versions) of those statutes-as they
pertain to corporate combinations-during the twentieth century.
The liberalizing nature of the statutory evolution has required a
revisitation (not confined to the three subject states) of the question
whether modernizing legislation can be utilized by pre-existing
1. A fourth means of effecting a corporate combination is by way of a consolidation.
Because consolidations are infrequent today, and because the legal principles applicable
to such transactions are essentially the same as those applicable to mergers,
consolidations are not addressed as a separate subject in this Article.
The Model Business Corporation Act Annotated contains the following comment:
Earlier versions of the Model Act also provided for a "consolidation,"
which was similar to a merger, except that all corporate parties to the
transaction disappeared and an entirely new corporation was created. In
modem corporate practice consolidation transactions are obsolete since it is
nearly always advantageous for one of the parties in the transaction to be the
surviving corporation. (If creation of a new entity is considered desirable, a new
entity may be created before the merger and the disappearing entities merged
into it.) As a result all references to a statutory "consolidation" have been
deleted from the Model Act.
MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. ch. 11 introductory commentary at 11-2 (1996).
2. These three states are sometimes hereinafter referred to as "the three subject
states," "the three states," or "the subject states."
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corporations notwithstanding the Constitution's Impairment Clause.
The "reserved power question" is still with us and deserves to be
better understood.
Throughout, the Article examines the tension between the push
for greater corporate flexibility and the need for protection of
shareholder rights. Written in the belief that capital formation is still
essential to the health of our economy, the Article gives special
attention to safeguards for shareholders. Of necessity, heavy
emphasis is placed on the statutory right of appraisal for dissenters.
(One significant aspect of current combination law is not
addressed herein. It is the matter of state anti-takeover statutes,3
which impose special requirements for corporate combinations in the
contexts to which they apply. This omission is due in part to the fact
that those statutes represent a massive subject by themselves and in
part to the writer's belief that someday Congress will adopt
legislation preempting such state statutes. Accordingly, this Article
examines the subject of corporate combinations as if such anti-
takeover statutes did not exist.)
3. Following Congress's enactment of the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat.
454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1994)), many states adopted
statutes further regulating tender offers for the benefit of target company managements
and shareholders. In 1977, for example, North Carolina adopted its Tender Offer
Disclosure Act. Act of June 28, 1977, ch. 781, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1018, 1018-25
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 39 78B-1 to -11 (1985)). However, the decision in Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), brought into question the constitutionality of such
statutes. Later state statutes, instead of attempting to regulate tender offers, proceeded
on the theory of regulating the internal affairs of target corporations-an approach
upheld in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). In 1986, New
Jersey adopted the initial version of its Shareholders' Protection Act. Act of Aug. 5,
1986, ch. 74, 1986 N.J. Laws 523 (effective Jan. 23, 1986) (codified as amended at N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10A-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1997)). In 1987, North Carolina adopted the
initial version of its Shareholder Protection Act. Act of Apr. 23, 1987, ch. 88, § 1, 1987
N.C. Sess. Laws 84, 84-88 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9-01 to -05
(1990 & Supp. 1996)). Later in the same year, North Carolina adopted the initial version
of its Control Share Acquisition Act. Act of May 13, 1987, ch. 182, § 1, 1987 N.C. Sess.
Laws 205, 205-10 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9A-01 to -09 (1990 &
Supp. 1996)). In 1988, Delaware amended its General Corporation Law by adding a new
section 203 titled Business Combinations with Interested Stockholders. Act of Feb. 2,
1988, ch. 204, § 1, 66 Del. Laws 422, 422-25 (1987) (codified as amended at DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991 & Supp. 1996)).
The 1997 Supplements to chapter 55 of the North Carolina General Statutes and title
8 of the Delaware Code Annotated had not been received by the cut-off date for this
Article (October 24, 1997). Hence, citations in this Article are to the 1996 Supplements
for North Carolina and Delaware.
1998] CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
PART ONE: DEVELOPMENT OF COMBINATION LAW IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
I. COMMON-LAW RESTRICIIONS
Corporate combinations, as we know them today, were not
permitted at common law. They became possible only by virtue of
state enabling statutes.
A. Merger
It has often been stated by courts and commentators that, at
common law, a corporate merger could not be effected without the
unanimous consent of shareholders.4 It was probably more accurate
to say that, in the absence of enabling legislation, a corporation
lacked the legal capacity to enter into a merger. From this, it
followed that a single shareholder could move successfully, on ultra
4. See New Jersey & Hudson River Ry. & Ferry Co. v. American Elec. Works, 81 A.
989, 991 (NJ. 1911) ("It is, of course, familiar and well-settled law that a majority of the
stockholders of a corporation cannot effect a consolidation with another corporation
without unanimous consent, unless the right of consolidation has been conferred by
legislation that may be read into the contract of incorporation."); Armstrong v. Marathon
Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776,781-82 (Ohio 1987) ("[Ihe courts of that [early] time viewed the
relationship between shareholder and corporation as a vested property right, and the vote
of a shareholder owning a single share of stock was sufficient, by the common-law rule, to
block any merger, sale of major assets or other organic change."); James Vorenberg,
Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189,
1194 (1964) (referring to "the veto which previously [i.e., before enactment of appraisal
statutes] the holder of even one share could exercise against mergers, sales of all assets,
and other basic corporate changes"); Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A
Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 627 (1981) ("At common law, one
shareholder in a corporation could block all others from making any fundamental change
in the corporation's business or charter .... ).
5. See Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25, 39 (1863) ("The power of the
legislature to confer such [merger] authority cannot be questioned, and without the
authority, railroad corporations organized separately, could not merge and consolidate
their interests."); Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 270 P. 1044, 1049 (Ariz.
1928) ("The right to consolidate or merge two or more corporations into one ... is
governed by statute or charter provisions."); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Doyle, 102 N.E.
790, 791 (I1. 1913) ("As a corporation must be created originally by statutory authority,
any consolidation, purchase, or merger by which it acquires the franchises of another
corporation must also have statutory authority."); Colgate v. United States Leather Co.,
72 A. 126, 128-29 (NJ. 1909) ("It is entirely well settled that the power of corporations to
consolidate and merge is not to be implied, and exists only by virtue of plain legislative
enactment"); Carolina Coach Co. v. Hartness, 198 N.C. 524,528,152 S.E. 489,491 (1930)
("Legislative sanction is essential, not only to the creation, but to the merger or
consolidation of corporations."); Jones v. Rhea, 107 S.E. 814, 824 (Va. 1921) ("[T]his
proposition that the right to merge must be plainly afforded by law ... is abundantly
sustained by authority.").
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vires grounds, to enjoin the consummation of a corporate merger not
authorized by statute.6
B. Purchase/Sale of Assets7
One of the basic characteristics of a corporation is its capacity, as
a legal entity, to acquire and hold real and personal property. Thus,
there could be little doubt that, at common law, a corporation had
the legal capacity to purchase all of the assets of another corporation
(except when the purpose was to eliminate competition). For this
reason, state statutes authorizing such purchases have not generally
been thought necessary.9
The situation was different when the perspective was that of a
corporation selling all of its assets.'0 At common law, a corporation,
unless in a failing condition, could not dispose of all of its assets
without the unanimous consent of its shareholders." However, this
6. See William B. Riker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co., 82 A. 930, 931 (N.J. 1912)
("[A]ny stockholder who refuses to consent [to a proposed merger not authorized by
statute] is entitled to the aid of a court of equity to prevent its being carried into
execution.").
7. The term "sale of assets" is used herein to denote the sale by a corporation of all
or substantially all of its assets otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.
There can, of course, be difficult questions as to what constitutes "substantially all"
of a corporation's assets. See Thorpe ex rel Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436,
444 (Del. 1996); Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1275-76 (Del. Ch. 1981); Gimbel v.
Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605-07 (Del. Ch.), aff'd per curiam on limited grounds, 316
A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Stiles v. Aluminum Prods. Co., 86 N.E.2d 887, 888-89 (I11. App. Ct.
1949); Good v. Lackawanna Leather Co., 233 A.2d 201, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1967).
8. See Elkins v. Camden & Ati. R.R. Co., 36 NJ. Eq. 5,13-14 (Ch. 1882).
9. Nonetheless, there were nineteenth-century examples of special acts authorizing
a named railroad corporation to purchase the railroad of another company. See, e.g., Act
of Feb. 22, 1849, [no chapter number], 1849 N.J. Laws 90; Act of Mar. 17, 1854, ch. 216,
§ 3, 1854 N.J. Laws 524, 525; see also infra text accompanying notes 123 (discussing the
1849 act) and 127 (discussing the 1854 act).
10. This subject is discussed in the following: Richard G. Elliott, Jr., Comment,
Corporations-Disposition of Corporate Assets, 43 N.C. L. REV. 957 (1965); and Note,
Corporations-Power of Majority Stockholders to Authorize the Sale of All of the
Corporate Property, 14 MINN. L. REV. 58 (1929).
11. See American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 F. 896, 899 (6th Cir. 1923) ("The law is
settled without apparent conflict that neither the directors nor a majority of the
stockholders of a solvent going corporation have power to sell all its property and assets,
thereby disabling itself from achieving the objects of its creation, against the dissent of a
single stockholder."); Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 270 P. 1044, 1049
(Ariz. 1928) ("Under the common law, neither the board of directors nor a majority of
the stockholders could dispose of all the property and assets of a prosperous and going
concern and put it out of business before the expiration of the time for which it was
incorporated .... "); Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 93 A. 380, 383 (Del. Ch. 1915)
("The general rule as to commercial corporations seems to be settled that neither the
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restriction could hardly be based on lack of corporate capacity.
Rather, it was based on the view that a sale of assets by a solvent
corporation, without the unanimous consent of its shareholders,
would constitute a breach of an implied contract among the
directors nor the stockholders of a prosperous, going concern have power to sell all, or
substantially all, the property of the company if the holder of a single share dissent.");
Forrester v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co., 55 P. 229,233 ("At
common law, neither the directors nor a majority of the stockholders have power to sell
or otherwise transfer all the property of a going, prosperous corporation, able to achieve
the objects of its creation, as against the dissent of a single stockholder."), reh'g denied, 55
P. 353 (Mont. 1898); Good v. Lackawanna Leather Co., 233 A.2d 201,211 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1967) ("At common law unanimous shareholder consent was required in order
for a corporation to sell all of its assets. Any attempt by the corporation to dispose of its
assets without such unanimous consent was void and could be set aside upon the
application of a dissenting shareholder."); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (Ch. 1853);
Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 115 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y. 1953) ("At
common law neither the majority stockholders nor the directors could bring about a sale
or cause a transfer of any portion of the property, essential for the transaction of its
customary business, of a solvent, prosperous corporation, which was justifying the reason
for its corporate existence, against the will of a minority however small."); In re Clark's
Will, 178 N.E. 766, 768 (N.Y. 1931) ("At common law, the assets of a corporation could
not be sold without the consent of all stockholders."); Abbot v. American Hard Rubber
Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861); Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 25 S.E.2d 363,
368-69 (Va. 1943) ("In the absence of an enabling statute, the common law rule, as
pronounced by the majority of the courts, was that a sale of all the assets of a corporation
for cash or securities could not be made without the unanimous consent of the
stockholders.").
There was, however, authority to the contrary. See Beidenkopf v. Des Moines Life
Ins. Co., 142 N.W. 434 (Iowa 1913); Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 73 Mass. (7 Gray)
393, 404 (1856) ("At common law, the right of corporations, acting by a majority of their
stockholders, to sell their property is absolute, and is not limited as to objects,
circumstances or quantity."); Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 82 A. 1014 (N.H. 1912); Edward
H. Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 HARV. L. REV. 335
(1917).
Relevant to this matter were cases involving the question whether a railroad
corporation could enter into a long-term lease of its properties. In Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. SL Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 290 (1886), the Court, after
reviewing a number of decisions, said the following:
We think it may be stated, as the just result of these cases and on sound
principle, that unless specially authorized by its charter, or aided by some other
legislative action, a railroad company cannot, by lease or any other contract,
turn over to another company, for a long period of time, its road and all its
appurtenances, the use of its franchises, and the exercise of its powers, nor can
any other railroad company without similar authority make a contract to receive
and operate such road, franchises, and property of the first corporation, and that
such a contract is not among the ordinary powers of a railroad company, and is
not to be presumed from the usual grant of powers in a railroad charter.
Id. at 309. And in Oregon Railway & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Railway Co., 130 U.S.
1 (1889), the Court concluded that a corporation, even though authorized by its charter
(filed under a general corporation statute) to buy or sell or lease railroads, could not
enter into a 96-year lease of railroad properties-either as lessor or as lessee-in the
absence of express statutory authorization to do so. See id. at 30-36.
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shareholders that the corporate assets were to be employed for the
life of the corporation in pursuance of the purposes stated in its
charter.12
C. Purchase/Sale of Controlling Stock Interest
Absent authorization in its charter or in a statute, 3 a corporation
could not, at common law, acquire stock of another corporation.14
This was especially true when the stock purchase amounted to the
12. Probably the best-known statement of this rationale is that contained in Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921), the Court saying:
It is, of course, a general rule of law that, in the absence of special
authority so to do, the owners of a majority of the stock of a corporation have
not the power to authorize the directors to sell all of the property of the
company and thereby abandon the enterprise for which it was organized....
The rule that owners of a majority of the stock may not authorize the sale
of all of the property of a going and not unprofitable company, rests upon the
principle that exercise of such power would defeat the implied contract among
the stockholders to pursue the purpose for which it was chartered.
Id. at 595-96.
To the same effect is the following from Fontaine v. Brown County Motors Co., 29
N.W.2d 744 (Wis. 1947):
At the common law a business corporation other than a real estate corporation
was not permitted to dispose of its entire property except by unanimous consent
of the stockholders, if the corporation were a solvent going concern.... The
basis for the limitation of authority was that such a conveyance was a substantial
abandonment of the business enterprise and contrary to the implied agreement
of the stockholders that the corporate property would be devoted to the
prosecution of corporate purposes.
Id. at 746-47; see also Elliott, supra note 10, at 958 ("At common law, the sale of all the
assets of a prosperous, going concern required unanimous shareholder consent. This
doctrine was based on a theory of an implied contract between the shareholders to pursue
the business for which the corporation was chartered.").
13. In Meares v. Monroe Land & Improvement Co., 126 N.C. 662,36 S.E. 130 (1900),
it was stated to be the general rule that, absent an "express provision in [the
corporation's] charter authorizing it to take stock in another corporation, it could not, in
law, do so, if it had attempted to do so." Id. at 664, 36 S.E. at 131 (note that slight
punctuation differences exist between the version of this quotation published in the North
Carolina Reporter and the version published in the South Eastern Reporter; this version
is taken from the South Eastern Reporter).
Similarly, in State v. Atlantic City & Shore Railroad Co., 72 A. 111 (N.J. 1909), it was
stated:
[I]t is undoubtedly the general rule in this country that one corporation may not
become a stockholder in another unless authority is clearly granted by statute;
and this is but a corollary of the principle that corporations possess only such
powers as are specifically granted by the state, and such incidental powers as are
necessary for carrying these into effect.
Id. at 117.
14. See Central Railroad Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 624-28 (1869), and People v.
Chicago Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E. 798, 800 (Ill. 1889), and the authorities cited therein.
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acquisition of control,15 and particularly if that control was to be
exercised for the purpose of eliminating competition. 6 There were
numerous reasons for this common-law rule, but chief among them
was the limitation arising from the ultra vires doctrine.
17
Free transferability of interests is, of course, one of the attributes
of a corporation that distinguish it from a partnership. Thus, absent
some self-imposed restriction on transfer (as in the case of a close
corporation), shareholders are generally free to dispose of their stock
at times and on terms of their own choosing. The corporation itself is
involved only if one takes the view that control constitutes a
corporate asset. 8
D. Charter Authorization
If a corporation's original certificate of incorporation granted it
the power to effect a merger or a sale of assets (upon the favorable
vote of holders of some specified majority of the corporation's
shares) or to acquire and vote the stock of another corporation (by
director action without any shareholder vote), this would be
tantamount to governmental authorization of such a transaction.
Accordingly, the power could be validly exercised in accordance with
the provisions of the original charter notwithstanding the absence of
enabling legislation of general applicability. It has been so held as to
a sale of assets19 and as to a long-term lease of a railroad's road,20 and
15. In De la Vergne Refrigerating Machine Co. v. German Savings Institute, 175 U.S.
40 (1899), the Court said:
But as the powers of corporations, created by legislative act, are limited to
such as the act expressly confers, and the enumeration of these implies the
exclusion of all others, it follows that, unless express permission be given to do
so, it is not within the general powers of a corporation to purchase the stock of
other corporations for the purpose of controlling their management.
Id. at 54-55; see also WALTER CHADWICK NOYES, INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS § 298,
at 545-46 (2d ed. 1909) (stating that a corporation must have express authority before
purchasing shares in another corporation to gain control).
16. See Elkins v. Camden & Ad. R.R. Co., 36 NJ. Eq. 5,13-14 (Ch. 1882).
17. See Hill v. Nisbet, 100 Ind. 341, 349 (1884); Note, Power of a Corporation to
Acquire Stock of Another Corporation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 281,284-86 (1931).
18. This concept is tangential to the subject now being addressed and will not be dealt
with further. However, for a discussion of this subject, see Thomas L. Hazen, Transfers of
Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders-Common Law, Tender Offers,
Investment Companies-and a Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 1024-41
(1977), and the authorities cited in note 1 of that article.
19. In Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 93 A. 380 (Del. Ch. 1915), the court said:
Stated succinctly, I hold ... in this case that a corporation created to carry
on the general business of mining, with general charter powers to buy, sell and
deal in mines, and own shares of stock of other corporations, and with a special
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there were dicta in support of this proposition with respect to both
corporate mergers2' and corporate acquisitions of stock of other
corporations.P
On the other hand, it is doubtful that a charter amendment,
adopted by less than all of a corporation's shareholders, could
provide a sufficient basis for the consummation of such a
transaction.23 It has been held, for example, that in the absence of a
statute authorizing a sale of assets for stock, a charter amendment
adopted by less than all of the shareholders could not validly provide
charter power vested in the directors to sell, or otherwise dispose of, all or
substantially all its property and assets of the corporation with the assent of the
holders of three-fourths of all the stock, may with such assent sell substantially
all its property and assets to another corporation and take in payment therefor
shares of the purchasing corporation, even though some of the stockholders
dissent, and the directors will not be enjoined from submitting to the
stockholders the proposed sale.
Id. at 385; accord Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co., 99 N.W. 290,293-94 (Iowa 1904).
20. The North Carolina Rail Road Company was chartered by Act of Jan. 27, 1849,
ch. 82, 1848-49 N.C. Sess. Laws 138. Section 19 of that special-act charter provided that
"the said company may, when they see fit, farm out their right of transportation over said
rail road." Id. § 19, 1848-49 N.C. Sess. Laws at 146. In State v. Richmond & Danville
Railroad Co., 72 N.C. 634 (1875), it was held that this charter provision was sufficient to
validate a 30-year lease of the company's road to another corporation. See id. at 636-37.
21. See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 135 F. 153, 156 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1905) ("It
is fundamental law that the right to exercise such a vital power of a corporation as
contemplates [consolidation into another corporation] must be found in some positive
plenary legislative grant either in the articles of association of the corporations
consolidating or in the general law of the land."), rev'd on other grounds, 144 F. 765 (8th
Cir. 1906); Market St. Ry. Co. v. Hellman, 42 P. 225, 229 (Cal. 1895) ("Corporations
cannot, without the consent of all their stockholders, consolidate with others, except
where the power so to do is given by their charters, or by a general statute .... "); Spencer
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 137 N.C. 107, 119,49 S.E. 96, 101 (1904) ("It is settled that
the power to consolidate may be conferred either in the charter, or by a general enabling
act.") (note that this is the case name as it appears in the South Eastern Reporter; it is
entitled Spencer v. Railroad in the North Carolina Reporter; also note that slight
punctuation differences exist between the version of this quotation published in the North
Carolina Reporter and the version published in the South Eastern Reporter; this version
is taken from the South Eastern Reporter).
22. See Meares v. Monroe Land & Improvement Co., 126 N.C. 662, 36 S.E. 130
(1900) (quoted supra in note 13). For an example of a New Jersey corporation whose
charter authorized it to acquire and vote the stock of an Illinois corporation, see Ellerman
v. Chicago Junction Railways & Union Stock-Yards Co., 23 A. 287 (N.J. Ch. 1891).
23. When a corporate charter prohibited the corporation from consolidating with
another without majority approval of the shareholders but also authorized amendments to
the charter by action of the directors alone, and thereafter the charter was amended by
the directors to authorize a consolidation without majority approval by the shareholders,
it was held that non-assenting shareholders were not bound to go along with a
consolidation authorized only by a directors' resolution adopted pursuant to the charter
amendment as approved by those directors. See Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42,47 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1869).
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authorization for such a sale.U
II. COMING OF CHANGE THROUGH ENABLING LEGISLATION
A. Need for Enabling Statutes
With the quickening pace of the Industrial Revolution in the
second half of the nineteenth century, the common-law rules
restricting corporate combinations were inevitably displaced. Given
the needs of a burgeoning economy, it came to be perceived that a
requirement of unanimity-under which a single shareholder could
forestall a presumably desirable corporate combination-was
intolerable. 5  The desire, not only to facilitate corporate
combinations in the public interest, but also to inhibit extortion by
minority shareholders, 26 made apparent the need for legislation
24. See American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 F. 896,900-01 (6th Cir. 1923) (involving
a New Jersey corporation).
25. In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Jarvis, 87 S.W. 759 (Ky. 1905), the court
said:
It requires but little observation to know that the trend of railroad development
has been constantly from isolated fragments of railway lines towards
consolidation into grand trunk lines, and that in proportion as this has been
successfully accomplished has the great usefulness of this branch of the common
carriers of traffic and passengers of this country been increased. It therefore
would seem to follow, as a natural and logical conclusion, that it is much to the
interest of small and fragmentary lines that they should be enabled with the
utmost facility, consistent with the preservation of the rights of the owners, to
enter into contracts of consolidation or sale with other railroads, whereby they
may become parts of great systems of interstate traffic, rather than remain small,
isolated lines. To require the unanimous vote of all the stock of a railroad to
unite with another railroad, or to sell its franchises out to another railroad, if
that be desirable, is to render this method of developing the interest of the
corporation impracticable, as it simply provides an opportunity for a small
number of the stockholders to entirely block the interest of the great majority of
the stock for their own selfish purposes.
Id. at 762; accord Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776,782 (Ohio 1987).
Weiss states that "[s]tate legislatures came to recognize that requiring unanimous
consent for fundamental changes in a corporation's organization and barring take outs of
dissenting shareholders created the potential for tyranny by the minority, thus impeding
economic progress by blocking desirable commercial transactions." Weiss, supra note 4,
at 629.
26. See Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941) ("At
common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental changes
in the corporation. This made it possible for an arbitrary minority to establish a nuisance
value for its shares by refusal to cooperate."); In re Timmis, 93 N.E. 522, 523 (N.Y. 1910)
("An incidental evil [of the requirement of unanimity for shareholder approval of a sale-
of-assets transaction] was the power of a dissenting stockholder to compel the majority to
buy him out on his own terms in order to secure unanimous consent with no one left to
question the transaction.").
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altering the common-law rules.
B. Overcoming the Barrier to Utilization of Post-Incorporation
Enabling Legislation
While the common-law restrictions on corporate combinations
could, of course, be changed by enabling statutes, there was a
potential barrier to the utilization of such legislation by a pre-existing
corporation.
1. Nature of the Barrier
With respect to corporations to be chartered subsequent to
enactment of enabling legislation, the state legislatures enjoyed a free
hand in authorizing (and prescribing both limitations on and
liberalized procedures for) corporate combinations2 7 Statutory
authorization of a corporate combination with only majority
shareholder approval, if such authorization was contained in a special
act chartering the corporation or in a general law under which the
corporation was organized, would be a part of the charter contract
and therefore be binding upon all the shareholders. 28
27. It was established in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,369 (1827), that
the Impairment Clause, U.S. CO NST. art. 1, § 10, prohibited state legislation only to the
extent that such legislation applied to pre-existing contracts. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTrIION OF THE UNITED STATES-PART 11-THE
RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 271-73 (1965).
The point was made as follows in Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877): "The
States may legislate as to contracts thereafter made, as they may see fit. It is only those in
existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect." Id. at 603.
In Imperial Trust Co. v. Magazine Repeating Razor Co., 46 A.2d 449 (N.J. Ch. 1946),
the court said:
Endowed with the governmental power to legalize mergers, the
legislature ex consequentia can prescribe the terms and conditions. Indeed, as
Justice Swayze remarked, "The Legislature is under no compulsion to authorize
a merger, and it may impose even fanciful conditions; it might, for instance,
prescribe that the approval should be written in red ink."
Id. at 451 (quoting American Malt Corp. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 92 A. 362, 363
(N.J. 1914)).
28. In Nugent v. Supervisors, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 241 (1873), a county was held liable
on bonds issued in payment of its subscription to stock of a railroad company,
notwithstanding the consolidation of that company with another, because such
consolidation was authorized by a pre-incorporation statute (as well as by a provision in
the special-act charter of the company). See i at 253. The Court said:
In a multitude of cases decided in England and in this country it has been
determined that a subscriber for the stock of a company is not released from his
engagement to take it and pay for it by any alteration of the organization or
purposes of the company which, at the time the subscription was made, were
authorized either by the general law or by the special charter, and a clear
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However, with respect to corporations already in existence,
there was a problem concerning the utilization of enabling legislation
that authorized a corporate combination upon the vote of holders of
some specified majority (less than all) of the shares.29 That problem
arose from a concept deeply embedded in nineteenth-century
distinction is recognized between the effect of such alterations and the effect of
those made under legislation subsequent to the contract of subscription .... The
American authorities ... uniformly assert that the subscriber for stock is
released from his subscription by a subsequent alteration of the organization or
purposes of the company, only when such alteration is both fundamental and not
provided for or contemplated by either the charter itself or the general laws of the
State.
Id. at 250-51.
In Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 114 F. 232 (C.C.D.NJ. 1902), affd, 119 F.
871 (3d Cir. 1903), when the executors of a deceased shareholder of a corporation sought
rescission of a 999-year lease of the corporation's property and franchises that had been
made to another corporation with the favorable vote of holders of a majority of the
lessor's shares, the court denied such relief, noting that both corporations had been
formed under the same 1893 act and that such act not only authorized such leases but also
provided a right of appraisal to dissenting shareholders. See id. at 253-55.
In Mayfield v. Alton Railway, Gas & Electric Co., 65 N.E. 100 (Ill. 1902), when a
merger was effected pursuant to pre-incorporation legislation upon a two-thirds vote of
shareholders and a dissenting shareholder sought payment in cash for his shares (even
though the statute made no provision for a right of appraisal), the court denied relief,
saying:
Of course, statutes authorizing consolidation after subscriptions have been made
cannot be held to compel a dissenting stockholder to transfer his subscription to
the consolidated company, because to do so would impair the obligation of his
contract. But if a statute already in existence to that effect enters into and
becomes a part of his contract, then manifestly there is no impairment of his
contract by requiring him to submit to the required majority vote for the
consolidation ....
Id. at 102; accord Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 120 A. 486, 490 (Del.
Ch. 1923); Norton v. Union Traction Co., 110 N.E. 113, 118-19 (Ind. 1915); Sparrow v.
Evansville & Crawfordsville R.R. Co., 7 Ind. 369, 372-74 (1856); New Jersey & Hudson
River Ry. & Ferry Co. v. American Elec. Works, 81 A. 989,991 (NJ. 1911).
29. In Fry's Executor v. Lexington & Big Sandy Railroad Co., 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 314
(1859), in commenting on post-incorporation legislation whereby the charter of a railroad
corporation was amended to authorize it to consolidate with other railroad companies or
to subscribe to the stock of other such companies, the court said:
Each shareholder in an incorporated company has a right to insist on the
prosecution of the particular objects of the charter. He can not be deprived of
his rights or privileges without his assent. Such alterations of the charter as are
necessary to carry into effect its main design, may be made without his consent.
But an alteration which materially and fundamentally changes the
responsibilities and duties of the company, or which superadds an entirely new
enterprise to that which was originally contemplated, may be resisted by the
stockholders, unless such alterations are provided for in the charter itself, or in
the general laws of the State in force at the time the act of incorporation was
passed.
Id. at 321.
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corporate law-the concept that a corporate charter constituted a
contract, one of whose central features was a limitation on the
corporation's powers and purposes.30  Part of that contractual
arrangement was the understanding that the directors or majority
shareholders could take action-notwithstanding opposition by
minority shareholders-if such action was within the ambit of the
powers and purposes stated in the corporate charter.31 But there was
30. In Hartford & New Haven Railroad Co. v. Croswell, 16 N.Y. Com. Law Rep. (5
Hill) 383 (Sup. Ct. 1843), the court said:
Indeed, [corporations] can exercise no powers over the corporators beyond
those conferred by the charter to which they have subscribed, except on the
condition of their agreement or consent. This is so in the case of private
associations, where the articles entered into and subscribed by the members are
regarded as the fundamental law or constitution of the society, which can only be
changed by the unanimous voice of the stockholders. So here, the original
charter is the fundamental law of the association-the Constitution which
prescribes limits to the directors, officers and agents of the Company not only,
but to the action of the corporate body itself-and no radical change or
alteration can be made or allowed, by which new and additional objects are to be
accomplished, or responsibilities incurred by the Company, so as to bind the
individuals composing it, without their assent.
Id. at 386 (citation omitted).
31. See Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25, 40 (1863) ("When any person
takes stock in a railroad corporation, he has entered into a contract with the company,
that his interests shall be subject to the direction and control of the proper authorities of
the corporation to accomplish the object for which the company was organized."). In
Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall River Railroad Co., 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 230 (1862), the point
was made as follows:
We suppose it may be stated as an indisputable proposition, that every
person who becomes a member of a corporation aggregate by purchasing and
holding shares agrees by necessary implication that he will be bound by all acts
and proceedings, within the scope of the powers and authority conferred by the
charter, which shall be adopted or sanctioned by a vote of the majority of the
corporation, duly taken and ascertained according to law. This is the
unavoidable result of the fundamental principle that the majority of the
stockholders can regulate and control the lawful exercise of the powers
conferred on a corporation by its charter. A holder of shares in an incorporated
body, so far as his individual rights and interests may be involved in the doings
of the corporation, acting within the legitimate sphere of its corporate power,
has no other legal control over them than that which he can exercise by his
single vote in the meetings of the company.... It cannot, therefore, be justly
said that the contract, express or implied, between the corporation and the
stockholders is infringed or impaired by any act or proceeding of the former
which is authorized by a majority, and which comes within the terms of the
original statute creating and establishing their franchise, and conferring on them
capacity to exercise control over the rights and property of their members. On
the contrary, the fair and reasonable implication resulting from the legal relation
of the stockholder and the corporation is, that the majority may do any act
either coming within the scope of the corporate authority, or which is consistent
with the terms and conditions of the original charter, without and even against
the consent of an individual member.
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also the understanding that, if the directors or majority shareholders
proposed to effect a significant change in the nature or operation of
the corporate business as specified in the charter, a minority
shareholder could successfully sue to enjoin or (as the question often
arose) defend against an action by the corporation to collect on his
unpaid stock subscription.32
Id. at 242-43.
32. In Wiswall v. Greenville & Raleigh Plank-Road Co., 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 183
(1857), when minority shareholders of a corporation, organized to build and operate a
plank road between two specified points, brought suit to enjoin the management from
proceeding-pursuant to a majority vote of shareholders-to purchase a line of stages
and to procure a contract for carrying mail, the court ruled in favor of the shareholder-
plaintiffs. See id. at 185-86. In Central Railroad Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869), in
holding that a railroad corporation could be enjoined from purchasing a large block of
stock in another railroad corporation, the court said:
By becoming a stockholder he has contracted that a majority of the stockholders
shall manage the affairs of the company within its proper sphere as a
corporation, but no further; and any attempt to use the funds, or pledge the
credit of the company not within the legitimate scope of the charter, is a
violation of the contract which the stockholders have made with each other, and
of the rights-the contract rights-of any stockholder who chooses to say, "I am
not willing."
Id. at 618; see also Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 116 S.E. 810, 811 (Ga. 1923) (enjoining
an application for amendments to a corporate charter and stating that "[i]t is now well
settled in this state that, when proposed amendments to a charter are fundamental,
radical, or vital, the unanimous consent of all the stockholders to their acceptance is
essential"); Faunce v. Boost Co., 83 A.2d 649,652 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951) (holding
that complaining minority shareholders could enjoin consummation of a charter
amendment, proposed by the board and approved by vote of more than two-thirds of the
outstanding shares, that would have effected a stock reclassification whereby the
complainants would have been deprived of their voting rights); Elkins v. Camden & Atl.
R.R. Co., 36 N.J. Eq. 5,7-8,13-16 (Ch. 1882) (holding that a shareholder could enjoin, on
ultra vires grounds, a proposed acquisition by his railroad corporation of stock, bonds,
and rolling equipment of another railroad corporation operating a parallel line on a
narrower gauge, even though the transaction was to be consummated only if approved by
a majority vote of shareholders of the acquiring corporation).
In New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517
(1854), when suit was brought to collect on an unpaid stock subscription following a
fundamental corporate change effected by a majority vote of shareholders pursuant to
post-incorporation enabling legislation, the court denied relief, saying:
[W]hen a person becomes a member of an incorporated company by his
subscription to the stock, he agrees to be bound by the terms of his contract, as
defined in the charter of incorporation; he agrees to be bound by the acts of the
corporation and its officers, performed within the scope of the charter powers;
but upon no principle can it be held that he impliedly consents to any alteration
which would work a radical change in the structure of the association [in this
case, a transaction amounting to a merger of the shareholder's corporation into
another], which might be voted or accepted by even a majority of the whole of
the corporators, and thereby be subjected to burdens and obligations wholly
foreign to the purposes and objects of the original charter.
Id. at 540.
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The problem was compounded by the provision in Article I,
Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution that "[n]o State shall ... pass any
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts" 33 and by the decision
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward4 that a corporate
charter constituted a contract within the purview of that
constitutional provision.35 Moreover, after the Supreme Court's
decision in the Dartmouth College case, it came to be accepted
doctrine that a corporate charter, in addition to being a contract
between the state and the corporation,36 was also a contract between
the corporation and its shareholders as well as a contract among the
body of shareholders,37 with the latter two of these contracts-as well
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. For a brief history of the Constitution's Impairment
Clause, see Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to
the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525 (1987).
34. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
35. See id at 650. Thus, in Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436
(1861), it was held that, when a bank's act of incorporation provided for a tax at the rate
of 6% of its profit in lieu of all other taxes, a post-incorporation statute imposing an
additional tax could not be applied to the bank because the charter provision constituted
a contract protected by the Impairment Clause. See id at 448-50. Similarly, in The
Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1865), when a corporation had been chartered
by special act to build a toll bridge across a river, with the stipulation that no other party
could build any bridge within two miles on either side of the authorized bridge, it was held
that a subsequent act of the legislature, chartering another corporation to build another
bridge within the two-mile limit, constituted a violation of the contract embodied in the
earlier charter and was therefore void because of the Impairment Clause. See ld at 81-82;
see also Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 15 F. Cas. 970, 984 (C.C.D. La. 1879)
(No. 8541) (holding that, when a corporation was chartered by special act in 1868 to
operate lotteries for a term of 25 years and no power was reserved to the legislature to
amend or repeal the charter, a federal court could properly enjoin-as violative of the
Impairment Clause-the implementation of a state statute enacted in 1879 purporting to
terminate the corporation's existence and to make it unlawful to operate lotteries).
36. The holding that a corporate charter constituted a contract between the state and
the corporation occasioned substantial criticism. See, eg., Barnett v. D.O. Martin Co., 11
S.E.2d 210,213 (Ga. 1940). Nevertheless, it continues to be accepted doctrine. In Stone
v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879), the Court said:
It is now too late to contend that any contract which a State actually
enters into when granting a charter to a private corporation is not within the
protection of the clause in the Constitution of the United States that prohibits
States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. The doctrines of
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, announced by this court more than
sixty years ago, have become so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United
States as to make them to all intents and purposes a part of the Constitution
itself.
Id. at 816 (citations omitted).
37. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 24 A.2d 315,
322 (Del. 1942) ("Regarding the charter as a contract, it has such status as between the
State and the corporation, as between the corporation and its shareholders, and, in some
respects, as between the shareholders among themselves."); Morris v. American Pub.
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as the first-being subject to the Impairment Clause.38 Further, it
was generally held that, if a corporation was formed not by special act
but under a general law, the provisions of that law, as in effect at the
time of incorporation, became part of the charter contract.3 9 Finally,
Utils. Co., 122 A. 696, 700 (Del. Ch. 1923); Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753,
755 (1i1. 1959) ("The charter or articles of incorporation ... is a contract of a three-fold
nature. It is operative as between the corporation and the State and it creates rights and
duties as between the corporation and its shareholders, as well as between the
shareholders themselves."); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Ill.
1949) ("Spoken of as a contract having a threefold nature, [a corporate charter] operates
to create rights and duties between the State and the corporation, between the
corporation and its shareholders, and among the shareholders themselves."); Somerville
v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 127 P. 464,465 (Mont. 1912) ("The charter granted by
a state to corporation ... operates in a threefold relationship, viz.: (a) Between the state
and the corporation; (b) between the corporation and its stockholders; and (c) between
the stockholders inter sese."); In re Collins-Doan Co., 70 A.2d 159, 163 (N.J. 1949);
Faunce v. Boost Co., 83 A.2d 649,651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951); Moore v. Conover,
195 A. 833, 841 (NJ. Ch. 1937); Dentel v. Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 539 P.2d 649, 651
(Or. 1975) ("The articles of incorporation constitute 'a contract between the corporation
and the state, between the corporation and its owners, and between the owners
themselves."' (quoting NORMAN D. LATriN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 156, at 570
(2d. ed. 1971))); Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills Co., 75 S.E. 309,311 (Va. 1912).
38. In Calvert v. Capital Southwest Corp., 441 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), the
court said: "It is also well settled law that the charter of a corporation creates contractual
relations between the corporation and its shareholders, between the shareholders
themselves, and that the rights growing out of this relationship are constitutionally
protected." Id. at 255. In Schramm v. Done, 293 P. 931 (Or. 1930), the court said:
Although there is some conflict in the decisions, the prevailing rules are as
follows: Where the state has not reserved the power to alter, amend, or repeal
the charter of a corporation, the provision of the Constitution of the United
States (article 1, § 10) against laws impairing the obligation of contracts protects
the contract between the corporators or members, and between them and the
corporation, as well as the contract between the state and the corporators or
corporation (Dartmouth College v. Woodward), and therefore any material or
fundamental amendment of the charter by or under legislative authority, or by a
constitutional amendment, in order that it may be binding, must have the
unanimous assent of all the stockholders or members, and the Legislature
cannot authorize acceptance of or assent to such an amendment by a majority of
the stockholders or members so as to bind the minority.
Id. at 934 (citation omitted); see also Avondale Land Co. v. Shook, 54 So. 268, 269 (Ala.
1911) ("The charter is under the protection of [the impairment] clause of the federal
Constitution in all three of its aspects as a contract.").
In New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517
(1854), the court said:
A charter is a contract, within the meaning of the constitution of the United
States, between the State granting the charter and the corporation itself, the
obligation of which it is not within the power of the legislature to impair. The
contract subsisting between the members of a corporate body and the
corporation is equally within the protection of the constitution.
Id. at 536.
39. See Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 338 (Del. 1940) ("It is
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it was a basic tenet of contract law that, absent some contrary
provision, a contract could not be amended without the assent of all
the parties thereto.
From all of this, it followed that, if a state legislature passed a
law authorizing some specified shareholder majority of an existing
corporation to effect a fundamental change that previously would
have required unanimous assent of the shareholders, any effort to
utilize such a law-without some basis upon which to sustain such a
change in the charter contract-would constitute an impairment of
the obligation of that contract and therefore be unconstitutional.4° In
Clearwater v. Meredith,41 when a railroad company was chartered
under an Indiana statute that provided for the incorporation of such
companies but made no provision for their merger or consolidation,
and thereafter (without having previously reserved a power of
alteration or amendment) the Indiana legislature adopted a statute
elementary that these provisions [of Delaware's general corporation statute] are written
into every corporate charter."); Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753,755 (Ill. 1959)
("The express nature of the [three-fold] contract is not limited to the specific language
found in the articles of incorporation but the contract in its entirety includes the statutory
provisions in force when the charter is granted as though those statutory provisions were
literally recited in the contract."); In re Collins-Doan Co., 70 A.2d 159, 163 (N.J. 1949)
("A corporate charter granted under a general enabling act [here the 1896 New Jersey
general corporation statute] embodies all the provisions of the constitution and the
statute under which it is issued and all other applicable general laws .... "); Faunce v.
Boost Co., 83 A.2d 649, 651 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951) ("Defendants argue that the
statutory law in effect at the date of the formation of the corporation becomes a part of its
charter, whether specifically referred to therein or not, and hence a part of said contract.
This must be conceded."); State ex rel. Starkey v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 413 P.2d 352, 358
(Wash. 1966) (en bane) ("It is axiomatic that the provisions of the statute under which a
corporate charter is granted is an integral part of the charter and binds all parties to the
contract, the state, the corporation, and the shareholders."). In State v. Jefferson Lake
Sulphur Co., 178 A.2d 329 (N.J. 1962), the court said:
A charter granted under the General Corporation Act includes, as if written
therein, the provisions of the statute under which it was issued and all applicable
general laws.... Moreover, the state of the law is not only a continuing
constituent part of the contract between the sovereign and the corporation, but
stockholders purchase their stock subject to it, and it becomes an integral part of
their contract with the corporation and with each other.
ld. at 335.
40. In Mowrey v. Indianapolis & Cincinnati Railroad Co., 17 F. Cas. 930 (C.C.D. Ind.
1866) (No. 9891), the court said:
These [cited] cases proceed on the just view that the relation between a
stockholder and the corporation is one of contract; and that every fundamental
change in its charter, made against his consent though on the authority of a
subsequent act of the legislature, is a violation of that contract, and is forbidden
by the national constitution.
Id. at 932.
41. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25 (1863).
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authorizing railroad companies to merge or consolidate, it was held
by the Supreme Court that a merger or consolidation of the pre-
existing railroad corporation could not have been effected over the
objection of a single shareholder.42 Similarly, in New Orleans,
Jackson & Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Harris,43 when suit was
brought to collect on an unpaid stock subscription, following a
fundamental corporate change (amounting to a merger of the
shareholder's corporation into another company) effected by a
majority vote of shareholders pursuant to post-incorporation
legislation, the court held for the shareholder-defendant on the
ground that action taken pursuant to the enabling legislation
impaired the obligation of the shareholder's contract with the
corporation. 4  The same result was reached in many other cases-
sometimes with, and sometimes without, express reference to the
Impairment Clause of the Constitution.45
42. The Court said:
The power of the legislature to confer such authority [i.e., authority to
merge or consolidate] cannot be questioned, and without the authority, railroad
corporations organized separately, could not merge and consolidate their
interests. But in conferring the authority, the legislature never intended to
compel a dissenting stockholder to transfer his interest, because a majority of
the stockholders consented to the consolidation. Even if the legislature had
manifested an obvious purpose to do so, the act would have been illegal, for it
would have impaired the obligation of a contract. There was no reservation of
power in the act under which the [railroad company] was organized, which gave
authority to make material changes in the purposes for which the corporation
was created, and without such a reservation, in no event could a dissenting
stockholder be bound.
Id. at 39.
43. 27 Miss. 517 (1854).
44. The court said:
According to the doctrine that the legislature had the right to 'confer upon any
number of the stockholders, who might own more than one half of the stock
subscribed, the authority to accept of amendments to the charter, it is evident
that the charter might be altered in its most essential stipulations, not only
without the approbation but against the consent of the great body of the
corporators, thereby subjecting them to duties and responsibilities not imposed
by their contract with the company. This, we think, cannot be done without a
clear violation of the constitution. Hence, we conclude that the act in question
did not invest the stockholders representing a majority of the stock subscribed
with authority to accept the amendment proposed to the charter.
Id. at 536.
45. These cases fall into five categories. The first category consists of cases involving
a significant change in the nature of a corporation's business, In Hartford & New Haven
Railroad Co. v. Croswell, 16 N.Y. Com. Law Rep. (5 Hill) 383 (Sup. Ct. 1843), a suit to
collect on a subscription for stock in a Connecticut corporation chartered in 1833 to build
and operate a railroad between Hartford and New Haven, the majority shareholders
having voted to ratify the board's acceptance of an amendment passed by the Connecticut
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legislature in 1839 authorizing the corporation to increase its capital by $200,000 for the
procurement of steamboats to be used in connection with the railroad, it was held that
such an extensive change in the powers and purposes of the corporation precluded a
recovery on the defendant's subscription. See id. at 388. In Stevens v. Rutland &
Burlington Railroad Co., 29 Vt. 545 (Ch. 1851), a non-assenting shareholder succeeded in
obtaining an injunction restraining his corporation from expending its funds to extend its
line for a distance of 30 miles pursuant to post-incorporation legislation, even though such
enabling legislation had been accepted by a majority vote of shareholders. See id. at 565;
see also Winter v. Muscogee R.R. Co., 11 Ga. 438, 452-53 (1852) (holding that a
subscriber to stock in a railroad company was not liable on his subscription when the
route of the railroad had been changed pursuant to subsequent enabling legislation
without the subscriber's consent); Hester v. Memphis & Charleston R.R. Co., 32 Miss.
378, 380-81 (1856) (same); First Nat'l Bank v. City of Charlotte, 85 N.C. 433, 438-40
(1881) (holding that a subscribing city was relieved of liability on its stock subscription
when it had not, as had the majority shareholders, assented to a post-incorporation
legislative amendment to the charter that effected a significant change in the nature of
the corporate enterprise-the corporation having been organized before the state's first
adoption of a reserved power). But see Banet v. Alton & Sangamon R.R. Co., 13 Ill. 504,
513 (1851) ("The alteration [of the railroad's route by post-incorporation legislation] is
not of such a radical character as to exonerate the stockholders from the payment of their
subscriptions.").
The second category of cases consists of those involving a corporate merger or
consolidation. In Lauman v. Lebanon Valley Railroad Co., 30 Pa. 42 (1858), when the
Pennsylvania legislature, by special act, authorized the merger of two existing railroads
but made no provision for dissenters' rights, it was held, in a suit for an injunction, that a
dissenting shareholder of the disappearing corporation could not be compelled to accept
stock of the surviving corporation and that the merger-even though approved by a
majority vote of shareholders-could not go forward unless security was given for
payment to the dissenting shareholder of the value of his stock. See id. at 49. In McCray
v. Junction Railroad Co., 9 Ind. 358 (1856), affid on reconsideration, 9 Ind. 359 (1857), the
court held that a consolidation of one railroad company with another, pursuant to post-
incorporation enabling legislation, released a non-assenting shareholder from the
obligation of his subscription. See id. at 358. In so holding, the court said:
As the state consented to the consolidation, the act of the companies in
making it, is not void; but that act constituted so great a change in the companies
committing it-bound them to so wide a departure from the original purpose of
either company, that it furnished a cause for the discharge of stockholders not
consenting to it.
Id. On reconsideration of McCray, the court said:
The relation between a railroad company and a stockholder is one of contract;
and any legislative enactment which, without his assent, authorizes a material
change in the powers or purposes of the corporation, not in aid of the original
object, if acted upon by the corporation, is not binding upon him.
McCray v. Junction R.R. Co., 9 Ind. 359, 359 (1857). On the other hand, in Sparrow v.
Evansville & Crawfordsville Railroad Co., 7 Ind. 369 (1856), and in Bish v. Johnson, 21
Ind. 299 (1863), it was held that a subscriber to stock was not relieved of his obligation by
a consolidation occurring after his subscription if, at the time of his subscription,
legislation existed that authorized such a consolidation. See Sparrow, 7 Ind. at 373-74;
Bish, 21 Ind. at 299-300.
The third category consists of cases involving a corporation's sale or lease of its
assets. In Mayor of Knoxville v. Knoxville & Ohio Railroad Co., 22 F. 758 (C.C.E.D.
Tenn. 1884), the court rescinded a corporation's sale of its assets, made upon the
favorable vote of its majority shareholders, even though such a sale had been authorized
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How, then, could a state legislature-confronted with the
Impairment Clause-remove the common-law restrictions on
corporate combinations with respect to corporations already in
existence?
2. Solutions to the Problem
a. Emergence of Possible Solutions
The problem was one of finding a justifiable basis upon which a
corporation, by vote of less than all of its shareholders, could avail
itself of post-incorporation enabling legislation notwithstanding the
Impairment Clause of the Constitution. Possible solutions began to
emerge in the nineteenth century.
by post-incorporation enabling legislation. See id at 763. The court stated:
[I]t was not competent for the legislature to do more in this respect than to
waive the public rights. It could not divest or impair the rights of the
shareholders, as between themselves, as guarantied by the company's charter,
without their consent.... The charter invests the owners of a majority of the
capital stock with the right to control the corporate business within the scope of
its provisions. Within this limit the power of a majority, when acting in good
faith, is supreme. But [the corporation's] charter does not, by any reasonable
intendment, clothe the majority with authority to sell the company's franchise
and property ....
Id. at 763; see also South Western RIR. Co. v. Benton, 58 S.E.2d 905, 918 (Ga. 1950)
(holding that a railroad corporation, organized (in 1845) before the state first adopted a
reserved power (in 1863), could not avail itself of post-incorporation legislation (enacted
in 1933) authorizing the company to sell all of its assets to another railroad corporation
upon a majority vote of shareholders, because such a transaction would contravene the
charter rights of minority shareholders); Small v. Minneapolis Electro Matrix Co., 47
N.W. 797, 798 (Minn. 1891) (enjoining, at the behest of a minority shareholder, a 25-year
lease of all of the corporation's assets that was to be effected only upon an approving vote
of the shareholders).
The fourth category consists of cases involving a corporation's purchase of stock in
another corporation. See Central R.R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 583, 632 (1869) (stating that
a railroad corporation could not, without the consent of every shareholder, avail itself of
post-incorporation legislation to justify its purchase of a large block of stock in another
railroad corporation).
The fifth category consists of cases involving a change in shareholder voting. See
Tucker v. Russell, 82 F. 263,268-69 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1897) (holding, with respect to a North
Carolina railroad corporation chartered by special act in 1852 (16 years before North
Carolina adopted its first reserved power), that a provision of the charter specifying
scaled voting could not be changed by legislation enacted in 1897 because this would
constitute an impairment of the charter contract); State ex rel. Haeussler v. Green, 78 Mo.
188, 194 (1883) (holding that, when a corporation's 1853 special-act charter mandated
straight voting in the election of directors and provided that the state's 1845 reserved
power should not extend to this corporation, an 1875 constitutional provision mandating
cumulative voting could not be applied to the corporation without violating the
Impairment Clause).
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First, following the lead suggested by Justice Story's dicta in the
Dartmouth College case, states began to include in their corporation
statutes (whether special acts or general laws47) a reserved power-
the power reserved to the legislature to amend or repeal such
statutes.4 New Jersey adopted a reserved power of general
46. Justice Story stated:
When a private eleemosynary corporation is thus created by the charter
of the crown, it is subject to no other control on the part of the crown, than what
is expressly or implicitly reserved by the charter itself. Unless a power be
reserved for this purpose, the crown cannot, in virtue of its prerogative, without
the consent of the corporation, alter or amend the charter, or devest the
corporation of any of its franchises, or add to them, or add to, or diminish, the
number of the trustees, or remove any of the members, or change, or control the
administration of the charity, or compel the corporation to receive a new
charter. This is the uniform language of the authorities, and forms one of the
most stubborn, and well settled doctrines of the common law.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 675 (1819). Justice
Story further stated:
In my judgment it is perfectly clear, that any act of a legislature which
takes away any powers or franchises vested by its charter in a private
corporation or its corporate officers, or which restrains or controls the legitimate
exercise of them, or transfers them to other persons, without its assent, is a
violation of the obligations of that charter. If the legislature mean to claim such
an authority, it must be reserved in the grant. The charter of Dartmouth
College contains no such reservation; and I am, therefore, bound to declare, that
the acts of the legislature of New Hampshire, now in question, do impair the
obligations of that charter, and are, consequently, unconstitutional and void.
Ld. at 712.
The concept of legislative reservation of a power to amend or repeal did not
originate with Justice Story. It had been articulated as early as 1806 in Wales v. Stetson, 2
Mass. (2 Tyng) 143 (1806): "We are also satisfied that the rights legally vested in this, or
in any corporation, cannot be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a
power for that purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation." Id. at
146. This case was cited with approval by Justice Story in his opinion in Dartmouth
College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 708.
Moreover, there were instances of reservation of a power of amendment in special-
act charters of educational institutions granted before the Dartmouth College case was
decided. See Houston v. Jefferson College, 63 Pa. 428, 437-38 (1869) (charter granted in
1802); Commonwealth v. Bonsall, 3 Whart. 559, 566-67 (Pa. 1838) (charter granted in
1784).
47. See Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 207 U.S. 310, 326 (1907) ("[I]t is
immaterial whether the power to alter the charter is reserved in the original act of
incorporation, or in the articles of association under a general law, or in a constitution in
force when the incorporation under a general law is made .... "); People v. O'Brien, 18
N.E. 692, 703 (N.Y. 1888) ("Whatever may be the effect of such reservations [of power to
alter or amend], it is immaterial whether they are embraced in the act of incorporation or
in general statutes or provisions of the constitution.").
48. For brief statements of the history of this development, see Spring Valley Water
Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 369-73 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting), Greenwood v.
Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, 19-21 (1881), Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 97 P. 590, 595-601
(Okla. 1908), and Legislative Control over Railroad Charters, 1 AM. L. REV. 451, 451-54
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applicability in an 1846 statute49 and later in its Constitution of 1875; °
(1867).
It appears that New York was the first state to adopt a reserved power of general
applicability. See Legislative Control over Railroad Charters, supra, at 452. The reserved
power was incorporated into New York's constitution in 1826. See Miller v. State, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 478, 478 (1872). Such a power was contained also in section 8 of title ImI of
chapter XVIII of the First Part of the Revised Statutes of New York as adopted by Act of
Dec. 4, 1827, ch. IX, §§ 1-2, 1827 (2d Mtg.) Laws of N.Y. 11, 11-13 (effective Jan. 1, 1828),
which provided as follows: "The charter of every corporation, that shall hereafter be
granted by the legislature, shall be subject to alteration, suspension and repeal, in the
discretion of the legislature." Id. § 8,1827 (2d Mtg.) Laws of N.Y. at 449.
But this does not mean that the reserved power was not included in special-act
charters in New York prior to 1826. As early as 1822, the special act chartering the
Farmers' Fire Insurance and Loan Company contained the following:
Provided always, That the legislature may, at their pleasure, after the expiration
of five years from and after the passing of this act, alter and modify all or any
part thereof, or expunge any or every section of the same, as they may deem it
proper. Provided also, That any such alteration and modification shall not annul
or invalidate any of the engagements or contracts entered into by or with the
said coporation [sic].
Act of Feb. 28,1822, ch. 50, § 1, 1822 N.Y. Laws 47,48.
49. On frequent occasions during the first half of the nineteenth century, the New
Jersey legislature made corporate charters (granted by special act) subject to alteration or
repeal. See JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY 379-83 (1949).
Pertinent cases include New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104, 104-05 (1877) (involving an 1835
special act chartering a New Jersey railroad), and McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige Ch.
102,103 (N.Y. Ch. 1828) (involving an 1824 special act chartering a New Jersey bank).
Then, in 1846, the New Jersey legislature enacted its first reserved power of general
applicability-in language almost identical to that enacted by New York in 1827, see
supra note 48 (second paragraph). Section 6 of the 1846 act provided as follows: "And be
it enacted, That the charter of every corporation which shall hereafter be granted by the
legislature, shall be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the
legislature." Act of Feb. 14, 1846, [no chapter number], § 6,1846 N.J. Laws 16,17.
Corporate charters granted by special act after 1846 were subject to the 1846 statute,
reserving the power of amendment or repeal, even though such special-act charters
themselves contained no such reservation. See State, Morris & Essex R.R. Co. v.
Commissioner of R.R. Taxation, 37 N.J.L. 228, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1874); State, Warren R.R.
Co. v. Person, 32 N.J.L. 134, 135-36 (Sup. Ct. 1866).
When New Jersey enacted its 1875 general corporation law, pursuant to a
constitutional amendment adopted that year, see infra note 50 (first paragraph), that
statute contained the following sections:
6. The charter of every corporation which shall hereafter be granted by or
created under any of the acts of the legislature, shall be subject to alteration,
suspension and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature.
35. The provisions contained in this act may be amended or repealed, at
the pleasure of the legislature, and every company created by this act shall be
bound by such amendment; but such amendment or repeal shall not take away
or impair any remedy against any such corporation or its officers for any liability
which shall have been previously incurred.
An Act Concerning Corporations (Act of Apr. 7,1875), published in REVISED STATUTES
OF NEW JERSEY 3, at 5,14 (1875).
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North Carolina's reserved power appeared first in its Constitution of
18681 and later in its 1901 corporation statute; 2 Delaware included a
The 1896 corporation statute of New Jersey contained the following sections:
4. The charter of every corporation, or any supplement thereto or
amendment thereof shall be subject to alteration, suspension and repeal, in the
discretion of the legislature, and the legislature may at pleasure dissolve any
corporation.
5. This act may be amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the
legislature, and every corporation created under this act shall be bound by such
amendment; but such amendment or repeal shall not take away or impair any
remedy against any such corporation or its officers for any liability which shall
have been previously incurred; this act and all amendments thereof shall be a
part of the charter of every corporation heretofore or hereafter formed
hereunder, except so far as the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the
objects of such corporation.
Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, §§ 4-5, 1896 NJ. Laws 277, 278-79; see infra text
accompanying notes 206-08 (discussing the origins of the 1896 New Jersey corporation
law).
50. At a constitutional convention in 1844, a proposal was made, but defeated, that
the New Jersey Constitution include a provision that laws with respect to private
corporations "may be altered, modified, or repealed by the legislature, whenever, in their
opinion, the public good may require it." CADMAN, supra note 49, at 93-96. However, in
1875, the New Jersey Constitution was amended to include the following sentence: "The
legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers, but they shall pass
general laws under which corporations may be organized and corporate powers of every
nature obtained, subject, nevertheless, to repeal or alteration at the will of the
legislature." NJ. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § 7, 1 11 (1875); see A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow, 98 A2d 581, 587 (NJ. 1953) (referring to the 1875 change in the New Jersey
Constitution).
The absence of a constitutional reservation of the power of amendment or repeal
prior to 1875 did not negate the effectiveness of an earlier statutory reservation of such
power. See Moore v. Conover, 195 A. 833,841 (NJ. Ch. 1937).
51. North Carolina's initial reserved power was contained in the second sentence of
the following constitutional provision:
Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created
by special act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the
judgment of the Legislature, the object of the corporations cannot be attained
under general laws. All general laws and special acts passed, pursuant to this
section, may be altered from time to time or repealed.
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1.
52. The first general corporation law enacted in North Carolina following ratification
of that state's 1868 constitution authorized the formation of a corporation by any three or
more persons "for the purpose of carrying on any manufacturing, mining, mechanical or
chemical business" or for other stated purposes, Act of Apr. 12,1869, ch. 280, § 1, 1868-69
N.C. Sess. Laws 669,669-70, and it provided that "[t]he Legislature may at any time alter,
amend or repeal this act, or may annul or repeal any incorporation formed under it," ld.
§ 24,1868-69 N.C. Sess. Laws at 677. However, a general law enacted three years later, in
1872, authorizing any three or more persons to form a corporation "for any purpose not
unlawful," contained no reservation of the power to amend but only a provision "[t]hat
every corporation may for just cause, and without prejudice to private rights, be
suspended, dissolved, or nullified according to any general public law now existing or
which may be hereafter enacted by the general assembly." Act of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 199,
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reserved power in its corporation statute as early as 1875, 53 but its
constitution has focused on legislative revocation.54 As will be seen
§§ 1,10, 1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws 347,347,350.
The 1901 corporation statute of North Carolina, borrowing heavily from New
Jersey's 1896 statute, see supra note 49 (fifth paragraph), contained the following
provisions:
Sec. 6. The charter of every corporation, or any supplement thereto, or
amendment thereof, shall be subject to alteration, modification, amendment or
repeal, in the discretion of the Legislature, and the Legislature may, at pleasure,
dissolve any corporation.
Sec. 7. This act may be amended or repealed at the pleasure of the
Legislature, and every corporation shall be bound by such amendment; but such
amendment or repeal, shall not take away or impair any remedy against any
such corporation, or its officers, for any liability which shall have been
previously incurred; this act and all amendments thereof shall be a part of the
charter of every corporation heretofore formed, or hereafter formed hereunder,
except so far as the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of
such corporation.
Act of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. 2, §§ 6-7,1901 N.C. Sess. Laws 13,14-15 (effective Apr. 1, 1901);
see infra text accompanying notes 225-27 (discussing the origins of the 1901 North
Carolina corporation law).
53. The Delaware corporation statute enacted in 1875, in implementation of the
constitutional amendment ratified earlier that year, see infra note 54 (first paragraph),
provided "[t]hat any charter of incorporation granted or made under the provisions of this
act, shall be subject to revocation by the Legislature, and power to amend, revoke or
annul all such charters, or any amendments, alterations or additions thereto, is hereby
reserved to the Legislature." Act of Mar. 26, 1875, ch. 119, § 5, 15 Del. Laws 181, 183.
The Delaware corporation statute of 1883, which repealed and replaced the 1875 statute,
contained the following provision, borrowed almost verbatim from section 35 of New
Jersey's 1875 statute, see supra note 49 (fourth paragraph):
The provisions contained in this act may be amended or repealed at the
pleasure of the Legislature, and every company created by this act shall be
bound by such amendment; but such amendment or repeal shall not take away
or impair any remedy against any such corporation or its officers for any liability
which shall have been previously incurred.
Act of Mar. 14, 1883, ch. 147, § 21,17 Del. Laws 212,224.
When Delaware's 1899 general corporation statute was enacted, its reserved power
provision, borrowing heavily from section 5 of New Jersey's 1896 statute, see supra note
49 (fifth paragraph), read as follows:
This Act may be amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the Legislature,
but such amendment or repeal shall not take away or impair any remedy against
any corporation created under this Act, or its officers for any liability which shall
have been previously incurred; this Act and all amendments thereof shall be a
part of the charter of every such corporation except so far as the same are
inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of such corporation.
Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 5, 21 Del. Laws 445, 446-47; see infra text accompanying
notes 214-18 (discussing the origins of the 1899 Delaware corporation law).
In 1901, this provision was repealed as section 5 and reenacted as section 140 of the
Delaware corporation statute, with no change except the insertion of a comma after the
phrase "or its officers." See Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch. 166, §§ 1,40,22 Del. Laws 255,255,
283-84; Act of Mar. 7,1901, ch. 167, § 140,22 Del. Laws 286,353.
54. A section of the Delaware Constitution of 1831 provided that "[n]o act of
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below, a split developed between the courts of various states as to
whether the reserved power provided an adequate solution to the
problem concerning a corporation's utilization of post-incorporation
enabling legislation.
Second, it came to be recognized that, notwithstanding the
Impairment Clause, a state could alter or repeal a corporate
charter-even in the absence of a reserved power-if such action was
taken in the exercise of either of two sovereign powers of the state.55
One of those powers was the police power-the power of the
state to protect the public health, safety, and morals-which could be
incorporation, except for the renewal of existing corporations, shall be hereafter enacted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of each branch of the legislature, and with a
reserved power of revocation by the legislature." DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 17. In
1875, a new sentence was added to that section providing that "[t]he Legislature shall
have power to enact a general incorporation act to provide incorporation for [specified
purposes, including manufacturing]; and no attempt shall be made, in such act or
otherwise, to limit or qualify the power of revocation reserved to the Legislature in this
section." Act of Jan. 28,1875, ch. 1,15 Del. Laws 3,3-4.
In Wilmington City Railway Co. v. Wilmington & Brandywine Springs Railway Co.,
46 A. 12 (Del. Ch. 1900), the court said, with respect to the above-quoted provision of the
1831 constitution:
This long review of the authorities shows that there is no decision of any
sort in opposition to the plain, logical interpretation of the phrase, "reserved
power of revocation by the legislature," as meaning the power to revoke, at the
pleasure of the legislature, any or all of the franchises granted to a corporation,
the power to recall all the rights, privileges, or franchises granted to a
corporation, or any number less than all, or any single right, privilege, or
franchise; that it cannot mean less than this, and that it cannot mean more, and
that it differs from the reserved power "to alter, amend, or repeal the charter" in
not including the power to regulate or control corporations in the manner
illustrated by the cases I have cited.
Id. at 18.
The Delaware Constitution of 1897 provides as follows:
No corporation shall hereafter be created, amended, renewed or revived
by special act, but only by or under general law, nor shall any existing corporate
charter be amended, renewed or revived by special act, but only by or under
general law; but the foregoing provisions shall not apply to municipal
corporations, banks or corporations for charitable, penal, reformatory, or
educational purposes, sustained in whole or in part by the State. The General
Assembly shall, by general law, provide for the revocation or forfeiture of the
charters of all corporations for the abuse, misuse, or non-user of their corporate
powers, privileges or franchises.
DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
55. The subject is discussed in the following: In re Mechanics Trust Co., 181 A. 423,
427-30 (NJ. Ch. 1935); Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for Limited Judicial
Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 190-94 (1985); and
Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 2), 57 HARV. L. REV.
621,636-63 (1944).
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exercised notwithstanding the Impairment Clause.ss In Beer Co. v.
Massachusetts,: when a Massachusetts corporation, chartered in 1828
to manufacture and sell malt liquors, brought suit challenging the
seizure of its product under a state prohibition law passed in 1869, the
Court held that the 1869 law-being a valid exercise of the state's
police power---did not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of the
corporation's charter contract 8 Similarly, in Stone v. Mississippi,5 9
56. In New York & New England Railroad Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894), the
Court said:
It is ... thoroughly established in this court that the inhibitions of the
Constitution of the United States upon the impairment of the obligation of
contracts, or the deprivation of property without due process or of the equal
protection of the laws, by the States, are not violated by the legitimate exercise
of legislative power in securing the public safety, health, and morals.
Id. at 567. Further, in Manigualt v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905), the Court said:
It is the settled law of this court that the [constitutional] interdiction of
statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from
exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal,
or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously
entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which in
its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the
sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort
and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under
contracts between individuals.
Id. at 480. And, in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548
(1914), the Court said:
For it is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process"
clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all
regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good
order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither
be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and
that all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.
Id. at 558.
57. 97 U.S. 25 (1877).
58. The Court said:
If the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of any
manufacture or traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from
providing for its discontinuance, by any incidental inconvenience which
individuals or corporations may suffer. All rights are held subject to the police
power of the State.
Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries
of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory
definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection
of the lives, health, and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good
order and the public morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest
itself of the power to provide for these objects.
Id. at 32-33; accord Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 669-70 (1878); Platte &
Denver Canal & Milling Co. v. Dowell, 30 P. 68,70-71 (Colo. 1892); Thorpe v. Rutland &
Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140,149-51,155-56 (1854).
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when a Mississippi corporation was chartered in 1867 with authority
to conduct lotteries for a period of twenty-five years, and a
Mississippi statute enacted in 1870 (implementing a provision of that
state's constitution of 1868) prohibited all kinds of lotteries, it was
held that the ouster of the corporation from the franchise theretofore
granted constituted a valid exercise of the state's police power and
did not, therefore, entail a violation of the Impairment Clause.6°
However, if a post-incorporation statute (enacted without benefit of
a reserved power) impinged upon corporate powers in such a way as
to constitute an impairment of the charter contract, the statute could
not survive a challenge to its constitutionality on the ground that it
was enacted in what the legislature perceived to be the public
interest; the statute could survive such a challenge only if it came
within the narrower confines of a bona fide exercise of the state's
police power.61 And it was difficult to argue that legislation
59. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
60. See id. at 819-20. Moreover, in Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Boston Railroad
Holding Co., 81 N.E.2d 553 (Mass. 1948), the court said:
It is manifest that the necessary and proper exercise of this [police] power will
frequently limit and restrict the freedom of action which particular persons and
corporations would otherwise enjoy in the management and control of their
property, and that such limitation and restriction do not constitute a taking of
property for which compensation must be allowed.
Id. at 558.
61. The North Carolina Rail Road Company was chartered by Act of Jan. 27, 1849,
ch. 82, 1848-49 N.C. Sess. Laws 138. Its special-act charter contained no reserved power
to alter or repeal, and there was no reserved power of general applicability in North
Carolina until adoption of that state's constitution of 1868. The charter contained no
requirement concerning the gauge of the company's rail line, and the line was built to a
gauge of 4 feet 8 1/2 inches. In 1871, the corporation granted a 30-year lease of its line to
a Virginia railroad corporation, and the lease agreement authorized the lessee to change
the line's gauge. The validity of this lease arrangement was upheld by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in its January term in 1875. See State v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co.,
72 N.C. 634, 637, 640 (1875). Having mandated a gauge of 4 feet 8 1/2 inches for other
North Carolina railroads, the legislature enacted a statute making it a crime to change the
gauge of any railroad in North Carolina that had been built to that gauge. See Act of
Mar. 15, 1875, ch. 159, 1874-75 N.C. Sess. Laws 185. Thereafter, the lessee and two of its
officers were indicted for violating the statute by a widening of the leased railroad's gauge
to 5 feet. The question, then, was whether the criminal statute constituted an
unconstitutional impairment of the charter contract (which the court construed as
permitting any gauge for the railroad line) or whether the statute-in its effort to regulate
the gauge of all railroads in the state--constituted an exercise of the state's police power,
thereby making the Impairment Clause inapplicable. In State v. Richmond & Danville
Railroad Co., 73 N.C. 527 (1875), it was held that the criminal statute did not constitute a
valid exercise of the state's police power and, therefore, amounted to an invalid
impairment of the charter contract, the court saying:
This police power, however extensive, must have reasonable limits. In
some places it is said to extend to everything "necessary for the welfare and
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authorizing corporate combinations had anything to do with the
public health, safety, or morals.
The other sovereign power was that of eminent domain-the
power of the state to take (or to authorize the taking of) private
property, for public use, upon payment of just compensation-which,
like the police power, could be exercised notwithstanding the
Impairment Clause.62 In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,6 when a
Vermont corporation was chartered in 1795 with the exclusive
privilege of building and operating a toll bridge over the West River
for a hundred years, and in 1843, pursuant to an enabling statute
enacted in 1839, the bridge was taken (with compensation) for a free
public highway across the bridge, it was held that the exercise of the
power of eminent domain did not entail a violation of the
Impairment Clause.64 When the granting of appraisal rights came to
prosperity of the State." But that would be to remove aU limits .... A State
cannot violate its contract under a pretended exercise of its police power. The
act must be bona fide intended to relieve some evil within the reach of that
power and strictly applicable to that end....
The Act ... does not appear to us to present the features of a police
regulation.... It may be a wise and convenient policy to require an uniformity
of gauge on all the railroads in the State, and it may be convenient to the roads
connecting with the North Carolina road that its lessees should be prevented
from changing its gauge from one uniform with theirs to a different one. But if
the lessees of the North Carolina road had a right to change its gauge according
to their ideas of their own interests (as in view of the decision of this Court at
the last term, must be admitted), no newly adopted policy of uniformity or
regard for the interests of other roads will authorize the State to deprive the
lessees of this right, except by virtue of its power of eminent domain, and upon
compensation.
Id. at 533-34.
62. In Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 223 U.S. 390 (1912), the
Court said:
The constitutional inhibition upon any state law impairing the obligation
of contracts is not a limitation upon the power of eminent domain. The
obligation of a contract is not impaired when it is appropriated to a public use
and compensation made therefor. Such an exertion of power neither challenges
its validity nor impairs its obligation. Both are recognized, for it is appropriated
as an existing enforceable contract. It is a taking, not an impairment of its
obligation. If compensation be made, no constitutional right is violated. All of
this has been so long settled as to need only the citation of some of the many
cases.
Id. at 400.
63. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
64. See id. at 536. The Court said:
This power, denominated the eminent domain of the State, is, as its name
imports, paramount to all private rights vested under the government, and these
last are, by necessary implication, held in subordination to this power, and must
yield in every instance to its proper exercise.
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be perceived as an exercise of the power of eminent domain, this
provided-as will be seen below-a fruitful solution to the problem
of a corporation's utilization of post-incorporation enabling
legislation.
b. Reserved Power Solution
The matter that first involved the courts-on the question
whether, notwithstanding the Impairment Clause, a corporation
could avail itself of post-incorporation enabling legislation-was an
examination of the scope and reach of the reserved power. Such an
examination had to take into account the fact that there was more
than one aspect to a charter contract-not only the public aspect (the
one involving only the state and the corporation) but also the private
aspects (those involving the corporation and its shareholders).
There was little doubt that, pursuant to a reserved power, the
public aspect of a charter contract could be altered by post-
incorporation legislation without violating the Impairment Clause.65
... A correct view of this matter must demonstrate, moreover, that the
right of eminent domain in government in no wise interferes with the
inviolability of contracts; that the most sanctimonious regard for the one is
perfectly consistent with the possession and exercise of the other.
... This right [of eminent domain] does not operate to impair the contract
effected [sic] by it, but recognizes its obligation in the fullest extent, claiming
only the fulfilment of an essential and inseparable condition.
Id. at 532-33. Similarly, in Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Louisa
Railroad Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 71 (1851), the Court said:
The grant of a franchise is of no higher order, and confers no more sacred title,
than a grant of land to an individual; and, when the public necessities require it,
the one, as well as the other, may be taken for public purposes on making
suitable compensation; nor does such an exercise of the right of eminent domain
interfere with the inviolability of contracts.
Id. at 83; see also Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 691 (1897)
("The true view is that the condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract, do not
break its obligations, but appropriate it... to public uses."); Central Bridge Corp. v. City
of Lowell, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 474,480-82 (1855) (holding that a bridge built and owned by
a corporation could be taken for public use, through exercise of the power of eminent
domain, without violating the Impairment Clause); Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston &
Worcester R.R. Corp., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 360, 394 (1839) ("Nor, in the opinion of the
Court, is this exercise of power [of eminent domain] by the legislature [impinging upon a
corporation's franchise], a law impairing the obligation of contracts, within the meaning
of the constitution of the United States.").
65. See Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 636, 644 (1899); Hamilton Gas
Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U.S. 258,270 (1892); Spring Valley Water Works
v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1884); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319, 324 (1877);
Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 454,459 (1872); State v. Miller, 30 N.J.L. 368,370
(Sup. Ct. 1863), affd per curiam, 31 N.J.L. 521, 530 (1864); Mayor of New York v.
Twenty-Third St. Ry. Co., 21 N.E. 60, 61-62 (N.Y. 1889); State v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg.
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Indeed, this was the intended purpose of the reserved power-to
overcome the holding in Dartmouth College so that a state
legislature, acting in the public interest, could alter the state's
contract with a corporation without violating the constitutional
prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts.6
Moreover, there were decisions by the Supreme Court that,
under a reserved power, a state legislature could constitutionally alter
the private aspects of a charter contract when, for a purpose deemed
to be in the public interest, the legislature compelled an alteration of
existing contractual arrangements between a corporation and its
shareholders or among its shareholders. Thus, in Sherman v. Smith,67
it was held that personal liability for subsequent debts of banking
corporations could be imposed on their shareholders by post-
Co., 25 A. 246,250 (R.I. 1892); Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 4 S.E.
49, 51-52 (S.C. 1887). See generally Legislative Control over Railway Charters, supra note
48, at 455-69 (discussing a number of the early cases).
However, in the absence of a reserved power, the charter contract between the state
and the corporation could not be altered to the corporation's detriment by post-
incorporation legislation, because to do so would run afoul of the Impairment Clause. See
Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264,267-68 (1871); Piqua Branch of the State
Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 392 (1853); Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 301, 318, 329-30 (1848). And the same result followed when, by terms of the
corporate charter, the reserved power was made inapplicable. See Louisville Gas Co. v.
Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U.S. 683, 696-97 (1885).
A state court case, reaching a result different from that reached in the cases cited in
the first paragraph of this footnote, is to be found in Sage v. Dillard, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.)
340 (1854). This case involved the Western Baptist Theological Institute, incorporated in
Kentucky in 1840 by a special-act charter that provided for a self-perpetuating board of
trustees but provided also that the charter could be altered, amended, or repealed. See id.
at 354-55. When legislation, enacted in 1848, amended the charter to increase the number
of trustees to 16 above the number then in office and named the persons who were to be
the 16 new members, the court held the act of the legislature to be an unconstitutional
impairment of the obligation of the contract embodied in the corporate charter,
notwithstanding the reserved power of amendment contained in the charter. See id. at
362-63.
66. See Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y. R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867), overruled
by Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585, 594-95 (N.J. 1967); infra text
accompanying notes 94-95 (quoting Zabriskie). In Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
454 (1872), the Court said:
The object of the reservation ... is to prevent a grant of corporate rights and
privileges in a form which will preclude legislative interference with their
exercise if the public interest should at any time require such interference. It is a
provision intended to preserve to the State control over its contract with the
corporators, which without that provision would be irrepealable and protected
from any measures affecting its obligation.
Id. at 458.
67. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 587,590-91,593-94 (1861); accord Bissell v. Heath, 57 N.W. 585,
587 (Mich. 1894).
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incorporation legislation enacted pursuant to a reserved power.
Similarly, in Looker v. Maynard, s it was held that a state, by way of
post-incorporation legislation enacted pursuant to a reserved power,
could compel corporations to accord to their shareholders the right of
cumulative voting.69
The question that remained-the one of greatest difficulty-was
whether a corporation could avail itself of post-incorporation
legislation enacted pursuant to a reserved power, when such
legislation, instead of compelling some change in the arrangements
between a corporation and its shareholders (or among the
shareholders) for a reason deemed to be in the public interest, simply
permitted the holders of some specified majority of the shares to
approve a particular kind of corporate action that could not have
been taken over the objection of a single shareholder under the law
as it had existed (and had become embodied in the charter contract)
at the time of incorporation.70
The background for consideration of this question was the
principle involved in the 1824 English case of Natusch v. Irving,71
which was often cited by American courts.3 The holding in that case
was to the effect that, when a joint stock company had been formed
to engage in the fire and life insurance business, a single shareholder
could enjoin the majority from embarking the enterprise upon the
business of marine insurance pursuant to enabling legislation enacted
by Parliament subsequent to formation of the company. If an
extension of the business of a joint stock company into a new line of
endeavor required the unanimous assent of the company's
shareholders notwithstanding enactment by Parliament of legislation
authorizing such an extension, could less than all of the shareholders
68. 179 U.S. 46, 54 (1900); accord Gregg v. Granby Mining & Smelting Co., 65 S.W.
312, 314 (Mo. 1901); Cross v. West Virginia Cent. & Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 12 S.E. 1071,
1072 (W. Va. 1891).
69. For another example of a state (acting pursuant to a reserved power) mandating a
change affecting shareholder rights, see Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478, 498-99
(1872).
70. The matter is discussed in the following- E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dissenting
Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (pt. 2), 75 U. PA. L. REV. 723, 723-
38 (1927); Horace Stem, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under a Reserved Right
to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation (pt. 2), 53 AM. L. REG. (U. PA.) 73 (1905).
71. 47 Eng. Rep. 1196 (1824).
72. See, e.g., New Orleans, Jackson & Great N. R.R. Co. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517, 538
(1854); Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y. R.R, 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 184 (Ch. 1867), overruled
by Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585,594-95 (N.J. 1967); Kean v. Johnson,
9 NJ. Eq. 401, 408 (Ch. 1853); Stevens v. Rutland & Burlington M.R. Co., 29 Vt. 545, 548
(Ch. 1851).
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of an American corporation embark their company upon a
significantly altered course permitted (but not required) by post-
incorporation legislation enacted pursuant to a reserved power?
Decisions on this question, in the state courts, led to two clearly
delineated schools of thought on the matter. Some courts adopted an
expansive reading of the reserved power, while others adopted a
restrictive reading.
The expansive reading was that, because the reserved power
itself became part of the charter of any corporation formed after
reservation of the power, there could be no impairment of minority
shareholders' contractual rights by corporate action taken pursuant
to post-incorporation legislation upon a vote of the majority of shares
specified in the enabling legislation. A leading case espousing this
view was the 1862 Massachusetts case of Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall
River Railroad Co.,73 in which a minority shareholder sought
unsuccessfully to enjoin his railroad corporation from extending its
line and uniting with another corporation pursuant to post-
incorporation enabling legislation enacted under a reserved power,
the court saying:
The real contract into which the stockholder enters with the
corporation is, that he agrees to become a member of an
artificial body which is created and has its existence by
virtue of a contract with the legislature, which may be
amended or changed with the consent of the company,
ascertained and declared in the mode pointed out by law
[i.e., by majority shareholder vote]. Having, by virtue of the
relation which subsists between himself and the corporation
as a holder of shares, assented to the terms of the original
act of incorporation, he cannot be heard to say that he will
not be bound by a vote of the majority of the stockholders
accepting an amendment or alterations of the charter made
in pursuance of an express authority reserved to the
legislature, and which by such acceptance has become
binding on the corporation. Such we understand to be the
result of the adjudicated cases.74
This view of the matter had been espoused by lower courts of New
York in 185175 and 185376 and embraced by that state's highest court
73. 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 230 (1862).
74. Id. at 245-46; accord Hale v. Cheshire R.L Co., 37 N.E. 307,307 (Mass. 1894).
75. In Northern Railroad Co. v. Miller, 10 Barb. 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851), in holding
a shareholder liable on his stock subscription notwithstanding changes made pursuant to
post-incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved power, the court said:
The defendant, when he subscribed for stock, yielded his assent to any alteration
1998] 723
724 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
in 1854.77 This view was adopted also by the highest court of Missouri
in 1853,78 of Rhode Island in 1869, 79 and of California in 1 895 .10 The
which the legislature might make. He can not, therefore, with truth say... "non
haec infoedera veni." The alteration in question must be presumed to have been
within his contemplation when he signed, and a part execution of the contract
into which he entered.
Id. at 283.
76. In White v. Syracuse & Utica Railroad Co., 14 Barb. 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 1853),
the court denied injunctive relief to a minority shareholder of a New York railroad
corporation (chartered in 1846) that sought to avail itself of post-incorporation legislation
(enacted in 1851) authorizing railroad corporations of New York-with the consent of
persons owning two-thirds of the stock of such a corporation-to subscribe to the stock of
a Canadian railroad company provided that the eastern terminus of the Canadian
company's road was at some point on the Niagara River. The court's decision was based
in part on the ground that the change to be effected pursuant to the post-incorporation
legislation, instead of altering the objects and business of the corporation, would promote
the objects for which it was chartered; but it was based primarily on the ground that the
"charter of the defendant, in express terms, reserves the right to the legislature to alter,
modify or repeal the act [of incorporation]." Id. at 560.
77. In Schenectady & Saratoga Plank Road Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N.Y. 102 (1854), when
the defendant sought to avoid liability for his unpaid subscription to stock of a plank road
corporation chartered in 1848 (under a general corporation law enacted in 1847) on the
ground that the corporation had proceeded without his assent to build a branch road
pursuant to a post-incorporation statute (enacted in 1849) authorizing plank road
corporations to build branch lines with the written consent of persons owning two-thirds
of the stock, the court held the defendant liable on his subscription on the ground that the
general law under which the corporation was formed contained a reserved power and that
the defendant "subscribed to stock under the original act [of 1847], subject to the
contingency that additional powers might be conferred or other changes made by an
amendment of the law." Id. at 109. The opinion of Judge A.S. Johnson contained the
following-
The persons who contract to take shares in a company under such an act,
contract subject to the same reservation of power. The courts are bound to read
their agreement with the legislative condition. They agree to take and pay for
the shares for which they subscribe, subject to the power of the legislature to
alter or repeal the charter of the company, and it does not lie in their mouths to
complain that the power has been exercised.
Id. at 114-15. This holding was followed in Buffalo & New York City Railroad Co. v.
Dudley, 14 N.Y. 336 (1856), when the defendant was held liable on his stock subscription
notwithstanding an extension of the corporation's railroad line pursuant to post-
incorporation enabling legislation enacted under a reserved power. After citing Thatcher,
Judge T.A. Johnson said: "The right to alter was reserved in the charter, and the
subscription must be taken to have been made subject to having such additional powers
conferred as the legislature might deem essential and expedient." Id. at 348.
78. In Pacific Railroad v. Renshaw, 18 Mo. 210 (1853), a subscriber to stock in a
railroad corporation was held liable on his subscription notwithstanding material changes
made in the charter by post-incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved power and
accepted by a majority in interest of the shareholders. The court said:
Into such a corporation, subject to such [reserved] powers of legislative control,
the defendant entered when he subscribed for stock in the company, and he
cannot now be allowed to complain that the power has been exercised, nor is he,
by the exercise of such power, discharged from his obligation to pay for the
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highest court of Maine appears to have been ambivalent.81
stock.
Id. at 215.
79. In Gardner v. Hope Insurance Co., 9 R.I. 194 (1869), the court said:
The legislature have reserved the power, at any time to alter or repeal the
charter, or any of its provisions. The corporators accepted it upon this
condition, and agreed that its provisions might be changed, and every purchaser
of stock in this company has assented to these terms, and has agreed to hold his
shares subject to this liability to change.
Id. at 199-200.
80. In Market Street Railway Co. v. Hellman, 42 P. 225 (Cal. 1895), the court said:
The objection that the proceedings under which the [corporate]
consolidation was had were violative of the constitutional rights of
nonconsenting stockholders, does not call for extended omment .... When an
individual becomes a stockholder in a corporation, it is with the implied assent,
on his part, to the right of the legislature to alter and amend the law within the
scope of the constitutional [reserved power] provision, and is as binding upon
him as a contract to like effect of his own making would be.... Corporations
cannot, without the consent of all their stockholders, consolidate with others,
except where the power so to do is given by their charters, or by a general
statute, existing at the date of incorporation, or in those cases where the right is
reserved by constitutional or statutory provision to the legislature to alter or
amend the charter. There is some conflict of authority as to the power of the
legislature to so amend the statute as to authorize corporations, without the
consent of all the stockholders, to consolidate, but the weight of authority is, as
we think, clearly in favor of the position that it may do so, and that the
legislature, corporation, and majority are not subject to the will of dissenting
stockholders.... The contract of the stockholders was made in view of the
existence of our constitutional [reserved power] provision, which entered into
and formed a part of the charter as effectually as did the statutes under which
the corporations were organized.
Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
81. Conflicting pronouncements were made in 1849 and 1855 by Maine's highest
court in two cases involving efforts to collect on unpaid stock subscriptions. In South Bay
Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Me. 547 (1849), one of the subscriber's defenses was that
post-incorporation legislation had increased the liability of shareholders, but the court
rejected this defense, saying:
The act of incorporation was accepted, and the subscription was made,
with a provision in the act, that it should be subject to all the duties and
liabilities imposed upon corporations by the seventy-sixth chapter of the
Revised Statutes. The twenty-third section of that chapter provides, that all acts
of incorporation thereafter granted, shall at all times be liable to be amended,
altered or repealed at the pleasure of the Legislature. The defendant cannot
therefore correctly allege, that his liability has been increased without his
consent. He consented to such action of the Legislature by becoming a member
of the corporation.
Id. at 551-52. Six years later, in Oldtown & Lincoln Railroad Co. v. Veazie, 39 Me. 571
(1855), the same court decided in favor of a subscriber by distinguishing the Gray case
and saying:
It is the charter only and the rights and liabilities of the corporation and of
its corporators, as such in consequence thereof, that can be varied by [a post-
incorporation] Act of the Legislature; and not the private contracts made
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While the expansive reading of the reserved power had a
superficial appeal, its conclusion did not follow from its premise. It
was true that the reserved power became part of a subsequent
corporate charter, and one could even assert that shareholders were
thereby put on notice that the charter of their corporation could be
altered or repealed by legislative action.81 But given the fact that the
impetus for adoption of a reserved power came from the decision in
the Dartmouth College case, it was far more plausible to believe that
the power was reserved by a state simply for the purpose of enabling
its legislature to mandate changes in the state's contracts with its
corporations, for reasons deemed to be in the public interest, 4 than
to suppose that the power was reserved also for the purpose of
enabling the legislature to authorize changes in the private aspects of
existing corporate charters so that majority shareholders could
between the corporation as one party and of its corporators as the other.
Id. at 580-81.
82. See Citizens' Say. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 636, 644 (1899) ("[A] general
statute reserving the power to repeal, alter or amend is by implication read into a
subsequent charter and prevents it from becoming irrevocable."); Hamilton Gas Light &
Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U.S. 258, 270 (1892) ("This [1851] reservation [in the
state constitution] of power to alter or revoke a grant of special privileges necessarily
became a part of the charter of every corporation formed under the [1852] general statute
providing for the formation of corporations."); Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
454, 457 (1872) ("The provisions of that law [a pre-incorporation reserved power statute]
.were as operative and as much a part of the charter and [an] amendment [thereof], as
if incorporated into them."); Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. Wilmington & Brandywine
Springs Ry. Co., 46 A. 12, 15-16 (Del. Ch. 1900); Pacific R.R. v. Renshaw, 18 Mo. 210,
215-16 (1853); In re Collins-Doan Co., 70 A.2d 159, 163-64 (N.J. 1949); State, Morris &
Essex R.R. Co. v. Commissioner of R.R. Taxation, 37 NJ.L. 228, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1874),
quoted with approval in Moore v. Conover, 195 A. 833, 842 (N.J. Ch. 1937); Elizabeth
City Water & Power Co. v. Elizabeth City, 188 N.C. 278, 287, 124 S.E. 611, 615 (1924);
State v. Cantwell, 142 N.C. 604, 606-07, 55 S.E. 820, 821 (1906); State v. Morris, 77 N.C.
512,517 (1877).
83. See Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 454, 458 (1872) ("The original
corporators, or subsequent stockholders, took their interests with knowledge of the
existence of this [reserved] power, and of the possibility of its exercise at any time in the
discretion of the legislature."); see also quotations supra in notes 79 and 80.
84. See Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 352, 355 (1884);
Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, 20 (1881); Tomlinson, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 458
("The object of the reservation, and of similar reservations in other charters, is to prevent
a grant of corporate rights and privileges in a form which will preclude legislative
interference with their exercise if the public interest should at any time require such
interference."); In re Opinion of the Justices, 33 A. 1076, 1080-84 (N.H. 1891); Lord v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y, 87 N.E. 443, 446-47 (N.Y. 1909); Cross v. Peach Bottom
Ry. Co., 90 Pa. 392, 395 (1879) ("The legislative reservation is in the nature of a police
power designed for the protection of the public welfare, and where such protection
becomes necessary, the law-making power may act without consulting either the interests
or will of the company .... The reservation ... was only intended to enable the
legislature to act without the consent and against the will of the corporation.").
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thereafter take actions previously requiring unanimous shareholder
assent. It was one thing to say that a state could preserve its right to
protect the public interest through the reservation of a unilateral
power to alter terms agreed to by the state at the time of its becoming
party to a contract through the granting of a corporate charter. It
was quite another thing to say that a state could adopt a reserved
power whose effect would be that the private aspects of all charter
contracts entered into after such reservation would themselves be
subject to subsequent alteration in whatever manner and to whatever
extent the legislature might authorize.8 This could be regarded as
tantamount to an unacceptable reservation of power to violate the
Constitution's Impairment Clause. It is not surprdsing, then, that
some state courts adopted a different reading of the -reserved power.
The restrictive reading of the reserved power was that such
power had no purpose or effect other than to overcome the result in
the Dartmouth College case; that, accordingly, the power related
solely to the public aspect of the charter contract (i.e., the contract
between the corporation and the state); and, therefore, that post-
incorporation enabling legislation-even though enacted pursuant to
a reserved power-could not validly empower majority shareholders
to take an action, over the objection of a minority, if such action
would effect a change in the nature or operation of the corporation's
business of such significance as to constitute a breach of the original
charter contract between the corporation and its shareholders or the
contract among the shareholders. An early case espousing this view
was the 1863 case of Kenosha, Rockford & Rock Island Railroad Co.
v. Marsh,86 in which a subscriber to corporate stock successfully
defended against a suit brought on his subscription after his railroad
85. A case holding that this could not be done was Bank of the Old Dominion v.
McVeigh, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 457 (1871), although the case did not involve rights of
shareholders. The court said:
It is undoubtedly true that it is in the power of the Legislature, under its
reserved rights, to alter or amend the charters of banking institutions, or to take
them away altogether. But it does not follow that in doing this it may interfere
with and abrogate contracts lawfully made under such charters, or disturb rights
already legally vested under them in the course of its legitimate business.
The Legislature did reserve the right to modify and amend the charter of
the Bank of the Old Dominion; but it did not and could not reserve the right to
alter contracts made under the old charter. All contracts made in pursuance of
its charter are to be construed with reference to the charter in force at the time
they were made. The charter may be changed, but the contracts made under
that charter cannot be altered by the Legislature.
Id. at 466-67.
86. 17 Wis. 13 (1863).
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corporation had changed its line and consolidated with another
company pursuant to post-incorporation enabling legislation enacted
under a reserved power, the court saying:
The occasion of reserving such a power either in the
constitution or in charters themselves is well understood. It
grew out of the decisions of the supreme court of the United
States, that charters were contracts within the meaning of
the constitutional provision that the states should pass no
laws impairing the obligation of contracts. This was
supposed to deprive the states of that power of control over
corporations which was deemed essential to the safety and
protection of the public. Hence the practice, which has
extensively prevailed since those decisions, of reserving the
power of amending or repealing charters. But this power
was never reserved upon any idea that the legislature could
alter a contract between a corporation and its stock
subscribers, nor for the purpose of enabling it to make such
alteration. It was solely to avoid the effect of the decision
that the charter itself was a contract between the state and
the corporation, so as to enable the state to impose such
salutary restraint upon these bodies as experience might
prove to be necessary....
... The power of amendment was never reserved with
reference to any question between the corporation and its
stock subscribers, but solely with reference to questions
between the corporation and the state, when the latter
desired to make compulsory amendments against the wish
of the former.87
This view of the matter was adopted by the highest court of Kentucky
in 1873 and 1888.8 It was adopted also by the highest court of New
87. Id. at 16-18.
88. In Weir v. Railey, 7 Ky. Op. 379 (1873), when a corporation had been organized
to insure against loss of livestock, it was held, notwithstanding a pre-incorporation
reserved power, that a non-consenting shareholder was not bound by a post-incorporation
amendment of the charter authorizing the company to insure against losses by fire or
other destruction of property. See id. at 381-82. The court said:
The right reserved by the law-making power to amend or repeal the
charter, is for the protection of the interests of the state, enabling the legislature
to place such restrictions upon the company as to prevent an injury to the public,
and if necessary to repeal the act itself; but when new franchises are created by
an amendment, and additional and increased obligations created, it is a virtual
dissolution of the original contract, so far as it affects those who are not
consenting and who have never ratified it.
Id. at 382.
In Botts v. Simpsonville & Buck Creek Turnpike Co., 10 S.W. 134 (Ky. 1888), it was
[Vol. 76728
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Hampshire in 188789 and that of Georgia in 1889.90
Notwithstanding a bizarre pronouncement by a lower Delaware
court in 185591 and references to the reserved power in North
held that dissenting shareholders could enjoin a consolidation of their turnpike
corporation with another such company pursuant to post-incorporation legislation
authorizing such a consolidation upon a-majority vote of shareholders. See id. at 135. The
court said:
Whether a consolidation could be authorized, under a general power
reserved by the legislature to alter or annul the charter, is not necessary to be
decided. It is certain that it cannot be done when it affects the rights of the
stockholders by increasing their liability as such, or diminishing the value of
their stock, and with such a radical change the burden would be placed on the
consolidated company to show that no harm could be done the stockholder
entering his protest. Whether the appellants would be injured by this change
does not appear in this record, and, if it did, this court would be reluctant to
hold, in the absence of authority in the charter, where one has become a
stockholder in a turnpike road of a certain description, and for a certain
purpose, that the legislature could unite him as a stockholder in another
corporation, and for other or additional objects in view than are to be found in
his original contract. In so doing his contract is destroyed, and another made for
him, against his consent.
In our opinion, the act of consolidation in this case is void, unless made by
the unanimous consent of the stockholders.
Id. at 135.
89. In Dow v. Northern Railroad, 36 A. 510 (N.H. 1887), a minority shareholder
succeeded in his suit to enjoin a 99-year lease of his corporation's railroad line and
property, entered into upon a two-thirds shareholder vote pursuant to post-incorporation
enabling legislation, even though the corporation's charter included a reserved power.
See id. at 511 n.1; see also Lease of Railroad by Majority of Stockholders with Assent of
Legislature (pts. 1 & 2), 8 HARv. L. REV. 295, 396 (1895) (setting forth notes made by the
judge who authored the opinion in Dow).
90. In Snook v. Georgia Improvement Co., 9 S.E. 1104 (Ga. 1889), the court held that
a subscriber to stock in a railroad corporation (whose charter was obtained under a
general law that authorized changes to be made in the routes of railroads but made no
provision for any change in their termini) was released from his subscription when,
pursuant to legislation enacted under a reserved power after his subscription, the
corporation was permitted to change one terminus of its railroad. See id. at 1105-06. The
court said:
The doctrine is now well settled that if the charter of a corporation is materially,
fundamentally, or radically changed by the legislature after a person has
subscribed for stock therein, without his consent, he is released from such
subscription.... It is also held that the charter of a corporation is a contract of a
dual character,-First, a contract between the state which grants the charter and
the corporation; and, secondly, a contract between the corporation and its
members; and while the state, if it reserves the power to do so, can alter and
amend the charter, and the corporation itself cannot object to the alteration or
amendment, yet the state has no power to make any material or essential
alteration in the contract between the members themselves and the corporation.
Id. at 1105.
91. In Delaware Railroad Co. v. Tharp, 6 Del. (1 Houst.) 149 (Super. Ct. 1855), the
defendant was held liable on his subscription to stock in a corporation chartered in 1849
(at which time there appears to have been no reserved power in Delaware) even though
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Carolina decisions in 1879 and 1892,9 it appears that there was no
authoritative adoption of either the expansive or the restrictive
reading of the reserved power in either of those two states during the
nineteenth century. However, matters were different in New Jersey.
Notwithstanding a brief flirtation with the expansive reading in an
1863 decision,9 the chancery court of New Jersey came down
the terminus of the corporation's railroad was changed pursuant to subsequent legislation.
See id. at 175. The judge's charge to the jury included the following:
The grant of acts of incorporation by the State is professedly for the
public good generally; and there is an inherent right in the Legislature to amend,
change, or alter the charter of any incorporated company with its consent.
Those who become corporators do so with that contingency, and their
engagements are therefore subject to it. If a subscriber to stock enters into the
corporation generally without specific stipulations, he is bound and concluded by
the action of a majority of the corporation; and if the Legislature change or
amend the charter on the application of the company, and with its assent and
approval, without thereby impairing the contract of the corporators, in the mode
we have stated, they will not be thereby discharged from their liability as
subscribers to stock.
Id. at 174-75.
92. The reserved power was referred to in Western North Carolina Railroad Co. v.
Rollins, 82 N.C. 524, 527-29 (1880). In Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Waterpower Co.,
111 N.C. 439,16 S.E. 402 (1892), the court said:
Unless the power is specially reserved when the charter is granted, or
under the constitution or general laws, the legislature cannot, as a general rule,
modify the charter so as to take away any power which would inure to the profit
of, or prove a protection to, a company from loss; but there is no restriction
upon the right of the sovereign to enlarge its powers or extend its privileges,
except that in so doing it must not infringe upon the vested rights of another.
Id. at 452-53, 16 S.E. at 406 (note that slight capitalization and punctuation differences
exist between the version of this quotation published in the North Carolina Reporter and
the version published in the South Eastern Reporter; this version is taken from the South
Eastern Reporter).
93. In Story v. Jersey City & Bergen Point Plank Road Co., 16 N.J. Eq. 13 (Ch. 1863),
relief was denied to a shareholder who sought to enjoin his corporation from applying to
the legislature for authority to abandon part of its road, to change its objects, and to alter
its structure. See id. at 22-23. The court said:
The complainant's bill is framed upon the theory that the charter of an
incorporated company cannot be altered in any essential particular, even with
the consent of the corporation, without the consent, express or implied, of every
stockholder, and that such alteration would be unconstitutional, as impairing the
obligation of the contract entered into between the state and such stockholder.
If this doctrine should be admitted in its fullest extent, it is not perceived that it
can affect the result of the present application.
When the charter of the [corporation], of which the complainant claims to
be a stockholder, was granted, it was provided by a general law of the state that
the charter of every corporation granted by the legislature should be subject to
alteration, suspension and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature. The
legislature, therefore, in granting the charter to the plank road company, must
be deemed to have reserved to themselves the right of altering, suspending, or
repealing the charter, whenever, in their discretion, the public good might
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squarely on the side of the restrictive reading in the 1867 decision of
Zabriskie v. Hackensack & New York Railroad Co.,9 4 in which the
court said:
The object and purpose of [the reserved power] are so
plain, and so plainly expressed in the words, that it seems
strange that any doubt could be raised concerning it. It was
a reservation to the state, for the benefit of the public, to be
exercised by the state only. The state was making what had
been decided to be a contract, and it reserved the power of
change, by altering, modifying, or repealing the contract.
Neither the words nor the circumstances, nor apparent
objects for which this provision was made, can, by any fair
construction, extend it to giving a power to one part of the
corporators as against the other, which they did not have
before.
It was to avoid the rule in the Dartmouth College case,
not that in Natusch v. Irving, that the change was made.
The words limit the power to that object.
require it, as fully as if the reservation were inserted in the charter. And all the
contracts, express or implied, resulting from the act of incorporation and its
acceptance by the stockholders, must be deemed to have been entered into by
both parties, subject to that reservation. whatever limitation may exist to the
reserved right of the legislature to alter or repeal the contract, I am clear that
the reservation is in itself valid, and that this court ought not, upon a motion for
a preliminary injunction, to pronounce any alteration, suspension, or repeal of
the charter to be unconstitutional or illegal. Much less should this court make
such declaration in advance of any actual legislation.
Id. at 21-22.
The decision in this case is difficult to follow because of the statement in the facts
that the company was incorporated on March 8, 1840. See id. at 14. Had this been an
accurate statement, it would have been nonsense for the court to proceed on the premise
that the incorporation occurred after the 1846 adoption of New Jersey's reserved power,
see supra note 49 (second paragraph). In fact, the company was incorporated by Act of
Mar. 6,1850, [no chapter number], 1850 N.J. Laws 255.
Interestingly, this case was not even cited in the Zabriskie decision. See infra notes
94-95 and accompanying text.
94. 18 NJ. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867), overruled by Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226
A.2d 585, 594-95 (NJ. 1967). In Zabriskie, the corporation had been chartered in 1856-
10 years after New Jersey's adoption of its first reserved power of general applicability,
see supra note 49 (second paragraph)-to build a railroad five miles long. See Zabriskie,
18 N.J. Eq. at 180. In 1861, the legislature amended its charter to authorize a 12-mile
extension, and the corporation was about to extend its line pursuant to this authorization.
See id. at 180-81. A minority shareholder brought suit to enjoin the extension, and he
prevailed. See Id. at 193-94.
The validity of the Brundage decision, in which Zabriskie was disavowed, is
questioned infra in text accompanying notes 1099-1114.
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There is no other alternative to the proposition, that
while the power reserved authorizes the legislature, within
certain limits, to make such alterations as they choose to
impose, it gives no authority, when the legislature does not
impose them, for the majority to adopt such alterations or
enter upon such enterprises as are allowed by the
legislature. 5
However, adoption of this restrictive reading of the reserved
power left matters in an undesirable state. It meant that the reserved
power provided an insufficient basis for the utilization by a pre-
existing corporation of enabling legislation designed to eliminate the
common-law restrictions on corporate combinations. Some other
basis was needed to sustain a corporation's utilization of such post-
incorporation enabling legislation.
c. Eminent Domain Solution
New Jersey's highest court found such a basis when the post-
incorporation legislation provided a right of appraisal for dissenting
shareholders. Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co.96 involved a
proposed 999-year lease, whereby the properties of three New Jersey
transportation corporations (called the United Companies) would be
leased to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company pursuant to enabling
legislation enacted by the New Jersey legislature in 1870. The
reserved power was not involved in this case, because the charters of
the three corporations proposing to make the lease contained no
reserved power and they were all chartered (in 1830-32) prior to the
1846 enactment of New Jersey's first general reservation of power to
amend or repeal charters subsequently granted.97  After first
concluding, on ultra vires grounds, that the corporations could not
enter into such a lease without legislative authorization," the court
95. Zabriskie, 18 NJ. Eq. at 185-86,192.
96. 24 NJ. Eq. 455 (1873).
97. See Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 22 N.J. Eq. 130, 141,393 (Ch. 1871),
rev'd, 24 NJ. Eq. 455 (1873). For New Jersey's 1846 reserved power statute, see supra
note 49 (second paragraph).
98. The appellate court said:
Was it within the power of the defendants, without the sanction of express
legislation, to make such lease?
There is an implied contract as well between the United Companies and
their stockholders as between the companies and the state, that their corporate
franchises, powers and property shall not be appropriated to uses or purposes
not contemplated or authorized by their charters. As corporations, any action
outside of the limits marked out for them in the legislative grant, is ultra vires.
Black, 24 N.J. Eq. at 463.
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next considered whether the corporations could avail themselves of
the post-incorporation enabling legislation in effecting the lease with
the consent of two-thirds in interest of their shareholders, and its
conclusion on this question also was in the negative.9 However, the
court then proceeded to hold that legislative provision of a right of
appraisal-at least with respect to stock of a transportation
corporation-constituted a valid exercise of the state's power of
eminent domain. The court said:
In the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the
legislature may authorize shares in corporations, and
corporate franchises, to be taken for public uses upon just
compensation. The title to this species of property is no
more secure against invasion when the public uses require
it, than is the ownership of real estate. Under this
paramount right in the public, subject to which all private
property is held, the franchises of one corporation have
been, and may be taken and bestowed upon another.
There can be no doubt that a railroad company may be
empowered to extend their road beyond the point to which
it was built under the original grant, if proper compensation
is provided for stockholders who may resist it, and I can see
no difference in principle, whether the original company, in
order to secure a through route under one management, is
authorized to take the lands of individuals, or to take the
property which individuals have in the stock of an existing
road. In the first case, for the purpose of establishing the
through route, one kind of private property, to wit, the
lands of individuals, is taken by the corporation; in the
second case, another kind of property, to wit, the shares of
stock of individuals in an existing company, is authorized to
be condemned. In the latter instance, the use is as clearly a
public use as in the former, and when the legislature
declares that it may be done it is no more necessary to
99. The court said:
The proposition now considered is, whether, after shareholders have
entered into a contract among themselves under legislative sanction, and
expended their money in the execution of the plan mutually agreed upon, the
scheme can be radically changed by the majority, by virtue of legislative
enactment, and a dissentient stockholder compelled to engage in a new and
totally different undertaking, without impairing the obligation of his contract
with his associates and with the state. That this cannot be done, is as well
supported by every consideration of justice and right, as it is firmly embedded in
judicial decision.
Id. at 468.
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declare in the grant that public necessity requires it, than it
is essential, in order to validate a railroad charter, that there
should be an express announcement by the legislature that
it is in aid of public uses. The same rule applies to both
cases, unless property in stock can claim a superior right to
protection. This, with all other private property, is held
under the dominant right of eminent domain.1'
Moreover, by treating the statutory right of appraisal as an
exercise of the state's power of eminent domain, the matter of
dissenting shareholders' contractual rights was removed from the
prohibition of the Impairment Clause.10' In West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix,"° the Supreme Court said that "the right of eminent domain in
government in no wise interferes with the inviolability of contracts"10 3
and that the right "does not operate to impair the contract effected
[sic] by it, but recognizes its obligation in the fullest extent."' 4
Similarly, in Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v.
Louisa Railroad Co.,' that Court said: "[When the public
necessities require it, the one [a franchise], as well as the other [land],
may be taken for public purposes on making suitable compensation;
nor does such an exercise of the right of eminent domain interfere
with the inviolability of contracts.' 0 6
Furthermore, by resting the matter on the exercise of a state's
power of eminent domain, the existence of a reserved power became
irrelevant. In Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.,107 when a
railroad company was chartered by North Carolina (in 1835) prior to
that state's 1868 adoption of its first reserved power,108 and thereafter
100. Id. at 468-69,470.
101. Noyes commented on this matter as follows:
The legislature has power to authorize the consolidation of railroad and
other quasi-public corporations, without the unanimous consent of their
stockholders, when it makes provision for appraising and paying for the stock of
dissenting stockholders. This power is entirely unaffected by the constitutional
prohibition against impairing the obligations of contracts and is based upon the
sovereign power of eminent domain. Corporate shares, as well as all other
property, are subject to the paramount necessities of the State for the promotion
of public interests.
NOYaS, supra note 15, § 51, at 98.
102. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
103. Id. at 532; see supra note 64 (quoting Dix).
104. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 533; see supra note 64 (quoting Dix).
105. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 71 (1851).
106. Id. at 83.
107. 137 N.C. 107,49 S.E. 96 (1904).
108. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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the company entered into a merger pursuant to post-incorporation
legislation (enacted in 1901) authorizing the merger with approval of
a majority vote of shareholders but according a right of appraisal to
dissenters, it was held that utilization of the enabling legislation did
not violate the Impairment Clause because the grant of appraisal
rights constituted a valid exercise of the state's power of eminent
domain.109 Similarly, in In re Paterson & Hudson River Railroad
Co.,110 which involved a New Jersey railroad corporation chartered by
special act in 1831 (fifteen years before New Jersey adopted its first
reserved power of general applicability), it was held that a sale of the
corporation's assets to its parent corporation could be validly
effected pursuant to post-incorporation enabling legislation that
provided a right of appraisal for dissenting shareholders, because,
even if the application of the post-incorporation legislation impaired
the obligation of the contract embodied in the subsidiary's charter,
the provision for appraisal constituted a valid exercise of the state's
109. See Spencer, 137 N.C. at 125-26, 49 S.E. at 103. The court said:
The plaintiff [shareholder] next contends that, assuming that the
[enabling] statute confers the power upon the [plaintiff's] Railroad to
consolidate, such power can be exer6ised only by the unanimous consent of the
stockholders; that a dissenting stockholder cannot be compelled to surrender his
stock in the corporation, and accept in lieu thereof stock in another company;
that unless such power is conferred upon the majority of the stockholders in the
charter, or by amendment thereto made before the subscription of the dissenting
stockholder, an act of the Legislature conferring such power would be invalid, as
impairing the obligation of the contract between the stockholders. This
proposition is amply sustained upon principle and authority... The defendant,
conceding this to be the law, says that the statute conferring the power upon the
several railroad companies consolidating expressly provides for paying the
dissenting stockholder the full value of his stock at the time of the consolidation.
This provision can only be sustained by invoking the right of eminent domain,
and condemning the stock for a public use by making compensation therefor....
The Legislature, in the exercise of its power, confers upon the majority of the
stockholders the power to consolidate with the other constituent companies, and
accept in consideration therefor such number of shares in the new or
consolidated corporation as may be agreed upon. This can be done only with
the consent of the Legislature. The Legislature, having decided that such
consolidation was promotive of the public welfare, recognized that it had no
power to compel a dissenting stockholder to accept stock in the new corporation.
Therefore, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, it empowers the
corporation to condemn the stock of such dissenting stockholder when it cannot
otherwise be acquired. This power is entirely distinct from the [reserved] power
to amend the charter.
Id. at 119-21, 49 S.E. at 101 (note that slight punctuation differences exist between the
version of this quotation published in the North Carolina Reporter and the version
published in the South Eastern Reporter; this version is taken from the South Eastern
Reporter).
110. 94 A.2d 657 (NJ. 1953).
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power of eminent domain.
There was criticism of this doctrine by which the constitutional
barrier to a corporation's utilization of post-incorporation enabling
legislation was said to be overcome, not on the basis of an exercise of
the reserved power, but on the basis of an exercise of the state's
power of eminent domain."' However, New Jersey and North
Carolina were not the only states in which it was held to be a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain when the legislature made
provision for removing the obstacle of minority shareholders
dissenting from a corporate combination by according to such
dissenters a right of appraisal. 12 And this view was supported by
nineteenth-century commentary.1
3
111. See Leonard M. Daggett, Taking Corporate Shares by Right of Eminent Domain,
5 YALE L.. 205, 209-12 (1896); Note, Consolidation of Railroads and Condemnation of
Shares of Dissenting Stockholders, 3 MICH. L. REV. 309,309-10 (1905).
112. Gregg v. Northern Railroad, 41 A. 271 (N.H. 1893), involved the valuation of
shares of a dissenting shareholder under a New Hampshire statute, Act of July 24, 1889,
ch. 5, § 1, 1889 N.H. Laws 35, 35-37, that authorized a railroad corporation to institute
valuation proceedings with respect to stock of shareholders who dissented from a lease or
union with another railroad corporation. See Gregg, 41 A. at 271. The court said:
The question of fact to be tried was the market value of Northern
Railroad stock on the 1st day of January, 1890, the day when Gregg's stock was
taken by an exercise of the right of eminent domain. This power of purchase
was exercised for the purpose of obviating Gregg's objection to a lease of the
road to the Boston & Maine Railroad for 99 years from that date.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. One commentator stated:
The property and privileges belonging to individual members of a
corporation are subject to the power of eminent domain, to the same extent as
the property and privileges belonging to the corporation collectively; and in the
exercise of this power a State may enable any portion of the shareholders in a
corporation to dissolve their association and consolidate with another company,
or to engage in an entirely new enterprise, upon making just compensation to
such shareholders as are not willing to accept the change.
VICTOR MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1050 (1886). Another commentator
stated:
It is not within the power of courts of law or equity to decree that the
stock of shareholders dissenting from a plan of consolidation shall be
condemned, appraised and sold, for the purpose of quieting factious opposition.
But the legislature may, by virtue of the State's sovereign power of eminent
domain, which extends not only to real, but also to personal property, provide, in
the statute authorizing consolidation, lease, or sale, that dissenting shareholders'
stock shall be appraised and condemned.
CHARLES F. BEACH, JR., LAW OF RAILWAYS 662 (1890).
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3. Statutory Right of Appraisal
a. Origin of the Right
It has been said that, when state statutes were enacted to
authorize mergers and sale-of-assets transactions, the right of
appraisal was accorded to dissenting shareholders as the quid pro quo
for loss of the right that existed at common law to veto such
transactions."4 However, there has been a divergence of views as to
both the origins of, and the reasons for, the statutory right of
appraisal.
Manning states that "the first appraisal statute" was enacted by
the Pennsylvania legislature in 1861 in response to the 1858 decision
in Lauman v. Lebanon Valley Railroad Co.115 However, Eisenberg
takes issue with Manning, stating that "Ohio had enacted
rudimentary appraisal statutes even before 1858.1' 16 Commentators
also have disagreed as to whether the right derived from a desire to
accord fair treatment to dissenting shareholders or from a concern
over the constitutionality of applying combination statutes to pre-
114. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 443-44 (1986) ("Historically, appraisal
rights seem to have been given to shareholders as the quid pro quo for abandonment of
the old nineteenth century rule that major corporate changes like mergers require the
unanimous consent of all the shareholders."); Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1194 ("The
appraisal remedy has been described as having been the quid pro quo for statutes giving
the majority the right to override the veto which previously the holder of even one share
could exercise against mergers, sales of all assets, and other basic corporate changes.").
Probably the most frequently cited statement of the proposition is that in Chicago
Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch. 1934), the court saying:
What is the purpose of provisions of statutes which provide for the
appraisement of the stock of a person who objects to the merger of his
corporation with another? At common law it was in the power of any single
stockholder to prevent a merger. When the idea became generally accepted
that, in the interest of adjusting corporate mechanisms to the requirements of
business and commercial growth, mergers should be permitted in spite of the
opposition of minorities, statutes were enacted in state after state which took
from the individual stockholder the right theretofore existing to defeat the
welding of his corporation with another. In compensation for the lost right a
provision was written into the modem statutes giving the dissenting stockholder
the option completely to retire from the enterprise and receive the value of his
stock in money.
Id. at 455; accord Meade v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 51 A.2d 313, 316 (Del. Ch.
1947), affd, 58 A.2d 415 (Del. 1948); Stanton v. Republic Bank, 559 N.E.2d 1064, 1066
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Anderson v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 67 N.E.2d 573,
576-77 (N.Y. 1946); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 782 (Ohio 1987);
Johnson v. Baldwin, 69 S.E.2d 585,591 (S.C. 1952).
115. 30 Pa. 42 (1858); see Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An
Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223,246 n.38 (1962).
116. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCrURE OF THE CORPORATION 75 (1976).
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
existing corporations in the absence of a provision for appraisal.11 7 It
is instructive, therefore, to examine the question of when and why the
statutory right of appraisal first appeared.
Eisenberg makes reference to Ohio statutes enacted in 1851 and
1852.118 These, however, were not true appraisal statutes; they gave
to dissenters only the right to be paid at least par value for their
shares. 9 Moreover, these Ohio statutes were not the first of their
kind. As early as 1831, a statute of New Jersey, authorizing the
consolidation of a canal company and a railroad company upon a
seven-eighths shareholder approval, provided "that if any
stockholders shall disagree to the provisions of this act, ... it shall be
the duty of the company, to pay such person or persons dissenting,
the sum paid for his, her or their stock, with interest, on transferring
the same to the Company."1 °
True appraisal statutes-in the sense of awarding to dissenters
the value of their shares at the time of the transactions to which they
objected, as distinguished from giving them a return of their (or their
predecessors') initial investments--came in New Jersey and New
York in the early 1850s. In both states, enactment of such statutes
was accompanied by intimations that the reserved power alone was
considered insufficient to remove the constitutional impediment to
the utilization of permissive enabling legislation by pre-existing
corporations.
In 1847, the year following enactment of New Jersey's first
reserved power of general applicability, 21 that state's legislature
117. See id.; see also Ernest L. Folk, M, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v.
Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1264-65 (1963) (discussing the derivation of
the appraisal right).
118. See EISENBERG, supra note 116, at 75 n.17.
119. The 1851 Ohio statute authorized the consolidation of two or more railroad
companies whose lines were such as to permit continuous passage; and (in addition to
requiring approval by a two-thirds vote of shareholders) it required the agreement of
consolidation to prescribe "the manner of compensating stockholders in each of said two
or more corporations who refuse to convert their stock into the stock of such new
corporation" and provided that "all stockholders in either of such corporations who shall
refuse to convert their stock into the stock of such new corporation shall be paid at least
par value for each of the shares so held by them, if they shall so require, previous to said
consolidation being consummated." Act of Mar. 3, 1851, [no chapter number], § 1., 49
Ohio Laws 94,94-95.
Similar provisions were contained in the 1852 Ohio statute with respect to the
consolidation of railroad companies, turnpike and plank road companies, and telegraph
companies. See Act of May 1, 1852, [no chapter number], §§ 21.1, 43, 48, 50 Ohio Laws
274,279-80,287,288.
120. Act of Feb. 15,1831, [no chapter number], 1831 NJ. Laws 124,124.
121. See supra note 49 (second paragraph).
[Vol. 76
CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
chartered the Somerville and Easton Railroad Company'- and two
years later, in 1849, authorized that corporation to purchase (for
shares of its stock) the railroad line of another New Jersey
corporation with the consent of the latter's shareholders123 In 1853,
in Kean v. Johnson,"4 it was held that such consent required the
concurrence of all of the shareholders of the acquired corporation,
not simply the holders of a majority of its stock;- 5 thus it was
considered unnecessary "to enter upon the interesting question ...
whether the act would not be unconstitutional because impairing the
obligation of contracts, unless it provided for the consent of all the
stockholders." 16 The following year, in 1854, the New Jersey
legislature enacted a supplement to the act chartering the Somerville
and Easton Railroad Company (by then the Central Railroad
Company of New Jersey) whereby that corporation was authorized
"to purchase or lease, or operate any railroad which may connect
with or intersect their road, ... or to consolidate the stock of such
company with their own" 7 but only with the assent of three-quarters
in interest of the shareholders and with a right of appraisal accorded
to dissenters.-8 This sequence of events clearly implied that the right
122. See Act of Feb. 26,1847, [no chapter number], 1847 N.J. Laws 128.
123. See Act of Feb. 22, 1849, [no chapter number], 1849 NJ. Laws 90.
124. 9 NJ. Eq. 401 (Ch. 1853).
125. See id. at 408 ("Nothing is more certainly settled than that any fundamental
alteration of a charter, or material deviation from or extension of a road, in the case of
road companies, interferes with the rights of the corporators, and that no majority,
however large, can compel any individual stockholders to submit.").
126. Id. at 420-21.
127. Act of Mar. 17,1854, ch. 216, § 3, 1854 N.J. Laws 524,525.
128. The right of appraisal, as stated in the 1854 Act, was as follows:
[I]f any stockholder or stockholders shall refuse his or their assent,....
application may be made by such stockholder or stockholders within three
months from the time that the purchase or consolidation shall take effect, to one
of the justices of the supreme court of this state, for the appointment of three
disinterested, impartial persons, well acquainted with the value of railroad
property, as commissioners to appraise the value of the shares held by such
stockholder or stockholders; provided, the appraisement shall in no case be less
than the par value thereof, whereupon such proceedings shall be had as are
provided in section seven of the act of incorporation for appraising and taking
lands, so far as the same is applicable.
Id.
A somewhat different provision for appraisal was included in an 1857 statute of
Pennsylvania. See Act of May 16,1857, No. 579, § 3,1857 Pa. Laws 519,521. That statute
provided for the public sale of the Main Line of Public Works (consisting of railroads and
canals owned and operated by the state) and authorized the sale to be made to the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company at a premium price coupled with tax concessions. See
Mott v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 9,34 (1858). It contained the following provision:
And provided further, That in case of the refusal of any stockholder or
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of appraisal was included in the 1854 statute to avoid the
constitutional difficulty alluded to in the 1853 decision in Kean, and
the Wording of the appraisal provision evidenced an intention on the
part of the legislature to invoke the state's power of eminent domain.
An 1850 New York statute1 29 authorized the directors of two
existing railroad corporations to consolidate the two into a new
corporation without shareholder approval, but it conditioned the
holding of the first election of new directors upon an appraisal of the
value of dissenters' stock if the holders of one-fourth of the stock of
either of the consolidating corporations registered their dissent and
the corporation failed to pay them the amount they claimed for their
stock.130 Then, in 1853, New York enacted a statute authorizing the
stockholders of said company to comply with the provisions of this act, after the
same may have been accepted by a majority of the stockholders of the company,
it shall be lawful for said company to pay the stockholder or stockholders so
refusing the full market value of his, her or their share or shares of stock, and
such share or shares shall enure to the benefit of the company to be disposed of
by the directors for the benefit of the balance of the stockholders.
Act of May 16,1857, No. 579, § 3,1857 Pa. Laws 519,521.
129. See Act of Apr. 9,1850, ch. 239,1850 N.Y. Laws 471.
130. Two sections of the 1850 statute provided as follows:
§ 2. The notice of the first election shall be published immediately after
filing the said articles of association [of the new corporation resulting from
consolidation of the two former corporations], and shall contain a notice to the
stockholders of the two former companies respectively, that such companies
have been united according to law, that unless they file with the secretary of the
new company... a dissent from becoming members of the new corporation ....
they will severally be deemed as assenting to the union of the two companies,
and be members of the new corporation .... Any stockholder dissenting from
the union of the two companies shall file his written dissent with the secretary, at
least five days before the day designated for the said election, and shall state
therein the amount claimed for his stock.
§ 3. If persons holding stock in either company to the amount of one-
fourth of the whole stock therein shall duly dissent from such union and the
corporation shall decline to pay the amount the amount [sic] claimed for the
stock, so as to leave one-fourth still dissenting, the first election shall be
postponed until the value of the stock shall be ascertained and paid as
hereinafter provided. Whenever the corporation shall decline to pay any
stockholders [sic], who has duly filed his dissent, the amount claimed for his
stock, it shall immediately apply to a justice of the supreme court ... for the
appointment of three persons to appraise the value of such stock. If the judge
shall be satisfied that reasonable notice has been given, he shall thereupon
appoint three competent persons to appraise the value of such stock, and shall
designate ... the manner in which payment shall be made to such stockholders
for the value of their stock. The appraisers ... or any two of them shall estimate
and certify the value of such stock, and shall deliver one copy of their appraisal
to the corporation ... and another copy to any stockholder who shall demand
the same.... When the corporation shall have paid to any stockholder according
to the order of the judge, the amount so appraised, or the amount agreed upon
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consolidation of several railroad companies,' thereby providing the
basis for creation of the New York Central Railroad Company."
This statute, in addition to requiring approval by shareholders of
each consolidating company "by the vote of at least two-thirds in
amount of the stockholders present at such meetings respectively,"'3
gave to dissenting shareholders a right of appraisal in terms that
sound almost modern. This 1853 statutory right of appraisal was
the subject of a New York court's comment, in the year following its
enactment, suggesting that the legislature entertained doubts that the
reserved power alone (i.e., without the right of appraisal) would
sustain the utilization by a pre-existing corporation of enabling
legislation upon a vote of less than all of its shareholders. 3
without appraisal, such stockholder shall thereafter have no interest in the stock
and the same may be disposed of by the corporation.
Act of Apr. 9,1850, ch. 239, §§ 2-3,1850 N.Y. Laws 471,472-73.
131. See Act of Apr. 2, 1853, ch. 76,1853 N.Y. Laws 110.
132. See FRANK W. STEVENS, THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NEW YORK CENTRAL
RAILROAD 350-87 (1926).
133. Act of Apr. 2,1853, ch. 76, § 1, 1853 N.Y. Laws 110, 110-11.
134. The appraisal section of the 1853 statute provided as follows:
If any stockholder shall, at said meeting of stockholders, or within twenty
days thereafter, object to said consolidation, and demand payment for his stock,
such stockholder or said new company may, if said consolidation take effect at
any time thereafter, apply to the supreme court... for the appointment of three
persons to appraise the value of such stock. If the court shall be satisfied that
reasonable notice has been given of such application, it shall thereupon appoint
three persons to appraise the value of said stock, and shall designate the time
and place of meeting of such appraisers, and give such directions in regard to the
proceedings on said appraisement as shall be deemed proper, and shall also
direct the manner in which payment for such stock shall be made to such
stockholder. The court may fill any vacancy in the board of appraisers occurring
by refusal or neglect to serve, or otherwise; the appraisers shall meet at the time
and place designated, and they or any two of them, after being duly sworn
honestly and faithfully to discharge their duties, shall estimate and certify the
value of such stock at the time of such dissent as aforesaid, and deliver one copy
of their appraisal to the said company, and another to the said stockholder, if
demanded .... When the corporation shall have paid the amount of the
appraisal as directed by the court, such stockholder shall cease to have any
interest in the said stock, and in the corporate property of the said corporation,
and the said stock may be held or disposed of by the said corporation.
Act of Apr. 2,1853, ch. 76, § 6,1853 N.Y. Laws 110, 113.
135. In Troy & Rutland Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1854), a
subscriber to stock in a New York railroad corporation was held liable on his subscription
notwithstanding actions taken by the company pursuant to post-incorporation enabling
legislation whereby portions of the corporation's road and franchises were leased or
conveyed to other corporations and the amount of its authorized capital stock was
reduced accordingly. See id. at 602,607. In the course of its opinion, the court said:
One who had embarked his fortune in the construction of a railroad, perhaps to
run past his own door, could hardly have supposed that, under the usual power
7411998]
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b. Importance of the Right
(1) New Jersey Cases
From the 1873 decision in Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal
Co." until well into the twentieth century, the New Jersey law,
concerning a corporation's utilization of permissive post-
incorporation legislation, could be summarized as follows.
Notwithstanding the reserved power, which had existed in New
Jersey since 1846,137 a corporation could not-over the opposition of
a single shareholder-avail itself of post-incorporation legislation
that permitted the taking of some significant action (not authorized
by the corporation's charter or by the general law under which it had
been incorporated) upon the approval of the holders of some
specified majority of its shares, unless (i) there had been some earlier
acceptance of the enabling statute by all of the corporation's
shareholders or (ii) the enabling statute accorded a right of appraisal
to dissenting shareholders.
While the first of these exceptions was implicit in New Jersey
law following the 1867 decision in Zabriskie v. Hackensack & New
York Railroad Co.,138 it was made explicit around the turn of the
century. In 1873, Justice Bradley, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court
in Railway Co. v. Allerton,139 had said: "[A] subsequent [enabling] act
... would not bind the stockholders without their acceptance of it, or
assent to it in some form.""4 Later, in 1908, a New Jersey court, in
Einstein v. Raritan Woolen Mills,' said: "I take it that, when Mr.
of repeal and amendment reserved by the legislature, he could be forced to lend
his money to, or become a member of, another railroad corporation chartered
and doing business in a foreign country. We have one or two other similar
enactments I believe, upon our statute books; but the legislature seems to have
given a more restricted construction to its powers; and, in a recent act to
authorize the consolidation of certain railroad corporations, inserted provisions
enabling a dissenting stockholder to receive compensation for his stock, and
withdraw.
Id. at 607 (citation omitted). In support of the last statement, the court cited the appraisal
provision (quoted supra in note 134) of the 1853 New York statute discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 131-34.
136. 24 N.J. Eq. 455 (1873); see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 49 (second paragraph).
138. 18 NJ. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867), overruled by Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226
A.2d 585, 594-95 (NJ. 1967); see supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (discussing and
quoting Zabriskie).
139. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 233 (1873).
140. Id. at 235-36.
141. 70 A. 295 (NJ. Ch. 1908).
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Justice Bradley speaks of the consent of the shareholders, he means
the consent of every shareholder, and that a mere majority, however
large, would not have the power to interfere with the rights and
property of the minority." 42 In 1900, in the case of Rankin v. Newark
Library Ass'n,4 3 it had been held that shareholders were bound by
the provisions of a post-incorporation statute, enacted pursuant to
New Jersey's reserved power, because all of them (by action or
acquiescence) had assented to its application.'" On the other hand,
in the 1908 decision in Einstein,145 it was held that a corporation could
not avail itself of post-incorporation enabling legislation, even though
enacted pursuant to the reserved power, if all of the shareholders had
not agreed.146
Absent the assent of all of the shareholders, the only basis upon
which a New Jersey corporation could avail itself of permissive post-
incorporation legislation, authorizing a significant change in the
nature or operation of the corporation's business, was through
legislative provision of a right of appraisal for dissenters. In 1886, in
Mills v. Central Railroad Co., 47 a 999-year lease of a corporation's
railroad line to another company, although approved by a majority
vote of shareholders, was annulled at the behest of a minority,
because the post-incorporation enabling legislation, though enacted
pursuant to a pre-incorporation reserved power, gave dissenting
shareholders no right of appraisal.148 In 1894, in Loewenthal v.
142. Id. at 297.
143. 45 A. 622 (N.J. 1900).
144. The Rankin court said: "Thus, the [post-incorporation] statute, which on its
enactment became perhaps only conditionally the law of this association,-the condition
being the assent of all the stockholders,--became on fulfillment of that condition the
absolute law of the corporation." Id. at 624.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
146. The court said:
I must hold that this [post-incorporation] act is merely the consent of the state
that the stockholders may, if they all agree, do the things which are provided for
in that act; but, if all the stockholders do not agree, the act cannot be held to be a
portion of the charter of the corporation or an amendment thereto. This is
specifically held in [cited New Jersey cases] and many other cases which have
ingrafted this doctrine into our law so deeply as to be beyond disturbance.
Einstein, 70 A. at 297.
147. 2 A. 453 (NJ. Ch. 1886).
148. The court said:
The provision in [an 1880 enabling statute], that it shall be lawful to lease or
consolidate, is merely a legislative authorization-a concession on the part of the
legislature of the power-to do that which could not lawfully be done without
such authority. It is not an enactment that the directors may, without the
consent of the stockholders of the company, lease, consolidate, or merge; nor is
1998] 743
744 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
Rubber Reclaiming Co.,149 it was held that a corporation, whose
corporate documents provided for cumulative voting and required a
two-thirds vote of shareholders for an amendment, could not (over
the objection of a minority) eliminate cumulative voting by availing
itself of post-incorporation legislation authorizing corporate charters
to be amended with the assent of a simple majority in interest of
shareholders. 50 In the 1899 case of German Mutual Fire Insurance
it in effect an enactment that they may, with the consent of the majority of the
stockholders, do so. But the statute is merely an enabling act,--a law intended
to give once for all a general legislative authority to lease, consolidate, or merge.
The legislature did not intend to affect the rights of stockholders inter sese, and
the act does not do so either expressly or by implication. It was settled law when
the act was passed that, after shareholders had entered into a contract among
themselves under legislative sanction, and expended their money in the
execution of the plan mutually agreed upon, the plan could not, even by virtue of
legislative enactment, be radically changed by the majority alone, and
dissentient stockholders be compelled to engage in a new and totally different
undertaking; because such action would impair the obligation of the dissenting
stockholders' contract with their associates and the state. This was declared by
the highest tribunal of the state to be the law, and to be as well supported by
every consideration of justice and right as it was firmly imbedded in judicial
decision. Black v. Delaware & R C. Co.
The rights of unwilling stockholders are not protected by the act of 1880,
and, inasmuch as their interest cannot be taken or controlled in invitum except
under the exercise of the right of eminent domain, it is a legal conclusion, from
the absence of any provision in that respect, that the legislature did not intend to
exercise the right of eminent domain at all, but simply to confer the right to do
the act, or exercise the power given, on first obtaining the consent of those
affected, or on payment of satisfactory compensation to such outside of
legislative provisions....
It is for the legislature to say whether the stock of dissenting
stockholders shall be taken, as for a public use, under the exercise of the rights
of eminent domain. It has not said that it may be so taken in this case.
Id. at 454-55, 460 (citation omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 96-100 (discussing
and quoting Black).
149. 28 A. 454 (N.J. Ch. 1894).
150. The court said:
The law, as contended for by complainants, is well settled. Mills v.
Railroad Co. and cases cited. If the certificate of incorporation and the by-laws
of a corporation form a contract between the stockholders, then the legislature
has no power to authorize a mere majority to alter it, except in the manner
provided by the contract itself ...
Ii was urged by the counsel of defendants ... that the rule of the majority
is the law of the corporation, and must govern, and that to hold this by-law
unrepealable, except by a two-thirds vote of all the stockholders, is in derogation
of this law. The authority relied upon for this position is Durfee v. Railroad Co.
That case, as I read it, is in direct conflict with the line of cases in this state
culminating in Mills v. Railroad Co., above cited. Its reasoning is expressly
repudiated by Chancellor Zabriskie in Zabriskie v. Railroad Co.
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Co. v. Schwarzwaelder,5' the plaintiff, a policyholder in a mutual fire
insurance corporation entitled to vote at its meetings, succeeded in
enjoining the changing of her corporation from a mutual company to
a joint stock company-whereby she would have lost her right to
vote-when the only basis for making such a change was enabling
legislation enacted after she had become a policyholder.152
(2) North Carolina Cases
In North Carolina, as in New Jersey,53 there was nineteenth-
century case law suggesting that post-incorporation legislation could
be accepted by shareholders'-' and that such acceptance could take
the form of acquiescence. 55 But there does not appear to have been
any nineteenth-century decision in North Carolina on the question
whether the provision of appraisal rights for dissenters was adequate
(or necessary) to sustain the utilization by a corporation of
permissible post-incorporation legislation.
Id. at 454, 456 (citations omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 73-74 (discussing
and quoting Durfee), 94-95 (discussing and quoting Zabriskie), and 147-48 (discussing
Mills).
151. 44 A. 769 (N.J. 1899).
152. The court said:
The [enabling act], if enforced against the complainant, would impair the
obligation of her contract by enabling the company to take from her a right
derived from her contract with it, in a method not authorized by the contract.
Such a law would be unconstitutional and void. Although the act under which
the company was organized is subject to amendment, alteration, and repeal by
the legislature, yet such amendment, alteration, or repeal can be effected only by
the legislative power of that body, and its legislative power does not extend to
the enactment of a law which impairs the obligation of a legal contract
previously made.
Id. at 770.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 138-46.
154. It appears to have been assumed in North Carolina in the early part of the
nineteenth century that a statutory amendment of a corporate charter became effective
upon acceptance of the amendment by the shareholders. See Attorney-General v.
President & Dirs. of the State Bank, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 545, 547-48 (1837).
And, in 1850, it was said that the creation of a corporation by the legislature entailed the
making of a contract that "cannot be modified, changed or annulled without the consent
of both parties." Columbus Mills v. Williams, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 558,561 (1850).
155. In Western North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Rollins, 82 N.C. 524 (1880), the court
said:
While it is true that each corporator may object to the repeal or to any material
modification of the provisions of a charter granted for other than municipal
purposes, and constituting a legislative contract protected by the Constitution of
the United States, yet, in the absence of complaint, acquiescence in the change
may be inferred, and ultimately its acceptance by the corporators.
Id. at 531-32.
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However, there was a significant North Carolina decision, in
1904, embracing the New Jersey doctrine that a corporation could
avail itself of post-incorporation legislation, authorizing a corporate
merger upon approval by less than all of the shareholders, when the
enabling legislation accorded a right of appraisal to dissenters. In
Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.,156 it was held, with respect
to a corporation chartered prior to the state's initial reservation of
the power of alteration or amendment, that the corporation could
utilize post-incorporation merger legislation, because the enabling
statute's provision of appraisal rights for dissenters amounted to a
valid exercise of the state's power of eminent domain.1'
(3) Delaware Cases
It appears that there was no Delaware decision in the nineteenth
century concerning the relevance of a right of appraisal to corporate
utilization of post-incorporation enabling legislation.
C. Early Enabling Statutes
The early statutes authorizing corporate combinations tended to
be special acts, but enabling statutes of general applicability began to
appear before the end of the nineteenth century.
1. Merger
Most of the merger law in this country had its origin in the
perceived need to make provision for combining the connecting lines
of railroad or other transportation companies. Special acts
authorizing railroad mergers were enacted in the nineteenth century
both in North Carolina 58 and in Delaware.15 9 Moreover, in 1872, the
North Carolina legislature enacted a general statute providing for the
formation of railroad corporations and authorizing any two or more
of such companies to consolidate to form a continuous line.16
However, because of New Jersey's location-between the cities
of New York and Philadelphia' 6L-railroad merger statutes were far
156. 137 N.C. 107,49 S.E. 96 (1904).
157. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
158. See, eg., Act of Jan. 16,1849, ch. 83,1848-49 N.C. Sess. Laws 160.
159. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1877, ch. 434, 15 Del. Laws 514; Act of Feb. 1, 1883, ch.
163,17 Del. Laws 293.
160. See Act of Feb. 8, 1872, ch. 138, §§ 1, 58-62, 1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws 186, 186,
215-18.
161. The preamble to an 1867 New Jersey statute began: "Whereas, it is desirable that
the Railroad lines between New York and Philadelphia, forming by their connection
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more numerous in that state during the nineteenth century, beginning
with special acts.162 Reference has been made previously to an 1831
statute authorizing two named corporations to consolidate (and
allowing dissenters to receive a return of their investment) 163 and to
an 1854 statute authorizing a named railroad corporation to
consolidate with any railroad connecting with or intersecting its line
(and according to dissenters a right of appraisal) .16 Other New
Jersey statutes, authorizing named railroad corporations to
consolidate with other companies and according appraisal rights to
dissenters, were enacted in 1866,165 1867,1 and 1870;167 but an 1872
statute of that state,'6 while authorizing the consolidation of two
named railroad corporations, inexplicably made no provision foi
appraisal rights. A more generalized approach to railroad mergers
came in an 1873 New Jersey act,'169 as supplemented by statutes
enacted in 1878170 and 1881,171 providing for the formation of railroad
essentially one line, should be more closely united in interest and management, whereby
great advantages would accrue to the public as well as to the stockholders ...." Act of
Feb. 27,1867, ch. 69,1867 NJ. Laws 114,114.
162. Cadman states:
No general statutes were enacted in New Jersey during the period [prior
to 1875] to regulate lease or consolidation agreements made between
corporations. Laws authorizing particular railroad companies to enter lease or
consolidation arrangements appeared, however, in considerable number after
1850. Between that date and 1875, twenty-six railroads were authorized by
charter amendments and thirteen were allowed by the terms of their original
charters to enter into some sort of lease or consolidation arrangement.
CADMAN, supra note 49, at 324-25.
163. See supra text accompanying note 120.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
165. See Act of Feb. 6,1866, ch. 10, §§ 1, 3,1866 NJ. Laws 15,15-16, 17.
166. See Act of Feb. 27,1867, ch. 69, § 1,1867 NJ. Laws 114, 114-15.
167. See Act of Mar. 17, 1870, ch. 389, §§ 1, 4, 1870 N.J. Laws 811, 811, 813; Act of
Mar. 17, 1870, ch. 432, § 1, 1870 NJ. Laws 916, 916-17. The latter was the statute
involved in the case of Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 24 N.J. Eq. 455 (1873).
For discussion of Black, see supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
168. See Act of Apr. 2,1872, ch. 450,1872 NJ. Laws 1017.
169. See Act of Apr. 2,1873, ch. 413, §§ 1,17,1873 NJ. Laws 88,88-89,98-99. This act
provided as follows:
[it shall be lawful for any corporation incorporated under this act at any time
during the continuance of its charter to lease its road, or any part thereof, to any
other corporation or corporations, of this or any other state, or to unite and
consolidate as well as merge its stock, property, and franchises and road with
those of any other company or companies, of this or any other state, or to do
both; and such other company and companies are hereby authorized to take such
lease, or to unite, consolidate as well as merge its stock, property, franchises and
road with said company, or to do both ....
Id. § 17,1873 NJ. Laws at 98-99.
170. See Act of Mar. 7,1878, cl. 49, §§ 1, 2,1878 NJ. Laws 58,58-59.
748 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
corporations by the filing of articles of association (rather than by
special act), authorizing such corporations to merge or consolidate,
and giving a right of appraisal to dissenters. By statutes enacted in
1883172 and 1888,173 similar authorization to merge or consolidate was
extended to corporations organized for specified purposes other than
the construction and operation of railroads. Then, in 1893, New
Jersey enacted its first merger statute of general applicability 174 titled
"An Act to authorize corporations incorporated under the laws of
this state to merge and consolidate their corporate franchises and
other property."75
2. Purchase/Sale of Assets
A purchase by one corporation of the assets of another
corporation did not require enabling legislation. 7 6 On the other
hand, a sale by a prosperous corporation of all of its assets could not
be effected, in the absence of enabling legislation, unless there was
unanimous assent by the shareholders.Y7 Surprisingly, statutes of
general applicability, authorizing corporations to sell all of their
assets upon the approval of some specified majority (less than all) of
the voting shares, did not come in any of the three subject states until
well into the twentieth century.17 8
171. See Act of Mar. 25,1881, ch. 178, §§ 1, 8,1881 N.J. Laws 222,222,225.
172. See Act of Mar. 23,1883, ch. 198,1883 N.J. Laws 242.
173. See Act of Apr. 17,1888, ch. 294,1888 N.J. Laws 441.
174. See Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585, 593 (N.J. 1967); infra note
1106 (quoting Brundage).
175. Act of Mar. 8,1893, ch. 67,1893 NJ. Laws 121.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. Nonetheless, section 49 of New Jersey's
1896 corporation statute provided as follows:
Any corporation formed under this act may purchase mines,
manufactories or other property necessary for its business, or the stock of any
company or companies owning, mining, manufacturing or producing materials,
or other property necessary for its business, and issue stock to the amount of the
value thereof in payment therefor ....
Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, § 49, 1896 N.J. Laws 277, 293-94; see infra text
accompanying notes 206-08 (discussing the origin of New Jersey's 1896 corporation
statute).
And section 55 of New Jersey's 1875 general corporation statute provided as follows:
"The directors of any company incorporated under this act may purchase mines,
manufactories, or other property necessary for their business, and issue stock to the
amount of the value thereof in payment therefor ...." An Act Concerning Corporations
(Act of Apr. 7,1875), published in REVISED STATUTES OF NEW JERSEY 3,20 (1875).
177. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
178. For Delaware, see infra notes 810-11 and accompanying text. For North
Carolina, see infra note 824 (first paragraph) and accompanying text. For New Jersey,
see infra note 843 (first paragraph) and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the perceived need to permit common
management of connecting railroads led to the enactment in New
Jersey of nineteenth-century special acts permitting one railroad
corporation to lease its line to another such corporation." 9 A more
generalized approach to the leasing of its line by one railroad
corporation to another came in the same 1873 statute' 8° that
contained New Jersey's more generalized approach to railroad
mergers.18' Then, in 1899, New Jersey enacted a statute authorizing
any corporation of that state (except railroad and canal companies)
to lease its property and franchises with the assent of two-thirds in
interest of its shareholders but without any statutory right of
appraisal.'
3. Purchase/Sale of Controlling Stock Interest
There were numerous special acts, enacted in New Jersey in the
second half of the nineteenth century,'8 authorizing one corporation
to hold stock of another corporation.'8 For example, in 1857, New
Jersey chartered a railroad company with a provision that any other
railroad company incorporated by that state's legislature "may
subscribe for and hold the stock.., of this company."1s5
Said to be the first state in the nation to do so,8 6 New Jersey
179. For example, a New Jersey statute, enacted in 1856, authorized an existing
railroad corporation "with the consent of the stockholders representing two-thirds of its
capital stock" to "lease out for a term of years the said road, with its powers and
authorities." Act of Feb. 25, 1856, ch. 37, § 2, 1856 N.J. Laws 65, 66. Similarly, in 1857,
New Jersey chartered a railroad corporation with a provision authorizing the road to be
leased out for a term of years "with the consent of the stockholders representing two-
thirds of its capital stock." Act of Mar. 20, 1857, ch. 111, § 18, 1857 N.J. Laws 313, 322.
Neither of these statutes made any provision for a right of appraisal for dissenters.
180. See Act of Apr. 2, 1873, ch. 413, § 17,1873 N.J. Laws 88, 98-99 (quoted supra in
note 169).
181. See supra text accompanying note 169.
182. The statute provided as follows:
Any corporation of this state, except railroad and canal corporations, may
hereafter, with the assent of two-thirds in interest of its stockholders .... lease
its property and franchises to any corporation, and every corporation of this
state is hereby authorized to take the lease or any assignment thereof, for such
terms and upon such conditions as may be agreed upon, and ... any such lease
or assignment, or both, heretofore made, are hereby validated ....
Act of Mar. 24,1899, ch. 150, § 1,1899 N.J. Laws 334,334.
183. See CADMAN, supra note 49, at 230-31.
184. The same was true in other states as well. See William Randall Compton, Early
History of Stock Ownership by Corporations, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 125, 127-29 & nn.3-
10 (1940).
185. Act of Mar. 20, 1857, ch. 111, § 18, 1857 N.J. Laws 313,321.
186. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 556 n.32 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
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enacted, in 1888, a statute of general applicability concerning
ownership by one corporation of stock of another corporation.187
However, this statute appeared to limit New Jersey corporations to
the ownership of stock of other New Jersey corporations. Then in
1893-the same year in which New Jersey adopted its first merger
statute of general applicabilityq--a statute was enacted giving to
New Jersey corporations virtually unlimited authorization to own and
vote stock of other corporations both domestic and foreign."8 9 This
statute, and its successor in section 51 of the 1896 New Jersey general
corporation statute,11° played a significant role in New Jersey's
becoming the home of many of the nation's industrial giants near the
turn of the century.191
D. Move from Special Acts to General Laws
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, most American
corporations were created by special acts of the state legislatures.
However, the perception that such special acts entailed political
favoritism led ultimately to the enactment of general laws pursuant to
which some specified number of persons could avail themselves of
the privilege of forming a corporation by filing the necessary
certificate. Moreover, in time, many states made it a constitutional
dissenting) ("New Jersey was the frst state to confer the general power of intercorporate
stockholding."); RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 60
(1937) ("New Jersey was the first state to authorize broad powers for intercorporate
stockholdings by amendment to its general incorporation law in 1888 and 1889.").
187. That statute provided as follows:
That it shall be lawful for any corporation of this state, or of any other state,
doing business in this state and authorized by law to own and hold shares of
stock and bonds of corporations of other states, to own and hold and dispose
thereof in the same manner and with all the rights, powers and privileges of
individual owners of shares of the capital stock and bonds or other evidences of
indebtedness of corporations of this state.
Act of Apr. 4,1888, ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385,385-86.
18& See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
189. That statute provided as follows:
That it shall and may be lawful for any corporation or corporations created
under the provisions of the act to which this is a further supplement to purchase,
hold, sell, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of the shares of
the capital stock of any other corporation or corporations created under the law
of this or any other state, and to exercise while owners of such stock all the
rights, powers and privileges, including the right to vote thereon, which natural
persons, being the owners of such stock, might, could or would exercise.
Act of Mar. 14,1893, ch. 171, § 1, 1893 NJ. Laws 301,301.
190. See infra note 236 (first paragraph) and accompanying text.
191. See Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L.
REV. 198,207-08 (1899).
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requirement that incorporation of business enterprises be by way of
general laws rather than special acts.' z
1. New Jersey
It appears that New York was the first state to enact a general
corporation statute,1" having done so in 1811.194 New Jersey followed
in 1816,195 patterning its statute on that of New York.Y However, it
seems that the New Jersey statute of 1816 was not used, and it was
repealed in 1819.191 More than a quarter of a century passed before
New Jersey, in 1846, passed another general corporation law.198 This
statute,119 authorizing five or more persons "to associate themselves
into a company to carry on any branch or branches of lawful
manufactures within this state" upon filing a written certificate, °° was
revised and replaced by an expanded statute in 1849.?1 Other
general corporation statutes were enacted in New Jersey during the
next several years.0m
In 1875, the year when New Jersey's constitution was amended
to require incorporation under general laws (rather than by special
act), 3 that state's legislature enacted a general corporation law'
that, according to one writer, gave New Jersey the title of "Mother of
Corporations."' 5 However, New Jersey's 1875 statute was replaced
192. For the 1875 constitutional provision in New Jersey, see supra note 50 (first
paragraph). For the 1868 constitutional provision in North Carolina, see supra note 51.
For the 1897 constitutional provision in Delaware, see supra note 54 (third paragraph).
193. See LARCOM, supra note 186, at 1 ("The state of New York in 1811 passed the
first general legislation providing for the formation and the regulation of certain types of
business companies."); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Historical Inheritance of American
Corporations, 3 THE POWERs AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, N.Y.U. SCH.
L. 189, 198 (1950) ("The first 'general corporation law for business purposes' is commonly
credited to the State of New York, in the year 1811.").
194. See An Act Relative to Incorporations for Manufacturing Purposes, ch. 67, 1811
N.Y. Laws 111.
195. See CADMAN, supra note 49, at 18-23.
196. See id. at 23 ("New Jersey's general law of 1816 was nothing more than a
duplicate of the New York law of 1811 with some slight changes." (footnote omitted)).
197. See id. at 24-25.
19& See id. at 25,112-15.
199. See Act of Feb. 25,1846, [no chapter number], 1846 NJ. Laws 64.
200. Id. § 1,1846NJ.Lawsat64.
201. See Act of Mar. 2,1849, [no chapter number], 1849 N.J. Laws 300.
202. See CADMAN, supra note 49, at 121-22.
203. See supra note 50 (first paragraph) and text accompanying note 192.
204. See An Act Concerning Corporations (Act of Apr. 7, 1875), published in
REVISED STATUTES OF NEW JERSEY 3,3-37 (1875).
205. See Berle, supra note 193, at 198 ("After a classic constitutional struggle, New
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in 1896 by a new general corporation statuteU6 that has been called
"the first of the modem liberal corporation statutes." This 1896
act, with its subsequent amendments and codifications, constituted
the general corporation law of New Jersey until January 1, 1969.2 3
2. Delaware
In 1871, Delaware enacted a general corporation law authorizing
the formation of corporations (by the filing of a certificate) for the
purpose of canning, manufacturing, and preparing fruits and other
products for sale;9 however, this statute remained in force for only
four years.10 In 1875, pursuant to an amendment of Delaware's
constitution authorizing the legislature "to enact a general
incorporation act to provide incorporation" for specified purposes,211
a statute was enacted authorizing the formation of a corporation
(through a somewhat cumbersome procedure including judicial
scrutiny of the charter prior to its being filed in the office of the
secretary of state) for any of the stated purposes.212 This 1875 statute
was repealed and replaced in 1883 by a more elaborate general
corporation law.13
Although the Delaware Constitution of 1897 required that
corporations be created under general law (rather than by special
act),214 it was not until two years later215 that the legislature-copying
largely from New Jersey's 1896 statute2"6 -enacted Delaware's
general corporation law of 1899.217 This 1899 statute, with its
Jersey, thereby acquiring the title 'Mother of Corporations,' passed a general
incorporation act in 1875 giving the widest powers to those who availed themselves of it,
and took leadership as an incorporating state.").
206. See Act of Apr. 21,1896, ch. 185,1896 N.J. Laws 277.
207. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974).
208. See infra note 250.
209. See Act of Mar. 21,1871, ch. 152,14 Del. Laws 229.
210. See LARCOM, supra note 186, at 3.
211. See supra note 54 (first paragraph).
212. See Act of Mar. 26,1875, ch. 119,15 Del. Laws 181.
213. See Act of Mar. 14, 1883, ch. 147, 17 Del. Laws 212.
214. See supra note 54 (third paragraph) and text accompanying note 192.
215. For an account of the delay, see LARCOM, supra note 186, at 8-9.
216. See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 454 (Del. Ch. 1934) ("[I]t is common
knowledge that the general act of this state adopted in 1899 was modeled after the then
existing New Jersey act .... "); Cary, supra note 207, at 664 ("Shortly afterwards,
Delaware, seeking new sources of revenue, copied very largely from the New Jersey act
to establish its own statute.").
217. See Act of Mar. 10,1899, ch. 273,21 Del. Laws 445.
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subsequent amendments and codifications, constituted the general
corporation law of Delaware until July 3, 1967.218
3. North Carolina
In 1837, the North Carolina legislature passed "An Act to
encourage the culture and manufacture of silk and sugar in this
State" authorizing "any six or more citizens of any congressional
district in this State" to form a corporation for either or both of the
stated purposes.219 Later, in 1852, a statute was enacted making it
lawful "for any number of persons not less than five, desirous to
engage in the business of mining, or to establish any manufactory at
any place within this State, and wishing to become incorporated for
convenience in raising the necessary capital and in conducting the
business, to become incorporated." 2
In the year following ratification of North Carolina's
Constitution of 1868, requiring incorporation under general laws
(rather than by special act)2 1 the legislature passed "An act to
authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining,
mechanical, chemical and other purposes" that authorized any three
or more persons to form a corporation by filing a certificate.' Other
general corporation statutes were enacted in North Carolina in
1872-one relating to the formation of railroad corporations23 and
the other authorizing corporations to be formed "for any purpose not
unlawful. '' 4
Soon after the turn of the century, North Carolina enacted its
1901 general corporation statute.225 Just as Delaware had patterned
its 1899 statute on that of New Jersey, North Carolina's 1901 statute
"was almost identical to the famous New Jersey General Corporation
Act of 1896."1 This 1901 statute, with its subsequent amendments
and codifications, constituted the general corporation law of North
Carolina until July 1, 19 57 P7
218. See infra note 251.
219. Act of Jan. 20, 1837, ch. 12,1836-37 N.C. Sess. Laws 40.
220. Act of Dec. 22,1852, ch. 81, § 1,1852 N.C. Sess. Laws 147,147.
221. See supra note 51 and text accompanying note 192.
222. Act of Apr. 12,1869, ch. 280, § 1,1868-69 N.C. Sess. Laws 669,669-70.
223. See Act of Feb. 8,1872, ch. 138,1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws 186.
224. Act of Feb. 12,1872, ch. 199, § 1,1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws 347,347.
225. See Act of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. 2,1901 N.C. Sess. Laws 13 (effective Apr. 1, 1901).
226. RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW 3 (5th ed. 1995).
227. See infra note 252.
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Ill. COMBINATION LAW AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
A. New Jersey
Sections 104 through 109 of New Jersey's 1896 general
corporation statute embodied almost verbatim the provisions of that
state's 1893 merger statute.P The basic authorization to merge, set
forth in section 104 of the 1896 statute, contained two limitations:
first, it authorized mergers of domestic corporations only; second, it
authorized mergers only between corporations organized to carry on
the same or a similar kind of businessPz 9  The procedural
requirements for a merger, set forth in sections 105 and 108 of the
1896 statute, were as follows: (i) a joint agreement entered into by
the directors of the merging corporations,210 (ii) the conversion of the
capital stock of each constituent corporation into "stock or
obligations" of the surviving corporation,31 (iii) the approval by vote
of "the holders of two-thirds of all the capital stock" of each of the
constituent corporations with "each share of stock entitling the
holder thereof to one vote," 2' 2 and (iv) a right of appraisal for the
dissenting shareholders of any merging corporation having "the right
to exercise any franchise, for public use." 3
New Jersey's 1896 general corporation statute did not contain
any authorization for a corporation to sell all or substantially all of its
assets.23 However, as previously noted, an 1899 New Jersey statute
authorized any corporation of that state (except railroad and canal
companies) to lease its property and franchises to another
corporation.235 ,
Section 51 of New Jersey's 1896 general corporation statute
228. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
229. The statute provided as follows:
Any two or more corporations organized or to be organized under any
law or laws of this state for the purpose of carrying on any kind of business of
the same or a similar nature may merge or consolidate into a single corporation,
which may be either one of said merging or consolidating corporations, or a new
corporation to be formed by means of such merger and consolidation ....
Act of Apr. 21,1896, ch. 185, § 104,1896 N.J. Laws 277,309.
230. See iL § 105.1,1896 N.J. Laws at 310.
231. Id.
232. I. § 105.M, 1896 NJ. Laws at 311.
233. Md § 108,1896 N.J. Laws at 312.
234. No such statutory authorization was enacted in New Jersey until 1931. See infra
note 843 (first paragraph) and accompanying text.
235. See Act of Mar. 24, 1899, cl. 150, § 1, 1899 NJ. Laws 334, 334 (quoted supra in
note 182).
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contained broad authority for a corporation to own and vote shares
of stock of any other corporation of that or any other state 36 This
section embodied the substance of the 1893 New Jersey statute on
this subject referred to previously.?37
B. Delaware
Sections 54 through 56 of Delaware's 1899 general corporation
statute authorized corporate mergers on terms similar to those
contained in New Jersey's 1896 statuteY8  Section 54 of the 1899
statute limited such mergers to domestic corporations formed to
carry on business of the same or similar nature? 9 The procedural
requirements for a merger, set forth in sections 54 and 56 of the 1899
statute, were as follows: (i) an agreement entered into by a majority
of the directors of the merging corporations,ul (ii) the conversion of
"the shares of each of the old corporations into the new,"241 (iii) the
"written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of the capital
stock of each corporation," 242 and (iv) a right of appraisal for
dissenting shareholders of either of the merging corporations.? 3
Delaware's 1899 general corporation statute contained no
236. The statute provided as follows:
Any corporation may purchase, hold, sell, assign, transfer, mortgage,
pledge or otherwise dispose of the shares of the capital stock of ... any other
corporation or corporations of this or any other state, and while owner of such
stock may exercise all the rights, powers and privileges of ownership, including
the right to vote thereon.
Act of Apr. 21,1896, ch. 185, § 51, 1896 NJ. Laws 277,294-95.
Statements in the case of Dittman v. Distilling Co. of America, 54 A. 570 (NJ. Ch.
1903), suggested two limitations: (i) that where one corporation acquired stock of
another corporation "the purchase and ownership must be for the purposes of the
business" of the acquiring corporation, id. at 576, and (ii) that a New Jersey corporation
could acquire stock of foreign corporations only if the latter were "organized in states
whose laws authorize their own domestic corporations to hold stock in and control their
own domestic companies," id.
237. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
23& See supra text accompanying notes 229-33.
239. The statute provided as follows:
Any two or more corporations organized under the provisions of this Act,
or existing under the laws of this State, for the purpose of carrying on any kind
of business of the same or similar nature, may consolidate into a single
corporation which may be either one of said consolidating corporations, or a
new corporation to be formed by means of such consolidation ....
Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 54,21 Del. Laws 445,461.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. lId § 54,21 Del. Laws at 462.
243. See id § 56,21 Del. Laws at 462-63.
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authorization for a corporation to sell all or substantially all of its
assets.2 Nor did it contain authorization for a corporation to lease
its properties and franchises.
Section 133 of the 1899 Delaware statute contained broad
authority for one corporation to own and vote stock of another
corporation25 This section was patterned after section 51 of the 1896
New Jersey statute.'
C. North Carolina
North Carolina's 1901 general corporation statute-while
borrowing extensively from the 1896 New Jersey statute in other
respects-contained no authorization for a corporate merger,247 for a
sale by a corporation of all of its assets,24 or for the acquisition by
one corporation of stock of another corporation.m9
PART TWO: EVOLUTION OF COMBINATION LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
The point of departure in considering the twentieth-century
evolution of the statutes governing corporate combinations in the
three subject states has to be New Jersey's general corporation
statute of 1896,250 Delaware's general corporation statute of 1899,251
244. No such statutory authorization was enacted in Delaware until 1917. See infra
notes 810-11 and accompanying text.
245. The statute provided as follows:
Any corporation created under the provisions of this act may purchase,
hold, sell, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of, the shares
of the capital stock of... any other corporation or corporations of this State or
any other State.... and while owner of said stock may exercise all the rights,
powers and privileges of ownership including the right to vote thereon.
Act of Mar. 10,1899, ch. 273, § 133,21 Del. Laws 445,500-01.
246. See LARCOM, supra note 186, at 61-62. For the New Jersey statute, see supra
note 236 (first paragraph).
247. No general authorization of corporate mergers was enacted by North Carolina
until 1925. See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
248. It was not until 1925 that North Carolina enacted legislation authorizing a
corporation to sell all or substantially all of its assets. See infra note 824 (first paragraph)
and accompanying text.
249. Legislation authorizing one corporation to own and vote stock of another
corporation was enacted by North Carolina in 1903. See infra note 912 and accompanying
text.
250. See Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, 1896 N.J. Laws 277. The provisions of this
statute (as amended) became title 14 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes when that
codification was adopted by Act of Dec. 20, 1937, ch. 188, 1937 N.J. Laws 832 (which
appears in the front part of 1938 N.J. Laws). Sections of title 14 were designated section
14:1-1 et seq.
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and North Carolina's general corporation statute of 1901.P
I. MERGER?53
The statutory law governing mergers, as that law evolved after
the turn of the century, entailed two aspects: (i) the authorization to
merge and (ii) the requirements for effecting a merger. The first of
these is of minor importance and can be covered quickly; the second
is the principal subject of this part of this Article and will be covered
Title 14 was rewritten as title 14A by Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 N.J. Laws
1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969). Sections of the new title 14A are designated section 14A:1-1
et seq.
251. See Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273,21 Del. Laws 445. By Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch.
166, 22 Del. Laws 255, the 1899 statute was modified by some revisions and changes in
section numbers, and (as so modified) it was reenacted by Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch. 167, 22
Del. Laws 286. The provisions of this statute (as amended) became the major part of
chapter 65 of the 1915 Revised Code of Delaware when that codification was adopted on
October 19, 1914, at a special session, and they continued as the major part of chapter 65
of the 1935 Revised Code of Delaware when that codification was adopted by Act of Mar.
8, 1935, ch. 74, 40 Del. Laws 293. From 1915 until 1953, provisions of the Delaware
corporation statute bore two sets of section numbers: section numbers within chapter 65
(beginning with section 1) and section numbers within the Code (beginning with section
1915 in the 1915 Code and section 2033 in the 1935 Code). When the Delaware Code of
1953 was approved in February of that year, see 49 Del. Laws 7, the Delaware corporation
statute (formerly contained in chapter 65 of the Delaware Codes of 1915 and 1935)
became chapter 1 (titled "General Corporation Law") of title 8 (titled "Corporations") of
the Delaware Code of 1953 with a single designation for each section (beginning with
section 101).
The Delaware General Corporation Law was rewritten by Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50,
56 Del. Laws 151. It continued as chapter 1 of title 8 of the Delaware Code (beginning
with section 101).
252. See Act of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. 2, 1901 N.C. Sess. Laws 13 (effective Apr. 1, 1901).
The provisions of this statute (as amended) became chapter 22 of the North Carolina
Consolidated Statutes (with section numbers beginning with section 1113) when that
codification was adopted by Act of Mar, 10, 1919, ch. 238, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 449. In
1943, the general statutes of North Carolina were re-codified as the North Carolina
General Statutes by Act of Feb. 4, 1943, ch. 33, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 33, and the
corporation statute became chapter 55 of the North Carolina General Statutes (with
sections designated as section 55-1 et seq.).
The Business Corporation Act of North Carolina was rewritten by Act of May 26,
1955, ch. 1371,1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1, 1957). It continued as chapter
55 of the North Carolina General Statutes (beginning with section 55-1).
The North Carolina Business Corporation Act was rewritten again by Act of June 8,
1989, ch. 265,1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990). It continues as chapter 55
of the North Carolina General Statutes (beginning with section 55-1-01).
253. For general discussions of mergers, see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISsION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACrIVITIES,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES-
PART VII-MANAGEMENT PLANS WITHOUT AID OF COMMITTEES app. B, pt. II, at 526-
56 (1938), and Comment, Statutory Merger and Consolidation of Corporations, 45 YALE
L.J. 105 (1935).
758 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
in detail.
A. Removal of Limitations on Authorization to Merge
As previously noted,' the merger provisions of both the 1896
New Jersey corporation statute and the 1899 Delaware statute
contained two limitations on the authorization to merge: (i) only
domestic corporations were authorized to merge, and (ii) such
corporations were allowed to merge only if they were organized to
carry on business of the same or a similar nature. When the 1901
North Carolina corporation statute was amended in 1925 by the
addition of that state's earliest general authorization of mergers,z2 5 it
contained the first but not the second of these limitations.z6 Later,
these limitations were eliminated from the statutes of all three states.
1. Intrastate Limitation
In 1918, New Jersey's merger statute was amended2 to provide
that a New Jersey corporation could merge with a corporation of
another state, with two provisos: (i) that the survivor be a New
Jersey corporation and (ii) that the merger be authorized by the laws
of the other state5 8 Then, in 1929, the first proviso was revised, 9 to
254. See supra note 229 and accompanying text, and note 239 and accompanying text.
255. See ROBINSON, supra note 226, at 486 n.5; Note, Corporations, 3 N.C. L. REV.
132, 132-33 (1925).
256. In 1925, a new article 13, containing sections 1224-a through 1224-f, was added to
chapter 22 of the North Carolina Consolidated Statutes. The new section 1224-a began as
follows:
Any two or more corporations organized under the provisions of this
chapter, or existing under the laws of this State, for the purpose of carrying on
any kind of business, may consolidate into a single corporation which may be
either one of said consolidated corporations or a new corporation to be formed
by means of such consolidation ....
Act of Feb. 27,1925, ch. 77, § 1,1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 81, 81.
257. See Act of Mar. 4, 1918, ch. 271, § 1, 1918 N.J. Laws 1013, 1013-14 (amending
section 104 of the 1896 New Jersey corporation statute).
258. Section 104 of the 1896 New Jersey statute, as amended in 1918, provided as
follows:
Any two or more corporations organized or to be organized under any
law or laws of this State, or any corporation organized under the laws of this
State and any corporation organized under the laws of any other State for the
purpose of carrying on any kind of business of the same or a similar nature, may
merge or consolidate into a single corporation, which may be either one of said
merging or consolidating corporations; provided, the same be a corporation
originally organized under the laws of this State, or a new corporation under the
laws of this State to be formed by means of such merger and consolidation; and
provided, further, that a merger or consolidation of the corporation so proposed
to be merged or consolidated with such New Jersey corporation is authorized by
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permit the survivor in a merger to be either the New Jersey
corporation or the corporation of the other state.
In 1935, Delaware's merger statute was amendedm1 by the
addition of a provision allowing a Delaware corporation to merge
with a corporation of another state provided only that the merger be
permitted by the laws of the other state. 2 Under this new provision,
the survivor could be either the Delaware corporation or the
corporation of the other state 2 3
In 1939, North Carolina's merger statute was amended2 4 to
provide that a North Carolina corporation could merge with a
corporation of another state if the laws of the other state permitted
such a merger, but with the proviso that the survivor be a North
Carolina corporation.3 In 1943, the North Carolina merger statutes
the laws of such other State ....
I& § 1,1918 NJ. Laws at 1013-14.
259. See Act of May 4,1929, ch. 261, § 1,1929 NJ. Laws 478,478-79.
260. The 1929 amendment changed the 1918 version of section 104 of the 1896 New
Jersey statute, see supra note 258, by inserting in the first proviso, after the phrase
"originally organized under the laws of this State," the phrase "or of the State where
either of said corporations may have been originally organized." Act of May 4, 1929, ch.
261, § 1,1929 NJ. Laws 478,479.
261. See Act of Apr. 18,1935, ch. 148, § 6,40 Del. Laws 524,534-37. By Act of Mar. 7,
1901, ch. 166, §§ 5-6,22 Del. Laws 255,274-75, the merger provisions (sections 54 through
59) of the 1899 Delaware corporation statute had been re-numbered as sections 59
through 64, and the change made in 1935 was a change in section 59 (formerly section 54).
262. The third paragraph of section 59, as amended in 1935, provided as follows:
Any one or more corporations organized under the provisions of this
Chapter, or existing under the laws of this State, may consolidate or merge with
one or more other corporations organized under the laws of any other State or
States .... if the laws under which said other corporation or corporations are
formed shall permit such consolidation or merger. The constituent corporations
may merge into a single corporation, which may be any one of said constituent
corporations, or they may consolidate to form a new corporation, which may be
a corporation of the State of incorporation of any one of said constituent
corporations as shall be specified in the agreement hereinafter required.
Act of Apr. 18,1935, ch. 148, § 6,40 Del. Laws 524,535-36.
263. See id. It is interesting to note that, for a time, the Delaware corporation statute
authorized a merger or consolidation of a Delaware corporation with a corporation of a
foreign country only if the surviving or resulting corporation would be a Delaware
corporation. See former DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 252(a), 253(e) (1991). That
requirement was eliminated by Act of July 1,1993, ch. 61, §§ 4,8,69 Del. Laws 54,54.
264. See Act of Feb. 1, 1939, ch. 5, § 1, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws 27, 27-28 (amending
section 1224-a of the North Carolina Consolidated Statutes).
265. As amended in 1939, section 1224-a provided as follows:
Any two or more corporations organized or to be organized, or existing
under the laws of this State, or any corporation organized under the laws of this
State and any corporation organized under the laws of any other state for the
purpose of carrying on any kind of business may merge or consolidate into a
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were rewritten,2 and a new paragraph was added covering mergers
of North Carolina corporations with corporations of other states and
allowing the survivor to be either the North Carolina corporation or
the corporation of the other state.267
When the Model Business Corporation Act was first published
in 1950,m section 70 authorized a merger between a domestic and a
foreign corporation if allowed by the laws of the state under which
the foreign corporation was organized, and it permitted either
corporation to be the survivor. 69
Today, the statutes of Delaware7 0 New Jersey,271 and North
Carolina,2n and the provisions of the Model Business Corporation
Act,273 give broad authority for mergers between domestic and
foreign corporations.
2. Similar Business Limitation
As noted above,274 both the 1896 New Jersey corporation statute
and the 1899 Delaware statute limited mergers to corporations
organized for the purpose of carrying on any kind of business of the
same or a similar nature.275 The North Carolina merger statute, when
single corporation which may be either one of said merging or consolidating
corporations or a new corporation under the laws of this State to be formed by
means of such merger and consolidation, provided, the corporation resulting
from said merger and consolidation shall be a corporation of the State of North
Carolina ....
Id. § 1, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws at 27-28.
266. See Act of Feb. 26,1943, ch. 270, § 1, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 257,257-64.
267. The first two sentences of the third paragraph of section 1224-a, as amended in
1943, were identical (except for some differences in capitalization) to the provisions of the
1935 Delaware statute quoted supra in note 262. Compare id. § 1, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws at
259, with Act of Apr. 18,1935, ch. 148, § 6,40 Del. Laws 524,535-36.
268. Following circulation of a draft in 1946, the Model Business Corporation Act was
first published in 1950, see MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr (1950), in 6 Bus. LAW. 1 (1950), and
it was revised on numerous occasions thereafter. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Model
Business Corporation Act and the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1407 (1974). The first edition of the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated
was published in 1960; a second edition was published in 1971, followed by Supplements
in 1973 and 1977; and a third edition was published in 1984 and supplemented and
amended thereafter.
269. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 70 (1950), in 6 BUs. LAW. at 57-58.
270. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 252 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
271. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-7 (West Supp. 1997).
272. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-07 (1990).
273. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.07 (1996).
274. See supra text accompanying note 254.
275. See supra note 229 and accompanying text, and note 239 and accompanying text.
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enacted in 1925, did not contain this limitation;276 nor did the Model
Business Corporation Act when first published in 1950.277
Delaware removed this limitation as early as 1901,278 but New
Jersey did not follow until many years later. It came to be
established in New Jersey that the test of similarity depended upon
the purposes stated in the charters of the corporations proposing to
merge (rather than the businesses actually carried on by them) and
that a lack of similarity in charter purposes constituted grounds for
invalidating a merger.279 In 1935, an addition to the New Jersey
merger statute was enactedm to permit two New Jersey corporations,
one holding 51% or more of the voting stock of the other, to merge
even though not organized for the purpose of carrying on business of
the same or a similar nature. sl But it also came to be recognized that
the similarity-of-business limitation could be avoided by the simple
expedient of amending the charter of one or the other of the
corporations wishing to merge so as to harmonize the two charters
276. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
277. The 1950 Model Business Corporation Act provided simply that "[a]ny two or
more domestic corporations may merge into one of such corporations pursuant to a plan
of merger approved in the manner provided in this Act." MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 64
(1950), in 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 52 (1950).
278. By Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch. 166, §§ 5-6, 22 Del. Laws 255, 274-75, the merger
provisions (sections 54 through 59) of the 1899 Delaware corporation statute were re-
numbered as sections 59 through 64, and the first of those sections, as quoted supra in
note 239, was amended to eliminate the phrase "of the same or similar nature."
279. See Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 72 A. 126, 129-30 (N.J. 1909); Imperial
Trust Co. v. Magazine Repeating Razor Co., 46 A.2d 449,451-53 (N.J. Ch. 1946).
280. See Act of Mar. 26, 1935, ch. 141, § 1, 1935 N.J. Laws 354, 354-55 (codified at
former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-9 (West 1939)). This provision provided in part as
follows:
Any corporation of this state, fifty-one per cent or more of the voting
stock of which is held by any other corporation of this state, may merge into,
consolidate with or merge into itself a corporation holding fifty-one per cent or
more of its voting stock, notwithstanding that the said corporations may not
have been organized for the purpose of carrying on business of the same or a
similar nature.
I& This provision was amended (in respects not important herein) by Act of Apr. 9, 1943,
ch. 170, § 1,1943 N.J. Laws 490,490-91.
When title 14 was replaced by title 14A effective January 1, 1969, see supra note 250
(second paragraph), this provision was omitted. See N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A (vol. 2) tbl.,
at 382 (West 1969).
While it was in effect, this provision did not affect the procedural requirements for
effecting the merger of a parent and its 51%-owned subsidiary. Thus, appraisal rights
were available to shareholders dissenting from a merger to which this provision applied.
See In re Janssen Dairy Corp., 64 A.2d 652,653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1949).
281. The similarity-of-business requirement was eliminated also in the 1952 New
Jersey statute authorizing parent-subsidiary mergers. See infra note 383.
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before steps were taken to effect the merger.m That being so, New
Jersey eliminated the phrase "of the same or a similar nature" from
its basic merger statute in 19670
B. Requirements for Merger Through 1950
Evolution of the statutory requirements for effecting a merger is
best understood against the backdrop of a classical merger. There
were four main ingredients to the classical merger-each entailing a
significant safeguard of the interests of shareholders. First, there was
the requirement that the directors of both of the merging
corporations approve the plan of merger. This requirement
visualized arm's length negotiation in which the management of each
corporation would seek to strike the best possible bargain for
shareholders of that corporation. Second, the classical merger
required the approving vote of shareholders of both of the merging
corporations. This meant that the shareholders of either corporation
could veto the proposed merger if they perceived it to be contrary to
their interests. Third, the classical merger assumed that the
consideration flowing to shareholders of the disappearing
corporation would consist of stock of the surviving corporation. This
meant that shareholders of the disappearing corporation would have
a continuing equity interest in the combined enterprise. Fourth, if
the proposed merger was approved by vote of the prescribed
majority of shares, dissenting shareholders were accorded a right of
appraisal. This entitled a shareholder of either corporation to
withdraw from the enterprise and receive payment in cash for the
value of his shares.
Much of the current law relating to the requirements for
effecting a merger is of relatively recent vintage. To highlight this
fact, changes in the requirements are described herein in two time
segments-those made through 1950, and those made thereafter.
The year 1950 was chosen as the dividing line in part because that
year marked the first publication of the Model Business Corporation
Act.2
1. Long-Form Merger
As recently as 1950, the merger statutes of the three subject
282. See Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585,596 (NJ. 1967).
283. See Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 70, § 1, 1967 N.J. Laws 313, 313-14 (amending
former N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-1 (West 1939)).
284. See supra note 268.
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states permitted (with only one exception) nothing but long-form
mergers. (The exception, discussed below, was the parent-subsidiary
merger-allowed only in Delaware by 1950.) The statutory
requirements for a long-form merger covered four basic matters: (i)
director action, (ii) shareholder approval, (iii) permissible
consideration, and (iv) the right of appraisal.
a. Director Action
(1) Statutory Provisions
The early merger statutes of the three subject states required
that the directors of the merging corporations enter into a merger
agreement. This requirement of an agreement entered into by the
directors continued to be a statutory requirement of the three states
past 1950.8
On the other hand, the Model Business Corporation Act, as
published in 1950, contained the more modem version of the
requirement for director action. It required simply that the two
boards, by resolution, approve a plan of merger. 7
285. The 1896 New Jersey corporation statute provided as follows: "The directors of
the several corporations proposing to merge or consolidate may enter into a joint
agreement ... for the merger or consolidation of said corporations, and prescribing the
terms and conditions thereof .... ." Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, § 105.1, 1896 N.J. Laws
277,310.
The 1899 Delaware corporation statute provided as follows: "[The directors or a
majority of them, of such corporations, as desire to consolidate, may enter into an
agreement signed by them... prescribing the terms and conditions of consolidation ... .
Act of Mar. 10,1899, ch. 273, § 54,21 Del. Laws 445,461.
The 1925 North Carolina merger statute contained, in section 1224-a, the same
provision as that of Delaware (except for differences in punctuation). See Act of Feb. 27,
1925, ch. 77, § 1, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 81,81.
286. In 1950, the New Jersey statute provided as follows: "The directors of the several
corporations proposing to merge or consolidate shall enter into a joint agreement ... for
their merger or consolidation...." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-2 (West 1939).
In the same year, the Delaware statute provided as follows: "I[TIhe directors, or a
majority of them, of such corporations as desire to consolidate or merge, may enter into
an agreement signed by them... prescribing the terms and conditions of consolidation or
merger .... " REv. CODE OF DEL. § 2091 (1935).
At that time, section 55-165 of the North Carolina General Statutes was identical (in
this respect) to the Delaware statute. See former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-165 (1950).
287. The 1950 Model Business Corporation Act provided as follows: "The board of
directors of each corporation shall, by resolution adopted by each such board, approve a
plan of merger ...... MODEL BUS. CoRP. Acr § 64 (1950), in 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 52 (1950).
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(2) Cases and Commentary
The requirement of director action brought into play the
fiduciary duty of directorsm and the related duty owed by controlling
shareholders.0 9 This meant that directors could not confront
288. Perhaps the best-known statement in the first half of the twentieth century,
concerning the fiduciary duty of directors, was that contained in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503 (Del. 1939), the court saying:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of
trust and confidence to further their private interests. While technically not
trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a
rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to
protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to
refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation .... The
rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. The occasions for
the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied,
and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is
measured by no fixed scale.
Id. at 510.
New Jersey also recognized the fiduciary duty of directors. In German Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Schwarzwaelder, 44 A. 769 (N.J. 1899), the court said:
[T]he complainant's case ... belongs to a class over which equitable cognizance
is firmly established,--cases where the directors of a corporation have adopted
or are about to adopt some measure which is beyond the scope of their
corporate authority, or in violation of the fiduciary duty which they owe to the
members of the corporation. In such a case a single member, on his own behalf
merely, or on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, may prosecute a
suit in equity against the directors, making the corporation a co-defendant, to
obtain appropriate relief, either by rescission or by prevention.
Id. at 769. Also, in Whitfield v. Kern, 192 A. 48 (N.J. 1937), the court said:
At common law, and by the modem current of authority in this country and in
England, the directors of a private corporation, while not regarded as trustees in
the strict, technical sense (for title to the corporate property is in the corporation
itself and not in its directors), are considered in equity as bearing a fiduciary
relation to the corporation and its stockholders.
Id. at 53.
The fiduciary duty of directors was recognized also in North Carolina. See Teague v.
Teague Furniture Co., 201 N.C. 803,807, 161 S.E. 530,532 (1931); Pender v. Spelght, 159
N.C. 612, 615, 75 S.E. 851,852 (1912).
289. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), the Court said: "The rule
of corporation law and of equity invoked is well settled and has been often applied. The
majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation
toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and directors." Id.
at 487-88.
Another statement of the principle is that contained in Allied Chemical & Dye Corp.
v. Steel & Tube Co., 120 A. 486 (Del. Ch. 1923), the court saying:
[I]t will be in order first to define the relations which equity will regard as
subsisting between the controlling majority members of the corporation and the
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shareholders with an unfair merger proposal even when there was a
statutory right of appraisal for dissenters.29  Moreover, in an
interested-party merger (as when a majority-owned subsidiary was
being merged into its parent), the burden was on the controlling
shareholder to prove the fairness of the merger.29'
minority. That under certain circumstances these relations are of a fiduciary
character is clear. No one, of course questions the fiduciary character of the
relationship which the directors bear to the corporation. The same
considerations of fundamental justice which impose a fiduciary character upon
the relationship of the directors to the stockholders will also impose, in a proper
case, a like character upon the relationship which the majority of the
stockholders bear to the minority. When, in the conduct of the corporate
business, a majority of the voting power in the corporation join hands in
imposing its policy upon all, it is beyond all reason and contrary, it seems to me,
to the plainest dictates of what is just and right, to take any view other than that
they are to be regarded as having placed upon themselves the same sort of
fiduciary character which the law impresses upon the directors in their relation
to all the stockholders. Ordinarily the directors speak for and determine the
policy of the corporation. When the majority of stockholders do this, they are,
for the moment, the corporation. Unless the majority in such case are to be
regarded as owing a duty to the minority such as is owed by the directors to all,
then the minority are in a situation that exposes them to the grossest frauds and
subjects them to most outrageous wrongs.
Id. at 491.
290. In Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 67 A. 657 (N.J. Ch. 1907), rev'd on other
grounds, 72 A. 126 (NJ. 1909), the court said:
In reference to the effect on these suits for injunction of [New Jersey's
appraisal statute], my conclusion is that the directors are bound under the
consolidation act to propose an agreement which does not unfairly or
inequitably impair the legal or equitable right of any preferred stockholder, and
that such stockholder cannot be required to exercise any option of surrendering
his stock on compensation until he has had an opportunity of joining in the
consolidation "under terms and conditions" which, as to him, are legal and
equitable. Any other construction or application of this act relating to
proceedings for condemnation would leave it altogether in the power of the
statutory majority of the stockholders to compel the sale of the stock of
dissentient stockholders by the devise [sic] of imposing terms so illegal or
inequitable that consent would be neither contemplated nor given.
Id. at 668.
Similarly, in Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., 138 A. 659 (N.J. Ch. 1927),
the court said:
The objection that the merger is unfair and inequitable calls for careful
judicial scrutiny of the plan, in view of the interests in the merger of interlocking
directorates, and of interlocking interests of stockholders of the three concerns
[two being merged into the third]. The plan must be free from unfairness before
the complainants can be put to their election of joining their associates or taking
compensation [by way of appraisal] in lieu.
Id. at 662.
291. In Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 143 A. 729 (N.J. Ch. 1928), affd per curiam,
146 A. 916 (N.J. 1929), the court said:
The merger agreement, procedurally, is in legal form, and the right to
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b. Shareholder Approval
(1) Statutory Provisions
A key requirement for a merger under the statutes of the three
subject states through 1950 was approval by the prescribed vote of
shareholders. Moreover, the required approval extended to
shareholders of the surviving corporation as well as to those of the
disappearing corporation. The variant factor in the statutes of the
three states related to the quantum of shareholder approval required.
The requirement in the 1896 New Jersey corporation statute was
a vote of the holders of two-thirds of all the capital stock of each of
the merging corporations with each share entitling the holder to one
vote.292 This requirement continued through 1950293 and remained in
effect until late in the 1960s.2 94 However, in 1921, New Jersey
amended its corporation statute to allow corporations (by charter
provision) to specify, as the base for determining shareholder
approval of a transaction, the shares "present and voting" rather than
the shares outstanding. 95
merge is in entire harmony with the complainants' corporate contract; but, as
the merger is, in reality, an apropriation [sic] of corporate property by a majority
of stockholders, by force of numbers and the grace of the statute, and, while no
valid legal objection can be interposed on that score (Colgate v. United States
Leather Co.), the agreement calls for careful judicial scrutiny, and the burden is
on the majority to show that the consideration is fair and equitable, and
judgment, as to fairness, is not to be influenced by the heavy note [sic vote?] of
approval, as it otherwise would be if the vote were independent ....
Id. at 730 (citation omitted).
292. See supra text accompanying note 232.
293. In 1950, the New Jersey statute provided as follows:
The agreement shall be submitted to the stockholders of each of the
merging or consolidating corporations at separate meetings thereof.... At each
of such stockholders' meetings a vote of the stockholders shall be taken ... for
the adoption or rejection of such agreement, each share of stock entitling the
holder to one vote.
If the votes of the holders of two-thirds of all the capital stock of each of
the merging or consolidating corporations shall be in favor of the adoption of the
agreement, that [shall constitute approval thereof].
Former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-3 (West 1939).
294. See Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585 (NJ. 1967), in which the
court said: "It may be noted that the requirement of stockholders' approval for [charter]
amendment is two-thirds in interest of each class whereas the requirement for merger is
two-thirds of all of the corporate stock with each share of stock entitling the holder to one
vote." Id. at 596 (citations omitted).
295. The statute, as amended, provided as follows:
[E]very corporation ... may by its original or amended certificate of
incorporation provide that any action which, at any meeting of stockholders,
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The 1899 Delaware corporation statute, as amended in 1901,
required a merger to be approved by vote of the holders of two-thirds
of the capital stock of each of the merging corporations with each
share entitling the holder to one vote.296 With a minor change of
statutory wording made in 1927, 9  this continued to be the
shareholder voting requirement in Delaware through 1950.298
As enacted in 1925, North Carolina's first merger statute
required the shareholders of each of the merging corporations to
approve the merger by vote of "a majority of the outstanding shares
of stock entitled to vote." 299 Notwithstanding a change of statutory
requires the vote, assent or consent of two-thirds in interest of all the
stockholders, or of two-thirds in interest of each class of stockholders having
voting powers, or which requires such assent or consent in writing to be filed,
may be taken upon the assent of and the assent given and filed by two-thirds in
interest of the stockholders present and voting at such meeting in person or by
proxy; provided, that where assent by classes is required such assent shall be
given by two-thirds in interest of each class so present and voting ....
Act of Apr. 12, 1921, ch. 304, § 1, 1921 N.J. Laws 873, 873-74. This act amended Act of
Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, § 17, 1896 N.J. Laws 277,282-83, as that statute had been amended
by Act of Mar. 22,1901, ch. 119, § 1, 1901 N.J. Laws 260,260. It was later embodied, with
minor changes, in former section 14:10-9 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. See
former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:10-9 (West 1939).
296. Section 54 of the 1899 Delaware corporation statute required, for approval of a
merger, the written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of the capital stock of
each of the merging corporations. See Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 54, 21 Del. Laws
445, 462 (quoted supra in text accompanying note 242). In 1901, the former section 54
was re-numbered section 59, and the shareholder approval requirement was changed to
read as follows:
[A]t said meeting [of the stockholders of each of the merging corporations held
separately] said agreement shall be considered and a vote ... taken for the
adoption or rejection of the same, each share entitling the holder thereof to one
vote; and if the votes of stockholders of each corporation representing two-thirds
in amount of its capital stock shall be for the adoption of the said agreement,
then that [shall constitute approval thereof].
Act of Mar. 7,1901, ch. 166, § 5,22 Del. Laws 255,274-75.
297. By Act of Mar. 2, 1927, ch. 85, § 18, 35 Del. Laws 220, 245-46, the provision
quoted supra in note 296 was amended to read as set forth infra in note 298.
298. In 1950, the Delaware statute provided as follows:
[A]t said meeting [of the stockholders of each of the merging corporations held
separately] said agreement shall be considered and a vote ... taken for the
adoption or rejection of the same, each share entitling the holder thereof to one
vote; and if the votes of stockholders of each such corporation representing two-
thirds of the total number of shares of its capital stock shall be for the adoption
of the said agreement, then that [shall constitute approval thereof].
REV. CODE OF DEL. § 2091 (1935).
299. Section 1224-a of the 1925 North Carolina merger statute, as adopted by Act of
Feb. 27, 1925, ch. 77, § 1, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 81, 81-82. This section also included the
phrase "each share entitled to vote entitling the holder thereof to one vote." Id. § 1, 1925
N.C. Sess. Laws at 82.
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wording made in 1943,m this continued to be the North Carolina
voting requirement through 1950.311 Thus, from 1925 through 1950,
North Carolina differed from New Jersey and Delaware by requiring,
for shareholder approval of a merger, only a simple majority of the
voting shares rather than two-thirds of all the shares.
The Model Business Corporation Act, as published in 1950,
required approval of a merger by the shareholders of each of the
merging corporations; and, as in the case of the New Jersey and
Delaware statutes, it required a two-thirds vote of all outstanding
shares whether or not otherwise entitled to vote. However, unlike
the 1950 statutes of the three subject states, the 1950 Model Act
provided for class voting on a merger if the plan of merger contained
"any provision which, if contained in a proposed amendment to
articles of incorporation, would entitle such class of shares to vote as
a class."'3 3
300. By Act of Feb. 26, 1943, ch. 270, § 1, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 257, 258, the phrase
quoted supra in the second sentence of note 299 was deleted from the merger statute.
301. In 1950, the North Carolina statute provided as follows:
[A]t said meeting [of the stockholders of each of the merging corporations held
separately] said agreement shall be considered and a vote ... taken for the
adoption or rejection of the same; and if the votes of stockholders of each such
corporation representing a majority of the outstanding shares of stock entitled to
vote shall be for the adoption of the said agreement, then that [shall constitute
approval thereof].
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-165 (1950).
302. The 1950 Model Business Corporation Act contained the following provision:
At each such meeting, a vote of the shareholders shall be taken on the
proposed plan of merger or consolidation. Each outstanding share of each such
corporation shall be entitled to vote on the proposed plan of merger or
consolidation, whether or not such share has voting rights under the provisions
of the articles of incorporation of such corporation. The plan of merger or
consolidation shall be approved upon receiving the affirmative vote of the
holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each such corporation,
unless any class of shares of any such corporation is entitled to vote as a class
thereon, in which event, as to such corporation, the plan of merger or
consolidation shall be approved upon receiving the affirmative vote of the
holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of shares
entitled to vote as a class thereon and of the total outstanding shares. Any class
of shares of any such corporation shall be entitled to vote as a class if the plan of
merger or consolidation, as the case may be, contains any provision which, if
contained in a proposed amendment to articles of incorporation, would entitle
such class of shares to vote as a class.
MODEL BUS. CoRP. Acr § 66 (1950), in 6 BUS. LAW. 1, 53-54 (1950).
303. Id., in 6 Bus. LAW. at 54. The occasions for class voting on charter amendments
were set forth in section 55 of the 1950 Model Act. See id § 55, in 6 Bus. LAW. at 43-44.
They included such matters as changing the preferences or relative rights of a class of
stock, limiting or denying preemptive rights, and canceling accrued dividends.
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(2) Cases and Commentary
As recently as 1950, the statutes of the three subject states and
the provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act required
approval by shareholders of the surviving corporation, as well as
those of the disappearing corporation, without regard to the scale of
the merger. If the merger consideration consisted of shares of the
surviving corporation's stock (which was not required in New Jersey
during the first half of the twentieth century3°4 but was required in
Delaware until 194105 and in North Carolina until 19433°6), approval
by shareholders of the surviving corporation would be in order if it
was necessary to authorize the issuance of additional shares for
purposes of the merger. On the other hand, if the surviving
corporation had ample shares of authorized but unissued stock, and if
the transaction did not contemplate any change in the rights of the
survivor's shareholders, there was little reason to require those
shareholders to approve a merger of small consequence.
In 1950, the statutes of Delaware and New Jersey, as well as the
provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, required a two-
thirds vote for approval of a merger, while the North Carolina statute
required only a simple majority vote. The latter approach was clearly
preferable.3 ° If the base for calculating a shareholder vote was the
number of shares voted, it might make sense to require a two-thirds
vote in order to make allowance for the possibility of substantial
abstentions. On the other hand, when the base is the number of
shares outstanding, an abstention has the same effect as a negative
vote, and a favorable vote of a simple majority of the outstanding
shares represents the vote of a true majority in interest. To require a
favorable vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares is to run the
risk of letting the issue be determined by vote of a minority in
interest or even by a substantial number of abstentions.0 8
304. See infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
305. See infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
307. The unfortunate consequences that can flow from a two-thirds voting
requirement are illustrated by the case of Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 143
N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1966). A person who owned in excess of one-third of the
corporation's outstanding stock, and who happened also to have an interest in a
competing business, was able to thwart the corporation's expansion program. See id. at
379.
308. The point is illustrated by the outcome of the voting on the proposed corporate
combination in Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965), when the voting of
shares (rounded to the nearest thousand) was as follows:
7691998]
770 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
In 1950, the statutes of Delaware and New Jersey, while making
no provision for class voting, gave non-voting shares a right to vote
on mergers. While this may have been thought to be protective of
the interests of preferred shareholders, it was a flawed approach.
Because the typical corporation has outstanding a number of
common shares far larger than the number of preferred shares,
legislation that gives a voting right (but no class vote) to the
preferred is likely to be of little consequence.30
Voted Voted Shares Shares Shares
For Against Voted Not Voted Outstanding
598,000 + 177,000 775,000 + 218,000 = 993,000
77% + 23% 100%
60% + (18% + 22%) = 100%
See id. at 411-12. When the court held the proposed combination to be a de facto merger,
requiring a favorable vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares, the transaction was
defeated-even though it was favored by 77% of the shares voted and by 60% of the
shares outstanding. See id. at 417.
309. The point is illustrated by Moss Estate, Ina v. Metal & Thermit Corp., 179 A.2d 54
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962), in which a proposed merger of Udylite (a Delaware
corporation) into M&T (a New Jersey corporation) was attacked by holders of voting
preferred stock of the latter corporation. The merger contemplated the conversion of
Udylite common stock (there being no Udylite preferred) into M&T common stock at a
time when M&T had no shares of authorized but unissued stock available for this
purpose. See id. at 56, 61. Under the New Jersey statutes then in effect, a charter
amendment to increase authorized stock required the affirmative vote of two-thirds in
interest of each class of shareholders having voting powers, whereas a merger required
the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of all the capital stock (whether voting or
non-voting) of each of the merging corporations. See id, 56-57. M&T's outstanding stock
consisted of 809,197 shares of common and 6462 shares of voting preferred, with plaintiffs
holding 2257 shares of the latter class. See id at 61. Thus, as holders of 34.9% of M&T's
voting preferred, plaintiffs could veto a charter amendment (to increase the number of
shares of M&T's authorized common stock for use in converting the Udylite stock)
because such an amendment required a two-thirds class vote. On the other hand, even
though the merger statute (as well as M&T's charter) gave plaintiffs the right to vote on
the proposed merger, it did not provide for class voting; thus, plaintiffs' ownership of less
than 0.3% of M&T's total capital stock gave them no prospect of vetoing the proposed
merger, notwithstanding the merger statute's requirement of a two-thirds vote. Plaintiffs
brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the merger could not be accomplished
without an amendment of M&T's charter requiring approval of two-thirds in interest of
each class of its shareholders having voting powers. See id, at 57. The court held against
the plaintiffs, saying the following:
[The New Jersey statute] provides that the joint agreement to merge or
consolidate must be approved by a vote of the holders of two-thirds of all the
capital stock of each of the merging or consolidating corporations. This clearly
means all capital stock voting or non-voting. It is not a class vote....
Clearly, the agreement of merger and consolidation may establish an
authorized capital stock of the consolidated corporation different from the
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In 1950, none of the three subject states' statutes provided for a
class vote to approve a merger, while the Model Business
Corporation Act did. Given the fact that the 1950 merger statutes of
the three states provided for "converting" the shares of the
constituent corporations, 310 and given the additional fact that the
terms of a merger would be determined by directors more than likely
elected by and responsive to the holders of common stock, preferred
shareholders (without the veto power of a class vote) could be
subjected to substantial changes in their rights.31 While the holders
of preferred stock would have appraisal rights and the protection
afforded by judicial concepts of fiduciary duty and fairness,31 2 there
needed to be a greater compulsion upon those structuring merger
transactions to make such transactions acceptable to all classes of
involved shareholders. 313 That compulsion is best supplied by
requiring that each affected class of shareholders be given the veto
power entailed in a class vote.
c. Permissible Consideration
(1) Statutory Provisions
The New Jersey merger statute, as enacted in 1896314 and as it
authorized capital stock of any corporate party to the merger, and without
limitation or restriction by the certificate of incorporation of any former
corporation which is a party to the merger and consolidation and without any
requirement of amendment of the certificate of incorporation of such merging
corporations.
Id. at 62-63.
310. For New Jersey, see infra note 315. For Delaware, see infra note 318. For North
Carolina, see infra text accompanying note 321.
311. For a collection of cases illustrating the kinds of changes that can be made in the
rights of preferred shareholders, see Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and
Draftsmanship, 42 CAL. L. REv. 243,298-309 (1954).
312- See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
313. Folk says the following:
Nevertheless, it is important to maintain some internal or external control to
offset the power of the directors, unless one assumes that directors, especially
when backed by a shareholder majority, should have unrestrained discretion.
Appraisal rights in the hands of "recalcitrant" or "troublesome" shareholders
have, in the past, served as a countervailing power to force the insiders to tailor
their plans to minimize the number of dissenters by getting the best deal
possible. A high vote requirement (including a class vote) plays the same sort of
role. When either weapon is removed, the insiders lack the real self-interest to
fashion a plan acceptable to a sufficient number of shareholders.
Folk, supra note 117, at 1293 (footnote omitted).
314. The 1896 New Jersey statute required that the merger agreement prescribe "the
manner of converting the capital stock of each of said merging or consolidating
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existed in 1950,315 allowed the merger consideration to be "stock or
obligations" of the surviving corporation. The Delaware merger
statute, from its enactment in 1899 until 1941, limited the permissible
merger consideration to "shares" of the surviving corporation;316 but,
in 1941, the statute was amended 317 to broaden "shares" to "shares or
other securities" of the surviving corporation.318
The North Carolina merger statute, as enacted in 1925, limited
the permissible merger consideration to "stock. ' 319 In 1950, following
a rewriting in 1943,32 the North Carolina statute required that the
merger agreement prescribe "the manner of converting the shares of
each of the constituent corporations into shares of the surviving or
consolidated corporation."32 1 However, added to this provision, by
the 1943 rewriting,3z2 was a new sentence providing that "[tihe
agreement of merger or consolidation may also provide for the
distribution of cash, property, or securities, in whole or in part, in lieu
of shares of the surviving or consolidated corporation, to
stockholders of the constituent corporations or any class of them."'323
The Model Business Corporation Act, as published in 1950,
required that the plan of merger set forth "[t]he manner and basis of
corporations into the stock or obligations of such new or consolidated corporation." Act
of Apr. 21,1896, ch. 185, § 105.1, 1896 N.J. Laws 277,310.
315. In 1950, the New Jersey statute required that the merger agreement prescribe
"[t]he manner of converting the capital stock of each of such merging or consolidating
corporations into the stock or obligations of the new or consolidated corporation." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14:12-2.e (West 1939).
316. The 1899 Delaware statute required that the merger agreement prescribe "the
manner of converting the shares of each of the old corporations into the new." Act of
Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 54,21 Del. Laws 445,461.
This provision (as contained in re-numbered section 59 of the Delaware corporation
statute) was amended in 1927 to read: "the manner of converting the shares of each of
the constituent corporations into shares of the consolidated corporation." Act of Mar. 2,
1927, ch. 85, § 18,35 Del. Laws 220,245-46.
317. See Act of Apr. 9,1941, ch. 132, § 12,43 Del. Laws 448,458-59.
318. In 1950, the Delaware statute required that the merger agreement prescribe "the
manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares or
other securities of the corporation resulting from or surviving such consolidation or
merger." REV. CODE OF DEL. § 2091 (1935), as amended by Act of Apr. 9, 1941, ch. 132,
§ 12,43 Del. Laws 448,458-59.
319. Section 1224-a of North Carolina's 1925 merger statute required that the merger
agreement prescribe "the manner and basis of converting the shares of each of the old
corporations into stock of the new corporation." Act of Feb. 27, 1925, ch. 77, § 1, 1925
N.C. Sess. Laws 81, 81.
320. See Act of Feb. 26,1943, ch. 270, § 1,1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 257, 258.
321. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-165 (1950).
322. See Act of Feb. 26, 1943, ch. 270, § 1,1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 257,258.
323. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-165 (1950).
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converting the shares of each merging corporation, into shares or
other securities or obligations of the surviving corporation."32
(2) Cases and Commentary
If a merger statute required that a shareholder of the
disappearing corporation receive shares of the surviving corporation,
such shareholder would be assured of a continuing equity interest in
the combined enterprise resulting from the merger.3 Moreover, if
the transaction was properly structured as a tax-free reorganization, a
low-basis shareholder not only would avoid an immediate capital
gains tax but also would have the continuing potential for a stepped-
up basis at the time of death.3
In providing for the use of "obligations" of the surviving
corporation as permissible merger consideration, the New Jersey
statute suggested the possibility of a freeze-out by the use of short-
term or redeemable debt securities.327 However, this possibility was
frowned upon in a 1928 statement by the New Jersey Chancery
Court.32s
The pre-1941 Delaware requirement of "shares," and the pre-
1943 North Carolina requirement of "stock," seemed to avoid this
324. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 64(c) (1950), in 6 Bus. LAw. 1, 52 (1950).
325. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. 1985) ("The consensus
was that the fairest way to achieve [the merger ofa parent corporation and its majority-
owned subsidiary] would be an exchange of common stock, continuing shareholder
participation in a larger post-merger company."); Citron v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 584 A.2d 490, 493 (Del. Ch. 1990) ("[Tihe merger consideration would consist of
DuPont stock rather than cash, so that Remington's shareholders would incur no
immediate tax liability and could continue as DuPont stockholders if they chose.").
326. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 354, 358, 368 (1994) (containing the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code relating to tax-free reorganizations); id. §1014 (containing the provision
of that Code relating to stepped-up basis at death).
327. This possibility was noted in Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d
893 (Del. 1959), when the court commented on the effect of the 1941 amendment of
Delaware's long-form merger statute expanding the permissible consideration from
"shares" to "shares or other securities." See i at 895.
328. In Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 143 A. 729 (N.J. Ch. 1928), aff'd per curiam,
146 A. 916 (NJ. 1929), the court said:
It is not overlooked that under the merger act the merger agreement may
provide for "converting the capital stock of each of said merging or
consolidating corporations into the stock or obligations of such new or
consolidated corporation," thus implying that obligations may be given in
exchange.... However, fairness in mergers dictates that, when obligations are
given in exchange for stocks of the character here involved, they at least should
bear a corresponding permanent investment value ... ; otherwise, a merger
would be a simple medium for a compulsory sale, and that is not permissible.
Id. at 732 (quoting state merger act).
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problem. However, even these unrestricted words did not foreclose a
resort to redeemable preferred stock with the attendant potential for
a freeze-out. In Outwater v. Public Service Corp.,29 minority
shareholders succeeded in enjoining a merger when the consideration
consisted of preferred stock redeemable within three years.30
However, in Matteson v. Ziebarth,331 the use of redeemable preferred
stock as merger consideration was sustained in the context of a
corporation in difficulty that resorted to this device as the means of
eliminating an obstreperous minority shareholder.
d. Right of Appraisal332
(1) Valuation Standard
(a) Statutory Provisions
New Jersey's 1896 appraisal statute provided that a dissenting
329. 143 A. 729 (N.J. Ch. 1928), affdper curiam, 146 A. 916 (N.J. 1929).
330. The court said:
But there is a more serious inequity; the preferred stock lacks permanency. It is
redeemable within three years at the option of the Electric & Gas Company.
Thus the merger, in effect, is nothing less than a forced sale by the majority
stockholders [sic] to itself at a price fixed by it and payable at its pleasure. The
preferred stock is but the equivalent of a 6 per cent. promissory note payable in
three years at the option of the buyer. The merger legislation countenances no
such perversion of the contractual obligations of stockholders inter sese.
Id. at 731.
331. 242 P.2d 1025,1031-32 (Wash. 1952) (en bane).
332. Among the early articles concerning the right of appraisal were the following:
Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45
HARV. L. REV. 233 (1931); Irving J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal
and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1930); Benjamin M. Robinson, Dissenting
Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation of Their Shares, 32 COLUM. L.
REv. 60 (1932); and Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM.
L. REv. 547 (1927).
Significant portions of most appraisal statutes relate to procedural matters such as
the requirements to be met by dissenting shareholders in perfecting their appraisal rights
and the procedures to be followed in conducting the appraisal. Those procedural aspects
of appraisal statutes are not addressed in this Article. This does not imply that the
procedural aspects are unimportant. The matter of whether the appraisal is to be
conducted by a court or by appointed appraisers, the question of who is to bear the
expense of an appraisal, the subject of whether (and from what point in time) interest is
payable on the amount of the appraisal award, and other aspects as well, are all of
significance to the dissenting shareholder. These procedural matters are discussed in the
following- James H. Kerr, Jr. & J. Spencer Letts, Appraisal Procedures for Dissenting
Delaware Stockholders, 20 BUS. LAW. 1083 (1965); and Note, Appraisal of Corporate
Dissenters' Shares: Apportioning the Proceeding's Financial Burdens, 60 YALE L.J. 337
(1951).
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shareholder's stock was to be valued at "full market value" and
"without regard to any depreciation or appreciation thereof in
consequence" of the merger,333 and this requirement continued in
effect through 1950.31 The Delaware statute, in 1899, required that a
dissenting shareholder be paid "the value of [his] stock at the date of
consolidation"; 335 and, in 1950, it required that the dissenter be paid
"the value of his stock on the date of the recording of [the merger
agreement], exclusive of any element of value arising from the
expectation or accomplishment" of the merger. 36 The North
Carolina merger statute, when enacted in 1925, required that a
dissenting shareholder be paid "the value of [his] stock at the date of
the consolidation"; 337 and, in 1950, it required that the dissenter be
paid "the fair value of his stock without regard to any depreciation or
appreciation thereof in consequence" of the merger. 38 The 1950
Model Business Corporation Act specified the entitlement of a
dissenting shareholder as "the fair value of his shares as of the day
prior to the date on which the vote was taken approving the merger
or consolidation." 39
(b) Cases and Commentary
The only significant difference in these valuation standards lay in
the fact that New Jersey's specified "full market value" while those of
the other two states (and the Model Business Corporation Act)
specified "value" or "fair value."3 °
It appears that there has been no reported North Carolina
decision involving the matter of valuation in the appraisal context.'
Given the language of the New Jersey statute, it is not surprising that
the courts of that state held (at least when there was a market for the
333. Act of Apr. 21,1896, ch. 185, § 108,1896 N.J. Laws 277,312.
334. See former NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:12-6 to -7 (West 1939) (quoted infra in note
353).
335. Act of Mar. 10,1899, ch. 273, § 56,21 Del. Laws 445,462-63.
336. REv. CODE OF DEL. § 2093 (1935), as amended by Act of May 23, 1949, ch. 136,
§ 7,47 Del. Laws 206,211-13 (quoted infra in note 362).
337. Section 1224-c of North Carolina's 1925 merger statute, as enacted by Act of Feb.
27,1925, ch. 77, § 1,1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 81,84.
338. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-167 (1950) (quoted infra in note 365).
339. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 71 (1950), in 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 58-59 (1950) (quoted
infra in note 366).
340. The view has been expressed that "value" and "fair value" are practically
synonymous. See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452,455 (Del. Ch. 1934).
341. See ROBINSON, supra note 226, at 532 ("There is no reported North Carolina
decision determining the fair value of dissenters' shares.").
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stock) that only market value, and not the value of the corporation's
properties and rights, should be considered." 2 On the other hand,
because of the contrasting language of the Delaware statute, it was
held by a Delaware court that appraisers acted erroneously when
they looked solely to market value and not to other factors such as
net asset value.M4
By 1950, the Delaware courts had established a number of points
concerning valuation in appraisal proceedings. Just as it had been
decided that market value alone was not dispositive,34 it was decided
also that asset value alone was not determinative 45 and, indeed,
could not be given excessive weight.346 Further, it was held that
valuation was to be determined on a going-concern basis rather than
a liquidation basis 4 7 Finally, it was established that a dissenter was
entitled to receive his proportionate interest in the entire corporate
enterprise valued as a going concern.34
342. See In re Capital Stock of Morris Canal & Banking Co., 141 A. 784, 785 (N.J.
1928),followed in Prall v. United States Leather Co., 143 A. 382 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1928), affd
on opinion below, 146 A. 916 (N.J. 1929).
343. See Munds, 172 A. at 454; see also Cole v. Wells, 113 N.E. 189, 191 (Mass. 1916)
("It is obvious that 'the value of the stock' means not merely the market price if the stock
is traded in by the public, but the intrinsic value, to determine which all the assets and
liabilities must be ascertained.").
344. See Munds, 172 A. at 454; accord Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co.,
75 A.2d 244,247 (Del. Ch. 1950).
345. See Root v. York Corp., 50 A.2d 52,58 (Del. Ch. 1946).
346. See In re General Realty & Utils. Corp., 52 A.2d 6, 15 (Del. Ch. 1947).
347. See id. The point had been made earlier in Munds, 172 A. at 455.
348. See Munds, 172 A. at 455 ("What [the dissenter] has been deprived of is his
proportional share of an active enterprise which but for the compulsion of others he could
continue to be associated with in the indefinite future. What he is deprived of is what he
should be paid for.").
The Delaware Supreme Court made the same point in Tri-Continental Corp. v.
Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950), as follows:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz.,
his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value of the stockholder's
proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic
value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determining what
figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must
take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter
into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning
prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or
which could be ascertained as of the date of merger and which throw any light
on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an
inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be
considered by the agency fixing the value.
Id. at 72.
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(2) Entitlement and Exceptions
(a) Statutory Provisions
The 1896 New Jersey statute granted the right of appraisal to a
dissenting shareholder of a merging corporation only if that
corporation had "the right to exercise any franchise, for public
use."' 49 However, in 1902, a new provision was added, granting the
appraisal right to a dissenting shareholder of either corporation upon
the merger of "any two or more corporations, which do not have the
right to exercise any franchise for public use. ' 350  Following minor
amendments in 1920351 and 19 3 6, 3 2 New Jersey's two appraisal
statutes, as codified in 1937 and in effect in 1950,313 gave appraisal
rights to dissenting shareholders of each corporation entering into a
merger.3 4
349. Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, § 108, 1896 N.J. Laws 277, 312. This limitation
probably was based on the New Jersey doctrine that the statutory grant of a right of
appraisal constituted an exercise of the state's power of eminent domain, see supra text
accompanying notes 96-100, and the short-lived notion that such doctrine could be
applied only with respect to a corporation in the nature of a public utility.
350. Act of Apr. 10, 1902, ch. 241, § 1, 1902 N.J. Laws 700,700-01.
351. See Act of Apr. 9,1920, ch. 142, § 1, 1920 N.J. Laws 284,284-85.
352. See Act of May 26, 1936, ch. 114, 1936 N.J. Laws 281; Act of May 26, 1936, ch.
115, 1936 N.J. Laws 283.
353. In 1950, one section of the New Jersey statute provided in part as follows:
If any of the corporations authorized by this title to merge or consolidate
shall have the right to exercise any franchise, for public use, and any stockholder
thereof not voting in favor of such agreement shall dissent therefrom ... , such
dissenting stockholder or such consolidated corporation may ... apply by
petition to the circuit court ... for the appointment of three disinterested
appraisers to appraise the full market value of his stock, without regard to any
depreciation or appreciation thereof in consequence of the merger or
consolidation.
The award of the appraisers, or that of a majority of them, when
confirmed by the court, shall be final and conclusive on all parties, and such
consolidated corporation shall pay to such stockholder the value of his stock as
aforesaid.
Former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-6 (West 1939).
In 1950, the next section of the New Jersey statute was (for the most part) the same
except for its introductory language, which was as follows:
Upon the merger or consolidation of any two or more corporations, which
do not have the right to exercise any franchise for public use, into a single
corporation.... if any stockholder in any of such merging or consolidating
corporations not voting in favor of such agreement of merger or consolidation,
shall dissent therefrom ....
Former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-7 (West 1939).
354. Although such a construction was probably unintended, a logical analysis of the
two provisions would seem to lead to the conclusion that, if a corporation having the right
778 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
The 1899 Delaware corporation statute provided appraisal rights
for dissenting shareholders of both parties to a corporate merger.355
The appraisal statute was rewritten in 192736 and again in 1935,357 but
it continued to give appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders of each
of the merging corporations.358 Following an addition to the statute
in 1941,3 9 it was rewritten in 1943,360 and again in 1949,361 but with the
same basic entitlement to appraisal.32
North Carolina's 1925 merger statute gave the right of appraisal
to dissenting shareholders of each of the merging corporations.363
Notwithstanding changes made in 1943, 36 this continued to be true
under the North Carolina appraisal statute through 1950.36
to exercise any franchise for public use merged with another corporation not having such
right, a dissenting shareholder of the latter corporation would have no appraisal right
under either of the two provisions.
355. See Act of Mar. 10,1899, ch. 273, § 56,21 Del. Laws 445,462-63.
356. See Act of Mar. 2,1927, ch. 85, § 20,35 Del. Laws 220,248-49.
357. See Act of Apr. 18,1935, ch. 148, § 8,40 Del. Laws 524,538-39.
358. See REV. CODE OF DEL. § 2093 (1935).
359. See Act of Apr. 9,1941, ch. 132, § 16,43 Del. Laws 448,468.
360. See Act of Apr. 15,1943, ch. 125, § 6,44 Del. Laws 422,425-29.
361. See Act of May 23,1949, ch. 136, § 7,47 Del. Laws 206,211-13.
362. In 1950, the Delaware statute provided in part as follows:
The corporation resulting from or surviving any consolidation or merger
as aforesaid shall within ten days after the date on which the agreement of
consolidation or merger has been filed and recorded ... notify each stockholder
in any corporation of this State consolidating or merging as aforesaid, who
objected thereto in writing and whose shares were not voted in favor of such
consolidation or merger, and who [perfected his right to appraisal].... and if
any such stockholders [sic] shall ... demand in writing, from the corporation
resulting from or surviving such consolidation or merger, payment for his stock,
such resulting or surviving corporation shall ... pay to him the value of his stock
on the date of the recording of said agreement of consolidation or merger,
exclusive of any element of value arising from the expectation or
accomplishment of such consolidation or merger. If... the corporation and any
such stockholder fail to agree as to the value of such stock, any such stockholder,
or the corporation resulting from or surviving such consolidation or merger, may
by petition filed in the Court of Chancery ... demand a determination of the
value of the stock of all such stockholders by an appraiser to be appointed by the
Court.
REV. CODE OF DEL. § 2093 (1935), as amended by Act of May 23, 1949, ch. 136, § 7, 47
Del. Laws 206,211-13.
363. See section 1224-c of North Carolina's 1925 merger statute, as enacted by Act of
Feb. 27,1925, ch. 77, § 1, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 81,84-85.
364. See Act of Feb. 26,1943, ch. 270, § 1, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 257,262-63.
365. In 1950, the North Carolina statute provided as follows:
If any stockholder, entitled to vote, in any corporation of this State
consolidating or merging as aforesaid shall vote against the same, or if any
stockholder in any such corporation, not entitled to vote, shall ... object in
writing to such merger or consolidation, and if any such stockholder shall ...
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The 1950 Model Business Corporation Act also provided
appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders of both the surviving and
the disappearing corporation.366
demand in writing from the surviving or resulting corporation payment of his
stock, such surviving or resulting corporation shall ... pay to him the fair value
of his stock without regard to any depreciation or appreciation thereof in
consequence of the merger or consolidation. In case the fair value of said stock
is not paid .... or such stockholder and the surviving or resulting corporation do
not ... enter into a written agreement for the payment of said stock, then such
stockholder... shall apply by petition to the superior court ... for the
appointment of three appraisers to appraise the fair value of such stock.... The
award of the appraisers (or a majority of them), if no exceptions be filed thereto
.... shall be confirmed by the court, and when confirmed shall be final and
conclusive....
On the making of said demand in writing .... any such stockholder shall
cease to be a stockholder in said constituent corporation and shall have no rights
with respect to such stock, except the right to receive payment therefor, as
aforesaid ....
Any stockholder in either or any of the constituent corporations, entitled
to vote, who does not vote against the merger or consolidation, and any
stockholder, not entitled to vote, who does not object thereto in writing ....
shall cease to be a stockholder in such constituent corporation and shall be
deemed to have assented to the merger or consolidation .... together with
stockholders voting in favor of the merger or consolidation, in the manner and
on the terms specified in the agreement of merger or consolidation; and any
stockholder in either or any of said constituent corporations voting against said
merger or consolidation, or objecting thereto in writing .... but who does not
demand payment for his stock .... or who does not apply to the court to have
the value thereof determined .... shall likewise cease to be a stockholder in
such constituent corporation and shall likewise be deemed to have consented to
said merger or consolidation.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-167 (1950).
366. The 1950 Model Act provided in part as follows:
If a shareholder of a corporation which is a party to a merger or
consolidation shall file with such corporation, prior to or at the meeting of
shareholders ... , a written objection to such plan of merger or consolidation,
and shall not vote in favor thereof, and such shareholder ... shall make written
demand on the surviving or new corporation ... for payment of the fair value of
his shares as of the day prior to the date on which the vote was taken approving
the merger or consolidation, then, if the merger or consolidation is effected, the
surviving or new corporation shall pay to such shareholder ... the fair value
thereof.... Any shareholder failing to make demand ... shall be bound by the
terms of the merger or consolidation.
If.. the shareholder and the surviving or new corporation do not [agree
on the value of the shares], then the dissenting shareholder may ... file a
petition in any court of competent jurisdiction asking for a finding and
determination of the fair value of such shares, and shall be entitled to judgment
against the surviving or new corporation for the amount of such fair value as of
the day prior to the date on which such vote was taken approving such merger or
consolidation .... Unless the dissenting shareholder shall file such petition ....
such shareholder and all persons claiming under him shall be bound by the terms
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(b) Cases and Commentary
Except for the short-lived New Jersey limitation noted above, 67
the statutes of the three subject states during the first half of the
twentieth century gave appraisal rights not only to shareholders of
the corporation that disappeared in a merger but also to shareholders
of the surviving corporation. It was pointed out above36 that there
was little reason for requiring approval of a merger by vote of the
shareholders of the surviving corporation if the merger was of small
consequence and contemplated no change in the rights of such
shareholders. Similarly, there was no good reason for according the
appraisal right to shareholders of the surviving corporation in such
circumstances.
(3) Exclusivity of Appraisal369
(a) Statutory Provisions
It made a significant difference to both proponents and
opponents of a merger whether availability of the appraisal remedy
precluded a resort by dissenters to equitable remedies such as
injunction or rescission. Thus, one might expect the statutes of the
three subject states to address the question whether appraisal
constituted the dissenter's exclusive remedy. There was a basis for
saying that the statute of North Carolina and a provision of the
Model Business Corporation Act, even as early as 1950, addressed
this question-if only obliquely.37 However, it was not until after
of the merger or consolidation.
MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 71 (1950), in 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 58-60 (1950).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 349-50.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 304-06.
369. See generally William R. Worth, Note, Corporations-Appraisal Statutes-
Exclusiveness of Statutory Remedy, 47 MICH. L. REv. 1010 (1949), and the later articles
and notes cited infra in note 779.
370. The concluding paragraph of North Carolina's appraisal statute as in effect in
1950, see supra note 365, provided that any shareholder of either corporation who did not
vote against the merger or (if a holder of non-voting stock) did not object thereto in
writing, or any shareholder who voted against the merger or objected thereto in writing
but did not demand payment for his stock or apply to the court to have the value thereof
determined, would "cease to be a stockholder" and "be deemed to have" assented or
consented to the merger. See former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-167 (1950). While the part of
this statute about ceasing to be a shareholder was clearly in error (since it applied to
shareholders of the surviving corporation as well as to those of the disappearing
corporation), the part about being deemed to have assented or consented would seem to
amount to a statutory declaration that such a shareholder could not challenge the merger.
The concluding sentence of the first paragraph of the appraisal provision of the 1950
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1950 that any of the three subject states explicitly addressed, by way
of statute, the matter of exclusivity of the appraisal remedy.
(b) Cases and Commentary
During the first half of the twentieth century, the courts of New
Jersey and Delaware 7 began to address the issue of exclusivity of
appraisal in terms that carried forward after 1950. For example, in
the 1907 decision of Colgate v. United States Leather Co.,3 the New
Jersey Chancery Court held that a suit to enjoin a merger-on the
ground (among others) that the merger was unfair and inequitable to
preferred shareholders-was not precluded by the existence of a right
of appraisal.373
In 1931, in Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n,374 the Delaware
Chancery Court voiced (in different words) the now-familiar
Delaware doctrine that appraisal is a dissenter's exclusive remedy in
the absence of illegality or fraud.37 Thus, when a merger was neither
unlawful nor inequitable, dissenting shareholders were "put to their
Model Business Corporation Act, see supra note 366, read: "Any shareholder failing to
make demand ... shall be bound by the terms of the merger or consolidation." MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 71, in 6 Bus. LAW. at 58-60.
371. No pre-1950 North Carolina decision on the point has been found.
372. 67 A. 657 (NJ. Ch. 1907), rev'd on other grounds, 72 A. 126 (N.J. 1909).
373. See supra note 290 (first paragraph) (quoting Colgate).
374. 156 A. 183 (Del. Ch. 1931).
375. The court said:
As a general proposition dissenting stockholders are thus put to an
election by the statute [between going along with the merger or exercising the
right of appraisal]. There may be circumstances, however, under which a court
of equity will say that the duty to make the election does not arise. For instance
where the merger is not authorized by law, a dissenting stockholder is under no
duty to make his election. He may enjoin its consummation. Furthermore, if
consent to the merger be induced by fraud practiced upon a consenting
company, a stockholder is under no duty to elect whether he will abide by a
merger so induced or take his money. In such a case equity holds that no just
alternatives are presented tohim for a choice. Where also the merger proposes
illegally to wipe out a right to accumulated dividends on preferred stock, a court
of equity will enjoin it on the application of a preferred stockholder. In such a
case the stockholder's election is invited between two alternatives one of which
is highly unfair. From these and other cases which may be cited it thus appears
that the election which is given to the stockholder is one that he is not, under
any and all circumstances, required to exercise. The exercise of the statutory
right of merger is always subject to nullification for fraud. The cases so hold.
Id. at 187 (citations omitted).
In Adams v. United States Distributing Corp., 34 S.E.2d 244 (Va. 1945), the court said:
"[The weight of authority is to the effect that unless the corporate merger be tainted with
fraud or illegality ... the dissenting stockholder must pursue the remedy prescribed by
the appraisal statute." Id. at 250.
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election" either to seek appraisal or to go along with the merger. 7 6
However, when a proposed merger would be unlawful or illegal-as
when consummation of the merger would be in violation of antitrust
laws377 or when the language of the statute was inadequate to sustain
the merger37 --existence of the appraisal remedy would not preclude
a suit attacking the transaction. Moreover, with respect to the
"fraud" exception to the exclusivity of appraisal, it was recognized
that, even in the absence of actual fraud, relief other than appraisal
could be sought by a dissenter upon a showing of constructive
fraud.3 79
2. Parent-Subsidiary Merger - °
A 1937 addition to the Delaware merger statutes31 provided a
376. See Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 342-43 (Del. 1940); accord
Langfelder v. Universal Labs., 68 F. Supp. 209,212-13 (D. Del. 1946).
377. See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan S. Ry. Co., 250 F. 160, 174 (6th
Cir. 1918).
37& See Jones v. Rhea, 107 S.E. 814,818 (Va. 1921).
379. See Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183, 187 (Del. Ch. 1931).
However, in a suit by a dissenting shareholder seeking to enjoin consummation of a
merger (as an alternative to the appraisal remedy) on the ground of inadequacy of the
merger consideration, proof of constructive fraud required a showing that the alleged
inadequacy was so gross as to lead the court to conclude that it was due not to an honest
error of judgment but rather to bad faith or a reckless indifference to the rights of others
interested. See id. at 188. Other cases voicing similar statements of the showing required
for proof of constructive fraud include Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d
944, 952 (3d Cir. 1943), and Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. Ch.
1943).
380. The term "parent-subsidiary merger" is used herein to denote only a merger of a
parent corporation with its wholly owned subsidiary. Such a transaction differs from the
"short-form merger" discussed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes
455-521.
381. See Act of Apr. 13, 1937, ch. 131, § 2, 41 Del. Laws 276, 277-78. This statute
added a new section 59A to chapter 65 of the 1935 Revised Code of Delaware, providing
as follows:
Any corporation now or hereafter organized under the provisions of this
Chapter or existing under the laws of this State, for the purpose of carrying on
any kind of business, owning all the stock of any other corporation now or
hereafter organized under the provisions of this Chapter or existing under the
laws of this State, or now or hereafter organized under the laws of any other
State .... if the laws under which said other corporation is formed shall permit a
merger as herein provided, may file in the office of the Secretary of State a
certificate of such ownership ... setting forth a copy of the resolution of its
board of directors to merge such other corporation, and to assume all of its
obligations and the date of the adoption thereof .... The parent corporation
shall not thereby acquire power to engage in any business, or to exercise any
right, privilege or franchise, of a kind which it could not lawfully engage in or
exercise under the provisions of the law by or pursuant to which such parent
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simplified procedure whereby a wholly owned subsidiary (domestic
or foreign) could be merged into a Delaware parent corporation
without any involvement (by way of voting or appraisal rights) on the
part of the parent's shareholders. A similar provision was added to
the New Jersey merger statutes, but not until 1952. North Carolina
did not provide a simplified procedure for parent-subsidiary mergers
until its 1955 Business Corporation Act was enacted (effective July 1,
1957).3 When the Model Business Corporation Act was published
corporation is organized .... Any plan of consolidation or merger which
requires or contemplates any changes other than those herein specifically
authorized with respect to the parent corporation, shall be accomplished under
the provisions of Section 59 of this chapter [relating to long-form mergers]. The
provisions of Section 61 of this chapter [relating to the right of appraisal] shall
not apply to any merger effected under this Section.
Id. § 2,41 Del. Laws at 277-78. This section was amended (in minor respects) by Act of
Apr. 18, 1945, ch. 157, § 5, 45 Del. Laws 594, 598-600, and by Act of June 15, 1951, ch.
353, § 9, 48 Del. Laws 918, 926-28. When the Delaware Code Annotated was
promulgated in 1953, this provision (as amended) became section 253 of title 8. By Act of
June 5, 1957, ch. 121, § 6, 51 Del. Laws 186, 188-90, it was replaced by Delaware's short-
form merger statute. See infra text accompanying notes 455-57.
382. While negation of appraisal rights was expressed in the last sentence of the
statute, as quoted supra in note 381, negation of shareholder voting rights was a matter of
statutory silence on the point.
383. See Act of Apr. 16, 1952, ch. 33, § 1, 1952 NJ. Laws 122, 122-23. It became
section 14:12-10 of former title 14, and it provided in part as follows:
Any corporation, except as hereinafter in this section specified, now or
hereafter organized under any law or laws of this State for the purpose of
carrying on any kind of business, owning all the stock of any other corporation
of this State or owning all the stock of any other corporation now or hereafter
organized under the laws of any other State ... if the laws of the State under
which said corporation of another State is formed shall permit a merger as
herein provided, may merge into itself said other corporation, notwithstanding
that said corporations may not have been organized for the purpose of carrying
on business of the same or a similar nature, by filing in the office of the
Secretary of State a certificate of such ownership ... setting forth a copy of the
resolution of its board of directors to merge such other corporation and to
assume all obligations of such other corporation and the date of the adoption
thereof.... The parent corporation shall not thereby acquire power to engage in
any business, or to exercise any right, privilege or franchise, of a kind which it
could not lawfully engage in or exercise under its certificate of incorporation or
charter in effect immediately prior to such merger.... The provisions of sections
14:12-6 and 14:12-7 of the Revised Statutes [relating to the right of appraisal]
shall not apply to any merger effected under this section.
Id. § 1, 1952 NJ. Laws at 122-23. By Act of June 19, 1967, ch. 117, § 1, 1967 N.J. Laws
561, 561-63, this provision was replaced by New Jersey's short-form merger statute. See
infra text accompanying note 475.
384. See Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1,
1957); supra note 252 (second paragraph). The 1955 Business Corporation Act, as
amended by Act of June 20, 1959, ch. 1316, § 37, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1500, 1506, which
deleted the word "domestic" from the phrase "surviving domestic corporation" appearing
1998]
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in 1950, its only reference to a parent-subsidiary merger was
contained in a sentence denying appraisal rights in that context.385
C. Liberalization of Merger Requirements After 1950
1. Changes in Required Director Action
a. Statutory Provisions
North Carolina was the first of the three subject states to
eliminate the requirement that directors of the merging corporations
enter into a merger agreement.3  Its 1955 Business Corporation
Act3 7 provided that "[t]he board of directors of each corporation
shall, by resolution adopted by each such board, approve a plan of
merger.' '381 Its 1989 Business Corporation Act389 provides that "[o]ne
in the original Act, contained the following provision:
Unless otherwise provided in the charter or bylaws, no approval by
shareholders of the surviving corporation shall be required for a merger if at the
time of approval of the plan of merger by the board of directors of each of the
corporations, domestic or foreign, who are parties thereto, the surviving
corporation is the owner of all the outstanding shares of the other corporation,
or corporations, domestic or foreign, who are parties to the merger, and the plan
of merger does not provide for any changes in the charter of, or the issuance of
any shares by, the surviving corporation; and in such case the articles of merger
shall contain statements showing compliance with the conditions of this Section,
and, in lieu of statements relating to the vote of shareholders of the surviving
corporation, need only state the approval by its board of directors.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-108.1 (1960). The 1955 Business Corporation Act also
included the following:
The provisions of this section [relating to appraisal rights] shall not apply
to a merger if on the date of the filing of the articles of merger the surviving
corporation is the owner of all the outstanding shares of the other corporation or
corporations, domestic or foreign, participating in the merger and if such merger
makes no changes in the relative rights of the shareholders of the surviving
corporation.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(i) (1960). These provisions were not replaced by a
short-form merger statute until North Carolina adopted its 1989 Business Corporation
Act (effective July 1, 1990). See Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566
(effective July 1, 1990); supra note 252 (third paragraph).
385. The concluding sentence of section 71 of the 1950 Model Act provided as follows:
"The provisions of this section [relating to appraisal rights] shall not apply to a merger if
on the date of the filing of the articles of merger the surviving corporation is the owner of
all the outstanding shares of the other corporations, domestic or foreign, that are parties
to the merger." MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 71 (1950), in 6 BUS. LAW. 1, 60 (1950).
386. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
387. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1, 1957);
see supra note 252 (second paragraph).
388. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-106(b) (1960).
389. Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990); see
CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
or more corporations may merge into another corporation if the
board of directors of each corporation adopts.., a plan of merger.' '390
Since being rewritten in 1967,391 Delaware's General
Corporation Law has required only that "[t]he board of directors of
each corporation which desires to merge ... shall adopt a resolution
approving an agreement of merger. ' '392 Since the rewriting of New
Jersey's Business Corporation Act in 1968 (effective January 1,
1969),539 that Act has required only that "[t]he board of each
corporation shall approve a plan of merger."394
The 1984 Model Business Corporation Act provides for the
merging of corporations "if the board of directors of each
corporation adopts ... a plan of merger. ' 395 It also contains (as does
the North Carolina statute based thereon) a provision requiring that
the board "recommend the plan of merger ... to the shareholders,
unless the board ... determines that because of conflict of interest or
other special circumstances it should make no recommendation. '396
b. Cases and Commentary
The requirement that directors adopt or approve a plan or
agreement of merger means that, instead of their deciding merely to
submit the matter to shareholders, the directors themselves must
make a decision to adopt or approve the plan or agreement before
submitting it to the shareholders. This point was highlighted in Smith
v. Van Gorkom,397 when the court said:
In the specific context of a proposed merger of
domestic corporations, a director has a duty under [the
statute], along with his fellow directors, to act in an
informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
390. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-01(a) (1990).
391. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151; supra note 251 (second
paragraph).
392. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (Supp. 1996).
393. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969);
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
394. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1(2) (West Supp. 1997).
395. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.01(a) (1996).
396. Id. § 11.03(b)(1); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(b)(1) (Supp. 1996)
(containing the North Carolina counterpart).
It should be noted that the provision requiring that directors "adopt" the plan of
merger, see supra text accompanying notes 390 and 395, contains no such exception based
on conflict of interest or other special circumstances. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-01(a)
(1990); MODELBUS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.01(a) (1996).
397. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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approve an agreement of merger before submitting the
proposal to the stockholders. Certainly in the merger
context, a director may not abdicate that duty by leaving to
the shareholders alone the decision to approve or
disapprove the agreement.39
(1) Directors' Fiduciary Duty
It is a matter of considerable importance to shareholders that
merger decisions by a board be made subject to the directors'
fiduciary duty. This is especially true in the case of extraneous-
purpose mergers-those in which the purpose is something other
than the fusion of two going businesses3 and when (more often than
not) a wholly owned subsidiary is used as the merger vehicle.40
398. Id. at 873, quoted in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del.
1993); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 n.2 (Del.
1990); Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1337 (Del. Ch. 1987); see also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 n.8 (Del. 1985) (stating that
director action is a prerequisite to the ultimate disposition of matters such as mergers).
399. See RALPH J. BAKER & WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 1474-76 (3d ed. 1959) (Notes on the Use of Fusion Techniques for
Special Purposes).
400. Because the clear intent of state merger statutes is to authorize the fusion of
going businesses, the question inevitably arises as to whether it constitutes a misuse of
those statutes to effect a merger between a going business and a shell corporation.
In the mid-1930s, it came to be established law in Delaware that dividend arrearages
on preferred stock could not be eliminated through a recapitalization by way of a charter
amendment. See Consolidated Film Indus. v. Johnson, 197 A. 489,493 (Del. 1937); Keller
v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115, 125 (Del. 1936). Then, in the well-known case of Havender
v. Federal United Corp., 2 A.2d 143 (Del. Ch. 1938), affd on reargument, 6 A.2d 618 (Del.
Ch. 1939), rev'd, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940), the Delaware courts had occasion to consider
whether such a result could be accomplished by way of the merger of a parent corporation
with its wholly owned subsidiary. The chancellor held that dividend arrearages could not
be thus abrogated, because "the merger was not conceived in any genuine purpose which
mergers are designed to serve." Havender, 2 A.2d at 147. On reargument, the successor
chancellor reached the same conclusion as to the dividend arrearages, because the
transaction "was not within the contemplation of [the merger] statute, when fairly and
reasonably construed." Havender, 6 A.2d at 623. However, the Delaware Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "a merger of a parent corporation with a subsidiary wholly owned
by it is within the purview of Section 59 [then Delaware's long-form merger statute]."
Havender, 11 A.2d at 337. While the wholly owned subsidiary involved in Havender was
already in existence when the merger transaction was conceived, use of a shell
corporation newly created for purposes of a merger was but a short step away. See
Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 953 (3d Cir. 1943) (involving a
Delaware corporation).
In other (more recent) decisions, it has been held that a merger with a wholly owned
subsidiary-newly created for the purpose-can be validly effected to accomplish some
extraneous purpose. See Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 92 (R.I. 1969)
(elimination of preferred stock and dividend arrearages thereon); Matteson v. Ziebarth,
242 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Wash. 1952) (en bane) (elimination of an obstructive minority
1998] CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW 787
Principal among these is the freeze-out merger, whose purpose is
elimination of the minority interest in a controlled corporation. 4°
Other extraneous-purpose mergers include those whose objective is
to change a company's state of incorporation,4 to eliminate dividend
shareholder).
However, there is authority to the contrary. In Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490
F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), in upholding an injunction that barred the cash-out of a minority
shareholder through the device of a merger of his corporation into a newly created shell
corporation, the court sustained a construction of the Georgia merger statute that "would
read out of the statute a situation where there was no pre-existing corporation to be
merged, but instead where such corporation was created solely for the purpose of
accomplishing an illegal result." Id. at 570. Use of a shell corporation as the merger
vehicle in a cash-out merger was frowned upon also in Young v. Valhi, Inc, 382 A.2d
1372,1378-79 (Del. Ch. 1978).
401. A controlled corporation exists when a corporation or an individual (or cohesive
group) owns a controlling interest in the stock of a corporation and is thereby in a
position to have the board of directors of the controlled corporation do the bidding of the
controlling party.
Such a situation may arise when the controlling party has acquired a majority stock
interest at the time of the controlled corporation's organization or thereafter by way of a
purchase of its stock through a tender offer or private negotiation. Examples of this
situation are found in such cases as Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.
1974), Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled in part by Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (rejecting the business purpose requirement
with respect to parent-subsidiary mergers), and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
Such a situation may arise also when the controlling party, having once owned all of
the controlled corporation's stock, retains control after a going public transaction that
puts shares in the hands of minority shareholders. Examples of this situation are found in
such cases as Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975), and Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757 (Del. Ch. 1986).
For brief surveys of freeze-out techniques, see Russell M. Robinson, II, Elimination
of Minority Shareholders, 61 N.C. L. Rsv. 515 (1983), and Note, Freezing Out Minority
Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961).
402. For example, it was by way of a merger that, in 1970, RJ. Reynolds Tobacco
Company ("Tobacco"), a New Jersey corporation, became a wholly owned subsidiary of
R.I. Reynolds Industries, Inc. ("Industries"), a Delaware corporation, and the
shareholders of Tobacco became (instead) shareholders of Industries. This transaction
took the form of a reverse triangular merger whereby a wholly owned subsidiary of
Industries was merged into Tobacco, the shareholders of Tobacco (other than dissenters)
received in exchange for their Tobacco shares identical shares of Industries, and
Industries received (in exchange for the stock of its disappearing subsidiary) all of the
shares of a new class of Tobacco common stock. See R. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.
PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 16,1970) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
A similar transaction was employed when, in 1983, Gulf Oil Corporation, a
Pennsylvania corporation, became a wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf Corporation, a
Delaware corporation, and the shareholders of the Pennsylvania corporation became
(instead) shareholders of the Delaware corporation. See GULF OIL CORP. PROXY
STATEMENT (Oct. 26,1983) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
For another example of use of the merger device to change a corporation's domicile,
see infra note 619.
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arrearages on preferred stock,4°3 or to terminate a derivative suit
against company management.414
(a) Scope of Duty
In the full-blown version of the fiduciary duty of directors, there
are two basic ingredients. The first is that the duty is owed to
shareholders as well as to the corporation. The second is that it
entails both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.
To their credit, the courts of Delaware have adhered to the full-
blown version of the directors' fiduciary duty-from the bold 1939
pronouncement in Guth v. Loft, Inc.4°5 to the present. While
Delaware has not addressed this matter in its corporation statute, its
courts have been unequivocal in stating that directors owe a fiduciary
duty both to the corporation and to its shareholders4 and that such
fiduciary duty entails duties of both care and loyalty.4w
403. The classic case is Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940). A
more recent case is Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969).
404. There have been cases in which a corporation was merged out of existence for the
purpose or with the effect of terminating a derivative suit against the management of the
disappearing corporation. See, e.g., Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311, 323 (Conn.
1979); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 763 (Del. Ch. 1986); Braasch v.
Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Del. Ch. 1964). But see Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 219
Cal. Rptr. 74, 76 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a shareholder could continue a derivative
action following a merger and the resulting involuntary loss of shareholder status); Alford
v. Shaw, 327 N.C. 526, 534-35, 398 S.E.2d 445, 449-50 (1990) (following Gaillard). For a
case discussing the circumstances in which a derivative suit may or may not be pursued
after the corporation, on whose behalf the suit was brought, has been merged out of
existence, see Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345,356-58 (Ind. 1977).
405. 5 A.2d 503,510 (Del. 1939); see supra note 288 (first paragraph) (quoting Guth).
406. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,360 (Del. 1993) ("In exercising
these [managerial] powers, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to
protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its
shareholders."); Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729 (Del. 1988)
("The exercise of [the board's] managerial power is tempered by fundamental fiduciary
obligations owed by the directors to the corporation and its shareholders."); Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) ("[O]ur analysis begins with the
basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
the corporation's stockholders."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)
("In carrying out their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders."); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619,
624 (Del. 1984) ("It follows that the existence and exercise of [the board's managerial]
power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The existence and
exercise of [the board's managerial] power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.").
407. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) ("In
discharging this function [of managing the business and affairs of a corporation], the
directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders
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The New Jersey courts have not addressed the fiduciary duty of
directors as extensively as have the Delaware courts. Nonetheless,
they have, in post-1950 decisions, said that directors have a fiduciary
duty to shareholders as well as to the corporation.4o8  When New
Jersey's corporation law was rewritten in 1968,409 the new statute
contained the following provision: "Directors ... shall discharge
their duties in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and
skill which ordinarily prudent people would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions."410 In a 1976 New Jersey case, this
statutory provision was cited in support of the statement that
corporate directors "have fiduciary obligations to the corporate
entity and the stockholders.4 a1
When North Carolina's corporation law was rewritten in 1955
(effective July 1, 1957),412 the new statute provided that "[o]fficers
and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and to its shareholders and shall discharge the duties of
.... "); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987) ("In
meeting this [management] responsibility the board is charged with fiduciary obligations
of care and loyalty."); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) ("In performing their
duties the directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the
corporation and its shareholders."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506
A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986) ("In discharging [the function of managing the business and
affairs of a corporation] the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders."). Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), was
a case involving the duty of care. Guth v. Lof4 Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), was a case
involving the duty of loyalty.
In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), the court said that
"[d]uty of care and duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who
endeavors to act in the service of a corporation and its stockholders. Each of these duties
is of equal and independent significance." Id. at 367 (citation omitted). The court further
stated that "[a] breach of either the duty of loyalty or the duty of care rebuts the [business
judgment rule] presumption that the directors have acted in the best interests of the
shareholders, and requires the directors to prove that the transaction was entirely fair."
Id. at 371.
408. See Hill Dredging Corp. v. Risley, 114 A.2d 697,712 (N.J. 1955) (" 'The directors
of a private corporation bear a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to its
stockholders."' (quoting, with approval, the opinion of the Superior Court, Chancery
Division)); Pilat v. Broach Sys., Inc., 260 Ald 13,16 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969).
409. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969);
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
410. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14(1) (West Supp. 1997). The word "people" was
substituted for the word "men" by Act of Aug. 4, 1988, ch. 94, § 33, 1988 NJ. Laws 676,
709 (effective Dec. 1,1988).
411. 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1976), aff'd per curiam, 374 A.2d 1222 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
412. See Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1,
1957); supra note 252 (second paragraph).
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their respective positions in good faith, and with that diligence and
care which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions.""41 In a 1961 decision, the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[t]his statutory provision, in
effect since 1957, is declaratory of the law prior to the effective date
of that Act";414 and other courts referred subsequently to the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed by the directors of a North
Carolina corporation to shareholders as well as to the corporation.41
When North Carolina's corporation law was rewritten in 1989,416 the
new statute stated the duty of directors in the following language:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director,
including his duties as a member of a committee:
(1) In good faith;
(2) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and
(3) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.417
The commentary on this provision states that, although the word
"fiduciary" was not used in describing the duty owed by a director to
a corporation, there was no intent "to change North Carolina law in
this area" or "to modify in any way the duty of directors recognized
under the former law. '418
The above-quoted provision of North Carolina's 1989 Business
Corporation Act is the same as a provision of the 1984 Model
Business Corporation Act,419 which was derived from an addition
made to the Model Act in 1974.420 It does not employ the term
413. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982).
414. Fulton v. Talbert, 255 N.C. 183, 184, 120 S.E.2d 410, 411 (1961) (relying on
Teague v. Teague Furniture Co., 201 N.C. 803, 807,161 S.E. 530,532 (1931), and Pender v.
Speight, 159 N.C. 612,615,75 S.E. 851,852 (1912)).
415. See Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342, 345 (M.D.N.C.
1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. 758, 774, 295 S.E.2d 249, 259 (1982),
modified and affd, 309 N.C. 279,307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Loy v. Lorm Corp., 52 N.C. App.
428, 436,278 S.E.2d 897, 903 (1981) ("Directors owe a duty of fidelity and due care in the
management of a corporation and must exercise their authority solely for the benefit of
the corporation and all its shareholders.").
416. See Act of June 8,1989, ch. 265,1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990);
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
417. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a) (1990).
418. Id. § 55-8-30 commentary at 169.
419. See MODELBUs. CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.30(a) (1996).
420. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 35, 1 2, at 270 n.1 (Supp. 1977); Report of
Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 BUS.
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"fiduciary" in describing the directors' duty 42' and it does not say
that the duty is owed to shareholders as well as to the corporation4 22
In this regard, the North Carolina statute has the potential for being
less protective of shareholder rights than is the doctrine espoused by
the Delaware judiciary.4
LAW. 501,501-02 (1975).
421. The explanation for omission of the term "fiduciary," given when the 1974
addition to the Model Business Corporation Act was made, was as follows:
The Committee also chose not to use the term "fiduciary" in the standard
for directors' conduct, although it recognized that the term has been employed
in certain of the existing statutes on the subject. The Committee took the view
that those responsibilities of directors which are fiduciary in nature would be
sufficiently comprehended in the affirmative standard adopted so as to make
unnecessary the use of a term which presents the possibility of importing into
the area of corporation law more than is appropriate of the attributes and
obligations of a fiduciary as firmly established in the law of trusts.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 35, 1 commentary at 256 (Supp. 1977); see Report of
Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, supra
note 420, at 506.
The explanation, given in the Official Comment on the 1984 Model Business
Corporation Act, was as follows: "Likewise, section 8.30 does not use the term
"fiduciary" in the standard for directors' conduct, because that term could be confused
with the unique attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts,
some of which are not appropriate for directors of a corporation." MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACr ANN. § 8.30 commentary at 8-168 (1996).
One must observe that the courts of Delaware appear to believe that they have the
competence to surmount these supposed difficulties. See supra notes 405-07 and
accompanying text.
422. There appears to be no explanation for this in the Official Comment on the 1984
Model Business Corporation Act. The only explanation given in the North Carolina
Commentary is as follows:
Former G.S. 55-35 provided that officers and directors stand in a fiduciary
relation "to the corporation and to its shareholders." The drafters decided not
to bring forward the words "and to its shareholders" in order to avoid an
interpretation that there is a duty running directly from directors to the
shareholders that would give shareholers [sic] a direct right of action on claims
that should be asserted derivatively.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 commentary at 169 (1990).
423. In the writer's view, North Carolina's 1989 Business Corporation Act and the
1984 Model Business Corporation Act (upon which the North Carolina Act is based)
should contain an unmistakable declaration that "officers and directors owe fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and to its shareholders." As was stated in a
recent article:
Trust, as George Shultz said in another connection, is the "coin of the realm."
Trust that the people with whom you deal will not only obey the law but also
fulfill the fiduciary responsibilities inherent in their relationships is as essential
to the working of the capitalist system as a sound currency and a reliable legal
system. Those who weaken that trust are sabotaging capitalism.
Herbert Steth, Blame Junk Bond Dealers, Not Junk Bonds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,1990, at
A10.
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(b) Content of Duty of Loyalty
The duty of care is, of course, a matter of importance in
safeguarding the rights of shareholders. Of greater importance-
especially in the context of extraneous-purpose mergers-is the duty
of loyalty.424
Some of the numerous components of the duty of loyalty need to
be highlighted. In their dealings affecting shareholders, directors
must act in good faith 42s and with complete candor. 26 Further, the
duty of loyalty requires that directors not use their fiduciary position
to benefit themselves to the detriment of any shareholder. 27
424. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("This Court
has traditionally and consistently defined the duty of loyalty of officers and directors to
their corporation and its shareholders in broad and unyielding terms .... "); Anadarko
Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988) ("It is a basic
principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that directors are subject to the
fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and disinterestedness. Specifically, directors
cannot stand on both sides of the transaction nor derive any personal benefit through self-
dealing.").
425. In Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324 (Del. Ch. 1987), the court said:
"The corporation's directors were obliged to make an informed, deliberate judgment, in
good faith, that the merger terms, including the price, were fair and that the merger
would not become a vehicle for economic oppression." Id. at 1335.
In Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984), the court said that
directors and majority shareholders "have an obligation to all shareholders to adhere to
fiduciary standards of conduct and to exercise their [managerial] responsibilities in good
faith when undertaking any corporate action, including a merger." Id. at 25.
In Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121,136 S.E.2d 569 (1964), the court referred to the
"good faith [the law] exacts from directors and other fiduciaries." Id. at 129, 136 S.E.2d
at 575.
426. In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Co., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), the court insisted that
disclosure to shareholders should be complete rather than merely adequate. See icl at
281. Then, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), after citing Lynch's rule
of complete candor, the court said: "This is merely stating in another way the long-
existing principle of Delaware law that these Signal designated directors on UOP's board
still owed UOP and its shareholders an uncompromising duty of loyalty." Id. at 710.
The fiduciary duty of full disclosure received attention in a number of later Delaware
decisions. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276-77 (Del.
1994); Zim v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773,778-79 (Del. 1993); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75,
85-88 (Del. 1992); Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 171 (Del. 1991);
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944-45 (Del. 1985).
In Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984), the court said:
"Moreover, all corporate responsibilities [of directors] must be discharged in good faith
and with 'conscientious fairness, morality and honesty in purpose.' Also imposed are the
obligations of candor and of good and prudent management of the corporation." Id. at 26
(citations omitted) (quoting Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 151
(N.Y. 1919)).
427. See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 F. 765,771 (8th Cir. 1906); Treadway
Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660, 666 (S.D.N,Y. 1980) ("A director [of a New
Jersey corporation] must act to further the best interests of the corporation, and may not
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Moreover, this duty requires that directors refrain from any disparate
treatment of holders of a given class of the corporation's stock,4
unless there is some overriding corporate purpose to be served by
utilize his powers to further a personal interest."), aff d in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361-
62 (Del. 1993); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and
directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their
private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders."); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566, 571
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) ("Those who control the affairs and conduct of a
corporation ... have a fiduciary duty to all the stockholders and the powers they have by
virtue of their majority status are powers held by them in trust. They cannot use their
powers for their own personal advantage and to the detriment of the minority
stockholders." (citation omitted)); Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578,
593-94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861) ("It requires no authority to establish the fact, that the
directors of the 'American Hard Rubber Company' could not have transferred the
property of the corporation directly to themselves, or to a corporation in which they were
stockholders and directors."); see also Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220-21 (Ohio
1989) (stating that majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders
and that control "cannot be used to give the majority benefits which are not shared by the
minority").
428. See Eagleson v. Pacific Timber Co., 270 F. 1008, 1010 (D. Del. 1920); Alaska
Plastics, Inc. v. Coppok, 621 P.2d 270, 276-77 (Alaska 1980); Alpert v. 28 Williams St.
kts' ,aawJ'.,]x- Schunr . .Y .. Mzaie, -315 --.N.E.2d 33,4- 337 _(N.Y. 197,5
nbers of a corporate board of directors ... owe a fiduciary responsibility to the
Iders in general and to individual shareholders in particular to treat all
Iders fairly and evenly.",); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,
i. L. REV. 1049,1049 (1931).
other cases applying the rule against disparate treatment of shareholders, see
,es 900-01 and accompanying text.
North Carolina Commentary on the basic merger provision of its 1989 Business
tion Act contains the following: 2
ITe tiiuo 'sentence or W ehsecono'aragan'-x'iti .
.on 11.01 of the [1984] Model Act indicates that a plan of merger can
iminate among holders of shares of the same class in the kind of property
receive in a merger. The drafters believed that this sentence does not
ct the current law in North Carolina. They believed that the current law
not permit discrimination among the holders of shares of a single class in
dind of property that can be received in a merger; all the shares of a single
must be treated the same, both in value and kind. Therefore, the drafters
their disagreement with this sentence in the "Official Comment."
4. STAT. § 55-11-01 commentary at 224 (1990).
ipare Lewis v. Clark, 911 F.2d 1558, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
to condone disparate treatment of majority and minority shareholders in a cash-
;er), with NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1424 (8th Cir. 1993)
; the Lewis view and concluding that "freeze out mergers are completely
le as long as the dissenting shareholders are given their appropriate appraisal
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
different treatment of such shareholders.429
But the overarching component of the duty of loyalty-perhaps
subsuming those to which reference has just been made-is the
requirement of fairness. While sometimes stated as an independent
standard for the validity of a merger,4 30 the requirement of fairness
would seem to be a logical derivation from the directors' fiduciary
duty of loyalty.431 Recent statements of this requirement of fairness
have recognized two components of the requirement-fair dealing
and fair price.4 32
429. See Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 27-28 (N.Y. 1984) (holding
that only a proper corporate purpose would serve to override the duty of treating all
shareholders evenly and thereby justify a cash-out merger's variant treatment of minority
shareholders); Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338 (N.Y. 1975) ("Departure from
precisely uniform treatment of stockholders may be justified, of course, where a bona fide
business purpose indicates that the best interests of the corporation would be served by
such departure.").
In Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (en banc), the court said:
It is well established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be
treated equally for all purposes. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
(discriminatory exchange offer held valid); and Cheff v. Mathes (selective stock
repurchase held valid).
IL at 1376-77 (citations omitted). In both Unocal and Cheff, the variant treatment of
shareholders was condoned on the basis of a perceived threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-57 (Del.
1985); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548,554-56 (Del. 1964).
430. See Havender v. Federal United Corp., 6 A.2d 618, 622 (Del. Ch. 1939) ("The
defendant necessarily concedes ... that if the plan adopted in a corporate merger is not
fair and equitable to the interested stockholders, it will always be enjoined by a Court of
Equity."), rev'd on other grounds, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc
Co., 226 A.2d 585, 596 (N.J. 1967) (referring to "the settled and continuing New Jersey
doctrine that a merger, even though it complies procedurally with the statutory
requirements, must also satisfy basic equitable requirements of good faith and fair
treatment").
431. See Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487,492 (Del. 1982) ("In Sterling,
... this Court recognized as a 'settled' rule of law in Delaware that a majority shareholder
and its director designees occupy a fiduciary relationship to the minority shareholders
from which springs a duty of fairness in dealing with the minority's property interests."
(citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107,109-10 (Del. 1952))).
432. In Weinberger v. UOP, Ina, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the court said:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect
of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed
merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company's stock.
Id. at 711.
Similarly, in Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984), the court
CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
(c) Charter Option Exculpatory Provisions
Reference needs to be made to the "charter option" statutes
enacted in the aftermath of the 1985 decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom.4 33 In general, those statutes authorize the inclusion in
corporate charters (originally or by amendment) of exculpatory
provisions that limit or eliminate personal liability of directors for
money damages for breach of their duty of care (except in the case of
certain specified actions).43 The Delaware statute expressly states
that such a charter provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director for "any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders, 4 35 and the New Jersey statute has a
In reviewing a freeze-out merger, the essence of the judicial inquiry is to
determine whether the transaction, viewed as a whole, was "fair" as to all
concerned. This concept has two principal components: the majority
shareholders must have followed "a course of fair dealing toward minority
holders"; and they must also have offered a fair price for the minority's stock.
Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
433. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile,
Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 5, 6-11 (1987) (describing the decline in availability of directors' liability
insurance, and the reluctance of individuals to serve as directors, in the aftermath of Van
Gorkom and subsequent decisions).
434. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAw. 695,
696-97 (1990).
435. The Delaware statute, added by Act of June 18, 1986, ch. 289, § 2, 65 Del. Laws
544,544 (effective July 1,1986), provides as follows:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation
may also contain any or all of the following matters:
i7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts
or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title [regarding liability for
unlawful distributions]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or
limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the
date when such provision becomes effective....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (Supp. 1996).
In Zim v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993), it was held that the fiduciary duty of
disclosure is embraced by the duty of loyalty and therefore is within the first exception set
forth in section 102(b)(7). See id, at 783. Surprisingly, however, in Arnold v. Society for
Savings Bancorp, Inc, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) (en bane), the court backed away from
the concept that the disclosure duty is embraced within the duty of loyalty, taking the
position (instead) that "fiduciary disclosure requirements ... were ... not excepted
7951998]
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similar limitation.4 6 The comparable North Carolina statute, on the
other hand, purports to authorize a charter provision limiting or
eliminating the personal liability of a director for monetary damages
for breach of "any duty" as a director (with some stated
exceptions).437 The breadth of this statute has been criticized, 38 and
it may be that the reference to "any duty" will be construed to extend
expressly from coverage" by section 102(b)(7). Id. at 1286-88.
436. The New Jersey statute, added by Act of Feb. 4,1987, ch. 35, § 1, 1987 N.J. Laws
108, 110, and amended by Act of Feb. 4, 1989, ch. 17, § 1, 1989 N.J. Laws 102, 103,
provides as follows:
The certificate of incorporation may provide that a director or officer
shall not be personally liable, or shall be liable only to the extent therein
provided, to the corporation or its shareholders for damages for breach of any
duty owed to the corporation or its shareholders, except that such provision shall
not relieve a director or officer from liability for any breach of duty based upon
an act or omission (a) in breach of such person's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its shareholders, (b) not in good faith or involving a knowing
violation of law or (c) resulting in receipt by such person of an improper
personal benefit. As used in this subsection, an act or omission in breach of a
person's duty of loyalty means an act or omission which that person knows or
believes to be contrary to the best interests of the corporation or its
shareholders in connection with a matter in which he has a material conflict of
interest.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1997).
437. The North Carolina statute, as derived from Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 626, § 1,
1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1113, 1113 (effective Oct. 1, 1987), and amended by Act of July 24,
1993, ch. 552, § 6, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2912, 2915 (effective Oct. 1, 1993), provides as
follows:
(b) The articles of incorporation may set forth any provision that under
this Chapter is required or permitted to be set forth in the bylaws, and may also
set forth:
(3) A provision limiting or eliminating the personal liability of any
director arising out of an action whether by or in the right of the
corporation or otherwise for monetary damages for breach of any duty as a
director. No such provision shall be effective with respect to (i) acts or
omissions that the director at the time of such breach knew or believed were
clearly in conflict with the best interests of the corporation, (ii) any liability
under G.S. 55-8-33 [regarding liability for unlawful distributions], (iii) any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit,
or (iv) acts or omissions occurring prior to the date the provisions [sic]
became effective. As used herein, the term "improper personal benefit"
does not include a director's reasonable compensation or other reasonable
incidental benefit for or on account of his service as a director, officer,
employee, independent contractor, attorney, or consultant of the
corporation....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b) (Supp. 1996). The phrase "any duty" read "his duty" in the
1987 version of the statute.
43& See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the
Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171,173,181 (1987).
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only to the duty of care and not to the duty of loyalty 39
Following a proposal made in 1990,4" a charter option provision
was added to the Model Business Corporation Act. As in the case of
the North Carolina statute, the Model Act provision contains no
express exception with respect to a breach of the duty of loyalty.441
One can agree that, on the facts of the case, the court in Van
Gorkom erred in not according to the defendant directors the
protection of the business judgment rule.442 But one can still regret
the legislative response in the form of these charter option
provisions-especially when it is recognized that "in some cases the
votes of the directors themselves as shareholders may be sufficient to
approve adoption of the [exculpatory] provision."443
(2) Inherited Duty Owed by Controlling Shareholders
The doctrine concerning the fiduciary duty owed by controlling
shareholders to the minority, espoused so well in 1923 in Allied
Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America,444 has
continued to be valid. 45 While it is generally understood that a
439. Robinson states: "The practical effect of the statute can be generally described as
permitting the shareholders of a corporation to limit or eliminate breach of the duty of
care as the basis of a claim for money damages." ROBINSON, supra note 226, at 394.
440. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 434, at 699-700.
441. The Model Act provides as follows:
(b) The articles of incorporation may set forth:
(4) a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the
corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any action taken, or
any failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for (A) the
amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he is not
entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the
shareholders; (C) a violation of section 8.33 [regarding liability for unlawful
distributions]; or (D) an intentional violation of criminal law ....
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 2.02(b) (1996).
442. See Daniel R Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437,1438,1445-55 (1985).
443. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 2.02 commentary at 2-18 (1996).
444. 120 A. 486,491 (Del. Ch. 1923) (quoted supra in note 289 (second paragraph)).
445. See Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311, 322 (Conn. 1979) ("The rule of
corporation law and of equity invoked is well-settled: the majority has the right to
control, but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relationship toward the minority, as
much as the corporation itself or its officers and directors."); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977) ("It is a settled rule of law in Delaware that Development, as
the majority stockholder of Magnavox, owed to the minority stockholders of that
corporation, a fiduciary obligation in dealing with the latter's property."), overruled on
other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983); Epstein v.
Celotex Corp., 238 A.2d 843, 847 (Del. Ch. 1968) (quoting with approval the second half
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shareholder (including a majority holder) is free to vote shares in the
shareholder's own self-interest,4 it is also recognized that, when a
controlling shareholder (whether an individual or cohesive group, or
the parent of a subsidiary) selects the directors and controls their
board decisions, the controlling shareholder thereby takes on the
fiduciary duties owed by those directors. 47 In such a context, the
of the court's statement from Allied Chemical, 120 A. at 491, as set forth supra in note 289
(second paragraph)); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585, 599 (N.J. 1967)
("G & W [parent] was undoubtedly a dominating influence in putting through the merger.
As holder of the majority stock in Zinc [subsidiary] on whose board of directors it was
represented, it had affirmative fiduciary responsibilities to Zine's minority
stockholders."); Freese v. Smith, 110 N.C. App. 28, 37, 428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (1993) ("In
North Carolina, it is well established that a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty
to minority shareholders.").
446. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1380-81 (Del. 1996) (en banc)
("Stockholders (even a controlling stockholder bloc) may properly vote in their own
economic interest, and majority stockholders are not to be disenfranchised because they
may reap a benefit from corporate action which is regular on its face."); Bershad v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) ("Stockholders in Delaware
corporations have a right to control and vote their shares in their own interest. They are
limited only by any fiduciary duty owed to other stockholders."); Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977) ("In sum, for more than fifty years our
Courts have held, consistent with the general law on the subject, that a stockholder in a
Delaware corporation has a right to vote his shares in his own interest, including the
expectation of personal profit, limited, of course, by any duty he owes to other
stockholders."); Norton v. Union Traction Co., 110 N.E. 113, 120 (Ind. 1915) ("As a
general rule, stockholders are not regarded as trustees for one another, but each may, as a
member of the corporate body, exercise the right of voting, even on a proposition in
which he has an interest not in common with other stockholders."); Boss v. Boss, 200 A.2d
231, 235 (R.I. 1964) ("It is true that a director represents all the stockholders and in the
exercise of his office as director stands in a fiduciary relation to them which prevents him
from using his office for his personal benefit at their expense, but when voting as a
stockholder he 'has the legal right to vote with a view to his own benefit .... '" (quoting
13 AM. JuR. Corporations § 997 (Supp. 1963))).
447. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955) ("[T]he same rule [as
that applicable to a director] should apply to [the individual defendant's] fiduciary duties
as majority stockholder, for in that capacity he chooses and controls the directors, and
thus is held to have assumed their liability."); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) ("Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a
fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business
affairs of the corporation."); Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 53 A. 842, 848 (N.J. Ch.
1903) ("But these [cited] authorities only hold, in effect, that the fiduciary relation arises
when the majority stockholder assumes control of the corporation and dictates the action
of the directors."); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 151-52 (N.Y.
1919) ("When a number of stockholders constitute themselves ... the managers of
corporate affairs or interests, they stand in much the same attitude towards the other or
minority stockholders that the directors sustain generally towards all the stockholders,
and the law requires of them the utmost good faith."); Levy v. American Beverage Corp.,
38 N.Y.S.2d 517, 525 (App. Div. 1942) ("A majority stockholder does not become a
fiduciary for other stockholders by reason merely of ownership of his stock. It is only
where he steps out of his role as a stockholder, and acts in the management and conduct
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controlling shareholder-by exercising the decision-making authority
of the board-inherits the duties of care and loyalty owed by
directors to the corporation and its shareholders. 8
Moreover, it has continued to be the case, as in earlier years," 9
that, when a controlling shareholder brings about an interested-party
merger, such controlling shareholder bears the burden of proving the
entire fairness of the transaction.450 The burden of persuasion on the
of the corporation, ... that he is said actually to become a fiduciary instead of a mere
stockholder.").
In Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 144 F. 765 (8th Cir. 1906), the court said:
A combination of the holders of a majority or of three-fifths of the stock
of a corporation to elect directors, to dictate their acts and the acts of the
corporation for the purpose of carrying out a predetermined plan places the
holders of such stock in the shoes of the corporation and constitutes them actual,
if not technical trustees for the holders of the minority of the stock. The
devolution of power imposes correlative duty. The members of such a
combination become in practical effect the corporation itself because they draw
to themselves and use the powers of the corporation.
Id. at 771. And, in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), the court said:
[Tihere is no doubt but that in situations in which the holder of a majority of the
voting shares of a corporation ... seeks to impose its will upon minority
stockholders, the conduct of such majority must be tested by those same
standards of fiduciary duty which directors must observe in their relations with
all their stockholders ....
Id. at 573.
448. See Zaln v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42,45-46 (3d Cir. 1947); Lebold v.
Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369,372-73 (7th Cir. 1941); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C.
340, 344-45, 67 S.E.2d 350, 353-54 (1951); David Finch & Robert Long, Comment, The
Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the Minority Shareholders, 9 HASTINGS
L. 306,308 (1958).
In Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969), the court said: "Majority
shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities to benefit themselves
alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority. Any use to which they put the
corporation or their power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders
proportionately ...... Id. at 471. And, in Linge v. Ralston Purina Co., 293 N.W.2d 191
(Iowa 1980) (en bane), the court said: "By being in a position to manage corporate affairs
through control of the board of directors, a majority shareholder is in the same [fiduciary]
relationship to minority shareholders as the directors themselves." Id. at 194.
449. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
450. Probably the most frequently cited statement of this principle is that contained in
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952), the court saying:
Plaintiffs invoke the settled rule of law that Hilton as majority stockholder of
Mayflower and the Hilton directors as its nominees [on Mayflower's board]
occupy, in relation to the minority, a fiduciary position in dealing with
Mayflower's property. Since they stand on both sides of the [merger]
transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire fairness, and it must
pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
Id. at 109-10; see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del.
1994) ("A controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a transaction,
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issue of entire fairness can be shifted by the controlling shareholder
to a complaining minority shareholder of the controlled
corporation,451 but only (i) if the terms of the merger are negotiated
in good faith by a committee of independent and disinterested
directors of the controlled corporation capable of engaging in arm's
length negotiation,4 2 or (ii) if consummation of the merger is
conditioned upon the favorable vote of a majority of the shares
owned by minority shareholders and they have been fully informed
concerning the transaction.453
2. Changes in Requirements for Shareholder Approval4
a. Authorization of Short-Form Merger
One of the liberalizing steps taken by the three subject states
after 1950 was authorization of the short-form merger. While
seemingly a simple subject, the enabling statutes were actually
somewhat complicated, and there were significant variations among
the three states.
as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving its entire fairness."); Freese
v. Smith, 110 N.C. App. 28, 37,428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (1993) ("Once a minority shareholder
challenges the actions of the majority, the burden shifts to the majority to establish the
fairness and good faith of its actions.").
451. See Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500-02 (Del. Ch.
1990).
452. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) ("Although
perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have been entirely different if
UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal
with Signal at arm's length.").
However, the burden is not shifted by utilization of a special negotiating committee if
the court concludes that the committee lacked true baigaining power. See Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117, 1120-21 (Del. 1994).
453. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) ("[A]pproval of a
merger, as here, by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, while not
a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the merger entirely to
the plaintiffs.").
However, the burden is not shifted by a "majority of the minority" vote if the court
concludes that there was a failure to inform minority shareholders of all material facts.
See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
454. This Article does not address the new section 251(g) of title 8 of the Delaware
Code Annotated, which was added to Delaware's General Corporation Law by Act of
June 23,1995, ch. 79, § 15, 70 Del. Laws 118,120-21 (effective July 1, 1995).
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(1) Statutory Provisions
(a) Delaware
In 1957, Delaware amended section 253 of its General
Corporation Law,45 changing it from a statute authorizing only
parent-subsidiary mergers (when the parent owns all of the stock of
the subsidiary)456 to one authorizing short-form mergers (when the
parent owns at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of
the subsidiary's stock).4s5 The key feature of the short-form merger is
that (with the exceptions noted below) it can be effected solely by
action of the parent's board of directors-with neither voting nor
appraisal rights accorded to the parent's shareholders, and with only
appraisal rights accorded to minority shareholders of the subsidiary.
One difference between Delaware's 1937 parent-subsidiary
merger statute and its 1957 short-form merger statute involved the
455. See Act of June 5,1957, ch. 121, § 6,51 Del. Laws 186,188-90.
456. See supra notes 381-82 and accompanying text.
457. The Delaware short-form merger statute provides as follows:
In any case in which at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class
of the stock of a corporation or corporations ... is owned by another
corporation and 1 of the corporations is a corporation of this State and the other
or others are corporations of this State, or any other state or states, or the
District of Columbia and the laws of the other state or states, or the District
permit a corporation of such jurisdiction to merge with a corporation of another
jurisdiction, the corporation having such stock ownership may either merge the
other corporation or corporations into itself and assume all of its or their
obligations, or merge itself, or itself and 1 or more of such other corporations,
into 1 of the other corporations by executing, acknowledging and filing ... a
certificate of such ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of
its board of directors to so merge and the date of the adoption; provided,
however, that in case the parent corporation shall not own all the outstanding
stock of all the subsidiary corporations, parties to a merger as aforesaid, the
resolution of the board of directors of the parent corporation shall state the
terms and conditions of the merger, including the securities, cash, property, or
rights to be issued, paid, delivered or granted by the surviving corporation upon
surrender of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned
by the parent corporation.... If the parent corporation be not the surviving
corporation, the resolution shall include provision for the pro rata issuance of
stock of the surviving corporation to the holders of the stock of the parent
corporation on surrender of any certificates therefor, and the certificate of
ownership and merger shall state that the proposed merger has been approved
by a majority of the outstanding stock of the parent corporation entitled to vote
thereon ... if the parent corporation is a corporation of this State or state that
the proposed merger has been adopted, approved, certified, executed and
acknowledged by the parent corporation in accordance with the laws under
which it is organized if the parent corporation is not a corporation of this State.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Supp. 1996).
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matter of mergers with foreign corporations. The earlier statute
made the simplified procedure for a parent-subsidiary merger
available only when the parent was a Delaware corporation, even
though the subsidiary could be a corporation of another state if that
state's laws authorized such a merger.458 On the other hand, the
short-form merger statute, as enacted in 1957, could be utilized even
if the parent was a corporation of another state, provided that that
state's laws authorized such a merger.4 9
In a significant departure from the then-existing Delaware
limitation with respect to long-form mergers,460 the 1957 statute made
458. See supra notes 381-82 and accompanying text.
459. The 1957 version of section 253(a)-as enacted by Act of June 5, 1957, ch. 121,
§ 6,51 Del. Laws 186,188-began as follows:
Any corporation organized or existing under the laws of this State, or
under the laws of any other state or jurisdiction subject to the laws of the United
States, if the laws of such other state or jurisdiction shall permit such a merger,
owning at least ninety per centum of the outstanding shares of each class of the
stock of any other corporation organized or existing under the laws of this State,
or under the laws of any other state or jurisdiction subject to the laws of the
United States, if the laws of such other state or jurisdiction shall permit such a
merger, may ....
Id. The 1967 rewrite of section 253(a)-as enacted by Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1,
§ 253(a), 56 Del. Laws 151, 209-10-changed the introductory language to read more
nearly like that of the current version, see supra note 457. By Act of Jan. 2, 1968, ch. 186,
§ 18, 56 Del. Laws 610, 613-14 (1967), "the District of Columbia" was added for
treatment like another state. Further (minor) changes in the introductory language of
section 253(a) were made by Act of June 23, 1969, ch. 148, § 24, 57 Del. Laws 433, 447
(effective July 15, 1969).
By Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 253(e), 56 Del. Laws 151, 211, the following
subsection was added:
A merger may be effected under this section although one or more of the
corporations parties to the merger is a corporation organized under the laws of a
jurisdiction other than one of the United States; provided that the laws of such
jurisdiction permit such a merger; and provided further that the surviving or
resulting corporation shall be a corporation of this State.
Former DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(e) (Cum. Supp. 1968). Enactment of this provision
had the effect of overturning a dictum in Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760 (Del. Ch.
1964), to the effect that "[t]he statute [i.e., section 253 as it read then], by necessary
implication, precludes mergers between domestic corporations and alien corporations,
that is, those created under the laws of a foreign country," id. at 763. See ERNEST L.
FOLK, 1H, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, A COMMENTARY AND
ANALYSIS 354 (1972). By Act of June 23, 1969, ch. 148, § 24, 57 Del. Laws 433, 447-48
(effective July 15, 1969), the first proviso of section 253(e), as quoted above (although
erroneously referred to in the amending statute as subsection (c)), was changed to read:
"provided that the laws of such jurisdiction permit a corporation of such jurisdiction to
merge with a corporation of another jurisdiction." By Act of July 1, 1993, ch. 61, § 8, 69
Del. Laws 54,54, the second proviso of section 253(e), as quoted above, was deleted.
460. See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
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cash a permissible form of consideration in a short-form merger.61 It
provided that, when the parent owned less than all of the subsidiary's
outstanding stock, the resolution of the parent's board was to state
the terms and conditions of the merger, "including the securities, cash
or other consideration to be issued, paid or delivered by the parent
corporation upon surrender of each share of the merged corporation
not owned by the parent corporation." 46
The 1957 Delaware short-form merger statute permitted only
upstream (subsidiary into parent) mergers. 43 However, when
Delaware's General Corporation Law was rewritten in 1967,464 the
new version of its short-form merger statute permitted downstream
(parent into subsidiary) as well as upstream mergers. 65 The 1967
statute provided that, when the parent is not the surviving
corporation, "the resolution shall include provision for the pro rata
issuance of stock of the surviving corporation to the holders of the
stock of the parent corporation on surrender of the certificates
therefor."' It further required that a downstream merger be
approved by the holders of a majority of the stock of the parent
corporation; however, the required vote was changed, in 1969, to "a
majority of the outstanding stock of the parent corporation entitled
461. See Act of June 5,1957, ch. 121, § 6,51 Del. Laws 186,188-90.
462. Id. § 6, 51 Del. Laws at 188. By Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 253, 56 Del.
Laws 151, 209, the quoted language was changed to read: "including the securities, cash
or other property to be issued, paid or delivered by the surviving corporation upon
surrender of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned by the
parent corporation." By Act of June 23, 1969, ch. 148, § 24, 57 Del. Laws 433, 447, it was
changed further to read: "including the securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued,
paid, delivered or granted by the surviving corporation upon surrender of each share of
the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned by the parent corporation." This is
the language of the current statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Supp. 1996)
(quoted supra in note 457).
463. See Act of June 5,1957, ch. 121, § 6,51 Del. Laws 186, 188-89.
464. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151; supra note 251 (second
paragraph).
465. See former DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Cune. Supp. 1968). This feature, as
enacted by Act of July 3,1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 253(a), 56 Del. Laws 151,209-10, continues
in effect. See supra note 457.
466. Former DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Cum. Supp. 1968) (as enacted by Act of
July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 253(a), 56 Del. Laws 151,210). This provision was amended
(in a minor respect) by Act of July 8, 1983, ch. 112, § 36, 64 Del. Laws 285, 290 (effective
July 1, 1983). For the current (almost identical) language, see supra note 457. '
By Act of July 9, 1987, ch. 136, § 26, 66 Del. Laws 335, 338 (effective July 1, 1987), a
clarification of the downstream provision was made to cover cases in which the parent
was not a Delaware corporation. The clarifying language appears at the end of the
second sentence quoted supra in note 457.
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to vote thereon. 467
Shareholders of a Delaware parent corporation are not accorded
a statutory right of appraisal in a short-form merger, and this is true
even in a downstream merger when the parent is the disappearing
corporation. However, shareholders of a Delaware subsidiary that
is a party to a short-form merger do enjoy a statutory right of
appraisal, 469 and this is true even when such subsidiary is the surviving
corporation in a downstream merger.4 70
The Delaware short-form merger statute contains an express
limitation on its use. As enacted in 1957, that statute carried forward
from Delaware's 1937 parent-subsidiary merger statute471 the
provision that "[a]ny plan of consolidation or merger which requires
or contemplates any changes other than those herein specifically
authorized with respect to the parent corporation, shall be
467. Act of June 23, 1969, ch. 148, § 24, 57 Del. Laws 433, 447-48 (effective July 15,
1969).
468. Section 253(c) of the Delaware statute provides: "Section 262 [the appraisal
provision] of this title shall not apply to any merger effected under this [short-form
merger] section, except as provided in subsection (d) of this section." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 253(c) (1991). Moreover, subsection (d) provides appraisal rights only for "the
stockholders of the subsidiary Delaware corporation party to the merger." Id. §253(d)
(quoted infra in note 470 (first paragraph)).
Appraisal rights were similarly denied to shareholders of the parent corporation
when the short-form merger statute was enacted in 1957. See Act of June 5, 1957, ch. 121,
§ 6,51 Del. Laws 186,189-90.
469. Provision was made for such appraisal rights in Delaware's 1957 short-form
merger statute as enacted by Act of June 5, 1957, ch. 121, § 6, 51 Del. Laws 186, 189-90.
Changes in statutory language, not affecting the substance of appraisal rights for
shareholders of a Delaware subsidiary, were made by Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1,
§ 253(d), 56 Del. Laws 151,210-11, Act of Apr. 24, 1976, ch. 371, § 2, 60 Del. Laws 1070,
1074 (effective July 1, 1976), and Act of June 6, 1981, ch. 25, § 13, 63 Del. Laws 36, 37
(effective July 6, 1981) (adopting the language set forth infra in note 470 (first
paragraph)).
470. The Delaware short-form merger statute provides as follows:
In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation party to
a merger effected under this section is not owned by the parent corporation
immediately prior to the merger, the stockholders of the subsidiary Delaware
corporation party to the merger shall have appraisal rights as set forth in § 262
of this title.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(d) (1991).
Additionally, the Delaware appraisal statute provides: "In the event all of the stock
of a subsidiary Delaware corporation party to a merger effected under § 253 of this title is
not owned by the parent corporation immediately prior to the merger, appraisal rights
shall be available for the shares of the subsidiary Delaware corporation." Id. § 262(b)(3).
The case of Temple v. Combined Properties Corp., 410 A.2d 1375 (Del. Ch. 1979),
provides an interesting example of a short-form merger in which steps were taken to
make the subsidiary the surviving corporation. See id. at 1376-77.
471. See supra note 381.
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accomplished under the provisions [relating to long-form
mergers]." 471 As subsequently amended,473 the comparable provision
now reads: "Any merger which effects any changes other than those
authorized by this section or made applicable by this subsection shall
be accomplished under [the sections relating to long-form
mergers]." 474
(b) New Jersey
In 1967, ten years later than Delaware, New Jersey amended its
corporation statute to permit short-form mergers as well as parent-
subsidiary mergers.475 The short-form merger provision applied only
to a New Jersey corporation "owning at least 90% of the outstanding
shares of each class of stock" of another New Jersey corporation or
of a corporation of another state if the laws of such other state "shall
permit a merger as herein provided."476 It permitted only upstream
mergers, and it required that the resolution of the parent's directors
"state the terms and conditions of the merger, including the
securities, cash or other consideration to be issued, paid or delivered
by the parent corporation upon surrender of each share of the
subsidiary not owned by the parent corporation." 477  It accorded
appraisal rights to minority shareholders of the subsidiary (if it was a
New Jersey corporation), but it denied such rights to shareholders of
the parent corporation.47
When the New Jersey corporation statute was rewritten in
1968,479 its short-form merger provision"w contained some significant
changes, and those changes were carried forward when the short-
form merger statute was later revised and redesignated. l ' While the
472. Act of June 5,1957, ch. 121, § 6,51 Del. Laws 186,189.
473. When Delaware's General Corporation Law was rewritten by Act of July 3, 1967,
ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151, see supra note 251 (second paragraph), the first sentence of
section 253(c) provided: "Any merger which effects any changes other than those herein
specifically authorized with respect to the parent corporation shall be accomplished under
the provisions [relating to long-form mergers]." The language (but not the substance) of
this provision was changed by Act of June 25, 1973, ch. 106, § 10, 59 Del. Laws 209, 214
(effective July 1,1973).
474. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(c) (1991).
475. See Act of June 19, 1967, ch. 117, § 1, 1967 N.J. Laws 561, 561-63.
476. Former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-10 (West Supp. 1968).
477. Id.
478. See id.
479. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969);
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
480. See former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.10-5 (West 1969).
481. See Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366, § 55, 1973 N.J. Laws 964, 1021-23 (effective May
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short-form merger statute is itself worded in terms of a merger
between a domestic parent and a domestic subsidiary,482 another
statutory provision authorizes short-form mergers if either the parent
or the subsidiary is a New Jersey corporation." The short-form
merger statute requires that the parent's board of directors approve a
plan of merger but states that approval by the subsidiary's board is
not required.4m The statute addresses the matter of permissible
merger consideration by stating that the plan of merger must set
forth the matters required by section 14A:10-1,4 which permits
shares to be converted "into shares, obligations, or other securities of
the surviving corporation..., or of any other corporation..., or, in
whole or in part, into cash or other property."486 Since January 1,
1969, the statute has permitted downstream as well as upstream
mergers.48 The statute does not require a vote by shareholders of the
subsidiary except in the unlikely event that the subsidiary's charter
1, 1974); Act of Aug. 4,1988, ch. 94, § 59, 71, 1988 NJ. Laws 676, 737-39, 756 (effective
Dec. 1, 1988). The latter act changed the designation of the short-form merger statute
from section 14A:10-5 to section 14A:10-5.1.
482. The New Jersey short-form merger statute provides as follows:
A domestic corporation owning at least 90% of the outstanding shares of
each class and series of another domestic corporation or corporations, may
merge the other corporation or corporations into itself, or may merge itself, or
itself and any subsidiary corporation or corporations, into any subsidiary
corporation, without approval of the shareholders of any of the corporations,
except as provided in subsections 14A:10-5.1(5) and 14A:10-5.1(6). The board
of the parent corporation shall approve a plan of merger setting forth those
matters required to be set forth in plans of merger under section 14A:10-1.
Approval by the board of any subsidiary corporation shall not be required.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-5.1(1) (West Supp. 1997).
The 1968 version of this statute contained the same substantive provisions. See
former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-5(1) (West 1969).
483. The New Jersey statute provides as follows:
One or more foreign corporations and one or more domestic corporations
may be merged in the manner provided in section 14A:10-5.1, provided that, if
the parent corporation is a foreign corporation, it shall, notwithstanding the
provisions of the laws of its jurisdiction of incorporation, comply with the
provisions of subsection 14A:10-5.1(2) with respect to notice to shareholders of
any domestic subsidiary corporation which is a party to the merger [concerning
appraisal rights].
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-7(4) (West Supp. 1997).
The 1968 version of this statute contained the same substantive provisions. See
former N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.10-7(4) (West 1969).
484. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-5.1(1) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note 482
(first paragraph)).
485. See id.
486. Id. § 14A10-1(2)(c).
487. See id. § 14A:10-5.1(1) (quoted supra in note 482 (first paragraph)).
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requires approval of a merger by vote of a percentage of shares
higher than that (90% or more) owned by the parent; and it requires
a vote by shareholders of the parent only (i) when the parent's
charter requires shareholder approval of a merger, (ii) when the
parent is to be the surviving corporation and the plan of merger
provides for a change in the parent's charter (other than a change
permitted to be made by the board alone), or (iii) when the
subsidiary is to be the surviving corporation. Under New Jersey's
appraisal statute,4 9 shareholders of a New Jersey corporation that
disappears in a short-form merger (whether the subsidiary in an
upstream merger or the parent in a downstream merger) are
accorded a right of appraisal (unless taken away on grounds
discussed below490); however, in the absence of a charter provision to
the contrary, shareholders of a New Jersey corporation that survives
in a short-form merger (whether the parent in an upstream merger or
488. The New Jersey statute provides as follows:
(5) Approval of the shareholders of any subsidiary corporation shall be
obtained pursuant to its certificate of incorporation, if the certificate requires
approval of a merger by the affirmative vote of the holders of more than the
percentage of the shares of any class or series of the corporation then owned by
the parent corporation.
(6) Approval of the shareholders of the parent corporation shall be
obtained:
(a) Whenever its certificate of incorporation requires shareholder
approval of a merger, or
(b) Pursuant to section 14A:10-3 where
(i) the plan of merger contains a provision which would change
any part of the certificate of incorporation of the parent corporation
into which a subsidiary corporation is being merged, unless the change
is one that can be made by the board without shareholder approval as
referred to in subsection 14A:9-2(2); or
(ii) a subsidiary corporation is to be the surviving corporation.
Id. § 14A:10-5.1(5)-(6).
489. That statute provides as follows:
(1) Any shareholder of a domestic corporation shall have the right to
dissent from any of the following corporate actions
(a) Any plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is a
party, provided that, unless the certificate of incorporation otherwise
provides
(ii) a shareholder of a surviving corporation shall not have the
right to dissent from a plan of merger, if the merger did not require for
its approval the vote of such shareholders as provided in section
14A:10-5.1 ....
Id. § 14A-11-1(1).
490. See infra notes 756-57 and accompanying text, and notes 761-62 and
accompanying text.
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the subsidiary in a downstream merger) are denied the right of
appraisal if the vote of such shareholders is not required for approval
of the merger.49'
(c) North Carolina
North Carolina was late in following Delaware and New Jersey
with respect to short-form mergers. Its 1955 Business Corporation
Act492 made provision for parent-subsidiary mergers4 93 but not for
short-form mergers, and that state of affairs continued until 1990.
When the Act was rewritten in 1989 (effective July 1, 1990) 494
provision was made for short-form mergers in language that followed
almost verbatim that of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act;495
however, North Carolina's short-form merger statute was amended in
1997.496
491. See supra note 489; see also supra note 488 and accompanying text (explaining the
rules covering required shareholder voting).
492. See supra note 252 (second paragraph).
493. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
494. See supra note 252 (third paragraph).
495. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.04 (1996).
496. The North Carolina statute now provides as follows:
(a) Subject to Article 9 [the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act],
a parent corporation owning at least 90 percent (90%) of the outstanding shares
of each class of a subsidiary corporation may merge the subsidiary into itself
without approval of the shareholders of the parent or subsidiary. Subject to
Article 9, a parent corporation owning at least ninety percent (90%) of the
outstanding shares of each class of a subsidiary corporation may merge itself
into the subsidiary without approval of the shareholders of the subsidiary if the
merger is approved by the directors and shareholders of the parent corporation
in accordance with G.S. 55-11-01 and G.S. 55-11-03.
(b) The board of directors of the parent shall adopt a plan of merger that
sets forth:
(1) The names of the parent and subsidiary; and
(2) The manner and basis of converting the shares of each
corporation into shares, obligations, or other securities of the surviving or
any other corporation or into cash or other property in whole or part.
(d) The parent may not deliver articles of merger to the Secretary of State
for filing until at least 30 days after the date it mailed a copy or summary of the
plan of merger to each shareholder of the subsidiary who did not waive the
mailing requirement. This subsection does not apply to a merger in which the
subsidiary was a public corporation before becoming a subsidiary qualifying for
a merger under this section and is still a public corporation on the effective date
of the merger.
(e) Articles of merger under this section may not contain amendments to
the articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation (except for
amendments enumerated in G.S. 55-10-02).
(0 The provisions of G.S. 55-13-02(c) [relating to the denial of appraisal
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As enacted in 1989, the North Carolina statute did not authorize
downstream short-form mergers, but that was changed by the 1997
amendment.497 The statute requires director action only by the board
of the parent,498 and no approval by shareholders of either
corporation is required except for those of a parent involved in a
downstream merger.499 Permissible consideration in a short-form
merger is stated to be "shares, obligations, or other securities of the
surviving or any other corporation or ... cash or other property in
whole or part."'' As enacted in 1989, the new Act's provision
governing entitlement to the right of appraisal was worded in such a
way that shareholders of a parent involved in a short-form merger
were not excluded from such entitlement; however, a "technical
amendment" was adopted in 1990 1 to exclude parent company
shareholders from such entitlement.m Minority shareholders of the
subsidiary involved in a short-form merger have the right of dissent
and appraisal unless their "shares are then redeemable by the
corporation at a price not greater than the cash to be received in
exchange for such shares." 5 3 The North Carolina statute provides
that short-form merger articles "may not contain amendments to the
articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation (except for
amendments enumerated [for board adoption without shareholder
rights for marketable shares] do not apply to subsidiary corporations that are
parties to mergers consumated under this section.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-04 (1990), as amended by Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 485, § 29
(effective Oct. 1, 1997).
497. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-04(a) (1990) (as amended in 1997) (quoted supra in
note 496).
49& See idU § 55-11-04(b) (quoted supra in note 496).
499. See id. § 55-11-04(a) (quoted supra in note 496).
500. Id. § 55-11-04(b)(2) (quoted supra in note 496).
501. See Act of July 27, 1990, ch. 1024, § 12.18, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 593, 601
(effective July 1, 1990). The amendment inserted the parenthetical phrase in section 55-
13-02(a)(1) (as quoted infra in note 502).
502. The North Carolina statute now provides as follows:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 [the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act], a shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the
following corporate actions:
(1) Consummation of a plan of merger to which the corporation
(other than a parent corporation in a [short-form] merger under G.S. 55-11-
04) is a party unless ... (ii) such shares are then redeemable by the
corporation at a price not greater than the cash to be received in exchange
for such shares;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a) (Supp. 1996).
503. Id. § 55-13-02(a)(1)(ii) (quoted supra in note 502).
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action] in G.S. 55-10-02)."' 4
(d) Model Business Corporation Act
In 1960, section 68A was "offered as an optional section" of the
Model Business Corporation Act. 05 It provided for upstream short-
form mergers, without approval by the shareholders of either
corporation, when one corporation owned at least 95% of the
outstanding shares of each class of another corporation.0 In the
1969 version of the Model Act, the optional designation was
eliminated, and the 95% was changed to 90%.507
The 1984 Model Business Corporation Act continues to provide
for short-form mergers; but, unlike the North Carolina statute as
amended in 1997, it authorizes only upstream mergers.:0 The Model
Act's appraisal provision relating to mergers519 also differs from that
of North Carolina.510
(2) Cases and Commentary
There is much to be said in favor of the flexibility afforded by
the modem statutes in allowing, by way of a short-form merger, the
elimination of minority shareholders of a subsidiary 90% or more of
whose stock is owned by its parent. Such mergers lead to the
"'greater economies, more efficient management'" and
"simplification of ... intercorporate structures" referred to by New
York's highest court in the earliest of the reported cases involving a
short-form cash-out merger n Moreover, when the minority interest
504. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-04(e) -(1990) (as amended in 1997) (quoted supra in
note 496).
505. MODELBUS. CoRP. AcrANN. § 68A (1960).
506. The language was as follows: "Any corporation owning at least ninety-five per
cent of the outstanding shares of each class of another corporation may merge such other
corporation into itself without approval by a vote of the shareholders of either
corporation." Id.
507. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 75 (1971).
508. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.04 (1996).
509. That provision entitles a shareholder to the right of dissent and appraisal in the
event of
consummation of a plan of merger to which the corporation is a party (i) if
shareholder approval is required for the merger by section 11.03 or the articles
of incorporation and the shareholder is entitled to vote on the merger or (ii) if
the corporation is a subsidiary that is merged with its parent under section 11.04.
MODELBUS. CORP. ACTANN. § 13.02(a)(1) (1996).
510. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(1) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 502).
511. See Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 87 N.E.2d 561, 565 (N.Y. 1949) (quoting
1936 legislative history).
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in a subsidiary is less than 10%, it is probably more efficient for that
interest to be terminated at fair value than for the parent to be
exposed to petty challenges of intercorporate transactions involving
the subsidiary.51 2 Nonetheless, it is important that there be adequate
safeguards for protecting the interests of shareholders involved in
short-form mergers.
(a) Perspective of Subsidiary's Shareholders
Protection of the rights of shareholders is more important-but
more difficult-in the case of the subsidiary involved in a short-form
merger. Recognizing that the board of the subsidiary will (in all
likelihood) be controlled by a parent owning 90% or more of the
subsidiary's stock, the short-form merger statutes of all three of the
subject states dispense with action by the subsidiary's directors.
Similarly, recognizing that the subsidiary's minority shareholders will
have insufficient votes to block such a merger, those statutes also
dispense with approval by the subsidiary's shareholders (with a
limited exception in New Jersey513). Moreover, the short-form
merger statutes of all three states permit the stock of the subsidiary's
minority shareholders to be converted into cash. Because no other
protection is available for minority shareholders of a subsidiary
involved in a cash-out short-form merger (beyond that based on the
fiduciary duty of the parent as controlling shareholder514), it is
especially important that the right of appraisal be available to such
shareholders. That right is given to shareholders of a Delaware
subsidiary, whether it is the disappearing or the surviving
corporation; and the same is true under the North Carolina statute
(with a limited exception 515). Under the New Jersey statute, the right
of appraisal (if not taken away on grounds discussed below5 6) is
given to minority shareholders of a domestic subsidiary if it is the
disappearing corporation; however, the right is denied to those
shareholders if such subsidiary is the surviving corporation (except in
the unlikely event that its charter "requires approval of a merger by
the affirmative vote of the holders of more than the percentage of the
512. See, for example, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), where
the minority interest in the subsidiary amounted to only about 3%. See id. at 719.
513. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.10-5.1(5) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note
488).
514. See supra text accompanying notes 444-53.
515. See supra text accompanying note 503.
516. See infra notes 756-57 and accompanying text, and notes 761-62 and
accompanying text.
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shares of any class or series of the corporation then owned by the
parent corporation").517
If minority shareholders of the subsidiary can be cashed out in a
downstream short-form merger, it seems a clear mistake of statutory
policy to deny such shareholders a right of appraisal. Indeed, it
would be a salutary rule to require-in all cash-out mergers-that the
cashed out shareholders be accorded a right of appraisal as a check
on the price proffered for their shares.
(b) Perspective of Parent's Shareholders
Under the statutes of the three subject states, the rights of
shareholders of the parent corporation are (for the most part)
protected in the case of an upstream short-form merger. One basic
thrust of the Delaware and North Carolina statutes is to preclude use
of the short-form merger to effect any significant change in the
charter rights of the parent's shareholders; therefore, it is of little
consequence that both statutes deny voting and appraisal rights to
those shareholders when the merger is upstream. Following a
different tack, the New Jersey statutes accord both voting rights and
appraisal rights to shareholders of the parent when an upstream
merger contemplates a change in the charter rights of those
shareholders. Contrary to the theory underlying the small-scale
merger statutes of the three states (discussed below 18), none of the
three short-form merger statutes accords voting and appraisal rights
to the parent's shareholders in the event (unlikely though it may be)
that the parent's outstanding common stock is increased by more
than 20% (40% in New Jersey) in an upstream short-form merger
using parent company common stock as the merger consideration.
In a downstream short-form merger, the statutes of all three of
the subject states require an approving vote by the parent company's
shareholders. While the Delaware short-form merger statute
requires that shareholders of the parent receive shares of stock of the
subsidiary in a downstream merger, thereby assuring them a
continuing equity interest in the combined enterprise, the statutes of
New Jersey and North Carolina contain no such requirement and,
instead, permit virtually any kind of consideration to be used in a
short-form merger (downstream as well as upstream). On the other
hand, while the New Jersey statute accords appraisal rights to
517. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note
489); see also id. § 14A:10-5.1(5) (quoted supra in note 488).
518. See infra text accompanying notes 522-52.
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shareholders of the parent in a downstream short-form merger, the
Delaware and North Carolina statutes deny such rights to parent
company shareholders in a short-form merger whether downstream
or upstream.
This latter feature of the Delaware short-form merger statute
could lead to an anomalous result-if not forestalled by Delaware's
judicial doctrine concerning fiduciary duty.519 The directors of a
Delaware corporation, if successful in mustering approval from the
holders of a majority of its outstanding stock entitled to vote (or if
they themselves were to hold such a majority), could change the
corporation's domicile by merging it on a share-for-share basis into a
wholly owned subsidiary newly created under the laws of another
state,m with no appraisal right being accorded to dissenting
shareholders of the parent even though their rights as shareholders
could be significantly different under the laws of the new
corporation's state of incorporation.5'
b. Relaxation for Small-Scale Merger
Prior to 1967, all three of the subject states required for any
long-form merger, regardless of scale, that it be approved by vote of
the shareholders of the surviving corporation (as well as those of the
disappearing corporation) and that dissenting shareholders of the
surviving corporation (as well as those of the disappearing
corporation) be accorded the right of appraisal. This meant that, if
Exxon or IBM acquired-by way of a merger-a corporation only a
small fraction of its size, approval by the Exxon or IBM shareholders
was required and those who dissented were accorded appraisal rights.
Given the broad powers of directors to effect other kinds of
transactions without reference to shareholders, this hardly made
sense.
519. See supra text accompanying notes 405-07 and 444-53.
520. Because the Delaware short-form merger statute expressly authorizes a Delaware
parent to merge into a non-Delaware subsidiary, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a)
(Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 457), such a transaction would not be precluded by the
statutory limitation on use of the short-form merger, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(c)
(1991) (quoted supra in text accompanying note 474).
521. For example, the new state of incorporation might be one whose statutes were so
ill-conceived that a charter amendment, making a class of non-callable preferred stock
subject to call, could be adopted by vote of the holders of other classes of stock capable of
outvoting the affected class. See Cowan v. Salt Lake Hardware Co., 221 P.2d 625, 626-28
(Utah 1950). This is to be contrasted with the state of affairs in Delaware, whose statute
governing charter amendments gives a class vote to any class (whether voting or non-
voting) if a proposed amendment would "alter or change ... special rights of the shares of
such class so as to affect them adversely." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (1991).
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(1) Statutory Provisions
Delaware changed this state of affairs, in the 1967 rewrite of its
General Corporation Law m by adding a new subsection (f) to its
basic long-form merger statute and by making a corresponding
change in its appraisal statute. Section 251(f) of the Delaware
statute2 now provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (c) of
this section [requiring approval by shareholders of both
corporations involved in a long-form merger], unless
required by its certificate of incorporation, no vote of
stockholders of a constituent corporation surviving a merger
shall be necessary to authorize a merger if (1) the
agreement of merger does not amend in any respect the
certificate of incorporation of such constituent
corporation," 41 (2) each share of stock of such constituent
corporation outstanding immediately prior to the effective
date of the merger is to be an identical outstanding or
treasury share of the surviving corporation after the
effective date of the merger, '~ and (3) either no shares of
522. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151; supra note 251 (second
paragraph).
523. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(f) (1991).
524. As originally enacted in 1967, this no-charter-amendment test included the
requirement that the agreement of merger "not change the name or authorized shares of
any class" of the surviving corporation. Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 251(f), 56 Del.
Laws 151, 207. That requirement was deleted from the no-charter-amendment test by
Act of June 23,1969, ch. 148, § 22, 57 Del. Laws 433, 443-45 (effective July 15, 1969).
525. This continuity-of-stock-ownership test was not included when subsection (f) was
first enacted in 1967. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 251(f), 56 Del. Laws 151,
207-08. As added by Act of May 16, 1970, ch. 421, § 9, 57 Del. Laws 1194, 1200-01
(effective July 1, 1970), it read: "(2) each share of stock of such constituent corporation
outstanding immediately prior to the merger becoming effective shall remain outstanding
immediately after the merger as an identical share of the surviving corporation ....
Folk says the following concerning the 1970 amendment:
The ... condition-a sort of "continuity of stock interest" requirement
applicable to the surviving corporation-was added by the 1970 amendments
.... This condition is designed to limit the operation of § 251(f) to the type of
transaction it was intended to cover: that is, where a large corporation is
absorbing a smaller entity, and the stockholders of the large surviving
corporation continue to hold their shares unchanged despite the merger, and
experience only a relatively minor dilution of their stock interests as a
consequence of the newly issued stock. The condition was added in order to
preclude the misuse of § 251(f) to consummate a three-party merger in which
the stockholders of the acquired corporation were arguably not entitled to vote
on the merger because that corporation was the technical survivor of the
merger. This is the so-called "reverse three-party" or "reverse phantom"
merger.... For the present, it is important to note that the 1970 amendment
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common stock of the surviving corporation and no shares,
securities or obligations convertible into such stock are to
be issued or delivered under the plan of merger, or the
authorized unissued shares or the treasury shares of
common stock of the surviving corporation to be issued or
delivered under the plan of merger plus those initially
issuable upon conversion of any other shares, securities or
obligations to be issued or delivered under such plan do not
exceed 20% of the shares of common stock of such
constituent corporation outstanding immediately prior to
the effective date of the merger ....
And section 262(b)(1) of the Delaware statute2 now provides that
"no appraisal rights shall be available for any shares of stock of the
constituent corporation surviving a merger if the merger did not
require for its approval the vote of the stockholders of the surviving
corporation as provided in subsection (f) of § 251 of this title."'
New Jersey followed Delaware's lead in 1968 (effective January
1, 1969) 9 The New Jersey statute530 now contains the following
adding § 251(0(2) made clear that, in a reverse three-party merger, the
stockholders of the acquired corporation, despite its nominal status as a
surviving corporation, would have a right to vote.
FOLK, supra note 459, at 320-21.
By Act of July 9, 1971, ch. 235, § 5,58 Del. Laws 707,709 (effective July 1,1971), the
continuity-of-stock-ownership test was changed to read as quoted in the text. The only
alteration of significance made by the 1971 amendment was to change "each share ...
shall remain outstanding" to read "each share ... is to be an identical outstanding or
treasury share"-to cover the remote contingency that the disappearing corporation
might have held some shares of the surviving corporation's stock. See FOLK, supra note
459, at 321.
526. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(0 (1991). As originally enacted in 1967, the
limited-dilution test was numbered "(2)" and provided as follows:
the authorized unissued shares or the treasury shares of any class of the
surviving corporation to be issued or delivered under the plan of merger do not
exceed 15 per cent of the shares of the surviving corporation of the same class
outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of the merger.
Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 251(0, 56 Del. Laws 151,207-08. By Act of May 16,
1970, ch. 421, § 9, 57 Del. Laws 1194, 1200-01 (effective July 1, 1970), this provision was
re-numbered "(3)" and amended to read as quoted in the text.
527. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (Supp. 1996).
528. The predecessor to this provision, as enacted by Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56
Del. Laws 151, was located in section 262(k) and provided as follows:
[N]or shall this section [the appraisal statute] apply to any of the shares of stock
of the constituent corporation surviving a merger if the merger did not require
for its approval the vote of the stockholders of the surviving corporation, as
provided in subsection (f) of section 251 of this title.
Former DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (Cum. Supp. 1968).
529. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, § 14AA0-3, 1968 NJ. Laws 1011, 1095-96
(effective Jan. 1,1969); supra note 250 (second paragraph).
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provisions:
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions set forth in
subsections 14A:10-3(1) and 14A:10-3(2), the approval of
the shareholders of a surviving corporation shall not be
required to authorize a merger (unless its certificate of
incorporation otherwise provides) 1 '" if
(a) The plan of merger does not make an
amendment of the certificate of incorporation of the
surviving corporation which is required by the
provisions of this act to be approved by the
shareholders; t5321
(b) Each shareholder of the surviving corporation
whose shares were outstanding immediately before the
effective date of the merger will hold the same number
of shares, with identical designations 63references,
limitations, and rights, immediately after;
(c) The number of voting shares outstanding
immediately after the merger, plus the number of
voting shares issuable on conversion of other securities
or on exercise of rights and warrants issued pursuant to
the merger, will not exceed by more than 40% the total
number of voting shares of the surviving corporation
outstanding immediately before the merger; tSm4 and
530. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1997).
531. The parenthetical statement "unless its certificate of incorporation otherwise
provides" was added by Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366, § 53, 1973 N.J. Laws 964, 1019-20
(effective May 1, 1974).
532. As enacted by Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, § 14A:10-3, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011,
1096, this provision read as follows: "(a) the agreement of merger does not change the
name or authorized shares or series of any class or otherwise amend the certificate of
incorporation of the surviving corporation .... ' By Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366, § 53,
1973 NJ. Laws 964,1019-20, it was amended to read as quoted in the text.
533. As enacted in 1968 and amended in 1974, section 14A:10-3(4) contained no
continuity-of-stock-ownership test. The test was added when that section was rewritten
by Act of Aug. 4, 1988, ch. 94, § 57, 1988 N.J. Laws 676, 734-36 (effective Dec. 1, 1988).
For the history of the comparable provision in Delaware, see supra note 525.
The Commissioners' Comment-1988 Amendments includes the following
observation:
Finally, subsection 14A:10-3(4) has been amended to include an explicit
requirement that the shareholdings of the shareholders of the surviving
corporation not be disturbed. See new paragraph 14A:10-3(4)(b). The
Commission was of the view that such a requirement would have been read into
the present statute by our courts and that the addition of this new paragraph is a
clarification, rather than a change.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3 commentary (1988) at 16 (West Supp. 1997).
534. As enacted by Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, § 14A:10-3, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011,
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(d) The number of participating shares outstanding
immediately after the merger, plus the number of
participating shares issuable on conversion of other
securities or on exercise of rights and warrants issued
pursuant to the merger, will not exceed by more than
40% the total number of participating shares of the
surviving corporation outstanding immediately before
the merger. 535
(5) As used in subsection 14A:10-3(4):
(a) "Participating shares" means shares that entitle
their holders to participate without limitation in
distributions.
(b) "Voting shares" means shares that entitle their
holders to vote unconditionally in elections of
directors. 36
And section 14A:11-1(1)(a)(ii) of the New Jersey statute5 37 provides
as follows:
1096, this provision read as follows:
(b) the authorized unissued shares and the treasury shares of each class
and series of the surviving corporation to be issued or delivered under the plan
of merger do not exceed 15 per cent of the shares of each such class or series of
the surviving corporation outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of
the merger.
Former N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(4)(b) (West 1969). By Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366,
§ 53,1973 NJ. Laws 964,1020, it was amended to read as follows:
(b) either (i) no shares of common stock of the surviving corporation and
no securities convertible into such common shares are to be issued or delivered
under the plan of merger or (ii) the number of common shares of the surviving
corporation to be issued or delivered under such plan, plus those initially
issuable upon conversion of any other securities to be issued or delivered under
such plan, does not exceed 20% of the following- the number of common shares
of the surviving corporation outstanding immediately prior to the merger
becoming effective plus the number of such common shares, if any, initially
issuable upon conversion of any other securities then outstanding.
Id. By Act of Aug. 4, 1988, ch. 94, § 57, 1988 N.J. Laws 676, 734-36, it was replaced by
subsection (c) as quoted in the text.
535. This provision and subsection (5) were added by Act of Aug. 4, 1988, ch. 94, § 57,
1988 N.J. Laws 676,734-36.
536. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1997). The provisions of this
statute are based upon the provisions of section 11.03(g)-(h) of the 1984 Model Business
Corporation Act, with one major difference. The difference is that 40% is the figure used
in New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:10-3(4)(c)-(d), while the corresponding
figure used in Model Business Corporation Act section 11.03(g)(3)-(4) is 20%. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(4)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1997); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.
§ 11.03(g)(3)-(4) (1996); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12 commentary (1972) at 29
(West Supp. 1997) (quoted infra in note 864) (describing the history behind New Jersey's
use of 40%).
537. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
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(1) Any shareholder of a domestic corporation shall
have the right to dissent from any of the following corporate
actions
(a) Any plan of merger or consolidation to which
the corporation is a party, provided that, unless the
certificate of incorporation otherwise provides
(ii) a shareholder of a surviving corporation
shall not have the right to dissent from a plan of
merger, if the merger did not require for its
approval the vote of such shareholders as provided
in... subsection 14A:10-3(4) .... 538
North Carolina followed in 1973.. Former section 55-108.1(b), 539
added to the North Carolina statute in that year,54° was (in substance)
almost the same as section 251(f) of the Delaware statute as then in
effect;s'4 and, similarly, former section 55-113(i), as amended in
1973,-12 denied the right of appraisal to shareholders of the surviving
corporation in a small-scale mergerM3 When North Carolina rewrote
538. Id. § 14A:11-1(1). This provision was adopted by Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350,
§ 14A.11-1, 1968 NJ. Laws 1011, 1106-07. The words "unless the certificate of
incorporation otherwise provides" were added by Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366, § 60, 1973
NJ. Laws 964,1029-30.
539. The North Carolina statute provided as follows:
Unless otherwise provided in the charter or bylaws, no approval by
shareholders of the surviving corporation shall be required for a merger if (i) the
plan of merger does not provide for any changes in the charter of the surviving
corporation, (ii) each share of the surviving corporation outstanding
immediately prior to the merger becoming effective shall remain outstanding
immediately after the merger as an identical share of the surviving corporation,
and (iii) either no common shares of the surviving corporation and no shares,
securities or obligations convertible into common shares are to be issued or
delivered under the plan of merger, or the authorized unissued common shares
or the treasury common shares of the surviving corporation to be issued or
delivered under the plan of merger plus those initially issuable upon conversion
of any other shares, securities or obligations to be issued or delivered under such
plan do not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the common shares of the surviving
corporation outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of the merger.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-108.1(b) (1982).
540. See Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 33, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 545, 555 (effective
Oct. 1, 1973).
541. See supra notes 522-26 and accompanying text.
542. See Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 37, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 545, 556 (effective
Oct. 1, 1973).
543. The statute provided in part that "[t]he provisions of this section [relating to
appraisal rights] shall ... not apply to the shareholders of the surviving corporation if
their approval of the merger is not required, as provided in G.S. 55-108.1(b)." Former
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its Business Corporation Act in 1989,54 it continued to make
provision for small-scale mergers, eliminating the need for approval
by the survivor's shareholderss45-on terms virtually identical to
those in the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act--and denying
appraisal rights to those shareholders5 47
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(i) (1982).
544. See Act of June 8,1989, ch. 265,1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990);
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
545. The North Carolina statute provided as follows:
(g) Action by the shareholders of the surviving corporation on a plan of
merger is not required if:
(1) The articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation will not
differ (except for amendments enumerated in G.S. 55-10-02) from its
articles before the merger,
(2) Each shareholder of the surviving corporation whose shares were
outstanding immediately before the effective date of the merger will hold
the same number of shares, with identical designations, preferences,
limitations, and relative rights, immediately after the effective date of the
merger;
(3) The number of voting shares outstanding immediately after the
merger, plus the number of voting shares issuable as a result of the merger
(either by the conversion of securities issued pursuant to the merger or the
exercise of rights and warrants issued pursuant to the merger), will not
exceed by more than 20 percent (20%) the total number of voting shares of
the surviving corporation outstanding immediately before the merger; and
(4) The number of participating shares outstanding immediately after
the merger, plus the number of participating shares issuable as a result of
the merger (either by the conversion of securities issued pursuant to the
merger or the exercise of rights and warrants issued pursuant to the
merger), will not exceed by more than 20 percent (20%) the total number of
participating shares outstanding immediately before the merger.
(h) As used in subsection (g):
(1) "Participating shares" means shares that entitle their holders to
participate without limitation in distributions.
(2) "Voting shares" means shares that entitle their holders to vote
unconditionally in elections of directors.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(g)-(h) (1990). The words "number of" were deleted from
subsection (g)(2) by Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 552, § 14, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2912, 2919
(effective Oct. 1, 1993).
546. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac" ANN. § 11.03(g)-(h) (1996). The Model Act first
made provision for the small-scale merger in 1978. See id § 11.03 commentary at 11-32.
547. The North Carolina statute provides as follows:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 [the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act], a shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the
following corporate actions:
(1) Consummation of a plan of merger to which the corporation
(other than the parent corporation in a [short-form merger]) is a party
unless (i) approval by the shareholders of that corporation is not required
under G.S. 55-11-03(g) ....
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(2) Cases and Commentary
Folk was quite correct in characterizing the statutory relaxation
for the small-scale merger as "a major innovation in American
corporate law."' ' What is surprising is that it did not come until
1967.
The small-scale merger provisions have no effect on the voting
rights or the appraisal rights (whatever they may be) of shareholders
of the corporation that disappears in a merger. They apply only to
shareholders of the corporation that survives a merger and only in
circumstances in which the rights of those shareholders remain free
from any significant alteration. Given compliance with the no-
charter-amendment test and the continuity-of-stock-ownership test, a
corporate combination by way of a small-scale merger does not pose
any threat to shareholders of the surviving corporation-
notwithstanding the denial of voting and appraisal rights to those
shareholders.
Because these two tests for utilization of the small-scale merger
are likely to be met in any bona fide corporate combination, the key
factor involved in the availability of this device is the degree of
dilution involved for shareholders of the surviving corporation. The
theory behind the Delaware small-scale merger statute is that
dilution is excessive-and the small-scale merger device therefore
unavailable-whenever the merger consideration is common stock
(or securities convertible into common stock) in an amount that
causes (or has the potential for causing) more than a 20% increase in
the outstanding common stock of the surviving corporation. This is
consistent with the "20% rule" of the New York Stock Exchange.549
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a) (Supp. 1996).
The comparable provision of the Model Business Corporation Act reads:
(1) consummation of a plan of merger to which the corporation is a party
(i) if shareholder approval is required for the merger by section 11:03 or the
articles of incorporation and the shareholder is entitled to vote on the
merger ....
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02(a)(1) (1996).
548. FOLK, supra note 459, at 318.
549. The rule provides as follows:
312.03 Shareholder approval... prior to the issuance of securities (under
(b), (c) or (d) below) will be prerequisite to listing when:
(c) 'Common stock or securities convertible into or exercisable for
common stock are to be issued in any transaction or series of related
transactions, other than a public offering for cash, (i) if the common stock
has or will have upon issuance voting power equal to or in excess of 20% of
the voting power outstanding before the issuance of such stock or securities
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The 1984 Model Business Corporation Act differs somewhat
from the Delaware statute in that it makes the small-scale merger
device (with its denial of voting and appraisal rights to shareholders
of the surviving corporation) unavailable when the number of
outstanding voting shares (not just common shares) or participating
shares (those entitling their holders to participate without limitation
in distributions) would be increased by more than 20%.550 New
Jersey followed this lead in 1988 (except that its statute uses 40%
rather than 20%),551 and North Carolina followed in 1989 (using20%).552
c. Modification of Voting Standards
(1) Statutory Provisions
Even when Delaware's General Corporation Law was rewritten
in 1967,553 it continued to require, for shareholder approval of a long-
form merger, "two-thirds of the total number of the outstanding
shares of the capital stock" with "each share entitling the holder
thereof to one vote."'aM Not until 1969 was that provision changed55
to require only "a majority of the outstanding stock of the
corporation entitled to vote thereon. 556 The Delaware statute has
convertible into or exercisable for common stock, or (ii) the number of
shares of common stock to be issued is or will be equal to or in excess of
20% of the number of shares of common stock outstanding before the
issuance of the stock.
312.05 Where shareholder approval is a prerequisite to the listing of any
additional or new securities of a listed company, the minimum vote which will
constitute shareholder approval for listing purposes is defined as approval by a
majority of votes cast on a proposal in a proxy bearing on the particular matter,
provided that the total vote cast on the proposal represents over 50% in interest
of all securities entitled to vote on the proposal.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 312.03(c), 312.05 (1995)
(footnote defining "voting power outstanding" omitted).
550. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.03(g)(3)-(4), (h) (1996).
551. See supra text accompanying notes 534-35.
552. See supra notes 544-45.
553. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151; supra note 251 (second
paragraph).
554. Fomer DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Cum. Supp. 1968).
555. See Act of June 23, 1969, ch. 148, § 22, 57 Del. Laws 433, 443-45 (effective July
15,1969).
556. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 1996). The "outstanding stock ...
entitled to vote" excludes (i) shares made non-voting by terms of the charter, see id.
§ 151(a), (ii) treasury shares or shares that have been called for redemption, see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c)-(d) (1991), and (iii) parent company stock belonging to a
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never made provision for class voting on a merger.
Prior to the 1968 rewrite of its Business Corporation Act,55 7 New
Jersey's statute had required, for approval of a long-form merger,
"the votes of the holders of two-thirds of all the capital stock" with
"each share of stock entitling the holder to one vote" but with no
provision for a class vote.5 8 However, the statute also permitted a
corporation to provide by its charter that any action requiring the
vote of "two-thirds in interest of all of the stockholders" could be
taken by "two-thirds in interest of the stockholders present and
voting."559 As enacted in 1968 and now in effect, the New Jersey
statute on shareholder approval of a mergers6° provides as follows:
(2) .... Such plan [of merger] shall be approved upon
receiving the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast
by the holders of shares of each such corporation entitled to
subsidiary when the parent holds "a majority of the shares entitled to vote in the election
of directors" of the subsidiary, id § 160(c).
It seems clear that part (2) of the second sentence of section 216 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law should be construed as being qualified by the introductory
phrase of the first sentence of that section. The section provides as follows:
Subject to this chapter in respect of the vote that shall be required for a
specified action, the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of any corporation
authorized to issue stock may specify the number of shares and/or the amount of
other securities having voting power the holders of which shall be present or
represented by proxy at any meeting in order to constitute a quorum for, and the
votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction of any business, but in no event
shall a quorum consist of less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at the
meeting. In the absence of such specification in the certificate of incorporation
or bylaws of the corporation:
(1) A majority of the shares entitled to vote, present in person or
represented by proxy, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of
stockholders;
(2) In all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative
vote of the majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy at
the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act of the
stockholders;
(4) Where a separate vote by a class or classes is required, a majority
of the outstanding shares of such class or classes, present in person or
represented by proxy, shall constitute a quorum entitled to take action with
respect to that vote on that matter and the affirmative vote of the majority
of shares of such class or classes present in person or represented by proxy
at the meeting shall be the act of such class.
Id. §216.
. 557. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 NJ. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969);
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
558. Former N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-3 (West 1939) (quoted supra in note 293).
559. Id. § 14:10-9; see supra note 295 and accompanying text.
560. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1997).
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vote thereon,L611 and, in addition, if any class or series is
entitled to vote thereon as a class, the affirmative vote of a
majority of the votes cast in each class vote; except that, in
the case of a corporation organized prior to January 1, 1969,
the plan of merger ... shall be approved upon receiving the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the votes so cast. Any class
or series of shares of any such corporation shall be entitled
to vote as a class if the plan of merger ... contains any
provision which, if contained in a proposed amendment to
the certificate of incorporation, would entitle such class or
series of shares to vote as a class 15 unless such provision is
one which could be adopted by the board without
shareholder approval as referred to in subsection 14A:9-
2(2). The voting requirements of this section shall be
subject to such greater requirements as are provided in this
act for specific amendments or as may be provided in the
certificate of incorporation.
(3) Subject to the provisions of section 14A:5-12,L5631 a
corporation organized prior to January 1, 1969, may adopt
the majority voting requirements prescribed in subsection
14A:10-3(2) by an amendment of its certificate of
incorporation adopted by the affirmative vote of two-thirds
of the votes cast by the holders of shares entitled to vote
thereon.5 6
561. Excluded from "shares ... entitled to vote" are (i) shares lacking voting rights by
terms of the charter, see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A7-1(2)(f) (West 1969), (ii) the
corporation's own shares held by it, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-13 (West Supp. 1997),
and (iii) parent company shares held by a subsidiary when the parent "holds a majority of
the shares entitled to vote for the election of directors" of the subsidiary, id.
562. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:9-3 (West 1969) (setting forth the class-voting
provisions).
563. That section provides as follows:
(1) The provisions of the certificate of incorporation shall control
whenever, with respect to any action to be authorized by the shareholders of a
corporation, including the election of directors, the certificate of incorporation
requires the affirmative vote of a greater proportion of the votes cast, including
a unanimous vote, by the holders of shares entitled to vote thereon, or by the
holders of shares of any class or series thereof, than is required by this act with
respect to such action.
(2) An amendment of the certificate of incorporation which changes or
deletes such a provision shall be authorized by the same vote as would be
required to take action under the provision.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-12 (West Supp. 1997).
564. The Commissioners' Comment-1968 states in part:
Subsection 14A:10-3(2) departs from Title 14 and follows the second
paragraph of section 67 of the Model Act by specifically requiring a class vote in
addition to a vote of all the shareholders entitled to vote, whenever the plan of
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In 1950, the North Carolina statute required only "a majority of
the outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote" for approval of a
long-form merger,565 and no provision was made for a class vote.
When that state enacted its 1955 Business Corporation Act,5 66 the
requirement of "a majority of the outstanding shares" was retained;
however, it was provided that each outstanding share "shall be
entitled to vote on the proposed plan of merger ... whether or not
such share otherwise has voting rights," and provision was made for
class voting "if the plan of merger.., contains any provision which, if
contained in a proposed amendment to the charter, would entitle
such class of shares to vote as a class. '567 When the North Carolina
Act was rewritten in 1989,5  the shareholder voting requirement for a
merger was stated in the new Act as follows:
(b) For a plan of merger.., to be approved:
(2) The shareholders entitled to votet1691 must
approve the plan.
(e) Unless this Chapter, the articles of incorporation, a
bylaw adopted by the shareholders or the board of directors
merger or consolidation contains a provision, which, if proposed as an
amendment to the certificate of incorporation, would require approval by a class
vote.
Subsections 14A:10-3(2) and 14A:10-3(3) represent a substantial
departure from both Title 14 and the Model Act. Both Title 14 and the Model
Act require a two-thirds vote; the Revision permits a majority vote to
corporations organized after the Revision's effective date, as well as to
corporations organized prior to the Revision's effective date, who amend their
certificates of incorporation in the manner provided by subsection 14A:10-3(3).
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3 commentary at 50 (West 1969).
565. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-165 (1950) (quoted supra in note 301).
566. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1, 1957);
see supra note 252 (second paragraph).
567. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-108(b) (1982). The occasions for class voting were
enumerated in former section 55-101(a). See id. § 55-101(a).
568. See Act of June 8,1989, ch. 265,1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990);
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
569. The "shareholders entitled to vote" exclude holders of shares which (by terms of
the charter) are non-voting. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 55-6-01(d)(1) (1990). Also excluded
are holders of shares in the following categories: (i) in the absence of "special
circumstances," parent company shares owned by a subsidiary when the parent owns "a
majority of the shares entitled to vote for directors" of the subsidiary, see id. § 55-7-21(b),
and (ii) redeemable shares that have been called for redemption, see id. §55-7-21(d).
There is no exclusion for treasury shares-other than in section 55-7-21(a), which
provides for voting only by "outstanding" shares-because the new North Carolina
statute does not recognize treasury shares, see id. § 55-6-31(a).
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(acting pursuant to subsection (c))5 °l require a greater vote
or a vote by voting groups,m1l the plan of merger ... to be
authorized must be approved by each voting group entitled
to vote separately on the plan by a majority of all the votes
entitled to be cast on the plan by that voting group ....
(f) Separate voting by voting groups is required:
(1) On a plan of merger if the plan contains a
provision that, if contained in a proposed amendment
to articles of incorporation, would require action by
one or more separate voting groups on the proposed
amendment under G.S. 55-10-04, except where the
consideration to be received in exchange for the shares
of that group consists solely of cash;
572
These provisions are based on the 1984 Model Business Corporation
Act with two differences.573
The Model Act was amended, in 1962, by eliminating the
provision giving non-voting shares the right to vote on mergers and
by restating the voting requirement in terms of "shares entitled to
vote thereon."57 4 In 1969, the Model Act was further amended to
570. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(c) (Supp. 1996) ("The board of directors may
condition its submission of the proposed merger ... on any basis."). The same provision
appears in the Model Act. See MODELBus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.03(c) (1996).
571. The North Carolina statute defines this term as follows:
"Voting group" means all shares of one or more classes or series that under the
articles of incorporation or this Chapter are entitled to vote and be counted
together collectively on a matter at a meeting of shareholders. All shares
entitled by the articles of incorporation or this Chapter to vote generally on the
matter are for that purpose a single voting group.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-40(26) (Supp. 1996). This is the same as the definition in the
Model Act. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 1.40(26) (1996).
572. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(b), (e)-(f) (Supp. 1996).
573. The Model Business Corporation Act's section 11.03(e) does not contain the
phrase "a bylaw adopted by the shareholders," and its section 11.03(f)(1) does not contain
the clause "except where the consideration to be received in exchange for the shares of
that group consists solely of cash." See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.03(e), (f)(1)
(1996).
574. Among the comments to section 73 of the 1969 Model Act was the following:
The Model Act as originally drafted provided that each share carried the
right to vote on a proposed plan of merger or consolidation, whether or not
entitled to vote under the articles of incorporation. In 1962 an amendment
eliminated this provision on the ground that shareholders who had waived the
right to vote on all other fundamental issues deserved no inalienable right to
vote on mergers and consolidations, and voting on a proposed plan of merger or
consolidation was made conditional upon receiving only the affirmative vote of
holders of... shares entitled to vote thereon.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 73 commentary at 365 (1971).
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reduce the vote of shares required for a merger from two-thirds to a
simple majorityY5  The Model Act continued to require class voting
when the plan of merger proposed a change which, if made by way of
a charter amendment, would give rise to a class vote.56 The merger
voting provisions of the 1984 Model Act are the same as the North
Carolina provisions set forth above (with the differences there
noted)Y n
(2) Cases and Commentary
The move from requiring a two-thirds vote to a simple majority
vote for shareholder approval of a merger was a significant step in
the right direction. The same can be said of the elimination of
provisions giving non-voting shares a right to vote on a merger when
no class vote was involved.58
The New Jersey statute seems mistaken in permitting a merger
to be approved by less than a majority of the outstanding voting
shares. 9 If a corporation has 1,000,000 voting shares outstanding
and 500,001 of those shares are present or represented at a meeting
(thereby satisfying the quorum requirement), the affirmative vote of
250,001 shares (even assuming that all of the 500,001 shares are
voted) is sufficient under this statute to approve a merger-even
though that constitutes only 25% (plus one share) of the outstanding
voting stock.
While the current statutes of New Jersey and North Carolina (as
well as the provisions of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act)
575. The comment on this point included the following- "[I]n 1969 an amendment
reduced the required vote from two-thirds to a majority in recognition of the generally
prevailing view that, unless otherwise provided in the articles, a minority should not be
permitted to block the wishes of the majority." Id.
576. See id.
577. See supra text accompanying notes 569-73.
578. Both of these points have been alluded to earlier. See supra notes 307-13 and
accompanying text.
The vice of requiring an approving vote of two-thirds (rather than a majority) of the
outstanding shares is illustrated by Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 143 N.W.2d
374 (Minn. 1966), and Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.V.2d 410 (Iowa 1965). See supra
notes 307-08. Nonetheless, the vote required for approval of a merger in New York as
recently as 1984 was said to be "two thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote." Alpert v.
28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19,25 (N.Y. 1984).
579. The New Jersey statute provides that a plan of merger "shall be approved upon
receiving the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast by the holders of shares ...
entitled to vote thereon." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(2) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted
supra in text accompanying notes 560-62).
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call for class-voting on mergers in specified circumstances,.5 ° the
Delaware statute does not. This aspect of Delaware law is not only
unfortunate;5 8' it is also strange, given the fact that the Delaware
statute relating to charter amendments provides that "[t]he holders
of the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class
upon a proposed amendment... if the amendment would... alter or
change the powers, preferences, or special fights of the shares of such
class so as to affect them adversely."' As everyone knows, rights of
shareholders (particularly holders of preferred stock) can be
adversely affected by a merger just as easily as by a charter
amendment.5
While the 1989 rewrite of the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act follows (for the most part) the 1984 Model Business
Corporation Act, it departs from the Model Act in the provision
calling for class voting on mergers.584 The North Carolina provision
denies the right of a class vote to the holders of a class if the shares of
that class are to be converted into cash by terms of the merger5 -
leaving such holders with no power to veto the transaction but only a
right of appraisal. What this permits (so far as the statute is
concerned, and without regard to the doctrines of fiduciary duty and
fairness) is that a class of non-redeemable preferred shares can be
cashed out-that is, redeemed-by the directors and common
shareholders through the simple expedient of a merger58 with a
wholly owned subsidiary.
One of the unfortunate aspects of North Carolina's 1989
580. See id. (quoted supra in text accompanying notes 560-62); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
11-03(f)(1) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in text accompanying notes 570-72). For the
Model Business Corporation Act, see supra text accompanying notes 576-77.
581. See supra text accompanying notes 310-13.
582. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (1991).
583. See, ag., Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136-37 (Del.
1984).
584. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(0(1) (Supp. 1996); supra note 573 (second
clause).
585. This bizarre provision is virtually unexplained in the North Carolina
Commentary, which says only this: "This provision [as set forth in the Model Business
Corporation Act] was modified in subdivision (f)(1) to create an exception where the
consideration to be received in exchange for the shares of the voting group consists solely
of cash." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03 commentary at 230 (1990).
586. Such a transaction probably would be effected by way of a long-form merger
because of the limitation on use of a short-form merger. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-
04(e) (1990), as amended by Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 485, § 29 (effective Oct. 1, 1997)
(quoted supra in note 496).
587. This proposition assumes, in case the preferred is voting stock, that the common
shares are more numerous and therefore capable of out-voting the preferred.
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Business Corporation Act (and of the 1984 Model Business
Corporation Act on which it is based) is that its voting provisions
discarded the terminology of class voting-wel understood by
corporate lawyers for decades-and substituted the new and
confusing terminology of "voting groups. ''ss
3. Changes in Permissible Consideration
Although other states-with Florida leading the way in 1925-
had earlier amended their statutes to permit the use of cash as
merger consideration,589 the merger statutes of the three subject
states, other than that of North Carolina between 1943 and 1957,590
did not authorize the use of cash prior to 1957.591 Moreover, it was
not until 1967 that any of the three states explicitly permitted-as
valid merger consideration-stock of another corporation that was
not a party to the merger.
a. Statutory Provisions
Use of cash as merger consideration was first authorized by
Delaware and New Jersey in their short-form merger statutes.
588. A minor deficiency in section 55-11-03(b)(2) of the new North Carolina statute,
and in section 11.03(b)(2) of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act, both relating to
shareholder approval of a plan of merger or share exchange, is that those sections provide
only that "[t]he shareholders entitled to vote must approve the plan" and fail to add the
words "as provided in subsections (e) and (0" (those being the subsections that set forth
the voting requirements). By way of contrast, section 55-10-03(b)(2) of the new North
Carolina statute, and section 10.03(b)(2) of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act,
both relating to shareholder approval of a charter amendment, correctly provide that
"[t]he shareholders entitled to vote ... must approve the amendment as provided in
subsection (e)" (that being the subsection that sets forth the voting requirements).
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(b)(2) (Supp. 1996), and MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr
ANN. § 11.03(b)(2) (1996), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-03(b)(2) (Supp. 1996), and
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 10.03(b)(2) (1996).
589. See Weiss, supra note 4, at 632.
590. Use of cash was authorized by a 1943 rewriting of North Carolina's merger
statute. See supra text accompanying notes 322-23. However, when that state enacted its
1955 Business Corporation Act, "cash" was dropped. See Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371,
sec. 1, § 106(b)(4), 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432,1495 (effective July 1,1957). The 1955 Act
provided that the plan of merger was to set forth "[t]he manner and basis of converting
the shares of each merging corporation into shares or other securities or obligations of the
surviving corporation." Id.
591. There was New Jersey case law allowing the use of cash as part of the merger
consideration. The New Jersey Commissioners' Comment-1968 contains the following:
The use of cash as part consideration has been recognized in Windhurst v.
Central Leather Co., but the statute may be subject to the limitations found in
Outwater v. Public Service Corp. See Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1 commentary at 38 (West 1969) (citations omitted).
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Delaware led the way in 1957,19 followed by New Jersey in 1967;593
but North Carolina did not adopt a short-form merger statute until
1989.594
When Delaware's General Corporation Law was rewritten in
1967, its basic long-form merger statute authorized as permissible
consideration (in addition to shares or other securities of the
surviving corporation) the use of either cash or securities of another
corporation. 595 With some changes of wording, 596 Delaware's current
long-form merger statute is virtually unlimited in what it permits as
valid merger consideration. 59
New Jersey followed, in 1968, by providing in its long-form
merger statute that the consideration could consist of cash or
securities of another corporation.5 98 With some amendments,5 9 New
592. See supra text accompanying notes 460-62.
593. See supra text accompanying notes 475-77.
594. See supra text accompanying notes 492-95.
595. The 1967 Delaware statute provided that the merger agreement was to state:
(4) the manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations
into shares or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the
merger or consolidation and, if any shares of any of the constituent corporations
are not to be converted solely into shares or other securities of the surviving or
resulting corporation, the amount of cash or securities of any other corporation
which is to be paid or delivered to the holders of such shares in exchange for or
upon the surrender of such shares, which cash or securities of any other
corporation may be in addition to the shares or other securities of the surviving
or resulting corporation into which any of the shares of any of the constituent
corporations are to be converted; ....
Act of July 3,1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 251(b)(4), 56 Del. Laws 151,206-07.
596. See Act of Jan. 2, 1968, ch. 186, § 16,56 Del. Laws 610,612-13 (1967); Act of June
23, 1969, ch. 148, § 22, 57 Del. Laws 433, 443-44 (effective July 15, 1969); Act of July 8,
1983, ch. 112, § 30, 64 Del. Laws 285, 289 (effective July 1, 1983); Act of July 9, 1987, ch.
136, § 18, 66 Del. Laws 335, 338 (changing the designation of section 251(b)(4) to section
251(b)(5)); Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 337, § 1, 68 Del. Laws 1159, 1159 (effective July 1,
1992).
597. Delaware's General Corporation Law now provides that the merger agreement is
to state:
(5) the manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations
into shares or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the
merger or consolidation and, if any shares of any of the constituent corporations
are not to be converted solely into shares or other securities of the surviving or
resulting corporation, the cash, property, rights or securities of any other
corporation or entity which the holders of such shares are to receive in exchange
for, or upon conversion of such shares and the surrender of any certificates
evidencing them, which cash, property, rights or securities of any other
corporation or entity may be in addition to or in lieu of shares or other securities
of the surviving or resulting corporation; ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (Supp. 1996).
598. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, § 14A:10-1(2)(c), 1968 N.J. Laws 1011, 1094
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Jersey's Business Corporation Act now provides that the plan of
merger is to set forth "Itlhe manner and basis of converting the
shares of each corporation into shares, obligations, or other securities
of the surviving corporation... or of any other corporation... or, in
whole or in part, into cash or other property. ' '
North Carolina's 1955 Business Corporation Act was amended
in 1969,611 and again in 1973,1 to follow the Delaware and New
Jersey approach concerning permissible merger consideration.6 3 Its
1989 Business Corporation Act, employing the language of the 1984
Model Business Corporation Act,6 provides that "[t]he plan of
merger must set forth: ... (3) The manner and basis of converting the
shares of each corporation into shares, obligations, or other securities
of the surviving or any other corporation or into cash or other
property in whole or part."6 5 ,
b. Cases and Commentary
The statutory changes noted above have had two significant
consequences. First, they made possible the cash-out merger; second,
(effective Jan. 1,1969). The Commissioners' Comment-1968 states in part:
This section substantially follows section 65 of the Model Act except that
paragraph 14A:10-1(2)(c) has been clarified to permit as consideration for the
merger cash as in the New York Act (N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 902(a)(3)D], or the
securities or obligations of corporations not a party to the merger as in the
Delaware Act (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 252(b)(3) [sic] (Rev. 1967)).
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1 commentary at 37 (West 1969).
599. See Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366, § 51, 1973 N.J. Laws 964, 1018 (effective May 1,
1974); Act of Dec. 15, 1995, ch. 279, § 12,1995 NJ. Laws 1692,1706-07 (effective Mar. 14,
1996).
600. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1(2)(c) (West Supp. 1997).
601. See Act of June 11, 1969, ch. 751, § 37,1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 773,780.
602. See Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, § 31, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 545, 554 (effective
Oct. 1, 1973).
603. The North Carolina statute provided that the plan of merger was to set forth:
(4) The manner and basis of converting the shares of each of the
constituent corporations into shares or other securities or obligations of the
surviving corporation, and, if any shares of any of the constituent corporations
are not to be converted solely into shares or other securities or obligations of the
surviving corporation, the cash, property, rights or shares or other securities or
obligations of any other corporation which the holders of such shares are
entitled to receive in exchange for such shares or upon their conversion and the
surrender of the certificates evidencing such shares, which cash, property, rights
or shares or other securities or obligations of any other corporation may be in
addition to or in lieu of the shares or securities or obligations of the surviving
corporation ....
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-106(b)(4) (1982).
604. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.01(b)(3) (1996).
605. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-01(b)(3) (1990).
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they made possible the triangular merger.
(1) Cash-Out Merger606
(a) The Problem Entailed
Following the authorization of cash as permissible merger
consideration, the cash-out merger became the device of choice in
eliminating minority shareholders from a controlled corporation.618
606. Articles on this subject include the following. Arthur M. Borden, Going
Private-Old Tort New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Victor Brudney,
A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975); Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE LJ. 1354 (1978); Dierdre A.
Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder in the Modern Public
Corporation: Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness in Freezeouts, 1984 Wis. L.
REv. 593; Edward F. Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976); Carole B. Silver, Fair Dealing Comes of Age in the Regulation
of Going Private Transactions, 9 J. CORP. L. 385 (1984); Marc I. Steinberg & Evalyn N.
Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1984); and Weiss,
supra note 4.
607. There is another device by which minority shareholders can be eliminated. It is
not discussed herein because it does not involve a corporate combination. The device is
the reverse stock split. The subject is discussed in the following: Paul H. Dykstra, The
Reverse Stock Split-That Other Means of Going Private, 53 CHM.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1976);
Michael J. Lawson, Comment, Reverse Stock Splits: The Fiduciaty's Obligations Under
State Law, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1226 (1975); and Michael R. Rickman, Note, Reverse Stock
Splits and Squeeze-outs: A Need for Heightened Scrutiny, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1219 (1986).
The reverse stock split has been the subject of litigation on several occasions. See
Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54, 57-58 (Ill. 1974) (holding that a 1-
for-600 reverse stock split was valid when there was no claim of fraud or deception, no
showing of any improper purpose, and no charge that the price paid for a fractional share
was inadequate); Lerner v. Lerner, 511 A.2d 501, 502-03, 511-12 (Md. 1986) (sustaining a
preliminary injunction against a proposed 1-for-35 reverse stc-.k split whereby one
brother owning 25 of the 95 outstanding shares would have been cashed out and another
brother owning the other 70 shares would have wound up with the only two shares
outstanding); Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173,174-75,177-79 (Mass. 1985) (holding,
when a 1-for-4000 reverse stock split was effected in 1980 following a going public
transaction in 1969, that the evidence supported the trial court's rejection of the plaintiff's
claim that the recapitalization was not designed to achieve a legitimate business purpose,
and remanding on the question of fairness of the price at which fractional shares were to
be paid out); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662, 665
(Sup. Ct. 1976) (granting a temporary injunction when no legitimate business purpose was
shown for eliminating the minority through a 1-for-4000 reverse stock split).
The new North Carolina statute gives a right of dissent and appraisal with respect to
a reverse stock split. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(4)(v) (Supp. 1996) (quoted infra
in note 1226).
608. A cash-out merger to eliminate minority shareholders would not occur in the
context of a widely held public corporation in which no entity or cohesive group has a
controlling stock interest. Nor could it occur in the context of a closely held corporation
whose voting shares are evenly divided between two individuals or two cohesive groups
(such as two families) or whose minority shareholders have successfully bargained for
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To highlight the problem inherent in such cash-out mergers, it is
important to contrast arm's length transactions and interested-party
mergers.
When a cash merger is negotiated at arm's length between the
managements of two previously unrelated corporations, all
shareholders (of each class) of the disappearing corporation receive
equal (pro rata) treatment, and consummation of the transaction
requires a meaningful vote by holders of that company's voting
shares. In these circumstances, there is little basis upon which a
dissenting shareholder of the disappearing corporation might expect
to obtain equitable relief.
From the point of view of minority shareholders of a controlled
corporation involved in a cash merger, matters are quite different. If
the controlled corporation involves a parent-subsidiary relationship
and the subsidiary is merged into its parent, or if the controlling
interest is held by an individual or cohesive group and the controlled
corporation is merged into another corporation (previously existing
or newly created) that is wholly owned by the individual or group,
two of the safeguards that protect the interests of shareholders of the
disappearing corporation in an arm's length merger are missing.
First, since the controlling party sits on both sides of the transaction
and thereby dictates its terms, there is a lack of any bargaining
(absent a negotiating committee charged with representation of the
veto powers at the time of the corporation's organization. Moreover, management-led
recapitalizations employing the merger device-as, for example, in Federal United Corp.
v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 333-34 (Del. 1940), and Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249
A.2d 89, 91 (RI. 1969)-have usually involved the use of new securities, rather than cash,
as merger consideration. Thus, it is probably accurate to say that a cash-out merger is
likely to occur only in the context of a controlled corporation, see supra note 401, when
control-at both the board level and the shareholder level-is exercised either by another
entity or by a cohesive group of shareholders.
609. When the merger terms have been arrived at through arm's length negotiation,
the requirement of fairness has limited significance. A shareholder mounting a legal
challenge to such a merger on fairness grounds will have the burden of establishing
unfairness of the transaction. And, if the transaction is one requiring approval by the
plaintiff's fellow shareholders, the court is likely to regard an approving shareholder vote
as a sufficient mark of the fairness of the transaction from the perspective of that
shareholder body. Moreover, if the right of appraisal is accorded to dissenting
shareholders, the plaintiff is likely to be confronted with the contention that the appraisal
remedy is exclusive in the absence of fraud or illegality. As a practical matter, a
complaining shareholder of the disappearing corporation is reduced to the contention that
the merger consideration is so grossly inadequate as to amount to constructive fraud.
And the standard required for a showing of constructive fraud is so demanding that a
complaining shareholder seldom succeeds in making the required showing. See supra
note 379.
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minority's interests610). Second, since the controlling party owns a
controlling interest in the stock of the disappearing corporation, the
outcome of the shareholder vote on the transaction is predetermined
and therefore meaningless (unless consummation of the merger is
conditioned upon the favorable vote of a majority of the minority6n').
Of course, the two safeguards missing in an interested-party
merger are absent even when the merger consideration consists of
common stock of the surviving corporation. However, in a stock
merger of a majority-owned subsidiary into its parent, the minority
holders-while eliminated as shareholders of the disappearing
corporation to become a smaller minority of the parent's
shareholders-would at least continue to have an equity interest in
the combined enterprise.613 Moreover, if parent company stock was
used as the merger consideration, the transaction could be structured
as a tax-free reorganization so that there would be no immediate tax
consequences for the subsidiary's minority shareholders.1 4 In a cash
merger, on the other hand, the controlling party winds up with the
wherewithal to continue the business of the controlled corporation,
while the minority shareholders of that corporation wind up with
nothing but cash and (possibly) a tax liability.
Thus, in a cash-out merger, the controlling party has not only
caused the transaction to be effected but has also done so to its own
benefit and to the detriment of the minority shareholders. In short,
the controlling party has engaged in self-dealing615 in breach of its
fiduciary duty"'1 and with more severe consequences for minority
610. Use of this technique is discussed in Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 606, at 367-
71.
611. Weiss advances three arguments "against giving substantial weight to an
approving vote by a majority of the minority shareholders." Weiss, supra note 4, at 676-
77.
612. As a practical matter, in a merger transaction engineered by controlling
individuals using their wholly owned corporation as the survivor, stock of the latter
corporation would not be utilized, because nothing would be accomplished-the minority
would not be eliminated.
613. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
614. See supra text accompanying note 326.
615. In Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512 (Del. Ch. 1978), the court said:
The traditional prerequisite for invoking the intrinsic fairness test, in a parent-
subsidiary context, is that the parent controls the making of the transaction and
the fixing of its terms. This rule has been narrowed, however, to require that
there also be a showing of self-dealing, i.e., that the parent benefited to the
exclusion of and to the detriment of the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.
Id. at 519 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Getty Oil Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970)).
616. n Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984), the court said:
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shareholders than in the case of an interested-party merger using
stock of the controlling corporation.
(b) The Judicial Response
The courts have had difficulty in dealing with cash-out mergers,
and their decisions have gone in different directions. 17 The difficulty
can be illustrated best by examining the tortuous evolution of the
decisions in Delaware.
For some years after Delaware's authorization of the use of cash
as merger consideration (1957 for short-form mergers and 1967 for
long-form mergers), minority shareholders enjoyed no success in
obtaining relief other than appraisal when they were eliminated as
shareholders by way of a cash-out merger. Two years after
enactment of the 1957 short-form merger statute, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp.,618 held
that minority shareholders of a subsidiary could be cashed out by way
of a short-form merger, notwithstanding the fact that they had
acquired their stock prior to enactment of the statute authorizing the
use of cash as merger consideration. Three years later, in Stauffer v.
Standard Brands Inc.,619 that court held that, in the absence of fraud
or illegality, appraisal was the exclusive remedy of a minority
Fair dealing and fair price alone will not render the [cash-out] merger
acceptable. As mentioned, there exists a fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders
equally. This duty arises as a concomitant to the power reposed in the majority
over corporate governance. The fact remains, however, that in a freeze-out
merger the minority shareholders are being treated in a different manner: the
majority is permitted continued participation in the equity of the surviving
corporation while the minority has no choice but to surrender their shares for
cash. On its face, the majority's conduct would appear to breach this fiduciary
obligation.
Id. at 27-28 (citations omitted).
617. In some cases, cash-out mergers have been sustained on the ground that appraisal
constituted the only remedy available to dissenting shareholders. See, e.g., Yanow v. Teal
Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311,320 (Conn. 1979); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 87 N.E.2d
561, 564 (N.Y. 1949). But in other cases, such mergers have been invalidated on the
ground that there was no valid business purpose to sustain them. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock
& Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1974); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345,
356 (Ind. 1977) (paying shareholders with five-year debentures instead of immediate
cash). In others, invalidation has been based on fiduciary duty and the requirement of
entire fairness. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566, 571-74 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
618. 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959); see infra text accompanying notes 1256-63.
619. 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962). In this case, Standard Brands, owning more than 90% of
the stock of Planters (Pennsylvania), changed Planters's domicile by merging it into a
newly created corporation, Planters (Delaware), and then cashed out Planters's minority
shareholders by way of an upstream short-form merger. See id at 79.
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shareholder in a short-form cash-out merger.A Then, in a 1971
decision by Delaware's chancery court in David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Industries, Inc.,' involving a long-form merger in which a
parent corporation eliminated the minority interest in a subsidiary
through the use of cash and fifteen-year debentures, the court denied
injunctive relief, holding that the plaintiffs' "recourse is to an
appraisal" when "no fraud or blatant overreaching is
demonstrated."'
Cashed-out plaintiffs had a similar lack of success when they
sought relief under S.E.C. Rule 10b-5.w In Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green,6 the Supreme Court held that, when full disclosure had
been made with respect to a cash-out merger, an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty was not actionable under Rule 10b-5. After noting
that some states required a "valid corporate purpose" for eliminating
a minority interest through a short-form merger while others
(specifically Delaware) did not,6 the Court made the following
observation: "There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary
standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this
complaint."'
Against this backdrop, the Delaware Supreme Court, in 1977,
embarked upon a short-lived embrace of the business purpose test
for the evaluation of cash-out mergers. In Singer v. Magnavox Co.,W
involving a long-form cash-out merger following acquisition of 84%
of the corporate stock through a tender offer, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that such a merger "accomplished without any purpose
other than elimination of the minority stockholders"-that is,
without any valid business purpose-is "violative of the fiduciary
duty owed by the majority to the minority stockholders" and that
such a merger, "made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process" and, further, that
"defendants cannot meet their fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs
620. The Stauffer court said: "[IThe very purpose of the [short-form merger] statute is
to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's
interest in the enterprise." Id. at 80. This point was reiterated in In re Delaware Racing
Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203,209 (Del. 1965).
621. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
622. Id. at 35.
623. 17 C.F.IR § 240.10b-5 (1997).
624. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
625. See id. at 479 n.16.
626. Id. at 479-80.
627. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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simply by relegating them to a statutory appraisal proceeding. ' 62S
Later in that year, the same court decided Tanzer v. International
General Industries, Inc.,629 holding that a bona fide purpose was
required to justify a long-form cash-out merger but that a purpose of
the parent corporation-that of facilitating long-term debt
financing-was sufficient.630 Then, in 1979, the court held, in Roland
International Corp. v. Najjar,6 1 that the principles announced in
Singer with respect to a long-form merger applied also to a short-
form cash-out merger. 32 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court had
done a complete about-face with respect to its 1962 decision in
Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc. 3
In 1983, that court did its second about-face in the space of six
years. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,634 the court stated that "the
business purpose requirement of the trilogy of Singer, Tanzer, Najar
... shall no longer be of any force or effect."635 In place of the
business purpose test, 36 the Weinberger court focused on a fiduciary
628. Id. at 980, 977.
629. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
630. A year later, the Delaware Chancery Court decided the case of Young v. Valh4
Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978). Notwithstanding alleged saving of corporate taxes
and avoidance of future conflicts of interest, a cash-out merger with a newly created
wholly owned subsidiary was enjoined when the court concluded that the basic purpose of
the merger was to eliminate the minority interest. See id. at 1378-79.
631. 407 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Del. 1979). In this case, parties owning 97.6% of the stock
of Roland transferred that stock to a newly created corporation, Landro, in exchange for
all of Landro's stock, and then attempted to cash out the 329 minority shareholders of
Roland by way of a short-form merger of Landro into Roland. See 11 at 1033.
The decision in Najjar was foreshadowed by the chancellor's decision in Kemp v.
Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 244-45 (Del. Ch. 1977) (expressing the view that the Singer doctrine
should be applied to short-form, as well as long-form, cash-out mergers).
632. In Harman v. Masoneilan Internationa4 Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982), the Singer
business purpose doctrine was reiterated even when the merger consideration received by
the minority shareholders consisted of stock rather than cash. See U at 492-93.
633. See supra notes 619-20 and accompanying text.
634. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). For a useful analysis of this decision, see Elliott J.
Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4
CARDOZO L. REV. 245 (1983).
635. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
636. Courts in other jurisdictions applied the Singer doctrine prior to the decision in
Weinberger. See Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1981)
(applying the business purpose test but holding that facilitation of financing constituted a
valid purpose); Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 607 P.2d 1036,1045-46 (Haw. 1980) (embracing the
Singer business purpose doctrine in a case involving a reverse triangular merger).
And some courts applied the Singer doctrine after (and notwithstanding) Weinberger.
See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1116-17 (Mass.
1986) (holding that a cash-out merger must meet the business purpose test as well as the
test of fairness); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28-29 (N.Y. 1984)
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duty/entire fairness test as the proper basis for evaluating a cash-out
merger. In the fiduciary duty part of that test, it stressed the duty of
loyalty;6 37 and, in the entire fairness part of the test, it stressed fair
dealing as well as fair price.638
(c) Some Unfinished Business
The Weinberger court came down on solid ground when it made
the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the requirement of entire fairness
the focal points in dealing with cash-out mergers. However, the
Delaware Supreme Court has yet to address squarely two points that
appear to deserve attention.
The result of a cash-out merger (as noted above) is that the
controlling party winds up with the wherewithal to continue the
business of the controlled corporation, while the minority
shareholders wind up with nothing but cash. Such a result (if
achieved without resort to a negotiating committee capable of
engaging in arm's length bargaining or to an informed vote of a
majority of the minority) would seem to violate two of the principal
ingredients of the duty of loyalty: the controlling shareholder (or
cohesive group) has used its fiduciary position to benefit itself to the
detriment of the minority,639 and there has been disparate treatment
of the majority and minority shareholders."4 With respect to entire
fairness or lack thereof, the controlling shareholder has made a
unilateral decision as to when and on what terms the minority
shareholders are to sell their stock in the enterprise.641 Upon
revisiting the concepts of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the
(holding that, in an equitable action challenging a freeze-out merger, a court should
consider, among other things, "whether there exists any independent corporate purpose
for the merger," but holding also that the need of the business to attract additional capital
constituted "a bona fide business purpose"). But see Persinger v. Carmazzi, 441 S.E.2d
646, 654 (W. Va. 1994) (expressing agreement with Weinberger's rejection of the Singer
business purpose requirement "so long as the terms tendered to the minority stockholders
[in a cash-out merger] accurately reflect the fair market value of the minority interest").
637. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11.
638. See id. at 711-12.
639. See supra note 427 and accompanying text, and notes 447-48 and accompanying
text.
640. See supra notes 428-29 and accompanying text.
641. See Borden, supra note 606, at 1015 ("The chief objection of minority public
shareholders to going-private transactions is that public policy should not permit the
controlling shareholders to fix the price at which they will use the assets of the
corporation to buy out the remaining shareholders."); Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1202
("Imhe nub of the problem is that an absolute freeze-out right would mean that those in
control rather than the stockholder himself would decide when he shall sell his stock.").
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requirement of entire fairness, the Delaware Supreme Court may yet
have occasion to qualify its statement-made in a 1984 cash-out
merger case-that "[i]t is ... settled under Delaware law that
minority stock interests may be eliminated by merger."642
The other point that deserves attention involves the question
whether the elimination of minority shareholders by way of merger
should be confined to stock mergers. While recognizing that there
may be good reasons why the management of a parent corporation
might want to eliminate the minority interest in a majority-owned
subsidiary, it should be understood that this objective can be
accomplished, not only by a cash merger, but also by a stock
merger." 3 In the classic case of Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,€"
the minority interest in the subsidiary (Mayflower) was eliminated by
way of a long-form merger of Mayflower into its parent (Hilton)
using common stock of Hilton as the merger consideration, so that
minority shareholders of Mayflower (excluding any who may have
elected to exercise their appraisal rights) became shareholders of
Hilton. 5 Similarly, in Tanzer,641 the minority interest in Kliklock
642. Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984)(involving an unsuccessful challenge by preferred shareholders of a cash-out merger,
following a tender offer, at a price substantially below the preferred's liquidation
preference).
Only seven years earlier, in Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977), the same court had said: "In Singer .... we held that a merger of a
Delaware corporation caused by a majority stockholder solely for the purpose of cashing-
out minority stockholders is a violation of a fiduciary duty owed by the former to the
latter." Id. at 1122. Other courts, as well, have said that a cash-out merger constitutes a
breach of fiduciary duty. See Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342,
345 (M.D.N.C. 1984) ("[Pllaintiffs' allegation, taken as true, that defendants intended to
freeze out the minority shareholders adequately states a breach of fiduciary duty claim.");
Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 607 P.2d 1036,1046 (Haw. 1980) ("We agree that a merger effected
for the sole purpose of freezing out the minority interest is a violation of fiduciary
principles governing the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders.").
But see Rosenstein v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 522 N.E.2d 221,223-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that a reverse triangular cash-out merger, engineered by a parent corporation,
did not entail any breach of fiduciary duty).
643. The transaction might take the form of a merger of a subsidiary into its parent,
with stock of the parent used as the merger consideration. With authorization given for
the use of stock of another corporation as merger consideration, see supra text
accompanying notes 595-605, the transaction might take the form of a merger of the
subsidiary with a newly created subsidiary of the parent using stock of the parent as the
merger consideration.
644. 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
645. Before the merger, the minority shareholders held approximately 17.4% of
Mayflower's outstanding common stock. See id. at 108. After the merger, if no one had
exercised the right of appraisal, the former minority shareholders of Mayflower would
have wound up owning approximately 4.1% of Hilton's outstanding common stock. See
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could have been eliminated by way of a merger using IGI stock; and,
in Weinberger,647 the minority interest in UOP could have been
eliminated by way of a merger utilizing Signal stock. Given the
benefits-a continuing equity interest with tax free treatment648-that
would accrue to minority shareholders from use of parent company
stock as the merger consideration, the question that arises is whether
the use of cash to eliminate the minority interest is consistent with
the duty of entire fairness owed by the controlling shareholder to the
minority.649 During the period from 1977 to 1983, when the Delaware
Supreme Court was examining the question whether there was a valid
business purpose to sustain a take-out merger, perhaps it should have
been examining the question whether there was a valid business
purpose for using cash rather than parent company stock in effecting
the elimination of the subsidiary's minority shareholders.6' A
requirement that parent company stock be used in effecting a merger
of a subsidiary into its parent (or into a newly created subsidiary of
the parent) would ensure that minority shareholders of the subsidiary
could retain a continuing equity interest in the total post-merger
enterprise (parent or parent plus new subsidiary) comparable to their
interest in the total pre-merger enterprise (parent plus former
subsidiary), thereby conforming more nearly with the mandates of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the requirement of entire fairness. 651
id. at 108-09.
646. See supra text accompanying notes 629-30.
647. See supra text accompanying notes 634-38.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 325-26 and 613-14.
649. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the court said: "The
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides
of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the
test of careful scrutiny by the courts." Id. at 710. This statement was repeated in
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929,937 (Del. 1985).
650. In In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1965), Delaware Park, a
charitable corporation, owning more than 90% of the stock of Steeplechase, transferred
that stock to its wholly owned subsidiary, Racing, and then caused Steeplechase to be
merged into Racing by way of a cash-out short-form merger. See id- at 207-09. Because
the parent was a charitable corporation, and as such did not issue stock, there was a
compelling reason to use cash in effecting the merger.
Borden draws a distinction between requiring the use of stock in the case of a public
operating parent eliminating the minority interest in a public subsidiary and permitting
the use of cash in the case of a non-public operating parent eliminating such a minority
interest. See Borden, supra note 606, at 1018-19.
651. It may not be too great a stretch to view the parent's shareholders and the
subsidiary's minority holders as two groups of shareholders in one combined enterprise
and to say that, in a take-out merger, both groups should be treated evenly. See Brudney
& Chirelstein, supra note 606, at 1375 ("The effect then [of using parent company stock in
a take-out merger] is to allow management to unite its stockholder groups without
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Some observations are in order concerning the suggestion that a
parent corporation be required (absent a valid reason for doing
otherwise) to use shares of its stock rather than cash in eliminating
minority shareholders from a controlled corporation.62 First, such a
requirement would preclude a transaction in which individuals,
owning a controlling stock interest in a corporation, transfer such
stock to a newly created shell corporation and then bring about a
cash merger between the controlled corporation and the shell
corporation for the purpose of eliminating the minority interest.
653
Second, in order to preserve the right of appraisal for dissenting
shareholders of a Delaware subsidiary whose shares are marketable
(in the sense of being listed on a national securities exchange or
designated as a national market system security or being held of
record by more than 2000 holders), it would be necessary to amend
the flawed provisions of the Delaware appraisal statute (discussed
below) that deny appraisal rights to such shareholders if their
corporation disappears in a long-form merger and if, under the
agreement of merger, they are to receive shares of the surviving
corporation or marketable shares (similarly defined) of another
corporation.6 Third, the suggested requirement that parent
preferring one group to the other.").
652. This suggested requirement does not overlook the fact that, if minority
shareholders are cashed out of a subsidiary of a publicly traded parent, such shareholders
could use the cash received by them in the merger to purchase shares of the parent's stock
in the open market. The problem, of course, is that brokerage commissions would, and
capital gains taxes might, reduce the number of parent company shares that could be
purchased with the cash proceeds from the merger.
Brudney and Chirelstein suggest that, in mergers between publicly held parents and
their subsidiaries, the subsidiaries' shareholders should receive common stock of the
parent or enough cash "to enable them to reacquire the same proportionate interest in
the parent that they would have possessed had the consideration received been common
stock alone." Id at 1372-73. One difficulty with this suggested cash alternative lies in the
fact that different shareholders of the subsidiary will have different tax bases and
therefore different capital gains (or losses) on their respective holdings of the subsidiary's
stock.
653. Transactions of this kind have been invalidated in a number of cases. See, e.g.,
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1974); Albright v.
Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754, 756-57 (D. Utah 1974); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d
345, 353-56 (Ind. 1977); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566, 570-74 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975); see also People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 371 N.Y.S.2d 550,554
(Sup. Ct. 1975) (enjoining a cash-out merger, utilizing a shell corporation of the
controlling family, in a suit brought not by complaining minority shareholders but by the
state attorney general), affd per curiam, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 1975).
Such transactions also have been frowned upon by commentators. See Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 606, at 1365-70; Greene, supra note 606, at 512-13.
654. This problem was alluded to when the Tanzer case was considered on remand.
See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 390-91 (Del. Ch. 1979)
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company stock be used in effecting a merger of a subsidiary into its
parent (or into a newly created subsidiary) need not be applied in a
case in which the merger has been consummated following arm's
length negotiation of its terms nor in a case in which the merger
terms have been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the
minority shares-that is, in cases in which the parent is acting with
some appropriate level of approval.655
(2) Triangular Merger656
The triangular merger is another mode of corporate combination
made possible by the newer forms of permissible merger
consideration. As implied by its name, it involves three corporations:
the prime mover in effecting the combination (acquiring
corporation), the corporation being acquired (acquired corporation),
and the acquiring corporation's wholly owned subsidiary
(subsidiary)-often newly created for purposes of the transaction. In
a straight triangular merger, the acquired corporation is merged into
the subsidiary, with shareholders of the acquired corporation
receiving either cash or stock of the acquiring corporation, and the
latter corporation (through its stock ownership of the subsidiary)
attaining control of the acquired corporation's business. In a reverse
triangular merger, the subsidiary is merged into the acquired
corporation, with shareholders of the latter corporation receiving the
same kind of merger consideration as in a straight triangular merger,
and the acquiring corporation receiving (in exchange for its stock
interest in the disappearing subsidiary) new voting stock of the
acquired corporation which makes that corporation a wholly owned
subsidiary of the acquiring corporation.
An important consequence of the triangular merger lies in the
("[N]or are [appraisal rights] available for shares of stock which are listed on a national
securities exchange, and which are exchanged upon a merger for shares of stock listed on
a national securities exchange."), on remand from 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), overruled in
part by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,715 (Del. 1983). The pertinent provision
of the Delaware appraisal statute, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1)-(2) (Supp.
1996) (quoted infra in note 753), is criticized infra in text accompanying notes 773-76.
The problem would be eliminated if the Delaware appraisal statute were to be
modified (as the appraisal provision of the Model Business Corporation Act has been) by
removing the denial of appraisal rights for shares that are marketable. See infra notes
775-76 and accompanying text.
655. This approach is in harmony with the philosophy embodied in interested director
statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
656. The subject is discussed in Gerald Raskin, Triangular Mergers: A Useful
Technique, 12 COLO. LAW. 1630 (1983), and Note, Three-Party Mergers: The Fourth
Form of Corporate Acquisition, 57 VA. L. REV. 1242 (1971).
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fact that, after the transaction is completed, the acquired
corporation's assets and liabilities are those of a subsidiary of the
acquiring corporation rather than assets and liabilities of the
acquiring corporation (as would be the case, by operation of law, had
the acquired corporation been merged into the acquiring
corporation). This means that the acquiring corporation enjoys the
benefit of limited liability so that its assets are not exposed to claims
of the acquired corporation's creditors.6 Moreover, in a reverse
triangular merger, with the acquired corporation's separate existence
continuing, the survival of that separate existence protects franchises
and licenses of the acquired corporation that are not freely
transferable and could obviate the need for consents from
governmental authorities when the acquired corporation is in a
regulated industry.
A triangular merger can, of course, be effected when cash is used
as the merger consideration. 58 However, it is in the context of a
large-scale acquisition utilizing stock of the acquiring corporatione 9
657. This could be a matter of considerable importance when the acquired corporation
has exposure to mass market product liability of the kind involved in Brotherton v.
Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337, 1339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (holding that, when a
corporation engaged in the asbestos business was merged into a corporation not
previously engaged in that business, the surviving corporation "became statutorily bound
to absorb all the liabilities of [the disappearing corporation] including any potential claims
for punitive damages").
658. One context in which the triangular form of merger has been attempted (with a
view toward eliminating the minority shareholders of the acquired corporation) is that in
which the acquiring corporation is an alien corporation and the statute of the acquired
corporation's domicile does not permit mergers with alien corporations. See Braasch v.
Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760,763 (Del. Ch. 1964) (involving a short-form cash-out merger).
659. If a Delaware parent corporation ("A") owns 90% or more of the stock of a
subsidiary corporation ("B") and creates a new wholly owned subsidiary ("C") to which
A not only transfers its stock in B but also issues A shares to be used by C as the
consideration for a merger of B into C, it may be that the simplified procedure of a short-
form merger could not be utilized. The Delaware short-form merger statute specifies the
consideration for such a merger as "the securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued,
paid, delivered or granted by the surviving corporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a)
(Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 457). If this provision were to be interpreted as
requiring a linking of each of the four verbs to each of the four nouns in their respective
order, then it would seem to preclude a triangular short-form merger using A's stock as
the merger consideration because such stock is not "issued" by the surviving corporation.
This problem of interpretation does not arise under North Carolina's short-form
merger statute, which provides for merger consideration in the form of "shares,
obligations, or other securities of the surviving or any other corporation." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-11-04(b)(2) (1990), as amended by Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 485, § 29
(effective Oct. 1, 1997) (quoted supra in note 496). Nor does it arise under New Jersey's
short-form merger statute, whose specification of merger consideration is virtually the
same as North Carolina's. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-1(2)(c) (West Supp. 1997)
(quoted supra in text accompanying notes 485-86).
CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
that the triangular merger has become the device of choice.10 An
important reason for this is the triangular stock merger's effect upon
voting and appraisal rights that might otherwise accrue to
shareholders of the acquiring corporation in a non-triangular merger.
If the acquired corporation were to be merged into the acquiring
corporation with the merger consideration consisting of common
stock of the acquiring corporation in an amount exceeding 20% (40%
in New Jersey) of its previously outstanding common, a key
requirement for a small-scale merger', 1 would not be met, and both
voting and appraisal rights would be accorded to the acquiring
corporation's shareholders. When the merger is effected in
triangular form, the acquiring corporation is not literally a party to
the merger-even though the merger consideration may consist of its
common stock in an amount exceeding 20% (40% in New Jersey) of
that previously outstanding. One could take the view that, while the
acquiring corporation may not be formally a party to the merger, it is
the true party in interest and, accordingly, its shareholders should
have voting and appraisal rights with respect to such a transaction. 62
However, it has come to be recognized that the acquiring
corporation's shareholders do not enjoy voting or appraisal rights in a
triangular merger.66
This is an anomaly that should be corrected. The small-scale
merger statutes were intended to provide greater flexibility in
effecting mergers by eliminating voting and appraisal rights for
shareholders of the surviving corporation, but one of the conditions
imposed for utilization of those statutes in effecting a stock merger
was that the survivor's outstanding common stock not be thereby
660. This was the device initially proposed (but later abandoned) whereby Time
Incorporated was to acquire Warner Communication utilizing common stock of Time in
an amount that would have more than doubled the number of shares of Time stock
outstanding. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146
(Del. 1990). The proposed transaction was misdescribed by the court as follows: "The
agreement called for Warner to be merged into a wholly-owned Time subsidiary with
Warner becoming the surviving corporation." Id.
661. See supra text accompanying notes 522-52.
662. See EISENBERG, supra note 116, at 305-06.
663. See Terry v. Penn Central Corp., 668 F.2d 188, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1981); Paramount
Communications, 571 A.2d at 1146 ("The [abandoned merger] agreement called for
Warner to be merged into a wholly-owned Time subsidiary .... Delaware law did not
require any vote by Time stockholders."); Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486
N.E.2d 70, 75 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) ("There is no ignoring that the triangular merger
device permits an acquiring corporation to outflank the requirement of stockholder
approval which attends a straight merger...."); Stephen H. Schulman & Alan Schenk,
Shareholders' Voting and Appraisal Rights in Corporate Acquisition Transactions, 38 BUS.
LAW. 1529, 1536-38 (1983); Note, supra note 656, at 1244-45.
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increased by more than 20% (40% in New Jersey). To allow the
policy underlying that condition to be thwarted by a resort to the
triangular merger device seems wrong. If it makes sense for the
statutes to accord voting and appraisal rights to shareholders of the
corporation surviving a long-form merger whenever that
corporation's outstanding common stock is thereby increased by
more than 20% (40% in New Jersey), it makes equally good sense to
accord those rights to shareholders of the acquiring corporation
whenever the same potential for dilution is present-regardless of
the form of the transaction, whether it be a triangular merger, a
purchase of assets, or a stock acquisition (by way of a share exchange
or otherwise). The legislatures of California and Ohio have taken
this unified approach with respect to both voting and appraisal
rights,6 4 and so has the New York Stock Exchange with respect to
voting rights. s
4. Changes in Right of Appraisal
a. Valuation Standard
(1) Statutory Provisions
Under the Delaware appraisal statute, as it read in 1950, the
standard for valuing a dissenter's shares was stated to be "the value
of his stock on the date of the recording of [the merger agreement],
exclusive of any element of value arising from the expectation or
accomplishment" of the merger.16 When the Delaware statute was
rewritten in 1967,661 the standard remained essentially the same.6 s
An amendment to the statute, made in 1976,6 9 introduced the
concept of "fair" value, and it retained the concept of excluding "any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger." As rewritten in 1981,670 the pertinent provision of the
664. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 181, 1200-1203, 1300 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.83-.85 (Anderson 1992 & Supp. 1996).
665. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL J1 312.03(c),
312.05 (1995) (quoted supra in note 549).
666. Former DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1953); see supra text accompanying
note 336.
667. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151; supra note 251 (second
paragraph).
668. See former DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Cum. Supp. 1968).
669. See Act of Apr. 24,1976, ch. 371, § 7,60 Del. Laws 1070,1077.
670. See Act of June 6,1981, cl. 25, § 14,63 Del. Laws 36,38-40.
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Delaware appraisal statute671 contains a new sentence requiring the
court to "take into account all relevant factors." 67
The valuation standard in the New Jersey statute, in 1950, was
"the full market value of his stock, without regard to any
depreciation or appreciation thereof in consequence" of the
merger.673 When the New Jersey Business Corporation Act was
rewritten in 1968,674 the standard of "full market value" was changed
to "fair value,"675 and a provision was added concerning the
determination of such "fair value. '676
671. The Delaware appraisal statute provides in part as follows: "Mhe Court [of
Chancery] shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any element
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation
.... In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991).
672. Id. For a commentary on the recent part of this statutory evolution, see
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,713-14 (Del. 1983).
673. Former N.J. STAT. ANN. 8H 14:12-6 to -7 (West 1939); see supra text
accompanying notes 333-34.
674. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969);
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
675. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-3(2) (West 1969). The Commissioners'
Comment-1968 included the following:
The Commission abandoned the more restrictive standard of "full market
value" used in Title 14, in favor of the broader and more flexible test of "fair
value" found in the Model Act. In most cases the shares to be appraised will not
be readily marketable.
Id. § 14A:11-3 commentary at 99.
676. See former N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-3(3) (West 1969). As amended by Act of
Jan. 7,1974, ch. 366, § 62, 1973 N.J. Laws 964,1032-33 (effective May 1, 1974), and Act of
Aug. 4, 1988, ch. 94, § 66, 1988 N.J. Laws 676, 748-49 (effective Dec. 1, 1988), it provides
as follows:
(3) "Fair value" as used in this Chapter shall be determined
(a) As of the day prior to the day of the meeting of shareholders at
which the proposed action was approved or as of the day prior to the day
specified by the corporation for the tabulation of consents to such action if
no meeting of shareholders was held; or
(b) In the case of a merger pursuant to section 14A:10-5.1 or
subsection 14A:10-7(4) in which shareholder approval is not required, as of
the day prior to the day on which the board of directors approved the plan
of merger, or
(c) In the case of an acquisition of all the shares or all the shares of a
class or series by another corporation pursuant to section 14A:10-9, as of
the day prior to the day on which the board of directors of the acquiring
corporation authorized the acquisition, or, if a shareholder vote was taken
pursuant to section 14A:10-12, as of the day provided in paragraph 14A:11-
3(3)(a).
In all cases, "fair value" shall exclude any appreciation or depreciation
resulting from the proposed action.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-3(3) (West Supp. 1997).
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The 1950 valuation standard in North Carolina was "the fair
value of his stock without regard to any depreciation or appreciation
thereof in consequence" of the merger.677 Under that state's 1955
Business Corporation Act,67 the standard was "the fair value of his
shares, as of the day prior to the date on which the vote was taken. 679
When that Act was rewritten in 1989,m the standard was stated as
"the fair value of his shares, '' 6sl and "fair value" was defined to mean
"the value of the shares immediately before the effectuation of the
corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any
appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action
unless exclusion would be inequitable."' This standard and the
definition were taken from the 1984 Model Business Corporation
Act.83
677. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-167 (1950); see supra text accompanying note 338.
678. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1, 1957);
see supra note 252 (second paragraph).
679. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(b) (1982).
680. See Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265,1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990);
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
681. N.C. GE . STAT. § 55-13-02(a) (Supp. 1996).
682. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-01(3) (1990).
683. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 88 13.02(a), 13.01(3) (1996). The Official
Comment with respect to the definition states:
The definition of "fair value" in section 13.01(3) ... leaves untouched the
accumulated case law about market value, value based on prior sales, capitalized
earnings value, and asset value. It specifically preserves the former language
excluding appreciation and depreciation in anticipation of the proposed
corporate action, but permits an exception for equitable considerations. The
purpose of this exception ("unless exclusion would be inequitable") is to permit
consideration of factors similar to those approved by the Supreme Court of
Delaware in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., a case in which the court found that the
transaction did not involve fair dealing or fair price: "In our view this includes
the elements of rescissory damages if the Chancellor considers them susceptible
of proof and a remedy appropriate to all the issues of fairness before him."
Consideration of appreciation 'or depreciation which might result from other
corporate actions is permitted; these effects in the past have often been reflected
either in market value or capitalized earnings value.
"Fair value" is to be determined immediately before the effectuation of
the corporate action, instead of the date of the shareholder's vote, as is the case
under most state statutes that address the issue. This comports with the plan of
this chapter to preserve the dissenter's prior rights as a shareholder until the
effective date of the corporate action, rather than leaving him in a twilight zone
where he has lost his former rights, but has not yet gained his new ones.
Id. § 13.01 commentary at 13-6 to -7 (citation omitted) (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701,714 (Del. 1983)).
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(2) Cases and Commentary
(Before examining the valuation standard applicable to the
exercise of appraisal fights, it will be helpful to eliminate a
complicating factor. The factor to be eliminated is the valuation, in
the appraisal context, of shares of preferred stock. While this is a
matter of large importance (especially to preferred shareholders), it
is also one of much difficulty. Moreover, any effort to address that
matter herein would unduly complicate an exposition of the points
that are to be covered. Accordingly, the discussion that follows
assumes the existence of common stock only.)
The right of appraisal is much less important as a safeguard for
shareholders in the case of a merger of two previously unrelated
corporations than in the case of an interested-party merger.1m In the
former context, with no self-dealing involved, the management of
each of the merging corporations is likely to strike a fair deal for its
shareholders or terminate negotiations. Moreover, in a merger of
unrelated corporations, the shareholders of both corporations (other
than those of the survivor in a small-scale merger65 ) must approve
such a merger, and the required vote may not be forthcoming unless
the terms of the merger are perceived to be fair. On the other hand,
in the case of an interested-party merger-when there is no arm's
length bargaining and no prospect of a shareholder veto-the
appraisal right is of great importance. Accordingly, the correctness
of the valuation standard applied in appraisal proceedings is best
examined in the context of interested-party mergers.6
684. In Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984), the court said:
When the directors and majority shareholders of each corporation are
independent and negotiate at arm's length, it is more likely that the negotiations
will reflect the full exertion of each party's bargaining power and the final terms
of the transaction will be the best attainable. When, however, there is a common
directorship or majority ownership, the inherent conflict of interest and the
potential for self-dealing requires careful scrutiny of the transaction.
Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
685. See supra text accompanying notes 522-47.
686. Schaefer states:
By their terms, appraisal statutes apply to all mergers, but, in practice, most
appraisal cases which have been litigated through the appellate court level
involve conflicts of interests; the outside shareholders have been frozen out on
terms dictated by insiders. For this reason, there is a compelling need for a
remedy which produces accurate valuations in appraisal proceedings.
Elmer J. Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value and Earnings Value in the
Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1982) (footnote omitted).
See generally Robert B. Thompson, ExiM4 Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role
in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995) (noting that the right of appraisal is most
significant in the context of interested-party transactions).
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Today, the appraisal statutes of the three subject states prescribe
"fair value" as the valuation standard. It is necessary, therefore, to
consider what meaning has been, and should be, given to "fair value"
in the appraisal context.687
(a) Market Value Versus Entity Value
The analysis begins with the question whether the valuation
standard for appraisal should be market value or what has sometimes
been called intrinsic value. While there is no answer in North
Carolina statutory6 or case law,69 it is clear that New Jersey and
Delaware have rejected market value as the sole valuation standard
for appraisal. From 1896 until 1969, New Jersey specified "full
market value" as the valuation standard for appraisal;69° however,
when New Jersey rewrote its Business Corporation Act in 1968,691 the
standard was changed to "fair value."611 Delaware's appraisal statute
has never specified market value as the valuation standard, and the
687. Articles and notes concerning appraisal valuation include the following: Richard
A. Booth, The New Law of Freeze-out Mergers, 49 Mo. L. REv. 517 (1984); Victor
Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems:
Reflections on the Delaware Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (1994); Daniel R.
Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875;
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law,
32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985); Simon M. Lome, A Reappraisal of Fair Shares In
Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1978); Schaefer, supra note 686; Joel
Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 829 (1984); David
Cohen, Comment, Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal, 34 EMORY L.J. 117 (1985);
Joseph M. Coleman, Comment, The Appraisal Remedy In Corporate Freeze-Outs:
Questions of Valuation and Exclusivity, 38 Sw. L.J. 775 (1984); Robert B. Heglar, Note,
Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DUKE L.J. 258; Donald E. Schlyer, Note, "Fair
Value" Determination in Corporate "Freeze-outs," and in Security and Exchange Act Suits:
Weinberger, Other, and Better Methods, 19 VAL. U. L. REv. 521 (1985); Michael R.
Schwenk, Note, Valuation Problems In the Appraisal Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 649
(1994); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L. REV.
1453 (1966); and Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Valuation of Stock of Dissenting
Stockholders in Case of Consolidation or Merger of Corporation, Sale of Its Assets, or the
Like, 48 A.L.R.3D 430 (1973).
68& See supra text accompanying notes 680-82.
689. See supra note 341.
690. For pre-1950 New Jersey decisions on this point, see supra note 342. After 1950,
it continued to be the New Jersey rule (based on the pre-1969 language of that state's
statute) that appraisers should look to market value and not asset value. See In re
Paterson & Hudson River R.R. Co., 94 A.2d 657,660 (N.J. 1953).
691. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969);
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
692. See supra note 675 and accompanying text. The first reported opinion on this new
valuation standard was Dermody v. Sticco, 465 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983).
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case law of that state makes it clear that market value is not the sole
standard to be applied in appraisal.693
Despite its simplistic appeal,694 there were several reasons for
rejecting market value as the measure of "fair value" for appraisal
purposes.95 One of those reasons lay in the vagaries of stock market
prices-a point colorfully stated in a 1934 Delaware opinion 96 and
693. For Delaware decisions in 1934 and 1950, see supra notes 343-44 and
accompanying text. In In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1965), the court
said:
It is, of course, axiomatic that if there is an established market for shares
of a corporation the market value of such shares must be taken into
consideration in an appraisal of their intrinsic value.... It is, of course, equally
axiomatic that market value, either actual or constructed, is not the sole element
to be taken into consideration in the appraisal of stock.
Id. at 211.
694. In Beerly v. Department of the Treasury, 768 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1985), the court
said: "[]f a stock has a 'thick' market, not only is market value the only rational measure
of value, but appraisal rights are unnecessary since the dissenting shareholder can fully
protect his interests by selling his shares." Id. at 946. (This was a rare case involving an
appraisal by the Comptroller of the Currency following a bank merger.)
695. The unfortunate consequence that can flow from a slavish adherence to a market
value standard of valuation is illustrated by the case of Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.,
513 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1987). In this appraisal case, U.S. Steel (through a subsidiary) had
acquired all of Marathon's common stock (other than that owned by shareholders who
perfected their appraisal rights) in a two-step transaction, consisting of a tender offer at
$125 per share for 51% and a second-step merger whereby each remaining share was
converted into a $100 note whose estimated value was $86 at the time of the tender offer
and $76 at the time of the merger. See Id. at 779,791. The court, believing itself bound by
the provisions of the state appraisal statute to value the dissenters' stock at the market
value on the day preceding the vote on the merger, set the appraisal value at the closing
price on that day of $75.75 even though Marathon's investment banker had estimated the
"blended value" of the U.S. Steel package at $106 per share. See id at 779, 790. In
reaching this unfortunate result, the court rejected the lower court's view that:
"[W]hat is to be valued [in appraisal] is not the value of a single share if it were
to be sold in an isolated sale, but instead the value per share of all the shares of
the corporation, which can be determined only upon the basis of a hypothetical
market or sale of all the shares of the corporation."
Id. at 789 (quoting lower court opinion).
A quite different-and more sensible-result was reached in BNE Massachusetts
Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). Following a "controlled auction" by
its investment bankers, 100% of Charterbank was acquired by Conifer in a negotiated
merger: $101 per share in cash for 35% of Charterbank's stock plus shares of Conifer
stock worth $92.25 for each remaining share of Charterbank, representing a "blended
value" of $95.35. See id. at 16. On the premise that the transaction represented an arm's
length negotiation for sale of the entire enterprise, the court suggested that, on remand,
the "fair value" for appraisal purposes be set at the blended value that had been agreed to
by the corporation's management. See id. at 20-21.
696. In Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch. 1934), the court said:
When it is said that the appraisal which the market puts upon the value of
the stock of an active corporation as evidenced by its daily quotations, is an
accurate, fair reflection of its intrinsic value, no more than a moment's reflection
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graphically illustrated by comparing the market prices of selected
common stocks on three dates in the fall of 1987. Other reasons lay
in the fact that there might well be material information not yet
disclosed to traders in the market;698 and, in the case of a controlled
corporation, the presence of a controlling shareholder could itself
have a dampening effect on the market price of the company's stock,
and the timing of a take-out merger might well coincide with a
is needed to refute it. There are too many accidental circumstances entering
into the making of market prices to admit them as sure and exclusive reflectors
of fair value. The experience of recent years is enough to convince the most
casual observer that the market in its appraisal of values must have been
woefully wrong in its estimates at one time or another within the interval of a
space of time so brief that fundamental conditions could not possibly have
become so altered as to affect true worth. Markets are known to gyrate in a
single day. The numerous causes that contribute to their nervous leaps from
dejected melancholy to exhilarated enthusiasm and then back again from joy to
grief, need not be reviewed. It would be most unfortunate indeed either for the
consolidated corporation or for the objecting stockholder if, on the particular
date named by the statute for the valuation of the dissenter's stock, viz., the date
of the consolidation, the market should be in one of its extreme moods and the
stock had to be paid for at the price fixed by the quotations of that day. Even
when conditions are normal and no economic forces are at work unduly to exalt
or depress the financial hopes of man, market quotations are not safe to accept
as unerring expressions of value. The relation of supply to demand on a given
day as truly affects the market value of a stock as it does of a commodity; and
temporary supply and demand are in turn affected by numerous circumstances
which are wholly disconnected from considerations having to do with the stock's
inherent worth.
Id. at 455.
697. Closing prices of the common stock of selected companies, as reported on the
days following the dates indicated, were as follows:
1015/ 7 10/19/87 11/2/87
Du Pont 122 3/4 801/2 93 1/4
Exxon 493/4 33 1/2 435/8
General Electric 625/8 417/8 47 1/8
IBM 1561/2 103 1/4 1241/2
Merck 208 160 180 1/2
Philip Morris 1171/2 88 1/8 93
Sears 513/8 31 37
See WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1987, at 67-68; WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 75-76; WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 1987, at 69-70.
698. See In re Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 64 (Me. 1979). Among other
things, if there had been an undisclosed misappropriation of corporate funds, giving rise
to a potential derivative suit against management, the potential recovery would not be
reflected in the market price of the company's stock but, if discovered during the course
of appraisal proceedings, could be included in net asset valuation. See Cole v. Wells, 113
N.E. 189,191 (Mass. 1916).
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depressed price for the company's stock.6 9
Of greater importance is the fact that, in the absence of special
circumstances, the product of multiplying the number of a
corporation's outstanding shares by the market price of the small
fraction of those shares traded on a given day is likely to be less than
the value of the total enterprise.70 And, if that lesser value were to
govern in an appraisal valuation, the dissenter would not receive "his
proportionate interest in a going concern." 701 Accordingly, it has
come to be recognized that the first step in appraisal valuation-and
the one of overall importance-is to determine the value of the
corporate entity.7 2 The second step involves nothing more than
699. These points are made in Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 687, at 305-06.
700. The "Legislative declaration" accompanying New York's 1982 revision of its
appraisal statute stated in part:
The case law interpretation of fair value has not always reflected the reality of
corporate business combinations. These transactions involve the sale of the
corporation as a whole, and the corporation's value as an entirety may be
substantially in excess of the actual or hypothetical market price for shares
trading among investors.
Act of June 15,1982, ch. 202, § 1,1982 N.Y. Laws 1718,1718 (effective Sept. 1, 1982).
Weiss, commenting on valuation in the context of fairness in take-out mergers, states:
Many recent transactions demonstrate that the value of a corporation's shares,
when someone desires to purchase the entire corporation, is often much greater
than the value suggested by the prices at which the corporation's shares usually
trade. It is the value of the minority's shares as a proportion of the corporation
being purchased as a whole, not the public trading price of those shares, that
should be the measure of fairness in take out mergers.
Weiss, supra note 4, at 678 (footnote omitted).
701. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950), is the case most
frequently cited for the proposition that a dissenting shareholder is entitled to be paid for
"his proportionate interest in a going concern." See supra note 348 (second paragraph).
The point has been reiterated in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Rapid-American Corp. v.
Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802, 805 (Del. 1992); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137,
1144 (Del. 1989); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,713 (Del. 1983); In re McLoon
Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997,1003 (Me. 1989).
702. In In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992), the court said:
Fair value, in an appraisal context, measures "that which has been taken from
[the shareholder], viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern." In the
appraisal process the corporation is valued "as an entity," not merely as a
collection of assets, or by the sum of the market price of each share of its stock.
Id. at 1218 (citations omitted) (quoting Tri-Continental Corp., 74 A.2d at 72, and Cavalier
Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144).
In Cavalier Oil Corp., the court said:
[Ihe Court of Chancery's task here was to value what has been taken from the
shareholder: "viz. his proportionate interest in a going concern." To this end
the company must be first valued as an operating entity by application of
traditional value factors, weighted as required, but without regard to post-
merger events or other possible business combinations.
Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144 (citation omitted) (quoting Tri-Continental Corp., 74
1998]
852 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
determining the portion of that entity value equivalent to the
dissenter's proportionate interest in the outstanding shares of the
corporation's stock.7 3
Notwithstanding the view that the proper approach in valuing a
dissenter's stock is to determine his proportionate share of the value
of the total enterprise,7 ' the question has been raised as to whether
the resulting determination should be discounted by applying either a
minority discount or a marketability discount.75 Discounting has
long been accepted in the context of valuation for tax purposes,706 and
some courts have applied discounts in other contexts as well.7 7 Only
A.2d at 72).
In McLoon Oil Co., the court said:
In the statutory appraisal proceeding, the involuntary change of ownership
caused by a merger requires as a matter of fairness that a dissenting shareholder
be compensated for the loss of his proportionate interest in the business as an
entity. The valuation focus under the appraisal statute is not the stock as a
commodity, but rather the stock only as it represents a proportionate part of the
enterprise as a whole. The question for the court becomes simple and direct:
What is the best price a single buyer could reasonably be expected to pay for the
firm as an entirety? The court then prorates that value for the whole firm
equally among all shares of its common stock. The result is that all of those
shares have the same fair value.
McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d at 1004.
See Weiss, supra note 634, at 252 (suggesting that the value of the company as a
whole is the most important factor in valuation).
703. In In re Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation, 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991), the
court said:
In determining the fair value of a shareholder's shares, the Court first
must determine the company's fair value as a whole. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Hartnett. In the second step, the Court determines plaintiffs share by merely
using his proportionate interest (Le., the number of shares plaintiff owns divided
by the number of shares outstanding).
Id. at 494 (citation omitted).
704. The concept was stated in Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes
as follows:
One aim of the appraisal remedy is to give the dissenter his "fair share" of the
value of the corporation. Clearly he will receive this if he goes along with the
corporate change, since he will share proportionately with all the other
stockholders. If he chooses instead to terminate his interest, it would be unjust
to give him less than his proportionate share of the business.
Note, supra note 687, at 1456.
705. See Harry J. Haynsworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV.
457, 488-96 (1982); Heglar, supra note 687, at 260-61.
706. See William P. Lyons & Martin J. Whitman, Valuing Closely Held Corporations
and Publicly Traded Securities with Limited Marketability: Approaches to Allowable
Discounts from Gross Values, 33 Bus. LAW. 2213,2215-18 (1978).
707. In Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div. 1985), in which the
need to determine the "fair value" of a one-fourth stock interest in a corporation arose
not under an appraisal statute but under a statute allowing a buy-out as an alternative to a
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in fairly recent years has this question been addressed in the
appraisal context,0 8 and a number of courts-both federal and
minority shareholder's petition for dissolution, a valuation was made combining a
determination of petitioner's share of the intangible value (goodwill) of the corporation
and a determination of his share of net tangible value (based on book value of assets less
liabilities), and then the court applied a 25% discount to petitioner's share of the
intangible value but not to his share of the net tangible value. See id. at 345-49. However,
the court drew a distinction between allowing a discount based on shares' lack of
marketability and denying a discount based on the fact that shares represent only a
minority interest. See id. at 349. Similarly, in In re Fleischer, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div.
1985), when the need to determine the fair value of a one-third stock interest in a
corporation arose not under an appraisal statute but under a buy-out arrangement
allowed as an alternative to dissolution, the court accepted a determination of total
enterprise value on the basis of an adjusted capitalization of earnings but approved the
application of "a 25% lack of marketability or illiquidity discount" while disclaiming that
this was "a minority interest discount." Id. at 274-75. In the same context, in Raskin v.
Walter Karl, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 120 (App. Div. 1987), the court allowed a 10% discount
for lack of marketability but held that a minority discount (based on a minority
shareholder's lack of control) would be improper. See id. at 122. In a similar context, in
McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986), the court
upheld the trial court's application of a 25% discount, without drawing a clear distinction
between minority discount and marketability discount. See id. at 243-45.
However, in the context of a purchase at "fair value" in lieu of dissolution, the court
in Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991), refused to apply
either a minority discount or a marketability discount. See id at 612-13; accord Brown v.
Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (Ct. App. 1979). Ard, in Woodward v.
Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, modified on reh'g, 136 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1965), the court
refused to allow a minority discount in applying a statute requiring majority shareholders
to purchase "at its real value" the stock voted against an extension of corporate existence.
See id. at 39-40. But cf. McCann Ranch, Inc. v. Quigley-McCann, 915 P.2d 239 (Mont.
1996) (upholding the application of a 25% minority discount in a declaratory judgment
action seeking to establish the value of a shareholder's one-fourth interest in the stock of
a close corporation).
For a criticism of decisions allowing discounting in the context of a buy-out in lieu of
dissolution, see Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
425,478-89 (1990).
708. Prior to the 1989 decision in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del.
1989), see infra note 711 (first paragraph) (discussing Cavalier Oil Corp.), the Delaware
courts had addressed this matter only superficially.
In Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1960), the chancery
court said:
After finding the average multiplier, the appraiser then discounted it 10%
for certain reasons, such as the lack of marketability of the stock, etc. I have
reviewed the pertinent evidence and arguments and I am satisfied that his
ultimate choice of 8.4 (based upon a fair comparison and discount) is within the
range of reason. It will not be disturbed.
Id. at 285.
However, in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), involving an
appraisal proceeding following a short-form cash-out merger, the supreme court said:
Kirby [the surviving corporation] would have the earnings value
determined by the Appraiser and the Vice-Chancellor, adjusted for lack of a
854 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
state-have condoned discounting even in this context.79 Such
discounting, however, would seem to contravene the widely held view
that a dissenter is entitled to receive, in an appraisal proceeding, "his
proportionate interest in a going concern.171 Accordingly, in a
market. The Appraiser stated that he was aware of no Delaware authority for
discounting earnings and declined to do so. We agree.
Id. at 147; accord Richardson v. Palmer Broad. Co., 353 N.W.2d 374,379 (Iowa 1984).
709. In Perlman v. Permonite Manufacturing Co., 568 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ind. 1983),
affd, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984), when minority shareholders (owning 48 of 145
outstanding shares) dissented from a merger of their corporation into its parent and
sought an appraisal of their shares, the court first determined the net asset value of the
total enterprise (using fair market value of the assets rather than book value based on
cost) and computed the dissenters' proportionate share (33.1%) of that value, but then
the court applied a 35% discount-15% to reflect the fact that the dissenters' shares
represented a minority interest, 15% to reflect the fact that there was virtually no market
for the dissenters' shares, and 5% to reflect the particular risk associated with holding
those shares because of the company's size and lack of diversity. See UL at 223-26, 230-32.
(Interestingly, this resulted in an appraised value of $2849.85 per share or just under 83%
of the $3435.00 per share that had been offered by the parent corporation to the
dissenters on the day after the merger was effected.) In Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F.
Supp. 1124 (N.D. Miss. 1985), affd, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986), it was said, in an
appraisal proceeding following a merger, that it was proper to apply a minority discount
in determining the fair value of the dissenters' stock. See &L at 1126; accord Atlantic
States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the
trial court, in an appraisal proceeding following a merger, should have given
consideration to both a minority discount and a discount for lack of marketability);
Stanton v. Republic Bank, 581 N.E.2d 678, 681-82 (II. 1991) (refusing, in an appraisal
proceeding following a merger, to overturn a trial court's determination that minority and
marketability discounts of 5% each should be applied); Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630
P.2d 167, 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing, with little discussion, the application of a
20% minority discount in an appraisal proceeding following an interested-party merger);
Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 555-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding, in an appraisal proceeding following a sale-of-assets transaction, that the
appraisers had not erred in applying a 25% marketability discount to their determination
of net asset value); King v. F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301, 304-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(upholding the trial court's denial of a marketability discount, in an appraisal proceeding
following a merger, but concurring in its application of a minority discount); Friedman v.
Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972,977-78 (N.Y. 1995) (rejecting a minority discount, in
an appraisal proceeding following a sale of the assets of several close corporations, but
accepting a discount based on lack of marketability); Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss,
765 P.2d 207, 209, 213-14 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (holding, in an appraisal proceeding
following a charter amendment, that it was proper for the appraisers to apply a 33.3%
marketability discount to the minority shareholder's proportionate interest in the
corporation's total enterprise value but that it was improper for them to apply a minority
discount); cf. Walter S. Cheesman Realty Co. v. Moore, 770 P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that minority and marketability discounts should not be applied, in
an appraisal proceeding, when the dissenter's objection concerned a plan of dissolution
and liquidation).
710. See Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 977 (N.Y. 1995) ("A
minority discount would necessarily deprive minority shareholders of their proportionate
interest in a going concern .... "); see also supra note 701 (citing cases voicing the
proposition that a dissenter is entitled to be paid his "proportionate interest in a going
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recent line of cases-with the Delaware decision in Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Hamett7n at the forefront-such discounting has been
rejected.7 12 These latter cases are based on a salutary recognition of
concern").
711. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989). This case involved an appraisal proceeding following
a cash-out short-form merger of a closely held corporation. See id. at 1139. The court
sustained the lower court's refusal to apply a minority or marketability discount, saying:
In rejecting a minority or marketability discount, the Vice Chancellor concluded
that the objective of a section 262 appraisal is "to value the corporation itself, as
distinguished from a specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands
of a particular shareholder" [emphasis in original]. We believe this to be a valid
distinction.
... The dissenting shareholder's proportionate interest is determined only
after the company as an entity has been valued. In that determination the Court
of Chancery is not required to apply further weighting factors at the shareholder
level, such as discounts to minority shares for asserted lack of marketability.
Id. at 1144 (quoting the lower court); see also Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d
796, 804-07 (Del. 1992) (distinguishing the proper allowance of a control premium at the
corporate level from the improper application of a minority discount at the shareholder
level).
712. In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me. 1989), involved an appraisal proceeding
following a merger of closely held corporations. Relying heavily on Cavalier Oil Corp.,
the court affirmed the lower court's acceptance of a referee's report rejecting the
application of a minority or marketability discount. The court said:
In sum, the referee held that the fair value of each Dissenter's stock was his
proportionate share of the full value of each company, as determined from the
expert appraisal testimony presented by the parties. The referee expressly
rejected Lido's contention that he should discount the full value of each
company because of the minority status and lack of marketability of the
Dissenters' stock. On appeal Lido's only serious challenge to the referee's
finding of fair value is directed at the referee's recognition of the Dissenters' full
proportionate interest in the whole value of each company, free of any minority
or nonmarketability discount. We find Lido's arguments for such discounts
unpersuasive. In our view application of those discounts would run directly
counter to our appraisal statute's purpose of protecting dissenting shareholders.
Id at 1003.
In Hunter v. Mitek Industries, Inc, 721 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1989), a diversity
case applying Missouri law in an appraisal proceeding following a merger, the court said:
"The Court declines to apply the minority and marketability discounts, and notes that
such efforts to discount a dissenting shareholder's stock have been expressly rejected by a
number of courts." Id. at 1107 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp.).
In MT Properties, Ina v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992), which involved an appraisal proceeding following a merger, the court (while
reserving judgment as to marketability discounts) refused to apply a minority discount,
saying that "because the legislature has enacted the [appraisal] statute with the evident
aim to protect the dissenting shareholder, we must prohibit application of minority
discounts when determining 'fair value' in statutory dissenter's rights cases." Id. at 388.
In Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519 (Neb. 1994), involving appraisal following
a merger, the court, after reviewing a number of cases (including Cavalier Oil Corp.),
rejected the application of discounts, saying:
We are persuaded, however, that in the event of a merger, neither a minority
discount nor a deduction for lack of marketability is to be given in determining
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the fact that to discount the dissenters' shares would be to assign to
the majority more than its proportionate interest in the total
enterprise and that such a windfall would constitute an undesirable
inducement for the majority to initiate freeze-outs at inadequate
prices. 713
(b) Valuation Factors
The implicit objective of the decades-old "Delaware Block"
approach to appraisal valuation-involving a weighting of market
value, earnings value, and net asset valuekt --was to arrive at a
valuation of the total enterprise. However, as is well known, in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.715 the Delaware Supreme Court said that
this approach "shall no longer exclusively control [appraisal and
other valuation] proceedings" and that "a more liberal approach
must include proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court. 716 While this pronouncement by the
the fair value of a dissenter's shares under the provisions of [the appraisal
statute]. Only by not doing so can the statutory policy of fully compensating a
dissenting minority shareholder be achieved.
Id. at 526.
713. In Cavalier Oil Corp., the court said: "[T]o fail to accord to a minority
shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty for lack of
control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap a windfall from the
appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting shareholder, a clearly undesirable result."
Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1145; accord Rigel Corp., 511 N.W.2d at 525; Friedman,
661 N.E.2d at 977.
In In re McLoon Oil Co., the court said: "Any rule of law that gave the shareholders
less than their proportionate share of the whole firm's fair value would produce a transfer
of wealth from the minority shareholders to the shareholders in control. Such a rule
would inevitably encourage corporate squeeze-outs." In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d at
1005.
714. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 145-46 (Del. 1980); Poole v. N.V.
Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 73 (Del. 1968) (involving valuation in a context other
than appraisal); In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203, 214 (Del. 1965); Levin v.
Midland-Ross Corp., 194 A.2d 50, 53 (Del. Ch. 1963); In re Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406
A.2d 54, 59, 67 (Me. 1979); Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145,
1148 (Mass. 1979); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 338 N.E.2d 614, 616 (N.Y. 1975);
FOLK, supra note 459, at 380-86.
There have been other approaches to valuation. One is the award of rescissory
damages. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497,501-03 (Del. 1981). Another
involves allocation of the synergistic benefits of a merger. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 552 F.2d 1239,1248 (7th Cir. 1977).
715. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
716. The court said:
In this breach of fiduciary duty case, the Chancellor perceived that the
approach to valuation was the same as that in an appraisal proceeding.... This
CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
Delaware court made it predictable that future appraisal proceedings
would entail a battle of financial experts,717 it did not mark an end to
the use of the former valuation factors.718 Market value, earnings
value, and net asset value will continue to be used in entity
valuation,719 but probably with some differences in approach.
Because of problems inherent in the weighting of different
values, use of this "mechanistic procedure" (as previously practiced
means that the so-called "Delaware block" or weighted average method was
employed wherein the elements of value, i.e., assets, market price, earnings, etc.,
were assigned a particular weight and the resulting amounts added to determine
the value per share. This procedure has been in use for decades. However, to
the extent it excludes other generally accepted techniques used in the financial
community and the courts, it is now clearly outmoded. It is time we recognize
this in appraisal and other stock valuation proceedings and bring our law current
on the subject.
... Accordingly, the standard "Delaware block" or weighted average
method of valuation, formerly employed in appraisal and other stock valuation
cases, shall no longer exclusively control such proceedings. We believe that a
more liberal approach must include proof of value by any techniques or methods
which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court, subject only to our interpretation of [the
Delaware appraisal statute]. This will obviate the very structured and
mechanistic procedure that has heretofore governed such matters.
Id. at 712-13 (citations omitted).
717. In Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166 (Del. 1991), the court said:
"As is often the case in disputed appraisal proceedings, the dispute over the value of
Wien shares at the time of the merger became a battle of experts, each espousing a
particular technique which purported to demonstrate the fairness of their respective
positions." Id. at 175.
At the end of its opinion in In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992), the court
took "the occasion to comment upon a recurring theme in recent appraisal cases-the
clash of contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions on value." Id. at 1222. To
compensate for the handicap of having "to pick and choose from a limited record without
the benefit of objective analysis and opinion," the court suggested that the chancery court
"should consider, in a proper case, appointing its own expert witness." Id. at 1222-23.
718. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985) ("Weinberger did
not abolish the block formula, only its exclusivity as a tool of valuation."); In re Radiology
Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. Ch. 1991) ("Even though the Delaware courts
have used the Delaware Block Method infrequently since Weinberger, the Delaware
courts still consider it an acceptable procedure for valuing a company.").
719. See In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1003 (Me. 1989) ("We note that since
Weinberger a number of jurisdictions have continued to rely primarily upon the three-
factor analysis .... "); Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1997)
("We will discuss market value, investment value, and asset value in that order.").
720. In Rosenblatt, the court said: "[U]nder Delaware law assets are often given
greatest weight." Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 941. On the other hand, in Radiology
Associates, the court said: "[E]xcept for corporations with significant natural resource
assets or with significant non-operating assets, the Delaware courts generally have
refrained from weighing the asset prong heavily in applying the Delaware Block Method
when the earnings valuation method appears reliable." Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d at
1998]
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under the Delaware Block approach) is likely to diminishn 1
Moreover, for reasons stated abovetm market value is likely to play a
smaller role than in the past. The most prominent factor in the
valuation process is likely to be earnings value, but with less emphasis
on historic earningsm and more attention given to current and
prospective earnings and cash flows.tm
The future of net asset value-at least in Delaware-is less clear.
If a corporation is profitable, implying that it should continue in
business, earnings value should be the dominant valuation factor for
appraisal purposes. On the other hand, if the corporation is
unprofitable and its prospects are bleak, it may well have a
liquidation value in excess of its earnings value. In the latter
circumstance, implying that the corporation should be liquidated,
logic would seem to require the conclusion that net asset value (or
liquidation value) should be the dominant valuation factor for
appraisal purposes.m  Otherwise, in the controlled corporation
context, the majority could effect a take-out merger, basing the
merger consideration on market value or earnings value, and
thereafter proceed to liquidate the corporation-with the result that
the majority would stand to reap the benefit of the higher liquidation
value.727 However, the Delaware courts have adhered for years to the
496.
Moreover, courts and appraisers can sometimes differ, and sometimes agree, on the
weights to be assigned to market value, earnings value, and net asset value. See Levin v.
Midland-Ross Corp., 194 A.2d 50, 57-58 (Del. Ch. 1963); In re Libby, McNeill & Libby,
406 A.2d 54,63-67 (Me. 1979).
721. See Schaefer, supra note 686, at 1095-96.
722. See supra notes 690-703 and accompanying text.
723. One of the problems with the determination of earnings value under the
Delaware Block approach, as it came to be applied, lay in the fact that it used average
annual earnings over the preceding five years. However, future prospects as well as the
trend of past earnings could be considered in selecting the multiplier used to capitalize the
earnings average. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d
216,218 (Del. 1975).
724. In Radiology Associates, the court said:
I find it intrinsically more appealing to rely on the future prospects of a
company, where reliable projections are available, than the historical earnings of
the company because the theoretically more correct measure of the entity's
value, under an earnings valuation approach, is the present value of its future
cash flows or earnings.
Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d at 497-98.
725. See Schaefer, supra note 686, at 1038-39.
726. See id. But see Seligman, supra note 687, at 848 (suggesting that to award the
dissenter a fair value based on liquidation value would be an "undeserved windfall").
727. A reason sometimes advanced for denying dissenters an appraisal valuation based
on liquidation value is that minority shareholders have no right or power to cause the
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proposition that value is to be determined on a going-concern basis
rather than a liquidation basis--an approach of real merit when
earnings value exceeds liquidation value but one of dubious validity
when the reverse is true.Zl In In re General Realty & Utilities
corporation to be liquidated. See, e.g., In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179,183 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
("Assuming ... that the company could be liquidated to produce the valuations for the
preferred and common stocks attributed to them by the appraisers, the fact remains that
this company was not to be liquidated; that petitioners [dissenting shareholders] had no
expectation or right to have it liquidated or considered on a liquidating basis."), affd
without opinion, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 1947). However, this is beside the point; the
question is not about the dissenters' powers, it is about the fair value of their stock.
Moreover, to say that a lack of power to compel liquidation deprives dissenting
shareholders of a right to an appraisal valuation based on liquidation value, even when
liquidation offers the best hope of maximizing shareholder wealth, is to say that dissenters
are necessarily restricted to an appraisal valuation generated by the course of action (or
inaction) chosen by the corporation's management even though that course might be self-
serving to the management and contrary to the best interests of the shareholders.
728. See In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213,1221 (Del. 1992) ("Liquidation value is one
factor relevant to a fair value inquiry and an acceptable technique, with others, upon
which the Court of Chancery can rely. Liquidation value cannot, however, be viewed as a
substitute for, or interchangeable with, fair value." (citation omitted)); Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 942 (Del. 1985) ("In Delaware a company is valued as a
going concern, not on what can be obtained by its liquidation."); Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 142 (Del. 1980) (referring to "the traditional going concern standard
under established Delaware law"); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co.,
334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975) ("It is well settled that in an appraisal proceeding ... the
shares must be valued on a going concern basis."); In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d
203, 209 (Del. 1965) ("[Tmhese [dissenting] stockholders are entitled to be paid the
intrinsic value of their shares determined on a going concern basis, which excludes a
valuation based solely upon the liquidating value .... "); Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye,
74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) ("[S]ince value is to be fixed on a going-concern basis, the
liquidating value of the stock may not be accepted as the sole measure."); Radiology
Associates, 611 A.2d at 496 ("The use of liquidation value rather than going-concern
value is inappropriate."); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 123 A.2d 121, 123 (Del.
Ch. 1956) ("[I]t is well established that in an appraisal proceeding under our statute the
shares must be valued on a going concern basis.").
729. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952), is a classic illustration
of the injustice that can result from a court's refusal to test the fairness of the
consideration received by minority shareholders in an interested-party merger against the
liquidation value of the corporation. In this case, Hilton, owning 321,883 of Mayflower's
389,738 outstanding shares of common stock, effected a share-for-share merger of
Mayflower into Hilton. See id. at 108-09. The court appears to have accepted the fact
that Mayflower had a liquidation value of $10,500,000 or about $27 for each of
Mayflower's outstanding shares. See id at 111. Yet it permitted Hilton, in effect, to
acquire the 67,855 minority shares of Mayflower-each of which would have received
about $27 had Mayflower been liquidated-in exchange for a like number of Hilton
shares having a market value of only about $15 per share. See id at 109-11. (Ironically,
this is the case most frequently cited for the proposition that a controlling shareholder
standing on both sides of a transaction must bear the burden of proving its entire fairness.
See supra note 450.)
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Corp.,730 the appraiser's report advanced the proposition that the
intrinsic value of a shareholder's interest could never be less than its
liquidation value,731 but the court rejected this view as being contrary
to the legal requirement that appraisal valuation be on a going-
concern basis.732
Mention needs to be made of a closely related point concerning
appraisal valuation. It has been suggested that the best of all
measures of entity value is the amount that a willing buyer would pay
for the total enterprise.733 However, this suggested approach has
730. 52 A.2d 6 (Del. Ch. 1947).
731. The conclusion of the appraiser's report, as set forth by the court, included the
following:
"[T]he liquidating value of the stock is not the sole basis for an appraisal of its
intrinsic worth, if we assume that the Company is justified in staying in business.
By holding the component parts of the Corporation together, it is presumed that
they will be worth more, because of the income which together they produce,
than could be realized from them in liquidation. But, it certainly cannot be said
that the intrinsic value of any shareholder's interest in a going Corporation at a
given time is less than he could realize for it upon a liquidation of the
Corporation's assets at that time. If that be the situation in any Corporation,
surely its time for liquidation has arrived."
Id. at 10 (quoting the appraiser's report).
732. The General Realty court said:
It appears that, contrary to the governing law, the Appraiser did in fact
approach the problem somewhat as though a liquidation were involved. This
court indicated in Chicago Corporation v. Munds that such is not the test in
cases arising under our appraisal statute. Moreover, asset value, while a factor,
must not be overemphasized in arriving at a determination of appraised value,
because other factors such as the value based on prospective earnings are vitally
important.
As stated, the Appraiser indicated that the "intrinsic value" of a
stockholder's shares in a going concern should always be more than their then
liquidating value, and if the situation is otherwise, he suggests that the
Corporation is a proper subject for liquidation. I cannot believe the Appraiser
intended to convey the thought that the appraised value of shares under our
statute should never be less than their hypothetical liquidating value because
such is not the law.
Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
733. In In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me. 1989), the court said:
Especially in fixing the appraisal remedy in a close corporation, the relevant
inquiry is what is the highest price a single buyer would reasonably pay for the
whole enterprise, not what a willing buyer and a willing seller would bargain out
as the sales price of a dissenting shareholder's shares in a hypothetical market
transaction.
Id. at 1005.
Dreiseszun v. FLM Industries, Ina, 577 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), involved an
appraisal proceeding following a sale-of-assets transaction negotiated at arm's length by
the family in control of the selling corporation. The selling corporation was to remain in
existence as a holding or investment company, and minority shareholders were offered
$23 for each of their shares although (if this offer were to be accepted by all of the
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been perceived as raising the question whether dissenters should be
entitled to share in a control premium. The Massachusetts courts
have answered this question in the affirmative,7 3 but the Delaware
minority holders) the controlling family would be left with shares having a book value of
$55 per share. See id. at 904-05. The court rejected the trial court's reasoning that $23
per share represented "fair value" mainly because most of the minority shareholders had
accepted that amount; and it held, instead, that the dissenters should receive their
proportionate share of the worth of the total package of consideration paid by the
purchasing corporation. See id. at 906-08. The court said:
The terms of the Garfinckel contract represented the price for which a willing
seller (Harzfeld's) would sell, and a willing buyer (Garfinckel) would pay, for
the business as a going concern representing the result of arm's length, fair and
knowledgeable negotiations.
Inlight of the sale of Harzfeld's, at a price conceded by all the parties
involved, including the parties herein, to be a fair and reasonable price, the usual
criteria, otherwise useful in evaluating the fair value of the stock,
including Harzfeld's business difficulties, capital situation, inventories, dividend
history, book value and market value of its stock and store locations and
condition fade into relative insignificance. The overriding, compelling and
decisive factors vital here to the ascertainment of "fair value" for the dissenters'
stock are the terms of the Garfinckel sale considered as a whole and reduced to
cash value as of [the valuation date] of the considerations flowing therefrom.
Id. at 907-08.
For a discussion of the fairness of third-party sale value in various contexts, see
Leonard Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public
Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1439
(1981).
734. In Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc, 492 N.E.2d 1122 (Mass.
1986), all of the 100,000 shares of voting common were owned by a single holder, while
139,800 shares of non-voting common were publicly owned. See id. at 1125. The latter
stock was eliminated by a cash-out merger with a newly created shell corporation, leading
dissenters to seek appraisal. See id. at 1124. The court sustained the trial judge's
appraisal valuation, see i. at 1130, which consisted essentially of two steps: (i)
determining what amount would be paid for the entire enterprise by one of those
extremely wealthy individuals desiring to become members of the exclusive club of NFL
franchise-owners, and (ii) assigning to each outstanding share, whether voting or
nonvoting, an equal portion of the amount determined in the first step-noting that the
two classes of stock were identical except for the right to vote, but not bothering to
consider that a purchaser would surely have paid a higher per-share price for all of the
voting stock than for all of the non-voting stock, see id. at 1125-26.
In BNE Massachusetts Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), the court
said:
We accept the possibility that there may be a difference between the valuation
of the enterprise as an entirety and the value the market might assign to shares
which do not represent control of the enterprise; but it is that difference to which
the dissenting stockholder may be entitled under § 92 [the appraisal statute].
The task assigned to the court by § 92 is not to reconstruct an "intrinsic value" of
each share of the enterprise but, rather, to determine what a willing buyer
realistically would pay for the enterprise as a whole on the statutory valuation
date.... Only in this fashion can minority stockholders be assured that insiders
in control of a company, burdened by conflicting interests, may not purchase the
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courts have answered it in the negative. In Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp.735 which involved a cash-out short-form merger of a subsidiary
owning valuable natural resources, dissenting minority shareholders
contended that the subsidiary's stock should be valued on the basis of
what all of the shareholders (including the parent) would have
received per share in a transaction negotiated at arm's length with a
third party,736 but the court rejected this contention because of "the
traditional going concern standard under established Delaware
law."737  In re Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation7m contains a
similar rejection of the view that dissenters are entitled to a
proportionate share of the amount for which the entire enterprise
could be sold.739
The right of appraisal can be thought of as the ultimate remedy
of dissenting shareholders. If it is to serve this function properly,
dissenters should receive in appraisal their proportionate share of the
value demonstrably available from applying the resources of the
corporation to their most highly valued use-whether that be the
earnings value from continuing in business, the net asset value
realizable from liquidation, or the amount that could be obtained
enterprise at a price less than that obtainable in the marketplace of qualified
buyers and avoid paying a full and fair price to the minority.
Id. at 19.
735. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980); see Shlomo Cohen, Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp: Ascertaining "Fair Value" Under the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 426 (1981).
736. The court said:
The [dissenting] stockholders contend that the entire fairness, close judicial
scrutiny rule in this parent/subsidiary merger requires the Court to assess
damages on the basis of a per share value of the stock as negotiated in a
hypothetical third party arms length transaction in which the vast natural
resource assets of Kirby would control.
Bell, 413 A.2d at 140.
737. Id. at 142.
738. 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991).
739. The Radiology Associates court said:
The [discounted cash flow] calculation arguably may have left out a premium
that normally accrues when shareholders sell a company. However, "the
appraisal process is not intended to reconstruct a pro forma sale but to assume
that the shareholder was willing to maintain his investment position, however
slight, had the merger not occurred." Plaintiff is not entitled to the
proportionate sales value of Radiology. Plaintiff is entitled to the proportionate
value of Radiology as a continuing shareholder.
Id. at 494 (citation omitted) (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145
(Del. 1989)); see also Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 789 (Ohio 1987)
("The view that fair cash value must be determined by calculating a pro-rata share of a
constructed or hypothetical purchase price for the entire corporation where there is an
actual market for the stock of the company.., is sinply incorrect.").
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from a sale of the corporate enterprise to a new owner.
b. Entitlement and Exceptions
(1) Statutory Provisions
In the three subject states up to 1950 (as discussed above),
dissenting shareholders of both corporations involved in a merger
(other than a parent-subsidiary merger, permitted then only in
Delaware7 °) were entitled to appraisal rights. Among the most
significant statutory changes made in the merger law of the subject
states after 1950 were those involving new exceptions to the right of
appraisal for dissenting shareholders. One kind of exception relates
to the nature of the merger transaction, another involves attributes of
the shares held by dissenters, and the third involves the type of
consideration used to effect the merger.
(a) Exceptions Based on Nature of Transaction
Under the current statutes of the three subject states, there is
only one kind of merger transaction (in only two of the three states)
in which shareholders of the disappearing corporation are denied the
right of appraisal because of the nature of the transaction. In
Delaware and North Carolina, shareholders of a parent corporation
that disappears in a downstream short-form merger-although
required to give their voting approval of such a transaction-are
denied the right of appraisal.7 41
However, under the current statutes of the three states, there are
several kinds of merger transactions in which shareholders of the
surviving corporation are denied appraisal rights. In all three states,
the appraisal right is denied to shareholders of the surviving
corporation in a small-scale merger742 -assuming, of course, that all
the conditions of the respective small-scale merger statutes are met.
The statutes of the three states (with limited exceptions in New
740. See supra notes 380-84 and accompanying text.
741. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(c)-(d) (1991) (discussed supra in note 468 and
accompanying text); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(1) (Supp. 1996) (discussed supra in
notes 501-02 and accompanying text). New Jersey's short-form merger statute permits
downstream mergers, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-5.1(1) (West Supp. 1997); supra note
482 and text accompanying note 487; however, its appraisal statute accords appraisal
rights to shareholders of the disappearing corporation, see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-
1(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997); supra note 489 and text accompanying notes 489-90.
742. For Delaware, see supra text accompanying notes 527-28. For New Jersey, see
supra text accompanying notes 537-38. For North Carolina, see supra note 547 (first
paragraph) and accompanying text.
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Jersey) also deny appraisal rights to shareholders of a parent
corporation surviving an upstream short-form merger.743 New
Jersey-alone among the three states-denies the right of appraisal
(except in limited circumstances) to shareholders of the subsidiary
that survives in a downstream short-form merger.744 Of course,
shareholders of the true acquiring corporation do not get appraisal
rights in the case of a triangular merger; however, this is not because
they are shareholders of a surviving corporation, but because their
corporation is not a party to the merger.745
What this means, so far as the nature of the transaction is
concerned, is that, under the current statutes of the three subject
states, the right of appraisal is accorded to shareholders of both
corporations in a long-form merger, to shareholders of the
disappearing corporation in a small-scale merger, and to shareholders
of the disappearing subsidiary in an upstream short-form merger.
With respect to downstream short-form mergers, New Jersey (but not
Delaware or North Carolina) accords appraisal rights to shareholders
of the disappearing parent, while Delaware and North Carolina (but
not New Jersey) accord such rights to shareholders of the surviving
subsidiary. Moreover, the statutory right of appraisal-if granted at
all-is granted with respect to non-voting as well as voting shares.746
As to the last point, the Model Business Corporation Act takes a
different approach. It provides that, except in the case of
shareholders of a subsidiary involved in a short-form merger, a
shareholder is not entitled to appraisal rights with respect to a merger
if that shareholder is not entitled to vote on the merger.747
743. For Delaware, see supra note 468 and accompanying text. For New Jersey, see
supra text accompanying note 491. For North Carolina, see supra notes 501-02 and
accompanying text.
744. For Delaware, see supra notes 469-70 and accompanying text. For North
Carolina, see supra note 503 and accompanying text. For New Jersey, see supra note 491
and accompanying text, note 488 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note
517.
745. See supra text accompanying notes 662-63.
746. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-
1(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(1) (Supp. 1996).
747. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02(a)(1) (1996) (quoted supra in note
509). The Official Comment includes the following:
Generally, only shareholders who are entitled to vote on the transaction
are entitled to assert dissenters' rights with respect to the transaction.... One
exception to this principle is the merger of a subsidiary into its parent under
section 11.04 in which minority shareholders of the subsidiary have the right to
assert dissenters' rights even though they have no right to vote.
Id. § 13.02 commentary at 13-16.
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(b) Exceptions Based on Attributes of the Dissenter's Shares
A major change involving the denial of appraisal rights occurred
in the 1967 rewrite of the Delaware General Corporation Law.74 It
was followed by New Jersey in the 1968 rewrite of its Business
Corporation Act749 and by North Carolina when its 1989 Business
Corporation Act was amended in 1997.750 In general (and subject to
certain exceptions), it took away appraisal rights with respect to
marketable shares.
The Delaware change added a new provision to that state's
appraisal statute;75' and, notwithstanding several amendments,752 its
basic thrust remains the same.7 3 One part of the statute provides
While the 1989 North Carolina Business Corporation Act is based (for the most part)
on the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act, it does not follow the Model Act in this
respect. See supra note 547. The Amended North Carolina Commentary states:
Subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) [of § 55-13-02] give a right of
dissent for all shares, whether voting or nonvoting, in the case of a merger or
sale or exchange of assets; the corresponding provisions in the Model Act give
the right of dissent only to voting shareholders.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02 commentary at 171 (Supp. 1996).
748. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, sec. 1, § 262(k), 56 Del. Laws 151, 222; supra note
251 (second paragraph).
749. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, § 14A:11-1(1)(a), 1968 N.J. Laws 1011, 1106-07
(effective Jan. 1,1969); supra note 250 (second paragraph).
750. See Act of June 9, 1997, ch. 202, § 1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(c)).
751. The new provision read as follows:
This section shall not apply to the shares of any class of stock which, at the
record date fixed to determine the stockholders entitled to receive notice of and
to vote at the meeting of stockholders at which the agreement of merger or
consolidation is to be acted on, were either (1) registered on a national securities
exchange, or (2) held of record by not less than 2,000 stockholders, unless the
certificate of incorporation of the corporation issuing such stock shall otherwise
provide; .... This subsection shall not be applicable to stockholders of a
corporation whose stock in a constituent corporation was not converted by the
merger or consolidation solely into stock of the corporation resulting from or
surviving a merger pursuant to sections 251 or 252 of this title.
Former DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (Cum. Supp. 1968).
752. See Act of June 23, 1969, ch. 148, § 29, 57 Del. Laws 433, 449 (effective July 15,
1969); Act of June 25, 1973, ch. 106, § 12, 59 Del. Laws 209, 214-15 (effective July 1,
1973); Act of Apr. 24, 1976, ch. 371, 88 11-12, 60 Del. Laws 1070, 1079-80 (effective July
1, 1976); Act of June 6, 1981, ch. 25, § 14, 63 Del. Laws 36, 38-40; Act of July 14, 1981, ch.
152,63 Del. Laws 290; Act of July 9,1987, ch. 136, §§ 30-32,66 Del. Laws 335,339; Act of
July 12, 1988, ch. 352, § 9, 66 Del. Laws 755, 756; Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 337, §§ 3-4, 68
Del. Laws 1159, 1159 (effective July 1, 1992); Act of July 1, 1993, ch. 61, § 10, 69 Del.
Laws 54,54-55; Act of June 27, 1994, ch. 262, §§ 1-9, 69 Del. Laws 523, 523 (effective July
1, 1994); Act of June 23, 1995, ch. 79, § 16, 70 Del. Laws 118, 121 (effective July 1, 1995);
Act of Feb 1, 1996, ch. 299, §§ 2-3,70 Del. Laws 711,711.
753. The Delaware statute provides as follows:
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that appraisal rights do not apply with respect to a class of
marketable shares-in the sense of shares that are "either (i) listed
on a national securities exchange or designated as a national market
system security ... or (ii) held of record by more than 2,000
holders. '754  However, another part of the statute provides that
appraisal rights do apply with respect to such a class of marketable
shares if the holders thereof are required by terms of the merger
agreement to accept in exchange therefor anything (leaving aside
cash in lieu of fractional shares) other than shares of the surviving
(b) Appraisal rights shall be available for the shares of any class or series
of stock of a constituent corporation in a merger or consolidation to be effected
pursuant to § 251 [relating to merger or consolidation of domestic
corporations] ..., § 252 [relating to merger or consolidation of domestic and
foreign corporations] ... of this title:
(1) Provided, however, that no appraisal rights under this section
shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock, which
stock .... at the record date .... were either (i) listed on a national
securities exchange or designated as a national market system security on
an interdealer quotation system by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. or (ii) held of record by more than 2,000 holders; ....
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, appraisal rights
under this section shall be available for the shares of any class or series of
stock of a constituent corporation if the holders thereof are required by the
terms of an agreement of merger or consolidation pursuant to §§ 251, 252
... of this title to accept for such stock anything except:
a. Shares of stock of the corporation surviving or resulting from
such merger or consolidation... ;
b. Shares of stock of any other corporation .... which shares of
stock ... at the effective date of the merger or consolidation will be
either listed on a national securities exchange or designated as a
national market system security on an interdealer quotation system by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or held of record by
more than 2,000 holders;
c. Cash in lieu of fractional shares ... described in the foregoing
subparagraphs a. and b. of this paragraph; or
d. Any combination of the shares of stock ... and cash in lieu of
fractional shares.., described in the foregoing subparagraphs a., b. and
c. of this paragraph.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1996).
754. Id. § 262(b)(1). The marketable shares exception does not apply to minority
shares of a Delaware subsidiary involved in a short-form merger, even if those shares are
listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than 2000 holders. This
is because section 262(b)(1)-(2) does not apply with respect to mergers effected under
section 253 (the short-form merger statute) and, further, because section 262(b)(3)
provides as follows: "In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation
party to a merger effected under section 253 of this title is not owned by the parent
corporation immediately prior to the merger, appraisal rights shall be available for the
shares of the subsidiary Delaware corporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1991 &
Supp. 1996).
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corporation or marketable shares, similarly defined, of another
corporation. Thus, if a shareholder is cashed out by a merger, he
does not lose his appraisal right simply because his pre-merger shares
were marketable.
The New Jersey statute, as rewritten in 1968, followed the
Delaware approach to a large degree.755 However, as subsequently
amended75 6 the New Jersey statute departs from the Delaware
approach in one significant respect.7 7  The current New Jersey
755. The New Jersey statute, as enacted in 1968, provided as follows:
(1) Any shareholder of a domestic corporation shall have the right to
dissent from any of the following corporate actions
(a) any plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is a
party, provided that
(i) a shareholder shall not have right to dissent from any plan of
merger or consolidation with respect to shares
(A) which are listed on a national securities exchange or are
regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market... on the record
date... ; and
(B) for which, pursuant to the plan of merger or
consolidation such shareholders are required to accept only shares
or shares and cash in lieu of fractional shares of the corporation
surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation;
Former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.11-1(1) (West 1969).
The Commissioners' Comment-1968 was as follows:
Subparagraph 14A:11-(1)(a)(i) departs from both Title 14 and the Model
Act and follows subsection 262(k) of the Delaware Act by withholding the right
of appraisal in the instances specified. However, the Commission did not adopt
the 2,000 shareholder provision of the Delaware Act. Further, whereas the
Delaware Act limits the withholding of appraisal rights only with regard to
shares registered on a national securities exchange, division 14A:11-
1(1)(a)(i)(A) also withholds the right of appraisal with regard to shares
regularly quoted on an over-the-counter market ....
Id. § 14A:11-1 commentary at 87.
756. See Act of Jan. 7,1974, ch. 366, § 60, 1973 N.J. Laws 964, 1029-30 (effective May
1,1974).
757. The amended New Jersey statutes provides as follows:
(1) Any shareholder of a domestic corporation shall have the right to
dissent from any of the following corporate actions
(a) Any plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is a
party, provided that, unless the certificate of incorporation otherwise
provides
(i) a shareholder shall not have the right to dissent from any plan
of merger or consolidation with respect to shares
(A) of a class or series which is listed on a national securities
exchange or is held of record by not less than 1,000 holders on the
record date... ; or
(B) for which, pursuant to the plan of merger or
consolidation, he will receive (x) cash, (y) shares, obligations or
other securities which, upon consummation of the merger or
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statute (in the absence of a contrary charter provision) contains an
outright denial of appraisal rights to dissenters whose shares are
marketable (using a test of ownership by 1000 rather than 2000
shareholders to imply a market for shares), with no provision
whereby that denial is subject to nullification on the basis of the kind
of merger consideration received. Thus, if a shareholder is cashed
out by a merger, that fact does not (as in Delaware) negate a denial
of appraisal rights based on the marketability of his pre-merger
shares.
As enacted in 1989 (effective July 1, 1990), North Carolina's
Business Corporation Act did not deny appraisal rights to dissenters
because of the marketability of their shares, but that Act did (and
continues to) deny such rights to a shareholder dissenting from a
merger if his shares are "then redeemable by the corporation at a
price not greater than the cash to be received in exchange for such
shares."7 58  In 1997, North Carolina amended its 1989 Act to
consolidation, will either be listed on a national securities
exchange or held of record by not less than 1,000 holders, or (z)
cash and such securities;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1) (West Supp. 1997).
The Commissioners' Comment-1972 Amendments contained the following:
The amendment of subsection 14A:11-1(1) modifies the previous statute
by withholding the right of appraisal (unless the certificate of incorporation
otherwise provides) on a merger, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all
the assets of a corporation if a shareholder holds prior to the transaction, or will
acquire as a result of the transaction, readily marketable securities. Under
subsection 14A:11-1(1), as amended, there is no appraisal right with respect to
shares held prior to a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets which are of a class
or series listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by not less
than 1,000 holders. Similarly, there is no appraisal right for a shareholder who
will receive upon consummation of any such transaction cash, securities which
are either listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by not less
than 1,000 holders, or a combination of cash and securities.
The Commission concluded that the standard of record ownership by not
less than 1,000 holders was preferable to the standard of regular quotation in an
over-the-counter market. Although the Delaware Act uses a 2,000 holder test,
the commission felt that a 1,000 holder requirement would adequately assure the
marketability of securities so held.
Id. §14A:11-1 commentary at 44.
758. The North Carolina statute provides as follows:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 [the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act], a shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the
following corporate actions:
(1) Consummation of a plan of merger to which the corporation
(other than a parent corporation in a [short-form] merger under G.S. 55-11-
04) is a party unless (i) ... (ii) such shares are then redeemable by the
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provide-for the first time-that shareholders will have no right of
dissent and appraisal if their shares are marketable (in the sense of
being listed on a national securities exchange or held by at least 2000
record holders).7 9 Unlike the comparable Delaware statute,760 this
corporation at a price not greater than the cash to be received in exchange
for such shares;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a) (Supp. 1996). While the new North Carolina Act is based,
generally, on the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act, the provision of the North
Carolina Act relating to redeemable shares does not appear in the Model Act.
The theory of the redeemable shares provision is that, if a corporation has
outstanding shares that are redeemable at the corporation's option, and if the corporation
proposes to enter into a merger pursuant to a plan that contemplates a cash-out of those
redeemable shares for an amount of cash that is not less than their redemption price,
then, a holder of such shares can be no worse off than if the redemption option had been
exercised, and thus there is no occasion to give him appraisal rights for the protection of
his interests.
759. The North Carolina statute provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article [relating to
Dissenters' Rights], there shall be no right of dissent in favor of holders of
shares of any class or series which, at the record date fixed to determine the
shareholders entitled to receive notice of and to vote at the meeting at which the
plan of merger or share exchange or the sale or exchange of property is to be
acted on, were (i) listed on a national securities exchange or (ii) held by at least
2,000 record shareholders, unless in either case:
(1) The articles of incorporation of the corporation issuing the shares
provide otherwise;
(2) In the case of a plan of merger or share exchange, the holders of
the class or series are required under the plan of merger or share exchange
to accept for the shares anything except:
a. Cash;
b. Shares, or shares and cash in lieu of fractional shares of the
surviving or acquiring corporation, or of any other corporation which,
at the record date fixed to determine the shareholders entitled to
receive notice of and vote at the meeting at which the plan of merger or
share exchange is to be acted on, were either listed subject to notice of
issuance on a national securities exchange or held of record by at least
2,000 record shareholders; or
c. A combination of cash and shares as set forth in
subsubdivisions a. and b. of this subdivision.
Act of June 9, 1997, ch. 202, § 1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997) (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-13-02(c)).
The provisions of this statute do not apply to subsidiary corporations that are parties
to short-form mergers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-04(f) (1990), as amended by Act of
Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 485, § 29 (effective Oct. 1,1997) (quoted supra in note 496).
It is difficult to determine, under subsubdivision (2)b of this statute, whether or not a
shareholder's right of dissent is denied if he holds marketable shares and is required
under a plan of merger or share exchange to accept (in exchange therefor) shares of the
acquiring corporation which (at the record date) are not marketable. Compare the
provisions of this statute with those of section 262(b)(1)-(2) of the Delaware Code. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 753).
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new North Carolina statute denies appraisal fights to holders of
marketable shares (unless otherwise provided in the corporate
charter) even when the consideration received by them in a merger
consists of nothing but cash.
(c) Exceptions Based on Type of Merger Consideration
New Jersey-alone among the three subject states-denies the
right of appraisal (without regard to any other circumstance) simply
on the basis of the shareholder's receiving either of two specified
types of merger consideration: cash or marketable securities.7 61 The
New Jersey statute states that, unless otherwise provided in the
corporate charter, "a shareholder shall not have the fight to dissent
from any plan of merger ... with respect to shares ... for which ...
he will receive (x) cash, (y) shares, obligations or other securities
which, upon consummation of the merger..., will either be listed on
a national securities exchange or held of record by not less than 1,000
holders, or (z) cash and such securities." 762
(d) Voluntary Appraisal Provisions
In 1974,76 New Jersey added a new subsection to its appraisal
statute, authorizing a corporation to provide in its charter for
appraisal rights in connection with specified transactions.7"
760. See supra text accompanying note 754.
761. This concept was introduced into the New Jersey appraisal statute by Act of Jan.
7, 1974, ch. 366, § 60, 1973 NJ. Laws 964, 1029-30 (effective May 1, 1974). For the
Commissioners' Comments-1972 Amendments, see supra note 757 (second paragraph).
762. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(a)(i)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note
757 (first paragraph)).
763. See Act of Jan. 7,1974, ch.366, § 60,1973 NJ. Laws 964,1031.
764. The New Jersey statute provides as follows:
A corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that holders
of all its shares, or of a particular class or series thereof, shall have the right to
dissent from specified corporate actions in addition to those enumerated in
subsection 14A:11-1(1), in which case the exercise of such right of dissent shall
be governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(4) (West Supp. 1997). The Commissioners' Comment-1972
Amendments includes the following:
A new subsection 14A:11-1(4) has been added to permit a corporation to
provide in its Certificate of Incorporation that shareholders are entitled to the
right of dissent from specified corporate actions in addition to those corporate
actions as to which the right to dissent is required by this Act. This, in effect,
enables a corporation to "volunteer" an appraisal right in particular situations
where the right is not required by the statute.
Id. § 14A:11-1 commentary at 44.
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Delaware followed, in 1981,765 adding a comparable provision to its
appraisal statute.76 North Carolina's 1989 Business Corporation
Act767 goes a step further; it authorizes appraisal rights to be
volunteered by a corporation, not only if so permitted by provisions
of the corporate charter or bylaws, but also if so provided in a
resolution of the board of directors.7a
(2) Cases and Commentary
The denial of appraisal rights to shareholders of the parent
corporation in an upstream short-form merger makes good sense,
765. See Act of June 6,1981, ch. 25, § 14,63 Del. Laws 36,38 (effective July 6,1981).
766. The Delaware statute provides as follows:
Any corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that
appraisal rights under this section shall be available for the shares of any class or
series of its stock as a result of an amendment to its certificate of incorporation,
any merger or consolidation in which the corporation is a constituent
corporation or the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation.
If the certificate of incorporation contains such a provision, the procedures of
this section... shall apply as nearly as is practicable.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (1991).
767. Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990); see
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
768. The North Carolina statute provides as follows:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 [the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act], a shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the
following corporate actions:
(5) Any corporate action taken pursuant to a shareholder vote to the
extent the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or a resolution of the board of
directors provides that voting or nonvoting shareholders are entitled to
dissent and obtain payment for their shares.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a) (Supp. 1996). This provision is taken from the 1984 Model
Business Corporation Act, as to which the Official Comment states:
Corporations may wish to grant on a voluntary basis dissenters' rights in
connection with important transactions (e.g., those submitted for shareholder
approval). The grant may be to nonvoting shareholders in connection with
transactions that give rise to dissenters' rights with respect to voting
shareholders. The grant of dissenters' rights may add to the attractiveness of
preferred shares, and may satisfy shareholders who would, in the absence of
dissenters' rights, sue to enjoin the transaction. Also, in situations where the
existence of dissenters' rights may otherwise be disputed, the voluntary offer of
those rights under this section will avoid a dispute.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 commentary at 13-15 (1996).
One can wonder whether (although probably unintended) the introductory language
of section 55-13-02(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes (quoted supra in note 759)
has the effect of precluding a volunteering of appraisal rights (otherwise than by terms of
the corporate charter) with respect to shares that are marketable as specified in that 1997
addition to North Carolina's appraisal statute.
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having in mind the limitations (discussed above) on use of this form
of merger. The same cannot be said for Delaware's or North
Carolina's denial of appraisal rights to the parent's shareholders in a
downstream short-form merger,769 nor for New Jersey's denial of
appraisal rights to the subsidiary's shareholders in a downstream
short-form merger.770 There should always be appraisal fights for
dissenting shareholders of a corporation that disappears in a merger
and for shareholders dissenting from a merger of their controlled
corporation even when it is made the survivor. 7 '
The denial of appraisal rights to shareholders of the surviving
corporation in a small-scale merger makes good sense, given the
requirements that have to be met for such a merger. On the other
hand, statutes are deficient when they permit, by resort to the
triangular merger device, a stock merger that increases the acquiring
company's outstanding common stock by more than 20% (40% in
New Jersey) without any right of appraisal for dissenters.m
Some aspects of the post-1950 appraisal statutes in the three
subject states seem patently wrong. One, now applicable in all three
states, is the denial of appraisal fights to shareholders whose shares
are marketable. The other, applicable only in New Jersey, is the
denial of appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders who receive cash
or marketable securities for their stock.
The premise underlying the denial of appraisal rights with
respect to marketable shares is (to say the least) difficult to accept.73
It would appear to be based on the notion that the price at which a
dissenting shareholder can sell his shares (i.e., the market value of
those shares) is the same as his entitlement in appraisal (i.e., the "fair
value" of such shares). Yet, as pointed out above, this notion has
come to be widely discredited;"4 and it is significant that a provision
769. For a problem that could arise with respect to a Delaware corporation, see supra
text accompanying notes 519-21.
770. See supra text accompanying notes 517 and 744.
771. For an example of a case, outside New Jersey, in which steps were taken to make
the subsidiary corporation the survivor in a short-form merger, see Temple v. Combined
Properties Corp., 410 A.2d 1375 (Del. Ch. 1979).
772. See supra text accompanying notes 663-65.
773. That premise has been stated as follows: "In short, the theory is that, if the
appraisal remedy provides a judicially created market for dissenting stockholders, such a
device is unnecessary where there is already a substantial trading market, either through
a securities exchange or the over-the-counter market." FOLK, supra note 459, at 391; see
also Willard P. Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 291,
302-03 (1968) (stating that the right of dissent and appraisal, while useful in limited
market situations, is not needed when an established market exists).
774. See supra notes 690-701 and accompanying text. For criticism of the denial of
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comparable to Delaware's, having been added to the Model Business
Corporation Act in 1969,.1 5 was deleted from the Model Act in
1978.76
The New Jersey statute-unlike that of Delaware or North
Carolina-denies appraisal rights in the context in which it is
probably needed most. It contains an outright denial of such rights to
any shareholder (whether of the surviving or the disappearing
corporation) if his shares are converted, in a merger, into cash.M
This leaves a cashed out shareholder with no means of checking the
adequacy of the consideration proffered for his shares-short of a
suit for equitable relief.
Consider the implications of this in the following case. A private
corporation is taken public with about 30% of its stock sold to
appraisal rights for holders of marketable shares, see EISENBERG, supra note 116, at 79-
84, and Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting
Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. Rsv. 1023,1036-60 (1976).
775. That provision read as follows:
This [right of dissent] section shall not.., apply to the holders of shares of
any class or series if the shares of such class or series were registered on a
national securities exchange on the [record date for the shareholders' meeting]
at which a plan of merger ... is to be acted upon unless the articles of
incorporation of the corporation shall otherwise provide.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 80 (1971).
776. The reasons for this deletion, as stated in Alfred F. Conard, Amendments of
Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80, and 81),
33 Bus. LAW. 2587 (1978), were in part as follows:
The former exception for shares listed on stock exchanges has been
eliminated in the light of facts which have become more visible since the stock
market exception was added to the Model Act in 1969. The 1970s have
demonstrated again the possibility of a demoralized market in which fair prices
are not available, and in which many companies publicly offer to buy their own
shares because the market grossly undervalues them. Under these
circumstances, access to market value is not a reasonable alternative for a
dissenting shareholder. Moreover, a shareholder may be disqualified by state or
federal securities laws from using the market because his shares are "restricted,"
because he is an "insider" who has acquired shares within six months, or because
he possesses "inside information." Even if the dissenter is free to use the
market, he may find it impractical to do so because his holdings are large and
the market is thin. In any event, the market cannot reflect the value of the
shares "excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation" of the
corporate change which gives rise to the dissenters' rights.
Id. at 2595-96.
777. See supra note 757 and text accompanying notes 761-62. Appraisal rights are
denied also if the shareholder's stock is converted into marketable securities. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(a)(i)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note 757 (first
paragraph)); see also John R MacKay II, The 1974 Corporation Law Amendments, 97
N.J. L.J. 337, 347 (1974) ("In sum, if a shareholder's shares are publicly traded or if he is
to receive, in exchange for his shares, shares which are publicly traded, or cash, or both,
he will not be entitled to dissent from a transaction.").
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outsiders at $5 per share; and later, when the market price of the
stock drops, its two controlling shareholders (owning about 70% of
its stock) arrange a cash-out merger. They organize a new shell
corporation, receive all of its stock in exchange for their 70% of the
stock of the operating company, and then arrange a merger of the
operating company into the shell corporation with the public
shareholders to receive $2 per share in cash. With the two individuals
dominating both boards, there is no arm's length bargaining; with
their control of 70% of the operating company's stock, the outcome
of the shareholder vote is a foregone conclusion; and with the merger
consideration consisting of cash, the minority shareholders are frozen
out of the on-going enterprise. These facts cry out for a statutory
right of appraisal, but under the New Jersey statute (as amended in
1974) there is none.778
c. Exclusivity of Appraisal 779
(1) Statutory Provisions
The Delaware appraisal statute7?8 continues (as in the past) to be
silent on the question whether appraisal is the dissenting
shareholder's exclusive remedy.
Prior to 1969, the New Jersey corporation statute also was silent
on the question. However, that state's 1968 Business Corporation
Act7 1 makes the right of appraisal exclusive except when the
"corporate action will be or is ultra vires, unlawful or fraudulent as to
such dissenting shareholder."'78
77& The facts are essentially those in Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975). The court granted a preliminary injunction against
consummation of the merger, noting in the course of its opinion that "[w]here, as here,
the stockholders of the corporation which is a party to the merger are to be paid in cash,
the stockholder does not have the right to dissent to the terms of the merger." Id. at 571.
779. The matter of appraisal exclusivity is discussed in the following: Vorenberg,
supra note 4; Coleman, supra note 687, at 790-98; Steven D. Gardner, Note, A Step
Forward: Exclusivity of the Statutory Appraisal Remedy for Minority Shareholders
Dissenting from Going-Private Merger Transactions, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (1992); and
Julie Gwyn Hudson, Comment, The Exclusivity of the Appraisal Remedy Under the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act: Deciding the Standard of Review for Cash-Out
Mergers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 501 (1991). For a California case in which the court split four to
three on the question of appraisal exclusivity, see Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683
(Cal. 1987) (en banc).
780. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
781. Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 NJ. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969); see
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
782. The New Jersey statute, as enacted in 1968 and now in effect, provides as follows:
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North Carolina's 1955 Business Corporation Act7m made the
right of appraisal non-exclusive.78" However, when that Act was
rewritten in 19 89,78 appraisal was made exclusive "unless the action
is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the
corporation."'7
The enforcement by a dissenting shareholder of his right to receive
payment for his shares shall exclude the enforcement by such dissenting
shareholder of any other right to which he might otherwise be entitled by virtue
of share ownership,... except that this subsection shall not exclude the right of
such dissenting shareholder to bring or maintain an appropriate action to obtain
relief on the ground that such corporate action will be or is ultra vires, unlawful
or fraudulent as to such dissenting shareholder.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.11-5(2) (West 1969).
The Commissioners' Comment-1968 states:
As under existing law, the remedy of dissent and appraisal is not
exclusive. See Colgate v. United States Leather Co.; Riker & Son Co. v. United
Drug Co. In subsection 14A:11-5(2), the Commission followed closely the
language of section 623(k) of the New York Act, limiting the alternate available
actions to those where the corporate action is "ultra vires, unlawful or
fraudulent." Compare Windhurst v. Central Leather Co. Attention is invited to
the last sentence of the first paragraph of section 74 of the Model Act, which
apparently makes the right of appraisal exclusive. Of course, the non-dissenting
shareholder continues to have the right to resort to courts without regard to the
provisions of this Chapter. See Imperial Trust Co. v. Magazine Repeating Razor
Co.
Id. § 14A:11-5 commentary at 102-03 (citations omitted).
783. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1, 1957);
see supra note 252 (second paragraph).
784. That statute contained the following provision:
In addition to any other right he may have in law or equity, a shareholder giving
such notice [of dissent] shall be entitled, if and when the amendment,
dissolution, merger, consolidation or sale of assets for shares is effected, to be
paid by the corporation the fair value of his shares, as of the day prior to the
date on which the vote was taken, subject only to the surrender by him of the
certificate representing his shares.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(b) (1982); see Austell v. Smith, 634 F. Supp. 326, 329
(W.D.N.C. 1986).
785. See Act of June 8,1989, ch. 265, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990);
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
786. The North Carolina statute now provides as follows:
A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his shares under
this Article may not challenge the corporate action creating his entitlement,
including without limitation a merger solely or partly in exchange for cash or
other property, unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the
shareholder or the corporation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(b) (Supp. 1996).
This provision is based on section 13.02(b) of the Model Business Corporation Act,
see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 13.02(b) (1996), except that the Model Act does not
contain the portion set off by commas in the North Carolina statute. The matter of
appraisal exclusivity had first been addressed in the Model Act in the late 1970s. See
Conard, supra note 776, at 2590-91, 2596; Report, Changes in the Model Business
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(2) Cases and Commentary
It makes a significant difference whether appraisal is the
dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy. It bears directly on the
question whether the dissenter can move to enjoin consummation of
the questioned transaction or (if it has been consummated) move for
rescission or rescissory damages. If the right of appraisal were held
to be a dissenter's exclusive remedy, the result would be to give a
controlling shareholder license to cash out a minority interest at any
time chosen by such shareholder.7 7
While there are some states in which the appraisal remedy is
truly exclusive, 788 most states have a different rule. In the latter
states, the rule is generally to the effect that appraisal is exclusive
only in the absence of fraud or illegality.789 Two questions arise
Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1859-61,1863 (1977).
787. Blunenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel Inc., 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1952), involved a
proposed sale of assets by the corporation operating the Roosevelt Hotel in New York
City to a wholly owned subsidiary of its dominant shareholder, Hilton Hotels
Corporation. See id. at 53. Alleging (among other things) that the purpose of the
proposed transaction was to freeze out the minority shareholders, plaintiffs sought to
enjoin its consummation. See id. Holding that the right of appraisal constituted an
adequate and exclusive remedy, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary
injunction and granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. See iL at 55, 58.
The following passages from Manning, supra note 115, are pertinent:
[T~he major effect of these appraisal statutes has been quite different from the
function generally attributed to them. Almost certainly the statutes have made
their major contribution not in shielding the minority, but in giving greater
mobility of action to the majority-that is, to corporate managements speaking
in the name of the majority. When a dissenting shareholder seeks to enjoin a
transaction, the courts turn him away if he has the appraisal remedy available to
him.
Th;e early supporters of the appraisal remedy may not have foreseen that
its availability would help to free corporate managements (the "majority") from
some of the risk of injunction.
Id. at 227,229.
788. Connecticut is such a state. See Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311, 320-21
(Conn. 1979), followed in Brandt v. Travelers Corp., 665 A.2d 616, 618-19 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1995).
789. See Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614, 628-30 (7th Cir. 1986); Yeager v. Paul
Semonin Co., 691 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Willcox v. Stern, 219 N.E.2d 401,
405 (N.Y. 1966) ("[I]t has been a judicial principle that equity will act-despite the
existence of an appraisal remedy-where there is fraud or illegality .... "); Adams v.
United States Distrib. Corp., 34 S.E.2d 244, 250 (Va. 1945) ("Suffice it to say, that the
weight of authority is to the effect that unless the corporate merger be tainted with fraud
or illegality ... the dissenting stockholder must pursue the remedy prescribed by the
appraisal statute.").
In Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Md. 1982),
the court said:
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under such a rule. The first is whether a breach of fiduciary duty
amounts to illegality so that appraisal is not exclusive. The second is
whether, notwithstanding illegality based on breach of fiduciary duty,
appraisal will be held to be exclusive when a minority shareholder
complains of nothing more than inadequacy of the proffered merger
consideration.
(a) Delaware Case Law on Question
The interplay of concepts of fiduciary duty, entire fairness,
business purpose, and exclusivity of appraisal, in the Delaware cash-
out merger cases decided between 1959 and 1983, has been covered
above.79 Those decisions culminated in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc 91 in
which, on the subject of exclusivity of the appraisal remedy, the court
said the following:
In considering the nature of the remedy available
under our law to minority shareholders in a cash-out
merger, we believe that it is, and hereafter should be, an
appraisal under [the Delaware appraisal statute] as
hereinafter construed.7 2
The court stated further:
[Except with respect to certain pending matters] the
provisions of [the Delaware appraisal statute], as herein
construed,... shall govern the financial remedy available to
minority shareholders in a cash-out merger.793
However, the court also stated:
While a plaintiff's monetary remedy ordinarily should
be confined to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding
herein established, we do not intend any limitation on the
historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief
as the facts of a particular case may dictate. The appraisal
remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases,
The prevailing view among state courts in states having similar appraisal
statutes, in the absence of statutory language making such appraisal the
dissenting shareholders' exclusive remedy, is that the statutory appraisal
proceeding is not the dissenters' exclusive remedy in cases of fraud, illegal
purpose or other wrongful conduct by the majority or controlling shareholder.
In other words, upon proof of such wrongful conduct, a court of equity will
provide appropriate relief apart from that set out in the appraisal statute.
Id. at 1036 (footnote omitted).
790. See supra text accompanying notes 618-38.
791. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
792. Id. at 703.
793. Id. at 715.
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particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing,
deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable
overreaching are involved.9 4
The following observations can be made on the basis of the words
employed in these passages. First, when the court refers to
"financial" and "monetary" remedy, it seems to be saying that
appraisal should be the exclusive remedy in any case in which a
minority shareholder seeks nothing more than a larger amount of
consideration than that proffered in the merger. Second, the court
makes it clear that relief other than appraisal may be in order in cases
involving "fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of
corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching." Moreover,
because most cash-out mergers entail "self-dealing,"795 the court's
inclusion of that term seems to mean that a minority shareholder can
properly seek equitable relief with respect to such a merger in all
cases except when the controlling shareholder has eschewed self-
dealing either (i) by having the terms of the merger negotiated by
outside directors of the controlled corporation, as suggested in a
footnote to the Weinberger opinion,7 96 or (ii) by conditioning
consummation of the merger on the favorable vote of a majority of
the minority, as was done (though unsuccessfully) in Weinberger.
There is support in other jurisdictions for the proposition that
appraisal is the exclusive remedy when a dissenter's only quarrel is
with the amount of the payment tendered in a cash-out merger.79
794. Id. at 714.
795. See supra text accompanying notes 615-16.
796. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
797. In Walter J. Schloss Associates v. Arkwin Industries, Ina, 460 N.E.2d 1090 (N.Y.
1984), while the New York appraisal statute embodied the often-stated proposition that
appraisal is the exclusive remedy except when the dissenter seeks by appropriate action
to obtain relief on the ground that the transaction is unlawful or fraudulent as to him, and
even though the complainant alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the
majority shareholder in engineering a cash-out merger, appraisal was held to be the
exclusive remedy because the complainant sought only monetary relief as distinguished
from equitable relief. See id. at 1091 (adopting the reasoning of the dissent to the lower
court's opinion, Walter J. Schloss Associates v. Arkwin Industries, Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d 844,
847-52 (App. Div. 1982) (Mangano, J., dissenting), rev'd, 460 N.E.2d 1090 (N.Y. 1984)).
In Walter J. Schloss Associates v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 536 A.2d 147 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1988), with the appraisal statute silent on the matter of exclusivity, the court
was of the view that "the availability of the statutory appraisal procedure is not exclusive,
at least to the point of foreclosing injunctive relief, in freeze-out situations." Id. at 154.
But, because plaintiffs in this case sought essentially monetary relief, the court concluded
that "the statutory appraisal right is a wholly adequate remedy." Id. at 158. In Stepak v.
Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio 1990), the court, while recognizing that the appraisal
remedy did not preclude an action for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a cash-
out merger, held that "remedy beyond the statutory [appraisal] procedure is not available
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However, subsequent decisions in Delaware make it clear that unfair
dealing involving a breach of fiduciary duty in a cash-out merger may
justify relief other than appraisal 98
(b) Statutory Treatment of Question in New Jersey and North
Carolina
As noted above, the New Jersey statute (since January 1, 1969)
makes appraisal the exclusive remedy except when the "corporate
action will be or is ultra vires, unlawful or fraudulent as to such
dissenting shareholder," and the North Carolina statute (since July 1,
1990) makes appraisal exclusive "unless the action is unlawful or
fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation." 799
The principal question that arises under these statutes relates to the
meaning that should be given to the word "unlawful" in this
context.m Some will say that it means nothing more than failure to
comply with the statute (e.g., that director action was taken without a
proper quorum or that a shareholders' meeting was held without
where the shareholder's objection is essentially a complaint regarding the price which he
received for his shares." It at 1075. In IRA ex reL Oppenheimer v. Brenner Cos., 107
N.C. App. 16, 419 S.E.2d 354 (1992), a cash-out merger case decided under North
Carolina's former appraisal statute which was expressly non-exclusive, the court sustained
a summary judgment in favor of defendant directors and majority shareholders on the
ground that, while plaintiffs' complaint asked for compensatory and punitive damages on
the theory of unfairness of the merger, breach of fiduciary duty, and actual or
constructive fraud, they failed to present facts to support any of their theories for
recovery other than that of a challenge to the stock value which "would be more
appropriately resolved in a statutory appraisal proceeding." IL at 25, 419 S.E2d at 360.
798. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187-89 (Del. 1988)
(upholding the right of a minority shareholder, who had dissented from a cash-out merger
and commenced an appraisal proceeding, to assert and pursue a later-discovered claim of
fraud in the merger through an action for rescissory damages against the participants for
breach of fiduciary duty to the shareholder); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498
A.2d 1099, 1100, 1104-05 (Del. 1985) (holding that availability of the appraisal remedy
did not preclude a suit challenging a cash-out merger on the basis of unfair dealing in the
form of a breach of fiduciary duty); Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1342
(Del. Ch. 1987) (granting a temporary injunction to preclude consummation by a
controlling shareholder of a cash-out merger when "misrepresentation, self-dealing, and
gross and palpable overreaching [were] alleged and preliminarily established"); accord
Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding, in a diversity
action involving a short-form cash-out merger under a New Jersey statute authorizing
mergers of insurance companies and providing that "the dissenting shareholder shall
cease to have any rights of a shareholder, except the right to be paid the fair value of his
shares," that the availability of an appraisal remedy did not preclude a suit challenging
the merger on the ground of breach of fiduciary duty by the parent corporation).
799. See supra note 782 (first paragraph) and accompanying text, and note 786 (first
paragraph) and accompanying text.
800. See Hudson, supra note 779, at 502.
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proper notice). Others will contend that unlawful action includes
also action taken in breach of a fiduciary duty.
It is a matter of considerable importance that the latter position
be the one adopted, and it appears that the courts have already taken
this view of the matter. In Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp.,0 1
involving a cash-out merger, the court said: "When a breach of
fiduciary duty occurs, that action will be considered unlawful and the
aggrieved shareholder may be entitled to equitable relief .... "80
Similarly, in Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.,03
also involving a cash-out merger, the court said: "Judicial inquiry
into a freeze-out merger in technical compliance with the statute may
be appropriate, and the dissenting stockholders are not limited to the
statutory remedy of judicial appraisal where violations of fiduciary
duties are found." 4  Moreover, the Official Comment on section
801. 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984).
802. Id. at 26. The court also said the following:
The pursuit of an appraisal proceeding generally constitutes the dissenting
stockholder's exclusive remedy. An exception exists, however, when the merger
is unlawful or fraudulent as to that shareholder, in which event an action for
equitable relief is authorized. Thus, technical compliance with the Business
Corporation Law's requirements alone will not necessarily exempt a merger
from further judicial review.
Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
Pert v. IU International Corp., 607 P.2d 1036 (Haw. 1980), involved a reverse
triangular merger in which the minority interest in a subsidiary was to be eliminated in
exchange for shares of redeemable convertible preferred stock of the controlling
corporation. See id at 1043-44. The applicable statute made appraisal exclusive except
for" 'suits or actions to test the sufficiency or regularity of the votes of the stockholders
authorizing or approving the proposed action.'" Id. at 1045 (quoting section 417-29 of
the Hawaii Revised Statutes, as then in effect). Nonetheless, the court held that the
merger could be attacked on the ground of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty, saying:
We agree that a merger effected for the sole purpose of freezing out the
minority interest is a violation of fiduciary principles governing the relationship
between controlling and minority shareholders. We conclude that appraisal is
not the exclusive remedy available to [the complaining shareholder] if the above
violation is established.
Id. at 1046.
803. 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986).
804. Id. at 1118. The court also stated that "[t]he defendants argue that judicial review
of a merger cannot be invoked by disgruntled stockholders, absent illegal or fraudulent
conduct," id. at 1117, and noted that the defendants relied on a statute making appraisal
the exclusive remedy except when" 'corporate action will be or is illegal or fraudulent as
to [a shareholder],'" id. at 1117 n.12 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 98 (1984)).
The court concluded, nonetheless, that it was "justified in exercising its equitable power
when a violation of fiduciary duty is claimed." Id. at 1117. For a somewhat similar
holding in Massachusetts, see Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1030, 1033
(Mass. 1978).
A different result was reached in Sifferle v. Micom Corp., 384 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct.
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13.02(b) of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act, which makes
appraisal the shareholder's exclusive remedy "unless the action is
unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the
corporation," includes the following:
If the corporation attempts an action in violation of the
corporation law on voting, in violation of clauses in articles
of incorporation prohibiting it, by deception of
shareholders, or in violation of a fiduciary duty-to take
some examples-the court's freedom to intervene should be
unaffected by the presence or absence of dissenters' rights
under this chapter.815
Nevertheless, in a case challenging a cash-out merger on the
ground of breach of fiduciary duty, a court-notwithstanding the
"unlawful or fraudulent" exception to the exclusivity of appraisal-
can fall into the trap of limiting complaining shareholders to the
appraisal remedy if the court concludes that the disagreement is
solely one as to the value of the shares. Notwithstanding a vigorous
dissent, this was the result reached in Stringer v. Car Data Systems,
Inc.806 One premise for this result was the observation that "this
App. 1986), which involved a short-form cash-out merger engineered by the controlling
shareholder following a tender offer that left the controlling shareholder with more than
90% of the outstanding stock. See id. at 505. However, that result was based on language
of the appraisal statute that provided for an exception to appraisal exclusivity only when
the corporate action was "fraudulent" and thus made no exception for "unlawful" action.
See id. at 507-09.
In Fleming v. International Pizza Supply Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994),
when a 75% shareholder sought to oust a 25% shareholder by engineering a sale of
corporate assets to a new corporation owned by the 75% holder and a third party and by
attempting to relegate the 25% holder to appraisal at the munificent amount of $10 (for
stock that had been valued at $300,000 in a buy-sell agreement less than two years
earlier), it was held that availability of the appraisal remedy did not preclude a recovery
of compensatory damage for a breach of fiduciary duty or fraud. See id. at 1078-79, 1080-
81. This decision is noteworthy because, two years before the original corporation had
been organized (in 1988), Indiana had adopted a new business corporation law based on
the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act but had consciously omitted from its provision
concerning the exclusivity of appraisal rights the Model Act's language, see MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02(b) (1996); supra note 786, to the effect that such rights are
exclusive unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the
corporation. See Fleming, 640 N.E.2d at 1079.
805. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 commentary at 13-16 to -17 (1996).
806. 841 P.2d 1183 (Or. 1992) (en banc). This case was decided under the Oregon
Business Corporation Act of 1987, which drew upon the Model Business Corporation Act
and contained the Model Act's provision that a shareholder entitled to appraisal "'may
not challenge the corporate action creating the shareholder's entitlement unless the
action is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation.'" Id.
at 1186 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 60.554(2) (1991)). Plaintiffs were minority
shareholders of CDS who had been cashed out by way of a merger of CDS with a newly
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court may not question the wisdom of the Legislative Assembly in
enacting the Oregon Business Corporation Act [which] drew upon
the Model Business Corporation Act and contains procedures for
majority shareholders to 'squeeze out' minority shareholders."8w
This pronouncement may be thought to reflect sound policy in the
form of corporate flexibility, but it hardly encourages investors to
take minority positions in Oregon corporations. 801
created shell corporation formed by the directors and majority shareholders, and
plaintiffs sought compensatory damages (actually, rescissory damages based on the stock
value at the time of trial) and punitive damages on the ground that defendants had
breached their fiduciary duty and acted unlawfully. See id. at 1184, 1186-87. Because the
complaint had been dismissed by the trial court and that dismissal had been confirmed
below, the question on appeal was whether the complaint stated a cause of action. See id.
at 1187. The gravamen of the complaint was that CDS's profitability was increasing, that
defendants decided to cash out the minority shareholders (owning 43% of the stock) at a
price below the fair market value of the stock so that defendants alone could benefit from
the anticipated increase in the value of CDS stock, and that defendants had even voted to
reject a third party's offer to purchase substantially all of CDS's assets at a price that
would have yielded substantially more per share than the price per share paid to the
minority in the cash-out merger. See id at 1186-88. The court recognized that the
dispositive question was whether plaintiffs had alleged facts that would establish that
defendants' conduct was unlawful or fraudulent. See id at 1188. Notwithstanding
plaintiffs' allegation that defendants had engineered a merger with a shell corporation to
reap for themselves (to the exclusion of the minority) the fruits of the corporation's
increasing profitability, the court said:
Plaintiff's complaint clearly alleges a disagreement as to valuation, and we
also can infer payment by Car Data of an unreasonably low price. Where the
allegations show only a disagreement as to price, however, with no allegations
that permit any inference of self-dealing, fraud, deliberate waste of corporate
assets, misrepresentation, or other unlawful conduct, the remedy afforded by
[the appraisal statute] is exclusive.
Id. at 1190. The dissenting opinion, after noting the statute's "unlawful or fraudulent"
exception to appraisal exclusivity, see id. at 1192 (Unis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), said (among other things) the following:
With respect to the minority shareholders of CDS .... the allegations of the
complaint are, in my view, sufficient to permit an inference of self-dealing and
gross, palpable, overreaching conduct-a violation of the fiduciary duty owed to
plaintiffs by CDS directors and majority shareholders. As such, the case should
not have been dismissed at the pleading stage for failure to state a claim.
... Surely the majority does not mean to hold that it is lawful for the
directors of a corporation to plot unlawfully against some of the corporation's
shareholders as long as those shareholders can subsequently defeat the unlawful
plot through judicial action to determine the fair value of the company's stock.
Yet that is the effect of the majority's holding.
Id. at 1194 (Unis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
807. Id. at 1188.
808. In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.
1989), the court said:
States compete to offer corporate codes attractive to firms. Managers who want
to raise money incorporate their firms in the states that offer the combination of
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11. PURCHASE/SALE OF ASSETS °
The Delaware, North Carolina, and New Jersey sale-of-assets
statutes are of relatively recent vintage. They were not enacted until
the twentieth century.
A. Statutory Provisions
1. Delaware
It was not until 1917 that Delaware first enacted a statute8 10
authorizing a corporation to effect a sale-of-assets transaction. 1
That statute, as subsequently amended,8 12 now appears as section 271
rules investors prefer. Laws that in the short run injure investors and protect
managers will in the longer run make the state less attractive to firms that need
to raise new capital.
Id. at 507 (citations omitted).
809. For articles contrasting mergers and sale-of-assets transactions, see the following:
SEcuRrIEs AND EXCHANGE Co mMssION, supra note 253, app. B, pts. fl-ll, at 526-89;
and George S. Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of
Shares, 19 CAL. L. REV. 349 (1931).
810. See Act of Mar. 20,1917, ch. 113, § 17,29 Del. Laws 320,332-33. It has been said
that enactment of this statute was prompted by the dictum in Butler v. New Keystone
Copper Co., 93 A. 380, 383 (Del. Ch. 1915) (quoted supra in note 11 (first paragraph)).
See FOLK, supra note 459, at 399 n.1.
811. The 1917 statute provided as follows:
Every corporation organized under the provisions of this Chapter, may at
any meeting of its Board of Directors, sell, lease or exchange all of its property
and assets, including its good will and its corporate franchises, upon such terms
and conditions as its Board of Directors deem expedient and for the best
interests of the corporation, when and as authorized by the affirmative vote of
the holders of a majority of the stock issued and outstanding having voting
power given at a stockholders' meeting duly called for that purpose, or when
authorized by the written consent of a majority of the holders of the voting stock
issued and outstanding, provided, however, that the certificate of incorporation
may require the vote or written consent of a larger proportion of the
stockholders.
Act of Mar. 20, 1917, ch. 113, § 17, 29 Del. Laws 320, 332-33. By Act of Apr. 2, 1925, ch.
112, § 13, 34 Del. Laws 272, 286-87, the mistaken reference to "the written consent of a
majority of the holders" was changed to read "the written consent of the holders of a
majority."
812. Two of those amendments addressed the matter of the kind of consideration that
could be received in a sale-of-assets transaction. A 1929 amendment, see Act of Mar. 22,
1929, ch. 135, § 19, 36 Del. Laws 366, 397, provided that such consideration could be "in
whole or in part shares of stock in, and/or other securities of, any other corporation or
corporations." The 1967 rewrite of the General Corporation Law, see Act of July 3, 1967,
ch. 50, sec. 1, § 271(a), 56 Del. Laws 151, 222, inserted the words "money or other
property."
The words "or substantially all" first appeared in the sale-of-assets statute in the 1967
rewrite of the General Corporation Law. See id.
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of the Delaware corporation statute."'
Under this statute, the terms and conditions of the sale,
including the form of consideration, must be determined by the board
of directors. 14 In making this determination, the directors must
consider "the best interests of the corporation." 815
The shareholder vote required to authorize a sale of assets was
stated, in the 1917 statute, to be that of "the holders of a majority of
the stock issued and outstanding having voting power." '16 This was
the requirement notwithstanding the fact that, at that time and until
1969, a merger required a two-thirds shareholder approval. 17 Under
the current sale-of-assets statute, the required approval is that of "the
holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation
entitled to vote thereon"8 ---the same as that now required for
approval of a merger.81 9
As originally enacted in 1917, the statute was silent concerning
permissible consideration for a sale of assets5s° A 1929 amendment
authorized the sale of assets to be for stock or securities of "any other
corporation";82' and, in 1967, "money or other property" was added
Post-1967 amendments of Delaware's sale-of-assets statute were made by the
following- Act of June 23, 1969, ch. 148, § 30,57 Del. Laws 433, 450; Act of July 8, 1983,
ch. 112, § 55,64 Del. Laws 285,292-93 (effective July 1,1983); and Act of July 4,1985, ch.
127, § 9,65 Del. Laws 224,225 (effective July 1,1985).
813. Section 271 provides, in subsection (a), as follows:
Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors ... sell,
lease or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets, including its
goodwill and its corporate franchises, upon such terms and conditions and for
such consideration, which may consist in whole or in part of money or other
property, including shares of stock in, and/or other securities of, any other
corporation or corporations, as its board of directors ... deems expedient and
for the best interests of the corporation, when and as authorized by a resolution
adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation
entitled to vote thereon ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991).
814. See id.
815. Id.
816. Act of Mar. 20, 1917, ch. 113, § 17, 29 Del. Laws 320, 332-33 (quoted supra in
note 811).
817. See supra text accompanying notes 242 and 553-56.
818. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991) (quoted supra in note 813).
819. See supra text accompanying note 556.
820. See supra note 811.
821. See supra note 812 (first paragraph). This meant that a purchasing corporation
could operate the business of the selling corporation as a separate subsidiary by having a
wholly owned subsidiary of the purchasing corporation act as the nominal purchaser using
stock of its parent as the consideration.
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as permissible consideration.'
The Delaware corporation statute has never given a right of
appraisal to shareholders dissenting from a sale of all or substantially
all of their corporation's assets. However, the Delaware statute
contains a provision whereby a corporation can provide in its charter
for appraisal rights in connection with such a transaction.A3
2. North Carolina
North Carolina's first sale-of-assets statute was enacted in
1925.1 In that state's 1955 Business Corporation Act, sale-of-assets
822. See supra note 812 (first paragraph).
823. See supra note 766.
824. See Act of Mar. 10, 1925, ch. 235, § 1, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 482, 482. It took the
form of an addition to the powers of corporations, providing as follows:
9. To sell any part of or all of its corporate property, whenever such sale
shall be authorized by a two-thirds vote of the board of directors of such
corporation and approved by the vote of the holders of two-thirds of the stock
entitled to vote at any stockholders' meeting, notice of which contains notice of
the proposed sale: Provided, that any corporation hereafter organized may
insert a provision in its charter that the powers granted by this subsection nine
may be exercised only when such sale shall be approved by the holders of such
amount of the stock of the corporation (not less than two-thirds of such stock
entitled to vote) or such amount of each class of stock as may be specified in said
charter, and provided further, that any corporation heretofore organized may by
vote of the holders of two-thirds of the stock entitled to vote amend its charter
at any stockholders' meeting, notice of which contains notice of the proposed
amendment[,] so as to provide the vote of stockholders (not less than two-thirds
of the stock entitled to vote) required to enable the corporation to exercise the
powers granted by this subsection nine.
Id.
By Act of Mar. 19, 1929, ch. 269, § 1, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 312, 312, a new proviso
was added, reading as follows: "Provided this section shall not be construed to limit or
abridge the right or power of any corporation from selling any of its assets in its regular
course of business." Id.
By Act of Mar. 31, 1939, ch. 279, § 1, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws 555, 555, subsection 9 was
replaced by three subsections, reading as follows:
9. To sell, transfer and convey any part of its corporate property in the
course of its regular business.
10. To sell, transfer and convey any part of its corporate real or personal
property when authorized so to do by its board of directors.
11. To sell, transfer and convey all of its corporate property when
authorized so to do by its board of directors and approved by a two-thirds vote
of the stock entitled to vote at any stockholders meeting, notice of which
contains notice of the proposed sale: Provided, this Act shall not be construed
as authorizing any public utility corporation to sell or convey all of its property
otherwise than under the terms prescribed in its charter ....
Id.
In 1943, these provisions were re-codified. See former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-26
(1943).
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transactions were covered in section 55-112Ps The 1989 rewrite of
that Act covers such transactions in section 55-12-02. 6
825. That statute provided as follows:
(c) Any other sale (whether for cash or for securities of the purchasing
corporation or otherwise), or any other lease or exchange of all or substantially
all the property of a corporation requires approval of the shareholders in the
following manner:
(1) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending
such sale, lease or exchange and directing the submission thereof to a vote
at a meeting of shareholders, which may be either an annual or a special
meeting.
(3) At such meeting the shareholders may authorize such sale, lease
or exchange and may fix, or may authorize the board of directors to fix, any
or all of the terms and conditions thereof and the consideration to be
received by the corporation therefor. Each outstanding share of the
corporation shall be entitled to vote thereon, whether or not otherwise
entitled to vote. Such authorization shall require the affirmative vote of at
least two thirds of the outstanding shares of the corporation, unless any
class of shares is entitled to vote as a class thereon, in which event such
authorization shall require the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the
outstanding shares of each class of shares entitled to vote as a class thereon
and two thirds of all other outstanding shares. Any class of shares shall be
entitled to vote as a class if the sale, lease or exchange is for securities of
another corporation, foreign or domestic, and such sale, lease or exchange is
part of a plan of distribution of such securities that would effectuate such
changes in that class of shares as would entitle those shares to vote as a class
if the changes were contained in a proposed amendment to the charter.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c) (1982).
826. The new Act provides as follows:
(a) A corporation may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of all, or
substantially all, of its property, otherwise than in the usual and regular course
of business, on the terms and conditions and for the consideration determined by
the corporation's board of directors, if the board of directors proposes and its
shareholders approve the proposed transaction.
(b) For a transaction to be authorized:
(1) The board of directors must recommend the proposed transaction
to the shareholders unless the board of directors determines that because of
conflict of interest or other special circumstances it should make no
recommendation, in which event the board of directors must communicate
the basis for its lack of a recommendation to the shareholders with the
submission of the proposed transaction; and
(2) The shareholders entitled to vote must approve the transaction.
(c) The board of directors may condition its submission of the proposed
transaction on any basis.
(d) The corporation shall notify each shareholder, whether or not entitled
to vote, of the proposed shareholders' meeting in accordance with G.S. 55-7-05.
The notice must also state that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the
meeting is to consider the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all, or
substantially all, the property of the corporation and contain or be accompanied
by a description of the transaction.
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From its enactment in 1925w until its amendment in 1939,8
North Carolina's sale-of-assets statute required such a transaction to
be authorized by "a two-thirds vote of the board of directors." As in
the case of that state's 1955 Business Corporation Act, 9 the
requirement in the 1989 rewrite of that Act is that a sale-of-assets
transaction be acted upon by the board of directors (under its
established voting rules) before its submission to shareholders.m
As enacted in 1925 and amended in 1 93 9,83 the North Carolina
statute required, for shareholder approval of a sale of assets, two-
thirds of the stock entitled to vote. North Carolina's 1955 Business
Corporation Act (effective July 1, 1957) continued the requirement
of a two-thirds vote of shareholders to approve a sale of assets832
(even though the same Act required only a majority vote to approve
amerger833), and it also gave the right to vote on such a transaction to
all shares whether or not otherwise entitled to vote. 4 Additionally, a
class vote was accorded by that Act to any class of stock if the sale of
assets was "for securities of another corporation" and was "part of a
(e) Unless the articles of incorporation, a bylaw adopted by the
shareholders, Article 9 or the board of directors (acting pursuant to subsection
(c)) require a greater vote or a vote by voting groups, the transaction to be
authorized must be approved by a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast on
the transaction.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-02 (1990).
This statute is based on section 12.02 of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act,
with minor differences: (i) the Model Act includes "(with or without the good will)" after
the word "property" in subsection (a); (ii) the Model Act uses the words "and
communicates the basis for its determination" in subsection (b)(1) rather than the words
"in which event the board of directors must communicate the basis for its lack of a
recommendation"; and (iii) the Model Act does not include the words "a bylaw adopted
by the shareholders, Article 9" in subsection (e). See &L; MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.
§ 12.02 (1996).
North Carolina General Statutes section 55-12-02(b)(2) and 1984 Model Business
Corporation Act section 12.02(b)(2) are deficient in not concluding with the words "as
provided in subsection (e)." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-02(b)(2) (1990); MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. § 12.02(b)(2) (1996). The point here is the same as that explained supra
in note 588.
827. See supra note 824 (first paragraph).
828. See supra note 824 (third paragraph).
829. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c)(1) (1982) (quoted supra in note 825).
830. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-02(a) (1990) (quoted supra in note 826 (first
paragraph)).
831. See supra note 824 (first and third paragraphs).
832. See former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c)(3) (1982) (quoted supra in note 825).
833. See former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-108(b) (1982) (quoted supra in text
accompanying notes 566-67).
834. See former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c)(3) (1982) (quoted supra in note 825).
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plan of distribution of such securities that would effectuate such
changes in that class of shares as would entitle those shares to vote as
a class if the changes were contained in a proposed amendment to the
charter."8' 5 When that Act was rewritten in 1989 (effective July 1,
1990), the required vote was changed to "a majority of all the votes
entitled to be cast on the transaction";8 6 however, this is subject to a
more demanding vote being required by the charter, a shareholder-
adopted bylaw, or a board resolution.
The pre-1955 statutes of North Carolina contained no
specification of the consideration that a corporation was permitted to
receive upon a sale of all of its assets.837 The 1955 statute, on the
other hand, covered such a sale "whether for cash or for securities of
the purchasing corporation or otherwise. '' s38 The 1989 statute refers
simply to "the consideration determined by the [selling] corporation's
board of directors."839
Until enactment of its 1955 Business Corporation Act, North
Carolina gave no right of appraisal to shareholders dissenting from a
sale of assets; and, under the 1955 Act, dissenters were accorded the
appraisal right only if the sale was "made for, or substantially for,
shares of another corporation."84° Under the 1989 rewrite of that
Act, the right of appraisal is given to shareholders dissenting from a
sale of assets unless it is "a sale pursuant to court order or a sale
pursuant to a plan by which all or substantially all of the net proceeds
of the sale will be distributed in cash to the shareholders within one
year after the date of sale."8'1 However, under a 1997 amendment of
835. Id.
836. N.C. GEM. STAT. §55-12-02(e) (1990) (quoted supra in note 826 (first
paragraph)).
837. See supra note 824 (first and third paragraphs).
838. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c) (1982) (quoted supra in note 825).
839. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 55-12-02(a) (1990) (quoted supra in note 826 (first
paragraph)).
840. Former N.C. GEM. STAT. § 55-113(a)(1), (b) (1982).
841. The North Carolina statute provides as follows:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 [the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act], a shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the
following corporate actions:
(3) Consummation of a sale or exchange of all, or substantially all, of
the property of the corporation other than as permitted by G.S. 55-12-01
[relating to sales of assets in the regular course of business and mortgage of
assets], including a sale in dissolution, but not including a sale pursuant to
court order or a sale pursuant to a plan by which all or substantially all of
the net proceeds of the sale will be distributed in cash to the shareholders
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1998] CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW 889
the Act, the right of appraisal is denied (unless otherwise provided in
the corporate charter) to shareholders whose shares are
marketable.842
3. New Jersey
It was not until 1931 that New Jersey first enacted a statute
authorizing the sale by a corporation of all or substantially all of its
assets.843 That statute, as subsequently amended,8" now appears as
within one year after the date of sale;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a) (Supp. 1996). The words "as permitted by G.S. 55-12-01"
were substituted for the words "in the usual and regular course of business" by Act of
July 12, 1991, ch. 645, § 12, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1540,1544 (effective Oct. 1, 1991).
This statute is based in part on the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act, which
provides as follows:
(a) A shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and obtain payment of the
fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the following corporate actions:
(3) consummation of a sale or exchange of all, or substantially all, of
the property of the corporation other than in the usual and regular course of
business, if the shareholder is entitled to vote on the sale or exchange,
including a sale in dissolution, but not including a sale pursuant to court
order or a sale for cash pursuant to a plan by which all or substantially all of
the net proceeds of the sale will be distributed to the shareholders within
one year after the date of sale;
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02(a) (1996).
A major difference between these two provisions is that the Model Act, unlike the
North Carolina statute, accords the appraisal right only to shareholders who are entitled
to vote on the sale-of-assets transaction.
842. See Act of June 9, 1997, ch. 202, § 1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(c)) (quoted supra in note 759 (first paragraph)).
843. Act of Apr. 27, 1931, ch. 288, § 1,1931 N.J. Laws 721,721-22, provided as follows:
Every corporation organized under this act [i.e., the act of 1896], including
every corporation organized under "An act concerning corporations"
(Revision), approved April seventh, one thousand eight hundred seventy-five,
except railroad and canal corporations, may, by action taken at any meeting of
its board of directors, sell or exchange all or substantially all of its property and
assets, including its good will, upon such terms and conditions and for such
considerations, which may be in whole or in part shares of stock in, and/or other
securities of, any other corporation or corporations as its board of directors shall
deem expedient and for the best interests of the corporation, when and as
authorized by the affirmative vote of two-thirds in interest of the holders of each
class of stock having voting powers on such proposal given at a stockholders'
meeting duly called for that purpose, or when authorized by the written consent
of two-thirds in interest of the holders of each class of stock having voting
powers on such proposal. Notice of such meeting or of such consent shall be
given to all stockholders of record of the corporation, whether or not they shall
be entitled to vote on such proposal. If any stockholder shall at such meeting or
within twenty days after such meeting or the receipt of notice of such consent,
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section 14A:10-11 of the New Jersey statute.845
object to such sale, and demand payment for his shares, such objecting
stockholder or the corporation may... apply for an appraisal of such stock ....
Id. In 1937, this statute (with minor changes) became section 14:3-5 of the New Jersey
Revised Statutes. See former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-5 (West 1939).
Under an 1899 statute, any New Jersey corporation (other than a railroad or canal
company) was authorized, with the assent of two-thirds in interest of its shareholders, to
lease its property and franchises to another corporation, and every New Jersey
corporation was authorized to take such lease or an assignment thereof. See Act of Mar.
24, 1899, ch. 150, § 1, 1899 N.J. Laws 334, 334 (quoted supra in note 182). In 1937, this
statute (with minor changes) became section 14:3-6 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes.
See former NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-6 (West 1939).
844. The 1968 rewrite of New Jersey's corporation statute, see Act of Nov. 21, 1968,
ch. 350, 1968 NJ. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969), made several changes. It combined
in section 14A:10-11 the concept of sale or exchange of assets, see supra note 843 (first
paragraph), and the concept of lease of assets, see supra note 843 (second paragraph); it
included "money or property, real or personal" as permissible consideration for a sale of
assets; and, in the words of the Commissioners' Comment-1968, it altered the
shareholder voting requirement so as to permit "shareholder approval by a majority
rather than a two-thirds vote, to (1) all corporations organized subsequent to the effective
date of the Revision, and (2) pre-Revision corporations who adopt an amendment to their
certificate of incorporation providing for a majority vote," NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-11
commentary at 82 (West 1969).
A subsequent amendment, in 1974, changed section 14A:10-11 by making minor
revisions in subsection (1)(b) and by adding a new subsection (3). See Act of Jan. 7, 1974,
ch. 366, § 58, 1973 N.J. Laws 964, 1027-29 (effective May 1, 1974). Another amendment,
in 1995, added a new subsection (4). See Act of Dec. 15, 1995, ch. 279, § 16, 1995 N.J.
Laws 1692,1710-12.
845. The New Jersey statute now provides as follows:
(1) A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all, or substantially all,
the assets of a corporation, if not in the usual and regular course of its business
as conducted by such corporation, may be made upon such terms and conditions
and for such consideration, which may consist in whole or in part of money or
property, real or personal, including shares, bonds, or other securities of any
other corporation, domestic or foreign, as may be authorized in the following
manner:
(a) The board shall recommend such sale, lease, exchange, or other
disposition and direct that it be submitted to a vote at a meeting of
shareholders.
(b) [Covers notice to shareholders]
(c) At such meeting the shareholders may approve such sale, lease,
exchange, or other disposition and may fix, or may authorize the board to
fix, any or all of the terms and conditions thereof and the consideration to
be received by the corporation therefor. Such sale, lease, exchange or other
disposition shall be approved upon receiving the affirmative vote of a
majority of the votes cast by the holders of shares entitled to vote thereon,
and, in addition, if any class or series of shares is entitled to vote thereon as
a class, the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast in each class vote;
except that, in the case of a corporation organized prior to January 1, 1969,
the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition shall be approved upon
receiving the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the votes so cast.
(d) Subject to the provisions of section 14A:5-12, a corporation
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The 1931 statute was similar to Delaware's 1917 statute with
respect to director action.8 However, the current New Jersey
statute requires that the directors "recommend such sale" and direct
its submission to a vote of shareholders. 47
Under the 1931 statute, shareholder approval of a sale of assets
required "the affirmative vote of two-thirds in interest of the holders
of each class of stock having voting powers on such proposal."'  As
rewritten in 19688 9 and as now in effectm the statute's shareholder
voting requirement varies depending upon whether or not the
corporation was organized prior to January 1, 1969. For corporations
organized on or after that date, a sale of assets requires for its
approval "the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast by the
holders of shares entitled to vote thereon" and, "if any class or series
of shares is entitled to vote thereon as a class, the affirmative vote of
a majority of the votes cast in each class vote."851 For corporations
organized prior to January 1, 1969, shareholder approval requires
"the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the votes so cast"; however,
such a corporation (subject to any supermajority voting provision
organized prior to January 1, 1969, may adopt the majority voting
requirements prescribed in paragraph 14A:10-11(1)(c) by an amendment of
its certificate of incorporation adopted by the affirmative vote of two-thirds
of the votes cast by the holders of shares entitled to vote thereon.
(3) The sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all, or substantially
all, the assets of one or more subsidiaries of a corporation, if not in the usual and
regular course of business as conducted by such subsidiary or subsidiaries, shall
be treated as a disposition within the meaning of subsection 14A:10-11(1) if the
subsidiary or subsidiaries constitute all, or substantially all, the assets of the
corporation.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a
parent corporation may, upon such terms and conditions and for such
consideration as may be determined by its board, transfer any or all of its assets
to any corporation, all of the outstanding shares of which are owned, directly or
indirectly, by the parent corporation, and, unless the certificate of incorporation
of the parent corporation otherwise requires, no approval or authorization by
the shareholders of the parent corporation shall be required.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-11 (West Supp. 1997).
846. See supra note 843 (first paragraph) and text accompanying notes 814-15.
847. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note
845).
848. Act of Apr. 27, 1931, ch. 288, § 1, 1931 N.J. Laws 721,722 (quoted supra in note
843 (first paragraph)). For the different vote required for shareholder approval of a long-
form merger under New Jersey's pre-1969 statute, see supra text accompanying notes
557-58.
849. See supra note 844 (first paragraph).
850. See supra note 845.
851. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-11(1)(c) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note 845).
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contained in its charters 2) may adopt the majority voting
requirements (quoted in the preceding sentence) "by an amendment
of its certificate of incorporation adopted by the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the votes cast by the holders of shares entitled to vote
thereon. '83 These voting requirements for approval of a sale of
assets are the same as those now required in New Jersey for approval
of a long-form merger.m
As enacted in 1931, the statute provided that the consideration
for a sale of assets "may be in whole or in part shares of stock in,
and/or other securities of, any other corporation or corporations. ' ' ss
In 1968 (effective January 1, 1969), it was made explicit that
permissible consideration for a sale of assets included "money or
property, real or personal.' ' 56
From the enactment of its first sale-of-assets statute in 1931857
until the present,.ss New Jersey has accorded a statutory right of
852. For the text of section 14A:5-12 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, referred
to at the beginning of section 14A:10-11(1)(d) (quoted supra in note 845), see supra note
563.
853. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-11(1)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note
845).
854. See supra text accompanying notes 560-64.
855. Act of Apr. 27, 1931, ch. 288, § 1, 1931 N.J. Laws 721, 722 (quoted supra in note
843 (first paragraph)).
856. Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, § 14A:10-11, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011, 1104 (effective
Jan. 1, 1969); see supra note 844 (first paragraph).
857. See supra note 843 (first paragraph).
858. Following adoption of Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, § 14A:11-1(1)(b), 1968 N.J.
Laws 1011, 1106-07 (effective Jan. 1, 1969), an amendment by Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366,
§ 60, 1973 NJ. Laws 964, 1029-31 (effective May 1, 1974), and a further amendment by
Act of Dec. 15, 1995, ch. 279, § 21, 1995 N.J. Laws 1692, 1715-16, New Jersey's appraisal
statute provides as follows with respect to a sale-of-assets transaction:
(1) Any shareholder of a domestic corporation shall have the right to
dissent from any of the following corporate actions
(b) Any sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or
substantially all of the assets of a corporation not in the usual or regular
course of business as conducted by such corporation, other than a transfer
pursuant to subsection (4) of NJ.S. 14A:10-11, provided that, unless the
certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, the shareholder shall not
have the right to dissent
(i) with respect to shares of a class or series which, at the record
date .... is listed on a national securities exchange or is held of record
by not less than 1,000 holders; or
(ii) from a transaction pursuant to a plan of dissolution of the
corporation which provides for distribution of substantially all of its net
assets to shareholders in accordance with their respective interests
within one year after the date of such transaction, where such
transaction is wholly for
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appraisal to shareholders dissenting from a sale-of-assets transaction.
However, unless otherwise provided in the corporation's charter, the
statute takes away that right with respect to marketable shares (as in
the case of dissent from a mergers 9) and with respect to a transaction
pursuant to a plan of dissolution providing for a distribution of net
assets to shareholders within one year when the transaction is for
cash or marketable securities.0
Unlike the statutes of Delaware and North Carolina, the New
Jersey statute addresses sale-of-assets transactions, not only from the
perspective of the selling corporation, but also from the perspective
of the purchasing corporation when the purchase price is not payable
in cash. As a consequence of a 1960 court decision,861 the New Jersey
legislature, in 1974,862 enacted a statutes 3 providing that, in the event
(A) cash; or
(B) shares, obligations or other securities which, upon
consummation of the plan of dissolution will either be listed on a
national securities exchange or held of record by not less than
1,000 holders; or
(C) cash and such securities; or
(iii) from a sale pursuant to an order of a court having
jurisdiction.
N.J. STAT. AN. § 14A:11-1(1) (West Supp. 1997).
859. See supra note 757.
860. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1l-l(1)(b) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note
858).
861. See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1960), affd per curiam, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960); infra note 902 (second
paragraph) (discussing Applestein).
862. See Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366, § 59, 1973 N.J. Laws 964, 1029 (effective May 1,
1974).
863. The statute provided as follows:
Shareholders of a corporation which proposes to acquire, directly or
through a subsidiary, in exchange for its shares, obligations or other securities,
some or all of the outstanding shares of another corporation, or some or all of
the assets of a corporation .... shall have the same rights, if any, as they would if
they were shareholders of a surviving corporation in a merger
(a) to notice of the proposed acquisition;
(b) to vote on the proposed acquisition; and
(c) to dissent from the proposed acquisition and be paid the fair value
of their shares
if (i) the securities to be issued or delivered pursuant to such acquisition are, or
may be converted into, shares of the acquiring corporation's common stock and
(ii) the number of the acquiring corporation's common shares to be issued or
delivered, plus those initially issuable upon conversion or exchange of any other
securities to be issued or delivered, will exceed 40 percent of the following- the
number of its common shares outstanding immediately prior to the acquisition
becoming effective plus the number of its common shares, if any, initially
issuable upon conversion or exchange of any other securities then outstanding.
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of a corporation's acquiring stock or assets of another corporation in
a transaction that actually or potentially (through conversion of
convertible securities) increased the acquiring corporation's
outstanding common stock by more than 40%, the shareholders of
the acquiring corporation would be accorded the same voting and
appraisal rights that they would have as shareholders of a surviving
corporation in a long-form merger 8 64 In 1988, this provision and the
New Jersey statute covering small-scale mergers' 5 were amended8 6
and brought into harmony.87
Id. (codified as amended at NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12 (West Supp. 1997)).
864. The Commissioners' Comment-1972 Amendments was as follows:
This section is new. It codifies the de facto merger doctrine articulated in
Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., by granting to shareholders the
same rights they would have in a merger in the event of any acquisition where
the corporation will issue common stock exceeding 40 percent of the number of
shares of its common stock previously outstanding. The Commission is of the
opinion that shareholders should be granted the right to vote and to dissent to
the same extent as in a merger in any corporate acquisition, however structured,
involving the issuance of such a substantial number of shares. At the same time,
the Commission believes that this codification will minimize the substantial
uncertainties which Applestein created.
The Rhode Island and Ohio acts have similar provisions. Note also the
similar requirement for a shareholder vote imposed by the New York Stock
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange.
Compare subsection NJ.S. 14A:10-3(4), which eliminates the requirement
for a vote of the shareholders of a surviving corporation on a merger if its
certificate of incorporation is not amended and the merger involves the issuance
of 20 percent or less of the number of shares of its common stock previously
outstanding.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12 commentary (1972) at 29 (West Supp. 1997) (citations
omitted).
865. See supra text accompanying notes 530-36.
866. See Act of Aug. 4, 1988, ch. 94, § 62, 1988 N.J. Laws 676, 742 (effective Dec. 1,
1988).
867. As amended in 1988, the New Jersey statute applies if:
(i) the number of voting shares outstanding immediately after the transaction,
plus the number of voting shares issuable on conversion of other securities or on
exercise of rights and warrants issued pursuant to the transaction, will exceed by
more than 40% the total number of voting shares of the corporation outstanding
immediately before the transaction; or (ii) the number of participating shares
outstanding immediately after the transaction, plus the number of participating
shares issuable on conversion of other securities or on exercise of rights and
warrants issued pursuant to the transaction will exceed by more than 40% the
total number of participating shares of the corporation outstanding immediately
before the transaction.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12(1) (West Supp. 1997). The Commissioners' Comment-
1988 Amendments stated:
Section 14A:10-12 has been revised to make its language consistent with
the revised language in subsection 14A:10-3(4). Both of these sections specify
when shareholders of a corporation have rights on an acquisition where their
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4. Model Business Corporation Act
The 1950 Model Business Corporation Act authorized a sale of
assets, for any kind of consideration (including money, property, or
shares), when recommended by the board of directors and approved
by the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding shares (whether or not
otherwise entitled to vote) including two-thirds of any class entitled
to vote thereon as a class, with provision for a dissenters' right of
appraisal. ss The voting requirement was later changed to a majority
of the shares entitled to vote.869 The sale-of-assets provisions of the
1984 Model Business Corporation Act were the basis for the North
Carolina provisions, discussed above.s70
B. Cases and Commentary
1. Perspective of Purchasing Corporation
Looking at sale-of-assets transactions from the perspective of the
purchasing corporation, one finds that the statutes of Delaware and
North Carolina (as well as provisions of the Model Business
Corporation Act) are silent. While this is understandable in the case
of cash-for-assets transactions, it is anomalous with respect to stock-
for-assets transactions of large scale-that is, those that entail an
increase of more than 20% in the purchasing corporation's
outstanding common stock. There is the same potential for dilution
in the latter case as there is in a long-form stock merger; and, this
being so, there is as much reason to accord voting and appraisal rights
to shareholders of the purchasing corporation in a large-scale stock-
for-assets purchase as there is to mandate such rights for
shareholders of the surviving corporation in a long-form stock
merger.s71 As previously noted, this concept is recognized in New
Jersey's acquisition statutes (even though those statutes provide for a
40% rather than a 20% trigger),7
corporation will be the surviving entity. These two sections have been revised to
make them identical in form and substance. As the Comment to Section
14A:10-3 explains, the particular language of the revision was taken from § 11.03
of the Model Business Corporation Act (1984 revision).
Id. § 14A:10-12 commentary (1988) at 29.
86& See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 73,74 (1950), in 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 60-63 (1950).
869. See MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 79 (1971).
870. See supra notes 826 and 841.
871. See supra text accompanying notes 663-65.
872. See supra text accompanying notes 861-67.
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2. Perspective of Selling Corporation
a. Evaluation of Current Statutes
In one form or another, the statutes of the three subject states
require action by the board of directors on a sale-of-assets
transaction, 3 thus bringing into play the concepts of fiduciary duty
previously discussed. 74 The statutes of Delaware and North Carolina
are sound in requiring that a sale of assets be approved by a majority
of the shares entitled to vote;17s but the New Jersey statute, in
allowing approval of a sale of assets by only a majority of the votes
cast, 76 is deficient in the same respect as is that state's statute relating
to shareholder approval of a long-form merger (previously
discussed 7). Permissible consideration for a sale of assets is broadly
stated in all three statutesT--leaving only the amount of
873. In Delaware, the terms and conditions as well as the consideration must be
"deem[ed]" by the board "expedient and for the best interests of the corporation." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991) (quoted supra in note 813).
In North Carolina, the board must "propose[]" the transaction on terms and
conditions and for consideration determined by the board. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-
02(a) (1990) (quoted supra in note 826 (first paragraph)).
In New Jersey, the board must "recommend" the transaction. See NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:10-11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note 845).
874. See supra text accompanying notes 397-432.
875. In Delaware, the resolution authorizing the transaction must be adopted by "the
holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote
thereon." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991) (quoted supra in note 813).
In North Carolina, the transaction must be approved by "a majority of all the votes
entitled to be cast" thereon. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-02(e) (1990) (quoted supra in note
826 (first paragraph)).
876. In New Jersey, approval of the transaction, in the case of a corporation organized
on or after January 1, 1969, requires "the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast
by the holders of shares entitled to vote thereon" plus, if a class of shares is entitled to a
class vote, "the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast in each class vote." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-11(1)(c) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note 845). Moreover,
a corporation organized prior to January 1, 1969, can adopt such majority voting
requirements by an amendment of its charter adopted by "the affirmative vote of two-
thirds of the votes cast by the holders of shares entitled to vote thereon." Id. § 14A:10-
11(1)(d) (quoted supra in note 845).
877. See supra text accompanying note 579.
878. In Delaware, the consideration "may consist in whole or in part of money or
other property, including shares of stock in, and/or other securities of, any other
corporation or corporations." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991) (quoted supra in
note 813).
In North Carolina, it is "the consideration determined by the [selling] corporation's
board of directors." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-02(a) (1990) (quoted supra in note 826
(first paragraph)).
In New Jersey, it "may consist in whole or in part of money or property, real or
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consideration as a point of contentionY9 Aside from the shareholder
voting provision in the New Jersey statute (referred to above), the
only significant deficiencies in the sale-of-assets statutes of the three
states relate to the right of appraisal.
Of the three subject states, only Delaware accords no right of
appraisal to shareholders dissenting from a sale-of-assets transaction.
Moreover, as of December 1, 1995, Delaware was one of only five
states whose statutes were in that posture.M For the Delaware
statute to accord appraisal rights to shareholders dissenting from a
merger of their corporation into another (except in the case of a
downstream short-form merger), but not to shareholders dissenting
from a sale of their corporation's assets, seems clearly mistaken-for
two reasons. The first reason is that the right of appraisal is needed
as a check on the fairness of price in the interested-party context. If a
controlling shareholder of a Delaware corporation engineers a sale of
the corporation's assets to his or its wholly owned entity for cash,
minority shareholders of the selling corporation do not enjoy the
protections customarily associated with fundamental corporate
changes. And, while the minority may have recourse to the courts for
equitable relief, statutes should not be written in such a way that the
legislature leaves it to the courts to provide the only safety net for
investors. The second reason is that the statutory right of appraisal
helps to facilitate desirable corporate combinations. It is well
recognized8' that, when corporate transactions are attacked on
grounds of inequity, courts are more likely to validate such
transactions if there is a right of appraisal2 and less likely to sustain
personal, including shares, bonds, or other securities of any other corporation, domestic
or foreign." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-11(1) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note
845).
879. See Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 128 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1956) ("We are to
determine whether the evidence shows such a gross inadequacy of the price received for
the sale of [the] business as to raise an inference of improper motive or reckless
indifference to the interest of the minority stockholders."); Baron v. Pressed Metals of
Am., Inc., 123 A.2d 848,855 (Del. 1956) ("When disparity is alleged between the value of
the assets sold and the consideration received, plaintiff has the burden of showing such a
gross disparity as will raise an inference of improper motives or reckless indifference to or
intentional disregard of stockholders' interests."); Schiff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 104 A.2d
267,271-72 (Del. Ch. 1954); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257,260-61 (Del. Ch.
1929).
880. See MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02 commentary at 13-22 (1996).
881. See Manning, supra note 115, at 227, 229 (quoted supra in note 787 (second
paragraph)).
882. In Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 197 A. 489 (Del. 1937), it was
held that dividend arrearages on preferred stock could not be eliminated by way of a
charter amendment. See id. at 491-93. Yet, in Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d
1998]
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them if there is no such right.
While the statutes of New Jersey and North Carolina provide a
right of appraisal for shareholders dissenting from a sale-of-assets
transaction (unless they hold marketable shares), both statutes
contain an exception that, as a practical matter, denies such right in
the circumstance when it is probably needed most-a sale of assets
for cash to an entity owned exclusively by the shareholder in control
of the selling corporation. Such a transaction will almost inevitably
be pursuant to a plan that calls for dissolution of the selling
corporation and distribution of the net proceeds of the sale within a
year; and, in that case, the statutes of both states deny appraisal
rights to the minority shareholders.8 The explanation in the Official
Comment on this provision in the 1984 Model Business Corporation
Act (upon which the North Carolina statute is based) is less than
satisfactory.""
331 (Del. 1940), it was held that such arrearages could be eliminated by way of a merger
with a wholly owned subsidiary. See iU at 342-43. It is now well recognized that part of
the explanation lies in the fact that appraisal rights were available for mergers but not for
charter amendments. See infra notes 1025-26 and accompanying text.
The case of Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 141 A. 425,434 (Md. 1928), illustrates
the proposition that availability of appraisal rights discourages the granting of injunctive
relief. So, too, does the case of Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hote4 Inc, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 55
(Sup. Ct. 1952), discussed supra in note 787 (first paragraph).
883. In Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 120 A. 486 (Del. Ch. 1923),
a sale of assets was preliminarily enjoined when challenged on the ground of unfairness of
price, the court noting that "[i]f the preliminary injunction is denied, the minority
stockholders will be barred of all relief." Id. at 496.
In Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200 (N.J. Ch. 1943), the court enjoined a
recapitalization to eliminate preferred stock dividend arrearages, because shareholders
dissenting from the charter amendment had no right of appraisal. The court said:
[Tihe plan is mandatory and lacks an essential element of justice or equity. The
situation here is different from that which involves the merger or consolidation
of separate companies. In such cases, dissenting minority stockholders are given
the right to have the value of their shares determined by a proceeding in the
Circuit Court. There the ends of justice are served and the dissenting minority
stockholders receive a fair value in return for that which they surrender at the
instance of the majority stockholders. The position of the defendant might have
been less assailable if some provision had been made to fairly compensate the
minority for their loss under the proposed plan.
Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
884. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(b)(ii)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in
note 858); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(3) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 841 (first
paragraph)).
885. That Comment contains the following statement:
An exception [i.e., a denial of appraisal rights] is provided for sales [of assets]
for cash pursuant to a plan that provides for distribution within one year. These
transactions are unlikely to be unfair to minority shareholders since majority and
minority are being treated in precisely the same way and all shareholders will
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b. Special Uses of Sale-of-Assets Transactions
The right of appraisal can be especially important to minority
shareholders when a sale of assets is resorted to for some ulterior
purpose. There have been several such special uses of a sale-of-assets
transaction.
For example, if a corporation wished to pay cash for the business
of another corporation and the merger statute in effect at that time
did not countenance the use of cash as consideration, resort could be
had to a sale-of-assets transaction when a minority shareholder was
unwilling to join in a sale of 100% of the stock to the purchasing
corporation.m Similarly, it has been held that a sale of assets to a
newly formed corporation, requiring approval by only a majority vote
of the selling corporation's shareholders, could be utilized to extend
the life of a business, when those in control were unable to muster
the two-thirds shareholder vote required to extend the corporation's
existence.w Also, a sale-of-assets transaction could be utilized to
change the domicile of a corporation by having it sell its assets for
stock of a newly organized corporation of another state and
distributing such stock to shareholders upon dissolution of the selling
corporation. Indeed, before mergers with foreign corporations
were permitted, the sale-of-assets device was the one resorted to in
an effort-not always successfulWg-to change a corporation's
ultimately receive cash for their shares.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02 commentary at 13-14 (1996). While this
explanation may be valid in the case of a sale of assets negotiated at arm's length between
unrelated parties, it misses the point in the context of an interested-party transaction. In
the latter case, only the minority shareholders will be hurt by an unduly low price, since
the controlling shareholder will simply recoup his or its proportionate share of whatever
amount of cash he or it put up to effect the transaction. That is why a right of appraisal is
important for the minority shareholders.
886. See Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 129 A.2d 242,244-45 (Del. Ch. 1957).
887. See Porter v. C.O. Porter Mach. Co., 58 N.W.2d 135, 136-37 (Mich. 1953) (en
bane). This was not a freeze-out case; the minority shareholders were offered their
proportionate share of the stock of the new corporation. See id. at 136. The court denied
injunctive relief; having concluded that no fraud or bad faith was involved, it held that
appraisal was the exclusive remedy for dissenters. See ri at 137; see also Hill v. Page &
Hill Co., 268 N.W. 705,705-06 (Minn. 1936) (holding that a Minnesota corporation, whose
corporate charter was about to expire (in 1933), could, over the protest of a minority
shareholder, sell all of its assets to a Delaware corporation, which had been created (in
1929) by some of the shareholders of the Minnesota corporation, in exchange for stock of
the Delaware corporation to be distributed to shareholders of the Minnesota corporation,
when the alternative would have been liquidation of the Minnesota corporation's assets at
values depressed by the Great Depression).
888. See Light v. National Dyeing & Printing Co., 55 A.2d 233,234-36 (N.J. Ch. 1947).
889. See Forrester v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co., 55 P.
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domicile.
Because some of the early sale-of-assets statutes were less
demanding-in terms of voting or appraisal rights-than then-
existing merger statutes, corporate combinations were sometimes
structured as sale-of-assets transactions even though the end result
was the same as in a merger.890 Some courts have treated such a
transaction as a de facto merger 91 and, accordingly, have invalidated
the transaction either because it did not receive the higher vote of
approval required by the merger statute8s9 or because shareholders
were not given the right of appraisal accorded by the merger
statute.89 Delaware, on the other hand, has been consistent in
refusing to apply the de facto merger doctrine,8 preferring its
doctrine of the independent legal significance of different provisions
of its corporation statute.895
229,236-37 (Mont. 1898) (enjoining a proposed change of the corporation's domicile from
Montana (where its mining operations were conducted) to New York (where its
management operations were conducted) by way of a sale of all of the Montana
corporation's assets to a newly formed New York corporation in exchange for all of the
New York corporation's stock which was to be distributed share-for-share to shareholders
of the Montana corporation); William B. Riker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co., 82 A. 930,
930-31 (N.J. 1912) (holding that a sale of assets by a New Jersey corporation to a
Massachusetts corporation, in exchange for stock of the purchasing corporation to be
distributed to shareholders in dissolution of the selling corporation, amounted to a merger
of the two corporations not permitted by New Jersey's merger statute because that statute
then authorized mergers only between domestic corporations); People v. Ballard, 32 N.E.
54, 55, 59-60 (N.Y. 1892) (holding that, in the absence of statutory authorization, a
corporation could not change its domicile from one state (New York) to another
(California) by way of a sale of its assets).
890. Compare Argenbright v. Phoenix Fin. Co., 187 A. 124, 125-26 (Del. Ch. 1936)
(refusing to treat as a merger or consolidation a transaction in which seven corporations
sold all of their assets to an eighth corporation in exchange for securities of the latter and
immediately thereafter the selling corporations were dissolved), with Marks v. Autocar
Co., 153 F. Supp. 768, 769-71 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (holding that, when one corporation sold its
assets to another corporation in exchange for the latter's stock and the selling corporation
was then dissolved with the stock being distributed to its shareholders, a dissenting
shareholder was entitled to recover the value of her shares as though it were a merger).
891. See Folk, supra note 117, at 1261-62 (discussing the derivation of the de facto
merger doctrine); see also Good v. Lackawanna Leather Co., 233 A.2d 201, 207-09 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (collecting some of the cases).
892. See Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410, 415-18 (Iowa 1965) (stock for
assets); cf. Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146,157 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1960) (stock for stock), affdper curiam, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960).
893. See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25,27,31 (Pa. 1958).
894. See Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377-78 (Del. 1963) (stock for stock);
Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 124-25 (Del. 1963) (sale of assets for stock);
Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 150 A.2d 755, 757-59 (Del. 1959) (purchase of assets for
stock).
895. See Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984)
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A significant ulterior purpose for which resort has been had to a
sale-of-assets transaction is the cash-out of minority shareholders.
Accomplishment of this purpose can be attempted through the device
of having the corporation sell its operating assets to its controlling
shareholder or to his or its solely owned entity and having the cash
paid for such assets (less any amount used to pay liabilities not
assumed by the purchaser) distributed to the shareholders upon
liquidation of the selling corporation. Such a transaction raises the
issue of the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty89 and can be
successfully attacked by minority shareholders;89 although, in some
cases, such attacks have been unsuccessful because of availability of
the appraisal remedy for dissenters.898
Freeze-out by way of a sale-of-assets transaction should be
governed by the same principles as those applied with respect to the
earliest freeze-out device encountered in the reported decisions-
namely, a corporate dissolution coupled with a liquidation in which
the corporation's operating assets would be acquired by the majority
shareholders. When majority shareholders implemented a
dissolution statute,899 not with a view to terminating the corporation's
(referring to "the well-settled principle of Delaware Corporation Law that 'action taken
under one section of that law is legally independent, and its validity is not dependent
upon, nor to be tested by the requirements of other unrelated sections under which the
same final result might be attained by different means'" (quoting Orzeck, 195 A.2d at
378)).
896. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), the Court said:
The rule of corporation law and of equity invoked is well settled and has been
often applied. The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it
occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation
itself or its officers and directors. If through that control a sale of the corporate
property is made and the property acquired by the majority, the minority may
not be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the sale.
Id. at 487-88.
897. See Cathedral Estates, Inc., v. Taft Realty Corp., 157 F. Supp. 895, 897-98 (D.
Conn. 1954), af-Pd, 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955); Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148,
150-51, 154-57 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 260
(Del. Ch. 1929) ("I suppose, however, if the sale is only a 'freezing out' one by which the
majority use their power to sell to themselves in another guise and thereby carry on in the
business without their former associates of the minority, equity would doubtless restrain it
regardless of the fairness of price.").
898. See Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 55, 58 (Sup. Ct. 1952)
(validating a sale of assets to an entity controlled by the majority shareholder of the
selling corporation, because there was a right of appraisal for dissenters); supra note 787
(first paragraph) (discussing Blumenthao.
899. There was a split of authority as to whether, at common law, unanimous consent
of shareholders was required for the dissolution of a corporation. Compare Theis v.
Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 74 P. 1004, 1005 (Wash. 1904) ("It is conceded that at
common law a corporation had no power to dissolve, excepting by universal consent of
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business and distributing its residual assets among all of its
shareholders, but for the purpose of acquiring the corporation's
operating assets and continuing the enterprise with minority
shareholders excluded from the fruits thereof, the courts generally
enjoined or otherwise invalidated such a transaction upon application
by a minority shareholder. The reason why the courts took this
stockholders, and that an injunction would be granted upon the application of a single
stockholder to prevent such dissolution .... "), with Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 73
Mass. (7 Gray) 393,404 (1856) ("But we entertain no doubt of the right of a corporation,
established solely for trading and manufacturing purposes, by a vote of the majority of
their stockholders, to wind up their affairs and close their business, if in the exercise of a
sound discretion they deem it expedient so to do.").
The early statutes in the three subject states resolved the issue. Section 31 of the
1896 New Jersey corporation statute, see supra note 250 (first paragraph), provided for
the dissolution of a corporation upon (i) the adoption by "a majority of the whole board"
of a resolution to the effect that "in the judgment of the board of directors [it is] deemed
advisable and most for the benefit of such corporation that it should be dissolved," (ii) the
convening upon notice of a meeting of the stockholders "to take action upon the
resolution[] so adopted by the board of directors," and (iii) the written consent at such
meeting of "two-thirds in interest of all the stockholders" that such dissolution take place,
or, "whenever all the stockholders shall consent in writing to a dissolution, no meeting or
notice thereof shall be necessary." Act of Apr. 21,1896, ch. 185, § 31, 1896 NJ. Laws 277,
287-88. (A similar provision, without the clause permitting action by written consent of
all the stockholders without a meeting, had been contained in section 34 of the New
Jersey corporation statute of 1875, An Act Concerning Corporations (Act of Apr. 7,
1875), published in REVISED STATUTES OF NEW JERSEY 3, 13-14 (1875).) Section 34 of
both the 1899 Delaware corporation statute, see Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 34, 21
Del. Laws 445, 455-56; supra note 251 (first paragraph), and the 1901 North Carolina
corporation statute, see Act of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. 2, § 34, 1901 N.C. Sess. Laws 13, 22-23
(effective Apr. 1, 1901); supra note 252 (first paragraph), authorized the dissolution of a
corporation pursuant to procedural steps virtually identical to those specified in section 31
of the 1896 New Jersey statute.
900. In Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 74 P. 1004 (Wash. 1904), the court said:
The practice is one which is frequently indulged in for the purpose of what is
described in vulgar phrase as "freezing out" small stockholders; a compliance
with the letter instead of the spirit of the statute; a pernicious practice, which
courts of equity cannot too promptly condemn. ...
... Vastly more unjust would it be to permit the small stockholder to be
deprived of his profitable holdings by the practice upon him by a majority of a
sort of legal legerdemain, which, while it ostensibly dissolves the corporation,
actually leaves it intact, with his interests eliminated.
Id. at 1006-07. In In re Paine, 166 N.W. 1036 (Mich. 1918), the court said:
[I]f counsel's contention is to prevail, [the minority shareholders] may be driven
out by a forced sale of their investment for no better reason than that a larger
stockholder desires to acquire it in the interest of economy. It is not conceivable
that the Legislature ever intended that the [dissolution] statute should be used
for such a purpose. To give the statute this construction would open the way to
the majority interest of every corporation in the state to dispose of an offensive
minority in the same way if it saw fit. Such a construction would be injurious to
the public interest and not beneficial to the stockholders as a whole.
Id. at 1039. In Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148 (N.Y. 1919), a
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view was that such a transaction entailed a breach of fiduciary duty
through the disparate treatment of majority and minority
shareholders whereby the majority wound up with the wherewithal to
continue the business while the minority wound up with nothing but
cash.901
complaint was held to state a cause of action when
facts are alleged which permit, if they do not compel, the inference that the
directors conceived and progressed the scheme of dissolving the corporation,
irrespective of the welfare or advantage of the corporation and of any cause or
reason related to its condition or future, through the desire and determination to
take from the corporation and to secure to themselves the corporate business
freed from interference or participation on the part of the [minority shareholder]
plaintiff.
Id. at 152. Cf. White v. Kincaid, 149 N.C. 415, 418-22, 63 S.E. 109, 110-12 (1908)
(allowing a dissolution, authorized by statute, to proceed notwithstanding objection by a
minority shareholder, when there was no indication that those in control intended to
continue the business for their own benefit).
901. In In re San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 127 P.2d 29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942),
in response to the contention that a transaction was fair because "the minority common
stockholders would receive the cash value of their shares which is exactly what they would
have received had the directors sold all of the assets for money and distributed the
proceeds," id. at 35, the court said:
[I]t may be here observed that had all of the assets been sold and the proceeds
distributed all of the stockholders would have been treated alike whereas under
the plan here attempted the majority stockholder obtains and may continue a
going business, whereas the minority stockholders are compelled to take the
present value of their respective shares.
... [W]e therefore hold that a corporation in the process of voluntary
dissolution has not the right to adopt and carry out a plan of distribution
whereby its plants and business properties are distributed to a majority
stockholder and its minority common stockholders are compelled to take their
share of the value of the distributable assets ....
Id. at 35-36. In Zimmerrnann v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 143 P.2d 409 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1943), the court said:
The question as to the desirability of permitting distribution on voluntary
dissolution of a corporation by transferring the main assets to certain
stockholders and compelling minority stockholders to accept cash for their
interests is not only debatable but it is one for the Legislature to decide. This it
has done and provisions which authorize such a procedure have been omitted
from our statutes. There is good reason to believe that this was intentionally
done. We adhere to the views expressed in the San Joaquin case insofar as this
issue is concerned.
Id. at 412. In Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964),
the court said:
To say that majority stockholders may dissolve a corporation and proceed to
take over the business and principal assets for themselves while at the same time
forcing the minority to take mere cash for their interests, the payments to be
based on a valuation made by the majority, would be to confer upon the majority
the power to confiscate the minority interest, thus depriving the minority
shareholders of their interest in an existing business with its attendant
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lI. PURCHASE/SALE OF CONTROLLING STOCK INTEREST
Control of one corporation by another may be acquired through
an "upside-down" transaction in which the acquired corporation
issues shares of its authorized voting stock to the acquiring
corporation in a quantity sufficient to give the acquiring corporation
control of the corporation whose stock is so issued.9 However, the
discussion that follows relates to the acquisition by one corporation
of stock of another corporation from shareholders of the latter
corporation.
A. Statutory Provisions
1. General Grants of Power
Statutes authorizing one corporation to acquire and vote stock of
another corporation came early in the three subject states.
Section 51 of the 1896 New Jersey corporation statute 9 3
provided that any corporation could purchase and vote shares of the
possibilities of growth and appreciation in value, an interest which may be worth
much more than the present cash value of the minority shares. Such should not
be permitted.
"'.'When Georgia-Pacific [the majority shareholder] decided to bring
about the dissolution of Crossett rather than to continue its corporate existence
and operations, it assumed the obligation to liquidate Crossett in accordance
with law. It had a right to distribute the assets in kind or to put them on the
block for sale and divide the proceeds, in either case treating all stockholders
alike. It had no right to take over [Crossett] as a going business and eliminate
plaintiffs' interests in that company by cash payments.
Id. at 724-25.
902. This was the nature of the transaction involved in Morley Brothers v. Clark, 361
N.W.2d 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). The court, while disclaiming any need to decide the
de facto merger question, held that shareholders of the acquired corporation were
entitled to the right of dissent and appraisal. See id. at 764.
In Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div.), aff'd per curiam, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960), the court had before it an exchange
agreement whereby United would issue its 160,000 previously unissued shares (out of a
total of 400,000 authorized) to one Epstein in exchange for his 100% of the shares of
Interstate, thereby (along with arrangements for six of eleven directors) giving Epstein
"effective control" of United, which would proceed to record the assets and liabilities of
Interstate on the books of United and then dissolve Interstate. See id. at 148-50, 153-54.
The court held that such a transaction would constitute a de facto merger entitling
dissenting shareholders of United to the right of appraisal. See id. at 157.
See generally Schulman & Schenk, supra note 663, at 1551-54 (examining rights
available to shareholders in "upside-down" acquisitions).
903. See supra note 250 (first paragraph).
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capital stock of any other corporation, foreign or domestic.' Before
Woodrow Wilson ceased to be Governor of New Jersey, this matter
became entangled in a spate of state antitrust legislation.' However,
since the effective date of New Jersey's 1968 Business Corporation
Act,9° the statutory authorization for one corporation to acquire and
vote stock of another corporation has been stated in broad terms.907
904. Section 51 of the 1896 statute, Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, § 51, 1896 N.J. Laws
277, 294-95, is quoted supra in note 236 (first paragraph). It was derived fiom an 1893
statute, Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, § 1, 1893 NJ. Laws 301, 301, quoted supra in note
189.
905. By Act of Feb. 19, 1913, ch. 18, § 1, 1913 N.J. Laws 32, 32-33, the grant of
authority contained in section 51 of the 1896 statute was rescinded, and that section was
restated as follows:
No corporation heretofore organized or hereafter to be organized under
the provisions of [the 1896 act as amended or supplemented], except as
otherwise provided therein or thereby, shall hereafter purchase, hold, sell.., the
shares of the corporate stock of any other corporation or corporations of this or
any other state,.., nor as owner of such stock exercise any of the rights, powers
and privileges of ownership, including the right to vote thereon.
Id. At the same time, by Act of Feb. 19, 1913, ch. 15, § 1, 1913 N.J. Laws 28, 28-29,
section 49 of the 1896 statute (quoted supra in note 176 (first paragraph)) was amended
so as to narrow its scope. Four years later, by Act of Mar. 28, 1917, ch. 195, 1917 N.J.
Laws 566, sections 49 and 51 of the 1896 statute (as amended in 1913) were repealed and
replaced by three provisions that, in 1937, became sections 14:3-9, -10, and -11 of former
title 14. Section 14:3-9 provided: "Any corporation ... may purchase ... property and,
subject to the provisions of section 14:3-10 .... the stock of any other corporation
necessary or desirable for its business .... " Former N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-9 (West
1939). Section 14:3-10 provided (in the first paragraph thereof): "No corporation of this
state engaged in trade or commerce shall acquire ... the stock.., of another corporation
also engaged in trade or commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition ... or tend to create a monopoly of any line of trade or
commerce." Id. § 14:3-10. Finally, section 14:3-11 provided:
Subject to the provisions of sections 14:3-9 and 14:3-10 ... any
corporation of this state may purchase, hold, [or] sell.., the shares of the capital
stock of... any other corporation or corporations of this or any other state or
any foreign country, and while owner of such stock may exercise all the rights,
powers and privileges of ownership, including the right to vote thereon.
Id. § 14-3-11.
906. Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 N.J. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969); see
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
907. The New Jersey statute provides as follows:
(1) Each corporation, subject to any limitations provided in this act or any
other statute of this State, or in its certificate of incorporation, shall have power
i(" to purchase, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, vote,
use, employ, sell, exchange ... or otherwise dispose of, and otherwise use
and deal in and with, shares or other interests in ... other domestic or
foreign corporations...;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-1(1) (West Supp. 1997).
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Section 133 of the 1899 Delaware corporation statute authorized
a corporation to acquire and vote stock of other corporations.9
With minor amendments,10 that authorization continued in effect
until the 1967 rewrite of the Delaware statute,910 when the
authorization was amplified to make it virtually unlimited.911
In 1903, North Carolina added to its 1901 corporation statute a
provision authorizing any corporation to acquire and vote the stock
of any other corporation.92 In 1919,913 the wording (but not the
substance) of this provision was changed, and it continued in effect
without further amendment914 until the effective date of North
Carolina's 1955 Business Corporation Act,915 when the authorization
was restated.9 6 A similar broad authorization is contained in the
908. See Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 133, 21 Del. Laws 445, 500-01 (quoted supra
in note 245).
909. By Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch. 166, § 39, 22 Del. Laws 255, 283, section 133 was re-
numbered as section 135, and the words "created under the provisions of this act" were
changed to read "organized under the laws of this State." By Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch. 167,
§ 135, 22 Del. Laws 286, 352, a mistaken reference to "county" was changed to read
"country."
910. See Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151; supra note 251 (second
paragraph).
911. The Delaware statute provides as follows:
Any corporation organized under the laws of this State may ... purchase
... or otherwise acquire; own, hold, use or otherwise employ; sell ... or
otherwise dispose of;.., or otherwise deal in and with ... shares or other
securities or interests in, or issued by, any other domestic or foreign corporation
.... A corporation while owner of any such securities may exercise all the rights,
powers and privileges of ownership, including the right to vote.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 123 (1991).
912. See Act of Mar. 9, 1903, ch. 660, § 3, 1903 N.C. Sess. Laws 1045, 1046. The new
provision stated: "Any corporation may purchase, hold, assign ... or otherwise dispose of
the shares of the capital stock of... any other corporation... of this or any other State,
and while owner of such stock may exercise all the rights, powers and privileges of
ownership, including the right to vote thereon." Id.
913. See Act of Mar. 10, 1919, ch. 238, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 449 (adopting the
Consolidated Statutes); supra note 252 (first paragraph).
914. From 1919 until 1957, first as section 1166 of the North Carolina Consolidated
Statutes and later as section 55-71 of the North Carolina General Statutes, it provided:
"A corporation may purchase stock ... created by any other corporation or corporations
of this, or any other state, and while owner of such may exercise all the rights, powers and
privileges of ownership." Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-71 (1950).
915. Act of May 26,1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432 (effective July 1, 1957);
see supra note 252 (second paragraph).
916. The 1955 Act provided as follows:
(b) In connection with carrying out the purposes stated in its charter, and
subject to any limitation prescribed by this Chapter or by its charter, every
corporation shall also have power:
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1989 rewrite of that Act (effective July 1, 1990).917
From the time of its first publication in 1950 until its 1984
revision, the Model Business Corporation Act contained
(unchanged) authorization for one corporation to acquire and vote
stock of another corporation.9i Such an authorization appears in
section 3.02(6) of the 1984 Model Act 19
2. Special Share Acquisition or Exchange Provisions
In 1967, New Jersey added to former title 14 a new chapter
12A,9  which (with some changes) became section 14A:10-9 of the
new title 14A enacted in 1968 (effective January 1, 1969). 921 It
provides a procedure whereby a New Jersey corporation can acquire,
in exchange for shares of its stock, all of the shares (or all of a class of
shares) of another New Jersey corporation.92 The statute requires
(5) To acquire, by purchase ... or otherwise, and to own, hold, vote,
use, employ, sell ... or otherwise dispose of, and otherwise use and deal in
and with, shares or other interests in ... other domestic or foreign
corporations ....
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b) (1982).
917. The 1989 Act provides as follows:
(a) Unless its articles of incorporation or this Chapter provide otherwise,
every corporation ... has the same powers as an individual to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without
limitation power:
i6) To purchase ... or otherwise acquire; own, hold, vote, use, sell...
or otherwise dispose of; and deal in and with shares or other interests in ...
any other entity;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3-02(a) (Supp. 1996). This provision is the same as that contained
in the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act except that the phrase "or this Chapter"
does not appear in the Model Act provision. See MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 3.02(6)
(1996).
918. Section 4(g) provided: "Each corporation shall have power: ... (g) To purchase
... or otherwise acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell ... or otherwise dispose of,
and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in... other domestic or
foreign corporations .... '" MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 4(g) (1950), in 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 3-4
(1950); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 4(g) (1971).
919. See supra note 917.
920. See Act of June 19,1967, ch. 116,1967 NJ. Laws 558 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:12A-1 to -5 (West Supp. 1968)).
921. See Act of Nov. 21, 1968, ch. 350, 1968 NJ. Laws 1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1969);
supra note 250 (second paragraph).
922. The New Jersey statute provides as follows:
Subject to the limitations imposed by any other statute of this State, any
domestic corporation may, in the manner provided by this section, acquire, in
exchange for its shares, all the shares, or all the shares of any class or series, of
1998]
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that an offer be made by mail to all holders of the shares to be
acquired, 9 and it requires the offeror to complete the acquisition if
(within 120 days after such mailing) the offer is accepted by the
holders of not less than 90% of the shares to which the offer relates
(other than shares already held by or for the offeror).924
Shareholders who have not accepted the offer must be given written
notice of their right either to accept the offer or to dissent and be
paid "the fair value of their shares."
North Carolina's Business Corporation Act, as enacted in 1989
(effective July 1, 1990),m contains a new provision-based on the
1984 Model Business Corporation Act-authorizing a share
exchange. Although the device is referred to in the statute's
any other corporation organized under any statute of this State.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-9(1) (West Supp. 1997).
923. See id. § 14A:10-9(2).
924. See id. § 14A:10-9(3)-(4).
925. See id. § 14A:10-9(3)(b). In the 1967 version of this provision, the valuation
standard was "the market value of his shares." Act of June 19, 1967, ch. 116, § 14:12A-3,
1967 N.J. Laws 558,559.
The basic entitlement to dissent and appraisal is set forth in section 14A:11-1(2),
providing as follows: "Any shareholder of a domestic corporation shall have the right to
dissent with respect to any shares owned by him which are to be acquired pursuant to
section 14A:10-9." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(2) (West Supp. 1997). However, another
section provides as follows:
Whenever all the shares, or all the shares of a class or series, are to be
acquired by another corporation pursuant to section 14A:10-9, a shareholder of
the corporation whose shares are to be acquired may, not later than 20 days
after the mailing of notice by the acquiring corporation pursuant to paragraph
14A:10-9(3)(b), make written demand on the acquiring corporation for the
payment of the fair value of his shares.
Id. § 14A:11-2(5). Though probably not intended, it is possible to read this latter statute
(in a multi-class situation) as saying that, not only a holder of shares of the class being
acquired in the share exchange, but also any other "shareholder of the corporation whose
shares are to be acquired" in the exchange, is entitled to the right of dissent and appraisal.
Minor changes in section 14A:10-9(3)(b), relating to the required notice concerning
the right of dissent and appraisal, were made by Act of Jan. 7, 1974, ch. 366, § 57, 1973
N.J. Laws 964, 1025-26 (effective May 1, 1974).
926. See Act of June 8,1989, ch. 265,1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (effective July 1, 1990);
supra note 252 (third paragraph).
927. The North Carolina statute provides as follows:
(a) A corporation may acquire all of the outstanding shares of one or
more classes or series of another corporation if the board of directors of each
corporation adopts and its shareholders (if required by G.S. 55-11-03) approve
the exchange.
(b) The plan of exchange must set forth:
(1) The name of the corporation whose shares will be acquired and
the name of the acquiring corporation;
(2) The terms and conditions of the exchange;
(3) The manner and basis of exchanging the shares to be acquired for
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caption as a "[s]hare exchange," the consideration paid for the
acquired shares can be cash or property and need not (although it
may) consist of shares or other securities. The plan of exchange
must be adopted by the directors of both corporations;929 and, while
shareholders of the acquiring corporation are not required to
approve a plan of exchange, such a plan must be approved by
shareholders of the corporation whose shares will be acquired in the
exchange.930 The statutory provisions governing the voting required
for such approval are somewhat complicated. 93' The North Carolina
statute gives a right of appraisal, not only to dissenting holders of
shares of a class being acquired but also (in a multi-class situation) to
dissenting holders of a class not being acquired, unless (in either
case) the dissenters' shares are part of a class that is marketable as
shares, obligations, or other securities of the acquiring or any other
corporation or for cash or other property in whole or part.
(c) The plan of exchange may set forth other provisions relating to the
exchange.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-02(a)-(c) (1990).
This statute is the same as that contained in the 1984 Model Business Corporation
Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.02(a)-(c) (1996). A share exchange
provision first appeared in the Model Act in the 1970s. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACr
ANN. 521-23 (Supp. 1977).
928. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-02(b)(3) (1990) (quoted supra in note 927 (first
paragraph)).
929. See id. § 55-11-02(a) (quoted supra in note 927 (first paragraph)).
930. The plan of share exchange must be submitted for shareholder approval only by
"the board of directors of the corporation whose shares will be acquired in the share
exchange." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(a) (Supp. 1996).
931. The statute provides: "For a plan of... share exchange to be approved:... (2)
The shareholders entitled to vote must approve the plan." Id. § 55-11-03(b)(2). The
deficiency in this wording has been commented on supra in note 588.
Subsection 55-11-03(e), and subsection 55-11-03(f)(2) as amended by Act of July 27,
1990, ch. 1024, § 12.17, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 593, 601 (effective July 1, 1990), provide as
follows:
(e) Unless this Chapter, the articles of incorporation, a bylaw adopted by
the shareholders or the board of directors (acting pursuant to subsection (c)
[authorizing the board to condition its submission of the proposed share
exchange to the shareholders]) require a greater vote or a vote by voting groups,
the plan of... share exchange to be authorized must be approved by each voting
group entitled to vote separately on the plan by a majority of all the votes
entitled to be cast on the plan by that voting group ....
(f) Separate voting by voting groups is required:
(2) On a plan of share exchange by each class or series of shares to be
acquired in the exchange, with each class or series constituting a separate
voting group.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(e)-(f) (Supp. 1996).
1998] 909
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
provided in a 1997 amendment to the statute.932 This statute permits
shares of a North Carolina corporation to be acquired in a share
exchange by either a domestic or a foreign corporation, but (standing
alone) it does not permit a North Carolina corporation to acquire
shares of a foreign corporation by way of a share exchange. 33
B. Cases and Commentary
Only one comment needs to be made concerning the general
power of one corporation to acquire a controlling interest in the stock
of another corporation. If the acquiring corporation has a limited-
purpose charter, the ultra vires problem could arise if the acquired
932. The appraisal statute provides as follows:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 [the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act], a shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the
following corporate actions:
(2) Consummation of a plan of share exchange to which the
corporation is a party as the corporation whose shares will be acquired,
unless such shares are then redeemable by the corporation at a price not
greater than the cash to be received in exchange for such shares;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a) (Supp. 1996). By way of contrast, the 1984 Model
Business Corporation Act provides as follows:
(a) A shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and obtain payment of the
fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the following corporate actions:
(2) consummation of a plan of share exchange to which the
corporation is a party as the corporation whose shares will be acquired, if
the shareholder is entitled to vote on the plan;
MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02(a) (1996). The Official Comment to section 11.03
of the 1984 Model Act includes the statement that "[o]nly shareholders who have the
right to vote on a ... share exchange under section 11.03 have the right to dissent and
obtain payment for their shares under chapter 13." Id. §11.03 commentary at 11-28.
The denial of appraisal rights with respect to marketable shares is covered in a
provision of the North Carolina General Statutes added by Act of June 9, 1997, ch. 202,
§ 1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(c)) (quoted
supra in note 759).
933. The North Carolina statute provides as follows:
(a) One or more foreign corporations may merge or enter into a share
exchange with one or more domestic corporations if:
i2i'In a share exchange, the corporation whose shares will be
acquired is a domestic corporation, whether or not a share exchange is
permitted by the law of the state or country under whose law the acquiring
corporation is incorporated;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-07(a) (1990).
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corporation is engaged in a different business.M3
There are significant differences between the share exchange
statutes of New Jersey and North Carolina.935 The New Jersey
statute applies only with respect to two domestic corporations, but
the North Carolina statute permits shares of a domestic corporation
to be acquired in a share exchange by a foreign corporation. Unlike
the New Jersey statute, the share exchange provision of the North
Carolina statute contemplates a negotiated transaction requiring
involvement by directors of the corporation whose shares are to be
acquired (as well as directors of the acquiring corporation). Under
the New Jersey statute, shareholder approval takes the form of
acceptance of a written offer; under the North Carolina statute, such
approval takes the form of a shareholder vote.936 The New Jersey
statute applies only when the consideration to be paid consists of
shares of the acquiring corporation's stock, whereas the North
Carolina statute permits consideration in the form of "shares,
obligations, or other securities of the acquiring or any other
corporation or... cash or other property in whole or part."
Each state's share exchange statute makes it possible for one
corporation to acquire control of another corporation while
continuing the separate existence of the acquired corporation. In this
regard, the share exchange statutes serve the same purpose as the
reverse triangular merger,937 previously discussed.938
934. In State v. Atlantic City & Shore Railroad Co., 72 A. 111 (N.J. 1909), the court
said:
We deem it clear that section 51 [of the 1896 New Jersey corporation statute] is
to be construed in subordination to section 2 [of that statute], and that the state
thereby grants to one corporation the capacity to hold stock in another
corporation only so far as such stock ownership is necessary or convenient to the
attainment of the objects set forth in the charter... of the holding company.
Id. at 116 (referring to Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, §§ 2, 51, 1896 NJ. Laws 277, 278,
294-95).
935. The Delaware General Corporation Law contains no provision comparable to the
New Jersey and North Carolina share exchange statutes. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.10-9
(West Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-02 (1990).
936. The New Jersey statute states in part: "This section shall not be construed to
prevent a corporation from making an offer to purchase the shares of another corporation
conditioned upon the acceptance of holders of less than 90% of the shares to which such
offer relates." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-9(5) (West Supp. 1997). The North Carolina
statute states: "This section does not limit the power of a corporation to acquire all or
part of the shares of one or more classes or series of another corporation through a
voluntary exchange or otherwise." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-02(d) (1990).
937. The Official Comment to section 11.02 of the 1984 Model Business Corporation
Act contains the following:
It is often desirable to effect a reorganization or combination so that the
corporation being acquired does not go out of existence but becomes a
1998]
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The North Carolina share exchange statute suffers the
deficiency, previously discussed, 9 9 of departing from the policy
entailed in the small-scale merger device. It permits an acquiring
corporation to increase its outstanding voting or participating stock
by more than 20%, in effecting a share exchange, without according
voting or appraisal rights to its shareholders. The New Jersey
statute, on the other hand, accords those rights to shareholders of the
acquiring corporation in a share exchange, but only if its outstanding
voting or participating shares are increased by more than 40% in
effecting the exchange.941
PART THREE: AVAILABILITY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY
LIBERALIZING STATUTES TO CORPORATIONS IN
EXISTENCE BEFORE THEIR ENACTMENT
I. RESTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Notwithstanding the twentieth-century liberalization of
combination statutes (relaxation of the requirements for mergers,
authorization of sale-of-assets transactions, etc.), there remained a
problem for older corporations. The problem entailed the question
whether the Impairment Clause of the Constitution precluded the
subsidiary of the acquiring corporation or holding company, the securities of
which are issued as part of the transaction. These objectives often are
particularly important in the formation of holding company systems for, or for
the acquisition of, insurance companies and banks, but are not limited to these
transactions. In the absence of a share exchange procedure, this kind of a
transaction often may be accomplished only by the process of a "reverse
triangular merger": the formation of a new subsidiary of the acquiring or
holding company, followed by a merger of that subsidiary into the corporation to
be acquired in which securities of the new subsidiary's parent are exchanged for
securities of the corporation to be acquired. Section 11.02 provides a
straightforward procedure to accomplish the same end.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.02 commentary at 11-20 (1996).
938. See supra text accompanying note 657.
939. See supra text accompanying notes 663-65,772, and 871-72.
940. The Official Comment to section 11.03 of the 1984 Model Business Corporation
Act (on which the North Carolina statute is based) contains the following:
The requirement that shareholders of the surviving corporation in a
statutory merger have a right to vote if the increase in the number of shares
exceeds 20 percent may be avoided by arranging the transaction in the form of a
merger involving a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation or as a share
exchange under section 11.02. This anomaly reflects a compromise among
basically conflicting points of view.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.03 commentary at 11-29 (1996).
941. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12 (West Supp. 1997); supra notes 862-67 and
accompanying text.
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utilization of such enabling legislation by pre-existing corporations.
While there are those who appear to believe that this question is no
longer one of importance, 2 others have recognized its continued
significance. 943
It has continued to be accepted doctrine9" that, without the basis
of either a pre-incorporation reserved power or a legislative grant of
appraisal rights, a corporation could not make a fundamental change
pursuant to post-incorporation enabling legislation without running
afoul of the Impairment Clause.945 It also has continued to be
942. The subject was covered in every edition of The Foundation Press's Cases and
Materials on Corporations from the 1951 edition by E. Merrick Dodd and Ralph J. Baker
through the 1988 edition by William L. Cary and Melvin Aron Eisenberg. Yet it is
omitted entirely from the Seventh Edition (published in 1995), whose Table of Cases does
not even list Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
943. The problem was recognized in Richard 0. Kummert, The Financial Provisions of
the New Washington Business Corporation Act, 41 WASH. L. Ruv. 207 (1966), in which
the author gives a brief but penetrating analysis of the question as applied to
Washington's new Business Corporation Act. See id. at 208-13.
The problem was discussed also in the following: Leslie J. Ayer, The New
Washington Business Corporation Act-Reserved Power of Legislature to Change, 8
WASH. L. REV. 97, 99-104 (1934); Judson A. Crane, Enlargement of Corporate Authority
Under the Reserved Power, 15 U. PriT. L. REV. 427 (1954); George D. Gibson, The
Virginia Corporation Law of 1956, 42 VA. L. REV. 603, 603-15 (1956); and Kenneth K.
Luce, Legislative Amendment of Corporation Statutes-The Wisconsin Problem, 30
MARQ. L. REv. 20,32-53 (1946).
944. For the nineteenth-century view of the matter, see supra text accompanying notes
29-45.
945. In Allen v. White, 171 N.W. 52 (Neb. 1919), in which there was no reference to
any reserved power, it was held that those in charge of a corporation could not utilize
post-incorporation legislation to change the method of distributing profits from one based
on stock ownership to one based on patronage. See id. at 52. The court said: "Such a
course, if pursued, would deprive plaintiffs of dividends to which they were entitled under
their contracts as original stockholders and would destroy their contractual rights. This
neither the Legislature nor the defendants can lawfully do." Id.
In Swan v. Barnes, 184 S.E. 257 (W. Va. 1936), the court said:
[W]here the statute under which a consolidation or merger is effected was in
force at the time the constituent corporation of the objecting stockholder was
organized, or, possibly, at the time the stock of the objecting stockholder in the
constituent company was issued, then the objecting stockholder is bound by the
terms of his contract of stock purchase of which the statute in question became a
part, and cannot object to a consolidation or merger carried out upon fair terms
pursuant to the statute. If, however, the statute under which the consolidation
or merger was effected was not in force at the time the shares of the objecting
stockholder in the constituent company were issued, then his shares are not
subject, over his objection, or without his consent, either express or implied, to
be carried into the consolidation or merger.
Id. at 258 (citations omitted).
In South Western Railroad Co. v. Benton, 58 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. 1950), when a railroad
corporation was chartered in 1845 and the state did not adopt its reserved power until
1863, it was held that the corporation could not avail itself of 1933 legislation authorizing
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accepted doctrine94 that, if a state legislature acted pursuant to a pre-
incorporation reserved power, it could-without violating the
Impairment Clause-impose new conditions upon corporations' 47 or
one railroad corporation to sell its property to another such corporation with the assent of
the holders of a majority of its stock and that an attempt to effect such a sale could be
enjoined by minority shareholders. See id. at 913, 917-18.
In State v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 413 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1966) (en bane), when a
corporation was organized in 1931 under an Alaskan statute that mandated cumulative
voting and there was no reserved power in effect until 1957, it was held that the
corporation could not avail itself of post-incorporation legislation (enacted in 1964) that
permitted bylaw elimination of cumulative voting. See id. at 354,358-59.
The importance of the reserved power is illustrated by two Missouri decisions in State
v. Holekamp Lumber Co., 331 S.W.2d 171 (Mo. Ct. App.), rev'd, 340 S.W.2d 678 (Mo.
1960), involving a 1957 charter amendment, extending the life of a corporation organized
in 1908 for a second period of 50 years, approved by the holders of 58% of the
outstanding stock and opposed by the holders of 38.7%. See i at 173. Statutes enacted
in 1943 authorized charter amendments changing the period of corporate duration upon a
majority vote of shareholders. See id at 174. However, the 1899 laws (in effect when the
corporation was organized) provided that a corporation, upon a three-fourths shareholder
vote and payment of a prescribed fee, could file a certificate accepting the provisions of
general laws of the state relating to corporations and thereby have the corporation's
existence extended as stated in the certificate of acceptance. See iL at 175-76. In the
view of the court of appeals, neither the state constitution of 1875 nor any state statute in
effect when the corporation was organized contained a reserved power, and, accordingly,
on the ground that the corporation could not avail itself of the 1943 statutes (and had not
complied with the 1899 laws), that court concluded that the charter amendment was
invalid. See i at 177, 181-82. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the trial court,
which had granted a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
See id. at 173, 184-85. However, it was the view of the supreme court that there was a
sufficient reservation of power in the state's 1875 constitution (which was in effect when
the corporation was organized); and, on that basis, the court concluded that the
corporation could avail itself of the post-incorporation enabling legislation and rejected
the contention of the minority shareholders that they had a vested right to have the
corporation's existence terminated and its assets distributed in 1958. See Holekamp
Lumber Co., 340 S.W.2d at 680-82. Therefore, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals and affirmed the decision of the trial court. See i. at 679, 683.
946. For the nineteenth-century view of the matter, see supra text accompanying notes
65-69.
947. See Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941) (indicating
that a pre-incorporation reservation of the power to alter or amend a state's corporation
law would sustain the application to a pre-existing corporation of a statute granting
appraisal rights to shareholders dissenting from a sale-of-assets transaction); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1936) (holding that, when there was a
constitutional reservation of power to alter or repeal corporate charters, the legislature
could validly impose upon existing corporations liability for injuries sustained by
employees through the negligence of fellow employees, thereby substituting the rule of
respondeat superior for the common-law fellow-servant rule); Erie R.R. Co. v. Williams,
233 U.S. 685,699-701 (1914) (holding that the reserved power sustained the application to
a pre-existing corporation of a statute requiring that employees be paid semimonthly in
cash); Fair Haven & Westville R.R. Co. v. New Haven, 203 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1906)
(holding that, under a reserved power, railroad companies could be subjected to post-
incorporation legislation authorizing cities to impose assessments for paving and repaving
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upon shareholders.' In addition, however, there has continued949 to
be a recognition of the difference between compulsory legislation and
permissive enabling statutes.95
along railroad tracks within the cities); Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & King's River
Canal & Irrigation Co., 192 U.S. 201, 211-13 (1904) (holding that, under a reserved
power, a corporation could be subjected to post-incorporation legislation giving rate-
fixing authority to a governmental agency); Gregg v. Granby Mining & Smelting Co., 65
S.W. 312, 313-14 (Mo. 1901) (holding that the reserved power sustained a post-
incorporation mandating of cumulative voting); State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 178
A.2d 329,335-36 (NJ. 1962) (holding that, under the reserved power, a corporation could
be subjected to the state's post-incorporation Custodial Escheat Act); New York Cent. &
Hudson River R.R. Co. v. Williams, 92 N.E. 404, 407-09 (N.Y. 1910) (holding that the
state legislature, acting under a reserved power, could constitutionally impose upon a
railroad corporation the requirement that its employees' wages be paid semimonthly in
cash); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 97 P. 590, 594, 609 (Okla. 1908) (holding that a
banking corporation could be required, by post-incorporation legislation enacted under a
reserved power, to make payments into a depositors' guaranty fund).
948. In Stockholders v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175 (1937), the Court sustained a post-
incorporation statute, enacted pursuant to a reserved power, specifying a new remedy for
enforcement of the liability of shareholders for debts of banking corporations to the
extent of the par value of their shares. See id. at 179-83.
In some states, it was held that, under the reserved power, the legislature could
constitutionally impose upon shareholders of banking corporations, by way of post-
incorporation legislation, liability for debts of such corporations to the extent of the par
value of their shares. See Rainey v. Michel, 57 P.2d 932, 942 (Cal. 1936); Melaven v.
Schmidt, 283 P. 900, 900-01 (N.M. 1929); Smathers v. Western Carolina Bank, 135 N.C.
410, 418, 47 S.E. 893, 896 (1904).
949. See supra text accompanying note 70.
950. In Berger v. United States Steel Corp., 53 A. 68 (N.J. 1902), in which the
challenged transaction involved a pro rata exchange of bonds for outstanding shares of
preferred stock, the court drew a distinction between different portions of the post-
incorporation enabling legislation-upholding (as a valid exercise of the reserved power)
a mandatory financial test that was "in the public interest, for the protection of creditors"
but not applying a permissive voting test (allowing approval by two-thirds of each class
present instead of the two-thirds of each class outstanding required by the general
corporation statute at the time of incorporation). See id. at 75.
Cook's treatise says the following:
The right of the legislature to amend a charter against the will of the
stockholders has been the subject of much litigation. Such amendments are
clearly divisible into two kinds. The first are those which, by their terms, are
absolute and compulsory, and become a part of the charter irrespective of the
action or willingness of the stockholders to accept them. Such amendments,
excepting those which are made as police regulations, are unconstitutional and
void, unless made under a reserved power to amend.
2 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A
CAPITAL STOCK § 497, at 1025 (5th ed. 1903) (footnotes omitted). Cook further states:
The second class of amendments to a charter-the amendments which
occur most frequently and give rise to many difficulties-are those which allow
the corporate directors or a majority of the stockholders in corporate meeting
assembled to engage in a new or different or more extensive or more contracted
business than that authorized by the original and unamended charter.
2 Id. § 498, at 1028. Cook further states:
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Thus, there remained the question of how to deal with enabling
legislation that permitted a corporation to take an action not
previously authorized or to take an action previously authorized but
with a lesser shareholder vote than formerly required. The
permission contained in such legislation was clearly available to a
corporation organized subsequent to its enactment, because statutory
law on the books at the time of incorporation would be considered
part of the corporate charter.951  But, if a previously existing
corporation attempted to avail itself of such permissive legislation in
effecting a transaction over the objection of a shareholder who would
have been able to veto or enjoin such transaction under the law
existing at the time of incorporation, would this involve an
The extent of the power of the legislature to amend a charter, where it has
reserved that power, is not yet fully settled, and is full of difficulties. There is a
strong tendency in the decisions, and a tendency which is deserving of the
highest commendation, to limit the power of the legislature to amend a charter
under this reserved power. It should be restricted to those amendments only in
which the state has a public interest. Any attempt to use this power of
amendment for the purpose of authorizing a majority of the stockholders to
force upon the minority a material change in the enterprise is contrary to law
and the spirit of justice.
2 Ud. § 501, at 1032-33.
951. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
In Peters v. United States Mortgage Co., 114 A. 598 (Del. Ch. 1921), injunctive relief
was denied to a preferred shareholder who complained of a proposed charter amendment
that would eliminate the right of preferred shareholders to participate in dividends paid in
excess of specified percentages for the preferred and common stock. See il at 599-600.
The rationale was that the statute, which was in effect at the time of incorporation and
thereby became a part of the preferred shareholder's contract, provided that the
preferences given to a class of preferred stock could be altered upon approval by a class
vote of the preferred shareholders whether or not otherwise entitled to vote. See ld. at
600-01.
In General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 129 A. 244 (N.J. 1925),
involving a charter amendment creating a new class of prior preferred stock ranking
ahead of then-outstanding cumulative preferred on which there was a substantial dividend
arrearage, the court rejected the contention of complaining preferred shareholders that
the creation of such a prior preferred violated their vested rights, because (by terms of the
statute under which the corporation had been organized) there was included as part of the
corporate charter a provision authorizing a corporation to amend its charter so as to
create one or more classes of preferred stock. See Id. at 245-46.
In Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943), the court held,
in a case involving a Delaware corporation, that the liquidation preference of preferred
stock could be reduced by a charter amendment made in accordance with pre-
incorporation enabling legislation. See id. at 764,767-68.
For other twentieth-century cases to the same general effect, see the following: Harr
v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F.2d 332, 333, 335 (2d Cir. 1933); Bernstein v. Kaplan, 43
So. 581,582 (Ala. 1907); Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corp. v. Martin, 91 N.W.2d 525,531-33
(Mich. 1958); and Williams v. National Pump Corp., 188 N.E. 756, 757-58 (Ohio Ct. App.
1933).
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unconstitutional impairment of the obligation embodied in the
charter contract existing between the corporation and its
shareholders or the contract existing among the shareholders? 952
I. APPROACHES TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Before coming to the question whether a corporation could avail
itself of post-incorporation changes in combination law, it will be
useful to examine the various theories that have evolved in other
contexts as courts have wrestled with the question whether-
notwithstanding the Impairment Clause-enabling statutes could be
validly utilized by corporations in existence at the time of their
enactment.
A. De Minimis Solution
One such theory, which may be thought of as the de minimis
doctrine, held that a corporation could avail itself of post-
incorporation enabling legislation if the resulting change in the
charter contract would not be fundamental but only auxiliary.953 In
other words, the constitutional problem was solved by the simple
rationale that it did not arise when the change was not material.954
952. The fact that it is the corporation acting-in utilization of the legislation-does
not avoid the constitutional question. Such action, because it is based on the enabling
statute, is treated as action by the legislature. As the court said in Lord v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 87 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1909):
We mention, only to overrule, the position that the Legislature did not
amend the charter by authorizing the directors to amend it. When the
Legislature authorizes a course of procedure whereby a charter may be acquired
or amended, action in conformity thereto does not create the charter or make
the amendment, but both come into existence through the operation of the
statute. The amendment is the act of the Legislature the same as the charter
itself, and neither has existence except as conferred by statute.
Id. at 452.
953. In Woodfork v. Union Bank, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 488 (1866), the concept was
stated as follows:
[]f the alterations proposed in the charter of a private corporation, by [post-
incorporation] legislative enactment, are merely auxiliary and not fundamental,
they may be accepted by a majority of the corporators; and, when so assented to,
they are binding on the whole; but it is otherwise ... when the alterations are
fundamental, radical, and vital-the acceptance must then be unanimous.
Id. at 500; accord Perkins v. Coffin, 79 A. 1070, 1075 (Conn. 1911); Everhart v. West
Chester & Philadelphia R.R Co., 28 Pa. 339, 352-53 (1857); Stevens v. Rutland &
Burlington R.R. Co., 29 Vt. 545,550 (Ch. 1851).
954. In Herning v. Eason, 739 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1987), it was held that members of a
nonprofit corporation could avail themselves of post-incorporation legislation authorizing
proxy voting because "a purely procedural change does not constitute a material
alteration of a [charter] contract; thus, the [statutory] amendment permitting proxy voting
1998]
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Pronouncements by the Supreme Court in the nineteenth
century appear to support this theory.955 And that Court's decision in
a 1919 case950 6 is best explained on the de minimis theory.957
On this ground, state courts-without reliance on any reserved
power-have permitted utilization of post-incorporation statutes for
a number of limited purposes. Thus, it was held, in each of two early
cases, that a subscriber to stock in a railroad corporation was not
relieved from the obligation of his subscription by an immaterial
change in the route of the railroad.9-8 In an 1863 Vermont case, it
was held that a corporation could avail itself of post-incorporation
legislation authorizing it to issue preferred stock with a guaranteed
dividend, because this seemed "nothing more than a mode of raising
money."95 9 In 1884, it was held by Minnesota's highest court9? ° that,
does not violate the [Constitution's] contracts clause." Id. at 168 n.3; see also Morseburg
v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 1980) (indicating that a severe impairment having
little justification would violate the Impairment Clause, while an insignificant impairment
would require minimal justification to withstand constitutional scrutiny).
For a discussion of the rationale for this treatment of "non-fundamental" changes,
see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters
(pt. 1), 75 U. PA. L. REV. 585,587-91 (1927).
955. See Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25, 40 (1863) ("[I]t is not every
unimportant change which would work a dissolution of the contract.").
In Pearsall v. Great Northern Railway, 161 U.S. 646 (1896), the Court said:
Nor does it follow, from the fact that the contract evidenced by the
charter cannot be impaired, that the power of the legislature over such charter is
wholly taken away, since statutes which operate only to regulate the manner in
which the franchises are to be exercised, and which do not interfere substantially
with the enjoyment of the main object of the grant, are not open to the objection
of impairing the contract.
Id. at 665.
956. See Bank of Oxford v. Love, 250 U.S. 603 (1919). In this case, the banking
corporation did not seek to avail itself of post-incorporation legislation; rather, it
sought-unsuccessfully-to resist such legislation, which made it subject to examination
by a new banking department and to an annual assessment for the maintenance of such
department. See id. at 605-06.
957. The Court acknowledged that the corporation's charter constituted a contract
protected by the Impairment Clause; but, with no reference to any reserved power, it
concluded: "And we think it clear that no impairment of the corporate charter has
resulted or will result from reasonable examinations and reports by duly authorized
officers and the small prescribed payments." Id. at 607.
95& See Wilson v. Wills Valley R.R. Co., 33 Ga. 466,469-70 (1863); Banet v. Alton &
Sangamon R.R. Co., 13 Ill. 504, 513 (1851) (holding that, if post-incorporation legislation
authorized a change of only an intermediate point in the line of a railroad, as
distinguished from a change in the terminus of the line, a shareholder would not be
relieved from the obligation of his stock subscription).
959. Rutland & Burlington M.R. v. Thrall, 35 Vt. 536, 545-46 (1863); accord City of
Covington v. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co., 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 69,76-77 (1873).
960. See Mower v. Staples, 20 N.W. 225 (Minn. 1884).
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notwithstanding the Impairment Clause, the holders of a majority of
the voting stock (over the objection of a minority shareholder) could
accept and act upon post-incorporation legislation increasing a
board's size from five to nine members.6 I In 1923, a New Jersey
court held that a corporation could avail itself of post-incorporation
legislation authorizing the issuance of no-par stock,96 because such a
change "does not seem ... of such a fundamental character as to
make ... applicable"' the New Jersey rule that the reserved power
(while sustaining post-incorporation changes in the charter contract
between the state and the corporation) would not sustain material
changes in the contract between the corporation and its shareholders
or the contract among the shareholders?94
It was clear, however, that the de minimis doctrine could be
applied only with respect to post-incorporation legislation
authorizing changes that could reasonably be characterized as
immaterial rather than fundamental. This doctrine-standing
alone-could hardly sustain the application to pre-existing
corporations of legislation authorizing the merger of one corporation
into another or the sale of all of the assets of a prosperous
corporation. Aside from dissolution and liquidation, there is no more
tumultuous event in the life of a corporation than to be the one that
disappears in a merger or that disposes of its productive property in a
sale-of-assets transaction. Thus, the prohibition of the Impairment
Clause required some other basis to justify a corporation's availing
itself of post-incorporation legislation authorizing changes of such
magnitude.
961. See id. at 227. The court said:
The principle upon which these [cited] cases appear to go is that
alterations, or, as they are sometimes called, amendments, which do not change
the nature, purpose, or character of a corporation or its enterprise [and are,
therefore, not fundamental], but which are designed to enable the corporation to
conduct its authorized business with greater facility, more beneficially, or more
wisely, are auxiliary to the original object, and that, therefore, when one
becomes a stockholder, he impliedly assents that such alteration or general
amendment may be made.
Id. at 226. But cf. Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 116 S.E. 810, 811 (Ga. 1923) (holding
that a proposed charter amendment, providing that the number of directors could be fixed
by the bylaws rather than by the charter, was a fundamental change requiring unanimous
consent of the shareholders).
962. See Grausman v. Porto Rican-American Tobacco Co., 121 A. 895, 897-98 (NJ.
Ch.), affd on other grounds, 122 A. 815 (NJ. 1923).
963. Id. at 897.
964. The court cited Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 112 A. 887 (N.J. 1921), as the most
recent case invoking the New Jersey rule. See infra note 1041 (third paragraph)
(discussing Allen).
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B. Reserved Power Solution
Most of the cases, dealing with the matter of whether a
corporation-notwithstanding the prohibition of the Constitution's
Impairment Clause-could avail itself of post-incorporation enabling
legislation, have involved the question of the proper scope and reach
of the reserved power adopted by the states in response to the dicta
of Justice Story in the Dartmouth College case.965 This has been a
difficult subject,96 and the courts have been far from united in
dealing with it.967 In attempting to bring some degree of clarity to this
confused subject, it will be helpful to begin with pronouncements that
have been made by the Supreme Court concerning the reserved
965. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
966. The subject is discussed in the following: Arno C. Becht, Corporate Charter
Amendments: Issues of Prior Stock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 900 (1950); Edward 0. Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of
Corporate Charters, 32 MICH. L. REV. 743 (1934); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Amendment of
Corporate Articles Under the New Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. CIN. L. REV. 129,
150-66 (1930); Dodd, supra note 954; Dodd, supra note 70; Edward R. Hayes, Extent of
the Legislature's Reserve Power to Change Common Law Attributes of Corporations, 13
VAND. L. REV. 261, 274-86 (1959); Norman D. Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental
Corporate Changes, 1 W. Rus. L. REv. 3 (1949); Luce, supra note 943, at 32-53; Gustavus
Ohlinger, Some Comments on the Reserved Power to Alter, Amend and Repeal Corporate
Charters, 29 MICH. L. REv. 432 (1931); Francis J. Putman, State Interference, Under the
Reservation Clause, with Contracts Between the Stockholders of Corporations, 7 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 487 (1929); William Clark Schmidt, Constitutional Limitations upon Legislative
Power to Alter Incidents of the Shareholder's Status in Private Corporations, 21 ST. LOUIS
L. REV. 12 (1935); Grover C. Bradstreet, Jr., Note, Corporations: Constitutional Law:
The Effect of the Reserved Power to Alter, Amend, or Repeal, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 257
(1937); J.R. Cades, Note, Constitutional and Equitable Limitations on the Power of the
Majority to Amend Charters so as to Affect Shareholders' Interests in the Corporation, 77
U. PA. L. REV. 256 (1928); Kenneth W. Fuller, Note, Corporations: Constitutional Law:
Power of State to Permit an Amendment to Articles, 14 CoRNELL L.Q. 85 (1929); Ralph C.
Thomas, Note, Corporations: Alteration of Shareholder's Rights: Scope of the Reserved
Power, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 222 (1950); Comment, Corporations-Amendment of Corporate
Charters-Power of the Legislature to Authorize Changes in Intracorporate Affairs, 34
MICH. L. REV. 859 (1936); Comment, Corporations-Charter Amendments-Delaware
Dilemma, 35 MICH. L. REV. 620 (1937); Note, Limitations on the Reserved Right to
Amend or Repeal Corporate Charters, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 598 (1907); and Note, Power of
the State to Alter Corporate Charters, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 1163 (1931).
967. See Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533, 546 (D.R.I. 1929)
("No effort will be made to reconcile all of the decided cases dealing with this problem. It
cannot be done."); Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 127 P. 464, 466 (Mont.
1912) ("Few questions have vexed the courts and text-writers more than the one arising
over the construction to be given the reservation which the states make respecting
corporations organized under their respective laws."); Breslav v. New York & Queens
Elec. Light & Power Co., 291 N.Y.S. 932, 936 (App. Div. 1936) ("Whether an amendment
to a charter is within or without the scope of the reserved power is difficult to determine.
It is impossible to reconcile the decided cases dealing with the problem."), aff'd per
curiam, 7 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y. 1937).
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power. This will be followed by an examination of twentieth-century
state court decisions attempting to interpret and apply the reserved
powers of the respective states. (In the twentieth century, substantial
changes were made in New Jersey's reserved power968 and also in that
of North Carolina,969 but only minor changes were made in
968. The reserved power provisions contained in New Jersey's 1896 corporation
statute are quoted supra in note 49 (fifth paragraph).
Those provisions were codified in 1937, see supra note 250 (first paragraph), as
follows:
14:2-8. This title and all its amendments shall be a part of the charter of
every corporation heretofore or hereafter formed hereunder, except so far as
the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of the corporation.
14:2-9. This title may be amended or repealed at the pleasure of the
legislature and every corporation created hereunder shall be bound by such
amendment or repeal. Such amendments or repeal shall not take away or impair
any remedy against a corporation or its officers for any liability which shall have
been previously incurred.
The charter of every corporation or any supplement thereto or
amendment thereof shall be subject to alteration, suspension and repeal, in the
discretion of the legislature, and the legislature may at pleasure dissolve any
corporation.
Former NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2-8, 14:2-9 (West 1939).
When the New Jersey corporation statute was rewritten in 1968 (effective January 1,
1969), see supra note 250 (second paragraph), the reserved power was stated as follows:
This act may be supplemented, altered, amended or repealed by the
Legislature, and every corporation, domestic or foreign, to which this act applies
shall be bound thereby.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1-5 (West 1969).
969. The reserved power provisions contained in North Carolina's 1901 corporation
statute are quoted supra in note 52 (second paragraph).
When the North Carolina statutes were codified in 1919, see supra note 252 (first
paragraph), what had been section 6 of the 1901 corporation statute did not appear, and
what had been section 7 of that statute was revised to read as follows:
This chapter may be amended or repealed by the legislature, and every
corporation is bound thereby; but such amendment or repeal shall not take away
or impair any remedy against the corporation, or its officers, for any liability
which has been previously incurred. This chapter and all amendments are a part
of the charter of every corporation formed hereunder, so far as the same are
applicable and appropriate to the objects of the corporation.
Former CONSOL. STAT. OFN.C. ANN. § 1135 (1919).
This provision was carried forward (verbatim) when the North Carolina statutes were
re-codified as the North Carolina General Statutes in 1943, see former N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-36 (1943), and continued in that form through 1956, see former N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-36 (1950).
When North Carolina adopted its 1955 Business Corporation Act (effective July 1,
1957), see supra note 252 (second paragraph), the reserved power was stated therein as
follows:
The General Assembly reserves the power to amend or repeal the charter
of any corporation hereafter or heretofore formed and to amend or repeal this
Chapter or any part thereof, and the rights of any corporation or of any
shareholder, director or officer in any corporation are subject to this reservation.
922 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
Delaware's reserved power.970)
This Chapter, including this reservation, is a part of the charter contract between
the shareholders. The power so reserved includes the power to authorize
charter amendments which are to be effectuated pursuant to consent by the
shareholders in the manner permitted by this Chapter, as now enacted or as
subsequently amended.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-174 (1982). Additionally, the 1955 Act provided as follows:
Any amendment of the charter made pursuant to this Chapter extends to
all rights theretofore existing under the charter as fully as if this Chapter,
including such future changes therein as may be made, had been in effect at the
time of the filing of the original articles of incorporation.
Id. § 55-99(c).
Since the rewriting of North Carolina's Business Corporation Act in 1989 (effective
July 1, 1990), see supra note 252 (third paragraph), its reserved power-following the
language of section 1.02 of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act-has been stated as
follows:
The General Assembly has power to amend or repeal all or part of this
Chapter at any time and all domestic and foreign corporations subject to this
Chapter are governed by the amendment or repeal.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-02 (1990). Additionally, the new Act-following the language of
section 10.01(b) of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act-provides as follows:
A shareholder of the corporation does not have a vested property right
resulting from any provision in the articles of incorporation, including provisions
relating to management, control, capital structure, dividend entitlement, or
purpose or duration of the corporation.
Id. § 55-10-01(b).
970. The reserved power provision contained in Delaware's 1899 corporation statute is
quoted supra in note 53 (second paragraph).
With minor changes, this provision became section 394 of the 1967 rewrite of
Delaware's General Corporation Law, see supra note 251 (second paragraph), and it now
provides as follows:
This chapter may be amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the General
Assembly, but any amendment or repeal shall not take away or impair any
remedy under this chapter against any corporation or its officers for any liability
which shall have been previously incurred. This chapter and all amendments
thereof shall be a part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every
corporation except so far as the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the
objects of the corporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991).
In Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928), the court said:
It is to be noted that the language by which the power to amend was
reserved by the Legislatures in Utah, New York and Montana is quite different
from that found in our [reserved power]. In those states, the power to amend
was simply reserved and there allowed to rest.... But here in Delaware the
Legislature did not content itself with a bare expression of the reservation of
power to amend. It proceeded further to say that the chapter as it was originally
enacted "and all amendments thereof" should be a part of the charter of every
corporation created under it. Thus all future amendments to the act were
written by that language into the defendant's charter as effectively as was the
original act.
Id. at 658. But see Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533 (D.R.I. 1929)
(refusing to accept the Delaware court's broad reading of that state's reserved power);
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1. Supreme Court's View of Reserved Power
The Supreme Court has addressed the reserved power on
numerous occasions over the years, and the pronouncements by that
Court have made it clear that the power of a state's legislature under
a reserved power is not unlimited.971
infra notes 1033-37 and accompanying text, and notes 1304-05 and accompanying text
(discussing and quoting Yoakam).
971. In Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 454 (1872), the Court said:
The reservation [of power to alter or repeal corporate charters] affects the entire
relation between the State and the corporation, and places under legislative
control all rights, privileges, and immunities derived by its charter directly from
the State. Rights acquired by third parties, and which have become vested under
the charter, in the legitimate exercise of its powers, stand upon a different
footing ....
Id. at 459.
In Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500 (1872), the Court said:
Vested rights, it is conceded, cannot be destroyed or impaired under such
a reserved power, but it is clear that the power may be exercised, and to almost
any extent, to carry into effect the original purposes of the grant and to protect
the rights of the public and of the corporators, or to promote the due
administration of the affairs of the corporation.
... Power to legislate, founded upon such a reservation, is certainly not
without limit, but it may safely be affirmed that it reserves to the legislature the
authority to make any alteration or amendment in a charter granted, subject to
it, that will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, or any
rights which have vested under it, which the legislature may deem necessary to
secure either the object of the grant or any other public right not expressly
granted away by the charter.
Id. at 519,522.
In Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 U.S. 528 (1879), the Court said: "Vested rights, it
is conceded, cannot be impaired under such a reserved power...." Id. at 540.
In Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900), the Court said:
The effect of such a [reserved power] provision, whether contained in an original
act of incorporation, or in a constitution or general law subject to which a
charter is accepted, is, at the least, to reserve to the legislature the power to
make any alteration or amendment of a charter subject to it, which will not
defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, or any right vested under
the grant, and which the legislature may deem necessary to carry into effect the
purpose of the grant, or to protect the rights of the public or of the corporation,
its stockholders or creditors, or to promote the due administration of its affairs.
Id. at 52.
In Fair Haven & Westville Railroad v. New Haven, 203 U.S. 379 (1906), the Court
said:
The limitation upon the power of amendment of charters of corporations has
been defined by this court several times. It is said in one case that such power
may be exercised to make any alteration or amendment in a charter granted that
will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant or any rights which
have vested under it, which the legislature may deem necessary to secure either
the object of the grant or any other public right not expressly granted away by
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One of the limitations voiced by the Supreme Court is that the
reserved power is inadequate to remove from the prohibition of the
Impairment Clause any state legislation that impairs a pre-existing
contract between a corporation and third parties.m It is now well
established that a corporate charter, in addition to being a contract
between the state and a corporation created under its laws, is also a
contract between the corporation and its shareholders as well as a
contract among those shareholders. 973  Thus, it follows that
shareholders-if regarded as third parties-enjoy contractual rights,
derived from the terms of the corporate charter, that merit protection
from impairment pursuant to permissive post-incorporation
the charter.
Id. at 388.
In Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), the Court said:
It is undoubtedly true that the reserved power to alter or amend is subject
to some limitations, and that under the guise of an amendment a new contract
may not always be enforcible upon the corporation or the stockholders; but it is
settled "that a power reserved to the legislature to alter, amend or repeal a
charter authorizes it to make any alteration or amendment of a charter granted
subject to it, which will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant,
or any rights vested under it, and which the legislature may deem necessary to
secure either that object or any public right."
Id. at 57 (quoting Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466,476 (1882)).
In Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932), the Court said:
The authority of a state under the so-called reserved power is wide; but it
is not unlimited. The corporate charter may be repealed or amended, and,
within limits not now necessary to define, the interrelations of state, corporation,
and stockholders may be changed; but neither vested property rights nor the
obligation of contracts of third persons may be destroyed or impaired.
Id. at 441-42.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936), the Court said:
The reserved power is not unlimited and cannot be exerted to defeat the
purpose for which the corporate powers were granted, or to take property
without compensation, or arbitrarily to make alterations that are inconsistent
with the scope and object of the charter or to destroy or impair any vested
property right.
Id. at 634-35.
972. See Tomlinson, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 459 (quoted supra in note 971 (first
paragraph)); Coombes, 285 U.S. at 441-42 (quoted supra in note 971 (seventh
paragraph)).
This limitation has been echoed in state court decisions. See Miller v. Magline, Inc.,
306 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) ("Nonetheless, a state may not under its
reserved power impair or destroy vested property rights or impair the contractual
obligations of third parties."); Mayor of New York v. Twenty-Third St. Ry. Co., 21 N.E.
60, 62 (N.Y. 1889) ("Under its reserved power [the legislature] cannot deprive a
corporation of its property, or interfere with or annul its contracts with third
persons .... ).
973. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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legislation. 4
Another limitation-and one more frequently and forcefully
voiced by the Supreme Court-is that the reserved power is not
adequate to sustain state legislation that destroys vested rights. 5
The vested right doctrine is not only deeply entrenched in Supreme
Court jurisprudence m but also frequently echoed in state court
decisionsYn  Thus, if the rights of shareholders, derived from the
terms of their charter contract, be regarded as vested rights, it would
follow that the reserved power could not be invoked to sustain an
abrogation of those rights by action taken pursuant to permissive
post-incorporation legislation 78
974. See Swan v. Barnes, 184 S.E. 257, 259 (W. Va. 1936) ("It requires no citation of
authority to sustain the proposition that the rights and relationships arising upon the
purchase of stock in a corporation are contractual, and that no state law can materially
alter the rights arising under such a contract.").
975. See cases cited and quoted supra in note 971.
976. See id In the dissenting opinion of Justice Field in Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S.
700 (1878), involving reserved powers contained in congressional legislation applicable to
a federally chartered corporation, it was said: "There have been much discussion and
great difference of opinion on many points as to the meaning and effect of a similar
reservation in statutes of the States, but on the point that it does not authorize any
interference with vested rights all the authorities concur." Id. at 758 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
977. See New Haven & Derby R.R. Co. v. Chapman, 38 Conn. 56, 70 (1871) ("The
power thus reserved is in terms absolute; yet it is not an unlimited power. Like all other
legislative powers it is subject to this important limitation, viz: it shall not be so exercised
as to impair the obligation of a contract, or to destroy vested rights."); Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 24 A.2d 315, 322 (Del. 1942) ("The
[reserved] power of amendment, as it affects the rights of shareholders, is broad, but it
has limitations. As to what those limitations are judicial authority is unsettled. Certainly
vested property rights may not be destroyed or impaired."); Venner v. Chicago City Ry.
Co., 92 N.E. 643, 646 (Ill. 1910) ("Even where the power of the state to alter or amend a
charter is expressly reserved in the grant, it is still subject to the limitation that it shall not
be exercised in such a way as to destroy vested rights or impair the obligations of
contracts."); Banner Transfer Co. v. Ockerman, 354 S.W.2d 514,515-16 (Ky. 1961) ("This
reserved power, however, is not without limits. It will not be exercised to destroy or
substantially impair rights vested under the State's grant."); Commonwealth v. Essex Co.,
79 Mass. (13 Gray) 239, 253 (1859) ("Ihe rule to be extracted is this; that where, under
power in a charter, rights have been acquired and become vested, no amendment or
alteration of the charter [pursuant to a reserved power] can take away the property or
rights which have become vested under a legitimate exercise of the powers granted.");
State ex rel Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 121 N.W. 919, 923 (Wis. 1909)
("The right to alter or repeal existing charters is not without limitation when the question
of vested property rights under the charter is involved. The power is one of regulation
and control, and does not authorize interference with property rights vested under the
power granted.").
978. See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115, 124-25 (Del. 1936); infra text
accompanying notes 1014-18 (discussing Keller).
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2. State Courts' Divergent Views
There has continued to be in the twentieth century, as there was
in the nineteenth century,979 a split among the state courts as to
whether an expansive or a restrictive reading should be given to the
reserved power tm
a. Expansive Reading of Reserved Power
(1) Twentieth-Century Decisions
The courts of some states adopted the expansive reading that a
corporation could avail itself of permissive post-incorporation
legislation, thereby altering rights of shareholders embodied in the
charter contract, provided only that a reserved power existed at the
time of the corporation's organization.
As had been the case in the nineteenth century, 81 this view of
the matter continued to be taken by the courts of Massachusetts, 98 as
979. See supra text accompanying notes 70-95.
980. The two schools of thought were described in Bove v. Community Hotel Corp.,
249 A.2d 89 (RI. 1969), as follows:
On the one side, there is a body of law which speaks of the three-fold
nature of the stockholder's contract and, while agreeable to an exercise of the
reserved power affecting only the contractual relationship between the state and
the corporation, rejects as unconstitutional any exercise which affects the
relationship between the stockholder and the corporation or between the
stockholders inter sese. Under this view, subsequent legislation purporting to
permit a corporate act to cancel accrued preferred dividends would obviously be
an improper exercise of the power inasmuch as the essence of a preferred
stockholder's contract is its definition of his relationship with the corporation
and with the other stockholders vis-&-vis such matters as the distribution of the
profits of the enterprise or the division of its capital and surplus account in the
event of liquidation.
The other side of the argument considers that the question is primarily
one of statutory construction and that so long as the statute authorizes the
corporate action, it should make no difference whether its enactment preceded
or postdated the birth of the corporation or the issuance of its stock. The basis
for this viewpoint is that the terms of the preferred stockholder's contractual
relationship are not restricted to the specifics inscribed on the stock certificate,
but include also the stipulations contained in the charter or articles of
association as well as the pertinent provisions of the general corporation law.
One of those provisions is, of course, the reserved power; and so long as it is a
part of the preferred shareholder's contract, any subsequent legislation enacted
pursuant to it, even though it may amend the contract's original terms, will not
impair its obligation in the constitutional sense.
Id at 96 (citations omitted).
981. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
982. See Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Boston R.R. Holding Co., 81 N.E.2d 553, 556
(Mass. 1948).
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well as by those of New York,9ss by those of Rhode Island,984 and by
those of CaliforniaP8s in the twentieth century.186 The courts of other
states also adopted the expansive reading of the reserved power in
983. See Hinckley v. Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 95 N.Y.S. 357 (App. Div. 1905);
infra text accompanying notes 1240-44 (discussing Hinckley).
In McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945), the court said:
Our courts have held generally that the "reserved power" extends not only to
the contract between the corporation and the state but to the contract between
the corporation and the stockholders or between the stockholders inter sese.
Thle contract between stockholders inter sese is not an unconditional
contract. It is a contract subject to a condition that it may be changed or altered
in the manner prescribed or authorized by the Legislature.
Id. at 258-260.
In Garzo v. Maid of the Mist Steamboat Co., 104 N.E.2d 882 (N.Y. 1952), a
corporation had been organized in 1892 for a term of 50 years; and, upon realizing in 1947
that its term had expired, it took steps to revive its existence and to make its duration
perpetual under a statute enacted in 1944 authorizing such revival and extension of
corporate existence upon approval by a majority vote of shareholders. See id. at 884-85.
Claiming that application of the post-incorporation enabling statute to the defendant
corporation would effect an unconstitutional deprivation of their vested rights, minority
shareholders brought suit seeking a dissolution of the corporation and payment to them of
their pro rata share of its assets. See id. at 884, 886. The court ruled against the plaintiffs,
holding that the reserved power sustained the corporation's utilization of the post-
incorporation enabling statute even though that statute provided no right of appraisal for
dissenters. See i at 886-88.
New York's expansive reading of the reserved power was applied in M'Kee v.
Chautauqua Assembly, 130 F. 536 (2d Cir. 1904), in which the court said:
Every member who enters into such an association is aware of the reservation of
the power of the Legislature and of the possibility of its exercise, and must trust
to the wisdom and justice of the Legislature that the power will not be abused;
and those who become members contract subject to the reservation of power,
and the courts are bound to read their agreement with the legislative condition.
Id. at 541 (citing Schenectady & Saratoga Plank Road Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N.Y. 102, 114
(1854)); see supra note 77 (discussing Thatcher).
984. See Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 94-98 (R.I. 1969); infra text
accompanying notes 1173-75 (discussing Bove).
985. See Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 391 P.2d 828,831 (Cal. 1964) ("[Because of
the reserved power, the shareholder] acquires his shares subject to the power of the
corporation to alter its contract with him pursuant to statutory authority."); Rainey v.
Michel, 57 P.2d 932, 942 (Cal. 1936) ("The contract between the stockholder and the
corporation is subject to the exercise of this reserved power."); De Mello v. Dairyman's
Co-operative Creamery, 167 P.2d 226, 228 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) ("The right of the
Legislature under the constitutional reservation of power to amend the corporate laws
and thus change the rights and liabilities of stockholders is well established."); Heller Inv.
Co. v. Southern Title & Trust Co., 61 P.2d 807, 809 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (quoting
and following Rainey, 57 P.2d at 942).
986. Missouri's highest court had espoused the expansive reading in 1853. See Pacific
R.R v. Renshaw, 18 Mo. 210, 215 (1853); supra note 78 (discussing Renshaw). For
Missouri's twentieth-century view, see supra note 945 (fifth paragraph).
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the twentieth century. Montana's highest court did so in 1904987 and
in 1912.988 The highest court of West Virginia took this view in
1906989 and, notwithstanding an apparent embracing of the restrictive
reading in 1937,m seems to have returned to the expansive reading in
1961.991 Virginia's highest court embraced the expansive reading in
1912,m in 1953,993 and in 1967. 4 The highest court of Iowa appears
987. See Allen v. Ajax Mining Co., 77 P. 47, 48-49 (Mont. 1904); infra text
accompanying notes 1193-95 (discussing Allen).
988. In Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 127 P. 464 (Mont. 1912), it was
held that, because the reserved power became part of the charter of a subsequently
organized corporation and thereby made the shareholders' contract with the corporation
subject to change pursuant to subsequent enabling legislation, a corporation could avail
itself of a post-incorporation scatute to make its stock assessable when authorized by the
two-thirds consent of shareholders specified in the enabling legislation, notwithstanding
the fact that the charter and the stock certificates stated that the stock was nonassessable.
See 1d. at 465-66 (citing and following Allen v. Ajax Mining Co., 77 P. 47 (Mont. 1904)).
But see Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Moffitt, 79 N.W. 560, 561 (Neb. 1899) (holding that paid-
up shares could not be subjected to assessment pursuant to post-incorporation
legislation).
989. See Germer v. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 54 S.E. 509, 513 (W. Va.
1906); infra text accompanying notes 1196-97 (discussing Germer).
990. In Marshall County Bank v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co., 193 S.E. 915
(W. Va. 1937), the court said:
We are cognizant that since 1863 our Legislature has reserved the power to
amend the corporate contracts of stockholders. However, that power may be
exerted only to promote the corporation in the interest of the public, and even
then the rights of minority stockholders must be fairly preserved. The power is
remedial, not oppressive. It may not be exercised, directly or indirectly, to
increase materially the liability of an unwilling stockholder. That power "should
be restricted to those amendments only in which the state has a public interest.
Any attempt to use this power of amendment for the purpose of authorizing a
majority of the stockholders to force upon the minority a material change in the
enterprise is contrary to law and the spirit of justice.... [T]he power to make a
new contract for the stockholders is not thereby given to the legislature. The
legislature may repeal the charter, but cannot force any stockholder into a
contract against his will."
Id. at 918 (citation omitted) (quoting 2 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK § 501, at 1661-62 (8th ed. 1923)).
991. See Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., 122 S.E.2d 436, 445-46 (W. Va. 1961)
(quoting at length from Germer v. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 54 S.E. 509 (W. Va.
1906)).
992. In Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills Co., 75 S.E. 309 (Va. 1912), the court said:
It seems that such a reservation of power to the state prescribed by the
laws in force when the charter is granted, whether written in the Constitution, in
general laws, or in the charter itself, qualifies the grant, and that the subsequent
exercise of that power cannot be regarded as an act impairing the obligation of
contracts.
• The [constitutional] provision that the charter shall be held ... under
the provisions and subject to all the requirements, terms, and conditions of the
Constitution and of any laws passed in pursuance thereof, so far as applicable, is
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to have followed the expansive reading in 1929,111 and Minnesota's
highest court did so (in a confused way) in 1950.996 The Delaware
courts have not been entirely consistent, but they have generally
embraced the expansive reading of the reserved power. 99 In 1974,
not limited to the relations between the state and the corporation, but applies as
well to the relations between the state and the stockholders, the corporation and
the stockholders, and between the stockholders themselves.
That this is the construction which should be placed upon the language
used is shown by the construction which has generally, if not universally, been
placed upon the language reserving the power to the state to amend, alter, or
repeal a charter. Although the power reserved is to alter, amend, or repeal the
charter, it is not limited to changes or alterations solely between the state and
the corporation, but authorizes amendments and alterations within certain
limitations directly affecting the stockholders in their relations to the state, to
the corporation, and to each other.
Id. at 310-11.
993. See French v. Cumberland Bank & Trust Co., 74 S.E.2d 265,269 (Va. 1953); infra
text accompanying notes 1245-47 (discussing French).
994. See O'Brien v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 152 S.E.2d 278,286-87 (Va. 1967).
995. In Wall v. Bankers' Life Co., 223 N.W. 257 (Iowa 1929), it was held that, because
of a reserved power, the corporation could avail itself of post-incorporation enabling
legislation to convert itself into a different kind of insurance company. See idU at 263-64.
(No shareholder rights were involved; the complainants were certificate holders under the
original form of insurance handled by the company. See id. at 259-60.)
996. Sherman v. Pepin Pickling Co., 41 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1950), represents a
misunderstanding of what the reserved power question is all about. The court treated
statutes (authorizing changes in preferred stock by way of charter amendments), which
were "in effect when the defendant was incorporated," as a power reserved to
corporations to alter rights of preferred shareholders. See id. at 576-79. It was in this
context that the court (after referring to Justice Story's suggestion in the Dartmouth
College case) said the following:
Where a statute authorizes the formation of a corporation upon compliance with
its provisions and the statute contains provisions reserving the right to alter by
amendment the rights of stockholders, the statute becomes part of the articles of
incorporation (the corporate charter) and of any stock issued thereunder as
effectively as if printed therein at length, and it operates not only to confer upon
the corporation reserved power to alter by amendment the rights of
stockholders, but also to notify them of such reserved power. In other words,
where the right to so amend is reserved, the contract between the corporation
and its stockholders and among the stockholders themselves, arising from their
stock ownership, is not an unconditional one, but is rather one subject to the
condition that it may be changed or altered in the manner authorized by the
statute.
Id. at 576.
997. In Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928), holders of
Class B stock sought to enjoin the filing of a charter amendment, authorized by post-
incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved power, whereby Class A stock would
be made non-redeemable and Class B stock would lose a preferential right to dividends in
excess of a stated amount for each class. See id. at 655. The complainants argued for
adoption of the restrictive reading of the reserved power, but the court adopted the
expansive reading-in part because the Delaware reserved power, in addition to
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reserving to the legislature the power to amend or repeal the statute, provided that the
statute and all amendments thereof shall be a part of every corporation's charter. See id
at 656-58; supra note 970 (third paragraph) (quoting Davis). The court noted, as an
alternative ground for its denial of injunctive relief, the fact that the corporate charter
reserved to the corporation the right to amend the charter "in the manner now or
hereafter prescribed by statute." Davis, 142 A. at 658-59.
In Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136 (Del. Ch. 1933), the court
cited Davis (above) in applying to a corporation post-incorporation legislation providing
that the number of directors "shall be fixed by, or in the manner provided in the by-laws."
Id. at 139. However, based on the court's conclusion that this statutory provision was
mandatory rather than permissive, see id at 139-41, Gow would appear to fall within the
class of cases dealing with the imposition of new conditions by the legislature, see supra
notes 947-48 (citing cases holding that state legislatures could impose new conditions
upon corporations or upon shareholders pursuant to a pre-incorporation reserved power).
In Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936), it was held that the right to be paid
dividend arrearages on preferred stock-being a vested right-could not be abrogated by
a charter amendment effecting a recapitalization pursuant to post-incorporation
legislation enacted under a reserved power. See id at 124-25; infra text accompanying
notes 1014-18 (discussing Keller).
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co., 24
A.2d 315 (Del. 1942), the court said:
Inhere is impliedly written into every corporate charter as a constituent part
thereof the pertinent provisions of the State Constitution and statutes.
Specifically, Section 83 of the Corporation Law declares that all amendments to
the law shall be a part of the charter of every corporation formed under it except
in so far as they are inapplicable or inappropriate to the objects of such
corporation. Regarding the charter as a contract, it has such status as between
the State and the corporation, as between the corporation and its shareholders,
and, in some respects, as between the shareholders among themselves. The
contract rights of the shareholders, in the sense of interrelations inter sese, do
not rest upon an unchangeable base, but are subject to alteration under the
amendatory provisions of the General Law. The power of amendment, as it
affects the rights of shareholders, is broad, but it has limitations. As to what
those limitations are judicial authority is unsettled. Certainly vested property
rights may not be destroyed or impaired. Keller v. Wilson & Co. But every
decision in this State has upheld the general right of the corporation to affect the
position of an existing class of stock by the creation of a class or classes having
preferred rights or superior positions....
... The power to amend and the method of exercising the power are parts
of the contract. Section 10 of Article 1 of the Federal Constitution does not
apply. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins.
Id. at 321-22 (citations omitted).
In Weinberg v. Baltimore Brick Co., 108 A.2d 81 (Del. Ch. 1954), affd, 114 A.2d 812
(Del. 1955), the court, citing Davis and Gow (above), held that a corporation could avail
itself of post-incorporation legislation authorizing the payment of "nimble dividends"
and, on that basis, denied injunctive relief to a holder of common stock seeking to prevent
payment of dividends on preferred stock. See id at 83-84.
In Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959), it was held that
a parent corporation could avail itself of Delaware's 1957 short-form merger statute and
thereby cash out the minority interest in a 96%-owned subsidiary that was in existence
prior to enactment of the 1957 statute. See id at 894, 897-98; infra text accompanying
notes 1256-63 (discussing Coyne).
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North Carolina's highest court adopted the expansive reading of the
reserved power.998 A result consistent with the expansive reading was
reached by Indiana's highest court in 1993."
(2) Vested Right Override
When a state's highest court adopted the expansive reading of
the reserved power, this appeared to provide a basis for corporations
of that state to avail themselves of any and all post-incorporation
enabling statutes. Nevertheless, in a subsequent case, a court of that
state might still conclude that a particular shareholder right was
"vested" and therefore protected from change pursuant to permissive
post-incorporation legislation. Moreover, if a shareholder contended
that his contractual rights had been unconstitutionally impaired
In Rothschild International Corp. v. Liggett Group, Ina, 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984),
the court upheld a cash-out merger, saying the following:
[A]s a matter of law, stock issued or purchased prior to the Legislature's
authorization of cash mergers does not entitle the stockholder to any vested
right of immunity from the operation of the cash merger provision. Further, it is
settled that the State has the reserved power to enact laws having the effect of
amending certificates of incorporation and any rights arising thereunder.
Id. at 137 (citing Coyne, 154 A.2d at 897).
998. In Adair v. Orrell's Mutual Burial Ass'n, 284 N.C. 534,201 S.E.2d 905 (1974), the
court said:
When a Legislature reserves the right to amend or repeal a Charter, it
retains the power to change the contract between the corporation and the State
and the contracts between the corporation and its stockholders so that a later
repeal or amendment of the Charter does not result in an unconstitutional
impairment of the contract.
Id. at 538,201 S.E.2d at 908.
In Webb v. Morehead, 251 N.C. 394, 111 S.E.2d 586 (1959), the court, while not
employing an expansive reading of the reserved power, held that a post-incorporation
statute (enacted in 1901) could be applied to invalidate a pre-existing quorum bylaw that
was valid at the time of its adoption (prior to 1900). See id at 395-99, 111 S.E.2d at 587-
90. The court reached this result notwithstanding earlier decisions by the same court to
the effect that rights could not be altered by a retroactive application of statutes that
came into effect after such rights had vested. See Lester Bros. v. Pope Realty & Ins. Co.,
250 N.C. 565, 568, 109 S.E.2d 263, 266 (1959); Bank of Pinehurst v. Derby, 218 N.C. 653,
657-58,12 S.E.2d 260,263 (1940).
999. In FGS Enterprises, Inc. v. Shirnala, 625 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. 1993), the court did not
discuss the question whether a reserved power should be given the expansive or the
restrictive reading but, instead, focused most of its attention on the question whether a
reserved power--enacted in 1949, inadvertently repealed in 1978, and purportedly
reinstated in 1986 retroactive to 1978-should be deemed to have been in effect in 1983
when the corporation was organized. See id. at 1228-29. Concluding that it should be, the
court held that the corporation could avail itself of post-incorporation legislation (enacted
in 1987) authorizing reverse stock splits and payment of cash for fractional shares,
whereby minority shareholders were cashed out through a 1-for-242 reverse stock split.
See id. at 1227,1229.
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through the utilization of post-incorporation legislation, a state court
decision applying an expansive reading of the reserved power would
not be binding on the federal courts. An explication of each of these
points follows.
(a) State Decisions
Because there is some confusion about the vested right doctrine,
it is important that attention be focused on the precise matter to be
examined. Thus, attention should not be diverted by recognition of
the fact that the vested right doctrine did not preclude changes with
respect to a corporation or its shareholders pursuant to compulsory
post-incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved power.1"
The focus here is on pennissive legislation; and the question is
whether, in a state where an expansive reading of the reserved power
had been adopted previously, a court could nevertheless apply the
vested right doctrine to preclude a change in shareholder rights
pursuant to permissive post-incorporation legislation.
Two cases in New York, where an expansive reading of the
reserved power had been adopted, 1°1 provide an affirmative answer
to this question. In Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,'M the
court considered the voting right of a shareholder to be a vested right
of property and, on that basis, clearly indicated that it would
1000. In Sherman v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 587 (1861), it was held that, because of the
reserved power, it was proper to give effect to post-incorporation legislation that imposed
on shareholders liability for subsequent debts of banking corporations (to the extent of
the par value of their shares) even though the general statute under which the corporation
had been organized expressly provided that shareholders would not be subject to such
liability. See id. at 590-91, 593-94; supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing Sherman).
In Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478 (1872), when a city had been authorized by
statute to subscribe for $300,000 of a railroad corporation's $800,000 authorized capital
and to name four of its thirteen directors, and thereafter (when only $255,200 had been
paid in beyond the $300,000 paid in by the city) another statute was enacted authorizing
the city to name seven of the thirteen directors, effect was given to the latter statute as a
valid exercise of the state's reserved power notwithstanding the contention that the right
to name all but four of the directors had become vested in shareholders other than the
city. See U at 489-91, 498-99.
In Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900), it was held that, when a power of
amendment or repeal was reserved in the state constitution of 1850 and a corporation was
organized in 1870 (under a general law enacted in 1869) with a charter providing for
straight voting, it was proper to give effect to an 1885 statute mandating that shareholders
of any corporation (organized under a general law of the state) be given the right to vote
cumulatively in the election of directors. See id, at 51, 54; supra text accompanying notes
68-69 (discussing Looker).
1001. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text, and note 983 (first paragraph) and
accompanying text.
1002. 87 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1909).
1998] CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW 933
invalidate the utilization of post-incorporation legislation to limit the
right of shareholders to vote for all of the directors while giving them
undiluted power to elect a specified portion of the total.1 03 A more
telling New York case is that of Breslav v. New York & Queens
Electric Light & Power Co.,10 in which it was held that the reserved
power did not sustain the utilization of post-incorporation legislation
to amend a corporation's charter so as to make non-callable
preferred stock subject to redemption, because the non-redeemable
feature of that stock constituted a vested right of the preferred
shareholders.0°5
Michigan provides another such example. In Attorney General v.
Looker,1w decided in 1897, that state's highest court had held that an
1885 statute mandating cumulative voting was binding on an 1870
corporation whose charter provided for straight voting.' °° The court
based its decision on an expansive reading of the reserved power
1003. See id. at 448-53; cf. In re Mt. Sinai Hosp., 164 N.E. 871, 874-76 (N.Y. 1928)
(acknowledging that if the right to vote for trustees was a property right, the legislature
might not have the power to take away that right, but concluding that a legislative act
amending the charter of a charitable corporation to require that trustees be elected by
other trustees whose terms had not expired, rather than by members of the organization,
was within the legislature's reserved power).
1004. 291 N.Y.S. 932 (App. Div. 1936), affd per curiam, 7 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y. 1937). This
case is discussed in Note, Alteration of Redemption Features of Preferred Stock by Charter
Amendment, 46 YALE L. 1055 (1937).
1005. The court said:
What is the nature and character of plaintiff's interest as the present holder of
noncallable preferred stock? Is it a vested interest which may not be divested
without plaintiff's assent, or a defeasible interest subject to extinguishment by
the holders of record of two-thirds of the outstanding shares? We believe it is a
vested property right inherent in her ownership ....
... Defendants are attempting, under the guise of classification or
reclassification of the preferred stock, to impair the obligation of plaintiff's
contract with the corporation and to divest plaintiff of her present vested and
permanent interest in the corporation. This we hold the statute does not
authorize, and if it does, it is unconstitutional.
Breslav, 291 N.Y.S. at 940-41. But see Garzo v. Maid of the Mist Steamboat Co., 104
N.E.2d 882, 886-88 (N.Y. 1952) (holding that the reserved power sustained a
corporation's utilization of a post-incorporation enabling statute); supra note 983 (third
paragraph) (discussing Garzo).
1006. 69 N.W. 929 (Mich. 1897), aff'd sub nom. Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900);
see supra note 1000 (third paragraph) (discussing Looker).
1007. See Looker, 69 N.W. at 932. In City of Detroit v. Detroit & Howell Plank-Road
Co., 5 N.W. 275 (Mich. 1880), it had been held that, notwithstanding a reserved power, a
plank-road corporation could not be subjected to post-incorporation legislation
prohibiting such corporations from maintaining toll gates within the corporate limits of
any city. See id. at 281.
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contained in the state's 1850 constitutioniw°8 and a rejection of the
contention that the right to straight voting constituted a vested right
protected by the Impairment Clause from legislative alteration.1 °9
However, in Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works,010 decided in 1936,
when the plaintiff had acquired shares of preferred stock under a
corporate charter providing that such shares "shall be redeemed at
par on January 25, 1932," and thereafter, pursuant to enabling
legislation enacted in 1931, the charter was amended (by the class
vote prescribed in the enabling statute) to change the redemption
date to January 25, 1957, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
1931 enabling statute could not be applied to deprive the plaintiff of
the right to have his stock redeemed on January 25, 1932. The court
based its decision on its view that the plaintiff's right of redemption
was a vested right, which was protected from change under the saving
provisions of the 1931 statute,""1 and whose abrogation pursuant to
the enabling provision of that statute could not be sustained under
the reserved power contained in the state's 1908 constitution.101 2 (It
1008. The court said:
It is claimed by the counsel [for those seeking to sustain the right of straight
voting] that the method of electing the directors of the ... Company [as
prescribed by the charter] was made in pursuance of the [general law under
which the corporation had been organized], and constitutes a contract between
the stockholders of the company, which the legislature cannot set aside; and it is
asserted that the minority stockholders law [prescribing cumulative voting]
changes the contract between the stockholders, and is therefore within the
constitutional provision which forbids impairing the obligation of contracts. It
would seem to be a complete reply to this view to say that the stockholders knew
when they entered this corporation that the constitution reserved to the
legislature the right to amend, alter, or repeal the law under which the
corporation was organized. The stockholders are as much bound by this
constitutional provision as though it was contained in the articles of
incorporation.
Looker, 69 N.W. at 931.
1009. The court said:
We do not think it can be said that the minority law changes the character
of the business in which the ... Company is engaged, or that it takes away any
substantial right acquired by the corporation. It changes the terms of office of
the directors, and provides for a representation on the board of directors of a
minority of the stockholders. We do not think this disturbs any vested right such
as is referred to by the cases cited by counsel ....
I. at 932.
1010. 267 N.W. 815 (Mich. 1936).
1011. See id. at 817 ("The inescapable conclusion is that notwithstanding the broad
terms in which [the enabling section] of the act is expressed, the Legislature clearly and
conclusively intended [by the saving provisions] to preserve vested rights of the character
here asserted by plaintiff.").
1012. The court said:
1998] CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
should be added that, in two subsequent cases, Michigan courts
refused to invalidate-under the vested right doctrine-utilization of
post-incorporation enabling legislation enacted under a reserved
power.013)
The context in which the vested right doctrine has been applied
most frequently-in invalidating attempts to alter shareholder rights
through the use of post-incorporation enabling legislation enacted
under a reserved power-is that involving charter amendments
designed to eliminate dividend arrearages on cumulative preferred
stock.10 14 And the best known case in this context is Keller v. Wilson
Notwithstanding the ingenious presentation of [defendant's] contention
[that the saving provisions of the statute related only to creditors' rights], it
seems clear that the redemption right of plaintiff as a preferred stockholder is
something more and different in character than an ordinary incidental right of a
stockholder, such as voting for the election of a director of the company, and
that his right is contractual in nature.... [We think the following statement of
the United States Supreme Court is applicable to the instant case:
"The authority of a state under the so-called reserved power... is wide;
but is not unlimited. The corporate charter may be repealed or amended, and,
within limits not now necessary to define, the interrelations of state, corporation,
and stockholders may be changed; but neither vested property rights nor the
obligation of contracts of third persons may be destroyed or impaired."
Id. at 818 (quoting Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434,441-42 (1932)).
1013. In Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 284 N.W. 635 (Mich. 1939), when a reserved power
existed prior to the corporation's organization, it was held that a shareholder had no
vested right in the termination of the corporation's existence for failure to pay its
privilege fees and that it was appropriate for the corporation to avail itself of post-
incorporation enabling legislation (enacted after the plaintiffs had filed their complaint
seeking appointment of a receiver to wind up the corporation's business) by which
corporations were authorized to make late payment of their privilege fees and thereby
revive their corporate existence. See id. at 640.
In Miller v. Magline, Ina, 306 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), it was held that a
corporation could avail itself of post-incorporation legislation (enacted under a reserved
power) authorizing an extension of corporate existence by vote of a simple majority of the
outstanding shares, even though the law in effect at the time of the corporation's
organization required an extension of corporate existence to be approved by two-thirds of
the outstanding shares. See id. at 536; infra text accompanying notes 1248-49 (discussing
Miller).
1014. A survey of cases on the point is contained in Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85
N.E.2d 722, 728-32 (Ill. 1949), and its Annotation, Validity of Cancellation of Accrued
Dividends on Preferred Corporate Stock, 8 A.L.R2D 893 (1949).
Among the numerous articles and notes on this subject are the following- Arno C.
Becht, The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter Amendnent, 40 COLUM. L.
REv. 633 (1940); John F. Meck, Jr., Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks:
The Legal Doctrine, 55 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1941); Joseph B. Kelly, Note, Accrued
Dividends-No Mirage in Ohio, 18 U. CIR. L. REV. 172 (1949); and Will J. Schaaf, Jr.,
Note, Corporations: Amendment of Articles to Eliminate Dividends Accrued on
Cumulative Preferred Shares, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 586 (1947).
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& Co.,10 15 decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1936. Eight
years earlier, in the case of Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.,0 16
Delaware's chancery court had considered both the restrictive and
the expansive reading of that state's reserved power and had clearly
opted for the expansive reading. °17 Yet, in Keller, the supreme court
held that a shareholder's right to be paid accumulated dividends on
preferred stock (before payment of any dividend on common stock)
constituted a vested right and, therefore, any effort to abrogate such
right by way of a charter amendment adopted pursuant to post-
incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved power would be
unconstitutional.018
A final point needs to be made concerning state court treatment
of the vested right doctrine. It involves the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Federal United Corp. v. Havender'019-decided
four years after that court's decision in Keller v. Wilson & Co."~0 In
Havender, it was held that dividend arrearages on cumulative
preferred stock could be eliminated through the device of a merger
with a wholly owned subsidiary pursuant to a pre-incorporation
merger statute that provided appraisal rights for dissenters.""' This
decision led to the strange assertions that Havender "broke Keller's
back"'O and "marked the end of 'vested rights.' "10 But, the U.S.
1015. 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936).
1016. 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928).
1017. See id. at 656-58; supra note 997 (first paragraph) (discussing Davis).
1018. The court stated the question to be
whether the State, under its reserved power[,] may authorize a corporation
created by it at a time when the law, as then existing, did not permit the
abrogation of dividends on cumulative preferred stock accrued through passage
of time, to abolish such dividends by virtue of a statute passed after the creation
of the corporation and the issuance of such stock ....
Keller, 190 A. at 118. The court answered this question in the negative on the ground that
the right of a holder of cumulative preferred to accrued but unpaid dividends must "be
regarded as a vested right of property secured against destruction by the Federal and
State Constitutions." Id. at 125; accord Wheatley v. A.I. Root Co., 69 N.E.2d 187, 194-96
(Ohio 1946). But see O'Brien v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 152 S.E.2d 278,284-87 (Va. 1967)
(holding that the constitutional rights of a holder of preferred stock were not violated by
the corporation's amendment of its charter to cancel dividend arrearages).
1019. 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
1020. 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936); see supra note 1018 and accompanying text (discussing
Keller).
1021. See Havender, 11 A.2d at 338-39. This case is discussed in Note, Accrued
Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Right to Mirage, 57 HARV. L. REV.
894,894-95 (1944).
1022. Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1943) ("[W]e
must conclude that Havender broke Keller's back.").
1023. George D. Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAW &
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Supreme Court having made the vested right doctrine a part of
reserved power jurisprudence,m4 only that Court-certainly not a
state court-can bring that doctrine to an end. Moreover, the merger
in Havender was effected under pre-incorporation legislation so that
the Impairment Clause was not implicated in Havender as it had been
in Keller. Additionally, it is now well understood'M that the right of
appraisal (available in Havender but not in Keller) played a major
role in the Havender outcome.'m Finally, a leading authority on
Delaware corporate law pointed out in 1972 that the vested right
principle had not been overruled in that state.'2
CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 286 (1958) ("In retrospect, it is now apparent that [Havender]
marked the end of'vested rights' .... ").
1024. See supra note 971 and text accompanying notes 975-78.
1025. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 1284 (6th ed. 1988) ("As between Keller and Havender, there is the
significant difference that if the direct amendment technique is permitted it is a
cramdown without appraisal, while under the merger technique a dissenter is entitled to
appraisal."); Weiss, supra note 4, at 645-46.
Manning states:
The court in Havender purported to find other grounds for distinguishing the
two cases, but it paused to note that under the Delaware corporation statute the
plaintiff in Keller did not have the appraisal remedy available to him while the
plaintiff in Havender did. Most observers have felt that this was the key
difference ....
Manning, supra note 115, at 228 (footnotes omitted).
1026. In Havender, the court said:
To say [as in Keller] that the right to [accumulated] dividends may not be
destroyed by charter amendment under Section 26 of the General Law which,
when the corporation was formed and the stock issued, did not authorize the
destruction of the right, and with no alternative right in the shareholder to
demand payment in money of the value of his stock, is not to say that the right
may not be compounded [as in Havender] under the merger provisions of the
law which warn the shareholder that his right is defeasible, and which, if he is
dissatisfied, entitle him to demand and receive the money value of his shares.
There is a clear distinction between the situations recognized by the General
Law and the modes of procedure applicable to each of them....
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 342 (Del. 1940); see also Wessel v.
Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215,216-17 (N.J. Ch.) (noting the same distinction), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Murphy v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 39 A.2d 431 (NJ. 1944).
1027. Folk states:
Even though ... dividend arrearages could be modified in the course of a
merger, the fundamental principle of "vested rights" has never been specifically
overruled. Indeed, outright abandonment of the principle, as distinguished from
evasion in practice, may be impossible in view of the declaration of the Supreme
Court of the United States that "neither vested property rights nor the
obligation of contracts of third persons may be destroyed or impaired" pursuant
to the state's reserved power to amend the statute or to authorize charter
amendments.
FOLK, supra note 459, at 560 (citing and quoting Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442
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(b) Federal Decisions
Even if a state court decided that a particular right was not
constitutionally protected from abrogation pursuant to post-
incorporation legislation, such a decision could be'overridden by the
U.S. Supreme Court.'m That Court's decision in Coombes v. Getz1" 9
provides an example of such an override with respect to a right of a
creditor.'= Another example is provided by Superior Water, Light &
(1932)).
1028. Early pronouncements supporting this proposition are to be found in the
following cases: Piqua Branch of the State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 391-92
(1853); Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 443-44 (1861); Murray v.
Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1877); Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U.S.
683, 697 (1885); and Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488,501-02 (1897).
In Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932), the Court said:
The decision of the supreme court of a state construing and applying its
own constitution and laws generally is binding upon this court; but that is not so
where the contract clause of the Federal Constitution is involved. In that case
this court will give careful and respectful consideration and all due weight to the
adjudication of the state court, but will determine independently thereof
whether there be a contract, the obligation of which is within the protection of
the contract clause, and whether that obligation has been impaired; and,
likewise, will determine for itself the meaning and application of state
constitutional or statutory provisions said to create the contract or by which it is
asserted an impairment has been effected.
Id. at 441; see also Haberlach v. Tillamook County Bank, 293 P. 927, 929 (Or. 1930)
("[W]hether the passage of a state law impairs the obligation of a contract is a federal
question, in the determination of which the rulings of the state court are not binding upon
the federal courts.").
1029. 285 U.S. 434 (1932).
1030. In Coombes, a creditor of a corporation brought suit against a director to recover
under a constitutional provision (said to have the force of a statute) making directors
liable to creditors and shareholders for moneys embezzled by officers while such directors
were in office. See id. at 439-40. While the appeal of a judgment against the plaintiff was
pending, the constitutional provision was repealed, and the state court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the cause of action had
abated. See id at 440. In the state court's opinion supporting its denial of a rehearing, it
was acknowledged that the directors' liability imposed by the constitutional provision was
contractual in nature and thereby became a part of the contract between the creditor and
the corporation; but the position was taken that, under the state's constitutional
reservation of power to alter or repeal laws concerning corporations, the repeal of the
provision for directors' liability was a contingency known at the time the contract was
made because the reserved power was as much a part of the contract as was the liability
provision; and, while acknowledging that "the reserved power, however broad, cannot be
exercised so as to impair a vested property right," the state court held that the remedy
formerly given by the state constitutional provision was not such a right. See Coombes v.
Franklin, 4 P.2d 157,157 (Cal. 1931) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S.
434 (1932). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff's right to enforce the
contractual liability created pursuant to the constitutional provision had become vested
prior to the repeal of that provision. See Coombes, 285 U.S. at 442. The Court said that,
while the repeal put an end to the liability rule for the future, such repeal "did not and
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Power Co. v. City of Superior,1031 involving rights of a corporation, in
which the Supreme Court reversed a state court's validation of post-
incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved power and held,
instead, that the legislation was invalid (as applied to the
corporation) because of the Impairment Clause.0 32
While Coombes involved a vested right of a creditor and
Superior involved rights of a corporation, a lower federal court's
decision in Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co. 0 33 involved a
right of shareholders. In this case, it was held (with respect to a
Delaware corporation) that a charter provision, requiring that
$20,000 be paid each year into a sinking fund for the retirement of
shares of preferred stock, could not be eliminated by a charter
amendment made pursuant to post-incorporation enabling legislation
enacted under a reserved power. Having referred to the Delaware
decision of Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., °M in which the
chancellor (after noting special wording in Delaware's reserved
power statute) had said that "all future amendments to the
[corporation] act were written by that [reserved power] language into
the defendant's charter as effectively as was the original act,"'0 35 the
could not destroy or impair the previously vested right of the creditor (which in every
sense was a property right) to enforce his cause of action upon the contract." Id.
(citations omitted).
1031. 263 U.S. 125 (1923).
1032. In this case, a water company, acting pursuant to its charter, entered into a
contractual arrangement with a municipality whereby the company would supply water to
the municipality for a term of 30 years, at the end of which time the arrangement would
be renewed for another 30 years or the municipality would purchase the water works for a
price determined in accordance with a specified procedure. See id. at 126-28. Before
expiration of the first 30 years, the legislature enacted the state's Public Utility Law
purporting to convert utility franchises into indeterminate permits. See id& at 131-32.
When the first 30 years expired, the company asked that the municipality either renew the
franchise or purchase the water works; but the municipality refused to renew, denied its
obligation to purchase, and took steps under the Public Utility Law to condemn the entire
plant. See id. at 133. The state's highest court held that, under the state's pre-
incorporation reserved power, the Public Utility Law was permissible and had the effect
of making the company's franchise one of indeterminate duration with the result that the
company's franchise had not come to an end and thus no purchase obligation had arisen.
See Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. City of Superior, 181 N.W. 113, 123-24 (Wis.
1921), rev'd, 263 U.S. 125 (1923). The Supreme Court reversed, citing the Impairment
Clause, and holding that "lilt was beyond the competency of the legislature to substitute
an 'indeterminate permit' for rights acquired under a very clear contract." Superior, 263
U.S. at 137.
1033. 34 F.2d 533 (D.R.I. 1929).
1034. 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928); see supra notes 970 (third paragraph) and 997 (first
paragraph).
1035. Davis, 142 A. at 658; see supra note 970 (third paragraph) (quoting Davis).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
federal court refused to accept this as dispositive of the issue"36 and
proceeded to make its own determination as to the scope and reach
of the reserved power.037
b. Restrictive Reading of Reserved Power
(1) Twentieth-Century Decisions
The restrictive reading of the reserved power was that this power
related solely to changes in the charter contract between the state
and the corporation0 38 and, therefore, a pre-existing reserved power
did not sustain a corporation's utilization of permissive post-
1036. The court said:
The decisions of the Delaware courts have been studied with the greatest
deference. I am compelled, however, to the conclusion that they do not settle
the point here involved. A federal court may be bound by the interpretation
placed upon a state statute by a court of last resort of that state, but is not bound
by the decision of the state court as to whether so interpreted there is a resulting
impairment of the "obligation of contracts" or the taking of property "without
due process of law," within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.
The issue presented necessitates an examination of the scope and effect of a
reservation of power by a state to amend by future act any enabling legislation
under which a corporation is organized.
Yoakam, 34 F.2d at 544.
1037. The court said:
At the outset, it is important to keep in mind that we are dealing with a
reservation, a refusal to part with power. No reservation can be construed as
giving or vesting in the state a power which it did not before have. The state has
no power to impair the obligation of contracts to which it is not a party. No
reservation, however artfully worded, can give it that power.
.. There [in the charter] are included the provisions essential to
corporate existence, the restrictive provisions imposed by the state, which
together constitute the contract with the state. There are also often included
various agreements between the stockholders and the corporation and between
the stockholders inter sese. It is a convenient place to record them. But to say
that, because they are there recorded, the state may by direct act, or by
empowering a majority so to do, impair the obligation of such commitments, is
to ignore the substance and character of the subject-matter and to be led astray
by the title to the document.
To say that a general reservation on the part of the state of a right to
repeal or enact future amendments to the corporation law gave to the state a
power to authorize the cancellation of this [sinking fund] agreement, is to
disregard every sound principle of law and to misconstrue legal history.
Id. at 54547.
103M The Wyoming Constitution, as quoted in Drew v. Beckwith, Quinn & Co., 114
P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1941), provided that " '[a]ll laws relating to corporations may be altered,
amended or repealed by the legislature at any time when necessary for the public good
and general welfare.'" Id at 103 (quoting WYO. CONST. art. X, § 1).
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incorporation legislation to alter a shareholder's contract rights vis-h-
vis the corporation or his fellow shareholders.03 9
As had been the case in the nineteenth century,l ° this view of
the matter continued to be taken in the twentieth century by the
courts of New Jersey at least through 1921.1041 Wisconsin, which was
1039. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1857, as quoted in the Pennsylvania College
Cases, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 190 (1871), contained the following provision:
"The legislature shall have power to alter, revoke, or annul any charter of
incorporation hereafter conferred by or under any special or general law,
whenever, in their opinion, it may be injurious to the citizens of the
Commonwealth; in such manner, however, that no injustice shall be done to the
corporators."
Id. at 196 (alteration in original) (quoting PA. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 26). Similar
provisions appeared in the Arkansas Constitution of 1874, as quoted in St Louis, Iron
Mountain & St Paul Railway Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404,406 (1899) (quoting ARK. CONST.
of 1874, art. XII, § 6), in the Colorado Constitution, as quoted in Pratt v. South Pueblo
Building & Loan Ass'n, 1 Colo. N.P. Dec. 171, 177 (Dist. Ct. 1901) (quoting COLO.
CONST. art. XV, § 3), and in the Alabama Constitution of 1875, as quoted in Avondale
Land Co. v. Shook, 54 So. 268, 269-70 (Ala. 1911) (quoting ALA. CONST. of 1875, art.
XIV, § 10).
1040. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 and 136-52.
1041. In Berger v. United States Steel Corp., 53 A. 68 (N.J. 1902), the court stated:
It must be conceded that it is firmly settled in our jurisprudence that the right
reserved ... to amend, alter, or repeal charters extends only to the modification
or destruction of rights as between the state and the corporation, but that the
rights of the stockholders inter sese can in no respect be impaired except in so
far as impairment may result from an alteration required by the public interest.
Kean v. Johnson, Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., and Mills v. Railroad Co. are cases
under the act of 1846, and the Newark Library Ass'n Case dealt with the right of
amendment and repeal under the act of 1846 [sic 1896?].
Id. at 73-74 (citations omitted).
In Einstein v. Raritan Woolen Mills, 70 A. 295 (N.J. Ch. 1908), it was held that a
corporation chartered by special act in 1869 could not, over the objection of a single
shareholder, avail itself of post-incorporation legislation to effect a charter amendment
increasing its capital stock, creating a class of preferred, and converting its outstanding
common into the new preferred. See id. at 295, 297. The court said:
This [charter limitation on the amount of capital stock] I take it is a
limitation upon the power of the company which is part of the contract existing
between the stockholders among themselves and between the stockholders and
the corporation itself, and that it cannot be abrogated or avoided by the
corporation or by its directors, or by any majority, however large, of its
stockholders against the objection of the holder of a single share. This is on the
ground that such action would violate that provision of the federal Constitution
which prohibits the states from passing any laws which impair the obligation of
contracts ....
"" I must hold that this [post-incorporation enabling legislation] is merely
the consent of the state that the stockholders may, if they all agree, do the things
which are provided for in that act; but, if all the stockholders do not agree, the
act cannot be held to be a portion of the charter of the corporation or an
amendment thereto. This is specifically held in Kean v. Johnson, Zabriskie v.
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early in adopting the restrictive reading,1°42 continued to adhere to
this view in the twentieth century.1°43 Also Kentucky, which adopted
this reading in the nineteenth century,1°4 continued to adhere to this
view in the twentieth century.0 45 New Hampshire adopted this view
in an 1887 decision,' °  and that decision was cited with approval in a
1932 New Hampshire decision (involving a change, under the
Hackensack Railroad Co., Black v. United Railroad & Canal Companies, Mills
v. NJ. Central Railroad Co., and many other cases which have ingrafted this
doctrine into our law so deeply as to be beyond disturbance.
Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted).
In Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 112 A. 887 (N.J. 1921), a corporation proposed to
effect a 10-year lease of most of its revenue-producing property pursuant to post-
incorporation enabling legislation authorizing such a lease (with the assent of two-thirds
in interest of the stockholders) but making no provision for appraisal rights. See ltL at
888. A minority shareholder-even though his shares were part of an issue of stock made
after the enabling legislation was enacted-succeeded in his suit for a preliminary
injunction. See id. at 889. The court said:
In Zabriskie v. Hackensack & New York Railroad Co., it was held that a
legislative charter is a contract between the state and the corporation which the
state cannot impair; and that corporators or partners associated for a special
purpose specified in their charter or articles of partnership cannot change that
purpose without the consent of all the corporators or partners; and that a
reservation in a charter that the state may, at any time, alter, amend, or repeal it
is a reservation made by the state for its own benefit, and is not intended to
affect or change the rights of corporators as between each other. Nor does it
authorize the state to authorize one part of the stockholders, for their own
benefit, at their mere option, to change their contract with the other part ....
Id. (citation omitted).
The decision in Fornataro v. Atlantic Coast Building & Loan Ass'n, 163 A. 240 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1932), giving retrospective effect to a post-incorporation statute regulating
withdrawals from savings and loan associations, did not represent a repudiation of the
Zabriskie doctrine. See id. at 244. It treated a utilization of the reserved power as an
exercise of the police power in the context of a financial crisis brought on by the Great
Depression. See id, at 244-45.
1042. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
1043. See Luce, supra note 943, at 45-48.
1044. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
1045. In Ayers v. Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Ass'n, 344 S.W.2d 836 (Ky.
1961), when the limited life of an incorporated association was changed to perpetual
existence by its board of directors, under post-incorporation legislation that authorized
such action to be taken by director action alone (whereas the corporation law in effect at
the time of incorporation required shareholder approval of any extension of corporate
existence), it was held that the vested right of shareholders to vote on charter
amendments could not be abrogated under the state's reserved power but that the action
of the directors should nevertheless be sustained because of the right of each member to
withdraw from the association and receive the value of his interest in cash. See id. at 838,
839-40; see also Donohue v. Heuser, 239 S.W.2d 238,239-40,245 (Ky. 1951) (upholding a
consolidation effected pursuant to post-incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved
power, but noting that dissenters were accorded the right of appraisal).
1046. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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reserved power, of the charter contract between the state and the
corporation).1 47 In Georgia, the restrictive reading of the reserved
power had been adopted in 1889,1W and that reading was echoed in a
1929 dictum;1049 however, in 1940, it was held that one corporation
could merge with another pursuant to post-incorporation enabling
legislation (notwithstanding a minority shareholder's effort to enjoin
the merger) simply because a reserved power antedated the
corporation's organization." 5
Among the state courts adopting the restrictive reading of the
reserved power in the twentieth century were the following: a lower
Colorado court in 1901,1°51 the highest court of Utah in 1907,1052 and,
1047. See Lorenz v. Steams, 161 A. 205,207,209 (N.H. 1932).
1048. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
1049. In McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond & Mortgage Co., 147 S.E. 102 (Ga. 1929), the
court said:
It may be conceded that the charter of a corporation is a contract of a
dual character: First, a contract between the state, which grants the charter, and
the corporation; second, a contract between the corporation and its members.
And while the state, in its reserved power to do so, can alter and amend the
charter, and the corporation itself cannot object to the alteration, even the state
has no power to make any material or essential alteration in the contract
between the members themselves and the corporation.
Id. at 103-04.
1050. See Barnett v. D.O. Martin Co., 11 S.E2d 210 (Ga. 1940); infra text
accompanying notes 1164-66 (discussing Barnett).
1051. In Pratt v. South Pueblo Building & Loan Ass'n, 1 Colo. N.P. Dec. 171 (Dist. Ct.
1901), it was held that a corporation could not avail itself of post-incorporation enabling
legislation (enacted under a reserved power) to extend the life of the corporation, unless
the complaining shareholder was given a right of appraisal. See id. at 182. After quoting
several authorities, the court said:
I conclude, therefore, that the restriction of the federal constitution being
removed by the reservation of power made for the protection of public interests,
the state can make any amendments or alterations which it may deem necessary
so as to change the relations between the corporation and itself, and may
thereby indirectly effect [sic] the relations between the members of the
corporation; and second, that by virtue of its sovereignty the state may make any
immaterial changes and alterations in the contract as between the corporators
themselves which may be regarded as in promotion and in furtherance of the
original design. Beyond this it cannot go.
Id at 178.
1052. In Garey v. St Joe Mining Co., 91 P. 369 (Utah 1907), it was held that a
corporation could not, over the objection of minority shareholders, avail itself of post-
incorporation legislation authorizing the holders of two-thirds of the corporate stock to
adopt a charter amendment making non-assessable stock subject to assessment. See id. at
369-70,374-75. The court said:
From the texts and the cases it will be seen that under the reservation the
state is not only unauthorized to alter or amend charters of existing corporations
in such a way as will change the fundamental character of the corporation,
impair the object of the grant, or rights vested thereunder, but it is also
1998]
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more recently, Ohio's highest court in 1946,053 Oklahoma's highest
unauthorized to alter or amend them in such a way as will impair the contractual
relations or rights of the stockholders among themselves, or between the
corporation and its stockholders; and it will also be seen that under the reserved
power the Legislature has only the right to amend the charter, or laws with
respect thereto, which it would have had in the event it had been decided in the
Dartmouth College Case that the federal Constitution did not apply to corporate
charters.... Because of the reserved power the state may now amend or alter
the charter, so far as affecting the contract with itself, and so long as it does not
change the fundamental character of the corporation or impair any vested rights
acquired thereunder. But, as stated by the authorities, the right is reserved for
the benefit of the state and of the public and for public purposes. The power can
only be exercised to the extent that the state is interested. It can alter or modify
any right, privilege, or immunity granted by it. It cannot, however, reach out
and impair the obligations of contracts existing between the corporation and its
members, or among the corporators themselves, any more than it can impair the
obligations of contracts existing between other individuals.
Id. at 374,followed In A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 92 P.2d 1057,1061
(Idaho 1939), and Jacobson v. Backman, 401 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1965).
1053. In Wheatley v. A.L Root Co., 69 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1946), it was held that a
corporation could not avail itself of post-incorporation enabling legislation to sustain a
charter amendment eliminating dividend arrearages on preferred stock. See ld. at 194-96.
The court's decision was based on the restrictive view of the reserved power, as set forth
in the following excerpt (quoted by the court) from Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporations:
"The true view is that the power to alter, amend or repeal charters is
reserved by the state 'solely' for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the
decision in the Dartmouth College case; that the charter of a corporation is a
contract between the state and the corporation within the constitutional
prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and that the
purpose of the reservation is to enable the state to impose such restraints upon
corporations as the Legislature may deem advisable for protection of the public.
Such power is not reserved in any sense for the benefit of the corporation, or of
a majority of the stockholders, upon any idea that the Legislature can alter the
contract between the corporation and its stockholders, nor for the purpose of
enabling it to do so."
Id. at 195 (Fletcher's footnotes and the court's citation omitted, and minor capitalization
added by court) (quoting 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5776, at 86-87 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1943)); accord
Schaffner v. Standard Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 83 N.E.2d 192,195-96 (Ohio 1948).
In Allen v. Scott, 135 N.E. 683 (Ohio 1922), it had been held that shareholders of an
insolvent banking corporation organized in 1909 were liable to creditors (who became
such after January 1, 1913) under a constitutional provision, adopted (in 1912 effective
January 1, 1913) under a reserved power, that made shareholders of banking corporations
responsible for debts of such corporations to the extent of the par value of their shares.
See id. at 684-86. And by way of dicta in Harper v. Ampt, 32 Ohio St. 291 (1877), Ohio's
highest court had said:
[Tihe state, through its legislature, possessed complete power-
2. To alter or amend the charter as to the mode of electing directors, or to
make any other amendment within the object and scope of the corporation, for
the better regulation of such company. It can not be said that such an
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court in 1 94 9 ,1054 and Pennsylvania's highest court in 1952.1055
(2) Public Interest Antidote
When a state's highest court adopted the restrictive reading of
that state's reserved power, it would likely have done so on the
ground that the reservation was intended (and therefore should be
interpreted) to relate solely to alteration or repeal of the charter
contract between the state and the corporation.105 6 This would mean
amendment violates any contract within the meaning of the federal constitution.
The power reserved to alter or amend the charter entered into and
formed part of the terms of the contract, and the stockholders held their
chartered privileges subject to its exercise.
Id. at 295-96.
1054. In Yukon Mill & Grain Co. v. Vose, 206 P.2d 206 (Okla. 1949), it was held that a
corporation could not avail itself of post-incorporation enabling legislation to effect a
charter amendment to make its non-redeemable preferred stock redeemable. See id. at
209-11. The court said:
We adopt the view that whether or not a power to amend a corporate
charter reserved to the state by statute or constitution protects a proposed
change in the obligation of a corporation to its stockholders, authorized under
enabling legislation enacted subsequent to the issuance of the corporate stock
affected, depends upon whether the proposed change is directed toward those
features of the contract in the corporate charter in which the state has an
interest, or relates to those features dealing with the private rights between the
stockholders and the corporation, or between the stockholders inter se; and we
hold that the reservation of power to amend corporate charters is applicable
only to those features of the contract affected with public interest, and the
private rights of the stockholder as against the corporation or his fellow
stockholders are protected from alteration by the inhibition against the
impairment of contracts.
Id. at 209.
1055. In Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 87 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1952), the court said:
But, while there is a conflict of authority on the subject, the preferable view
would seem to be that this reserved power of the State to alter or amend
charters of incorporation, although wide, is not unlimited, and that it can
properly be exercised only to amend a charter so far as it represents a contract
between the corporation and the State, and not in respects as to which it
constitutes a contract between the corporation and the shareholders or between
the shareholders themselves. That is the view presently taken of the extent of
the reserved power by many, if not most, of the courts which have considered
the question.
Id. at 232. For comments on this decision, see Note, Elimination of Accrued Dividends:
Possible Obstacles for the Pennsylvania Corporation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 663 (1953).
1056. The point was well expressed in Pratt when the court said:
I presume it was never doubted that the charter of a corporation is a
contract between the members of the corporation, inter se. The decision in the
Dartmouth college case was not necessary to settle that point. The great
question there debated was the relation of the corporation to the sovereign
power, and the principle settled was that the charter of a corporation is a
contract as between itself and the state. It is universally conceded that the sole
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that the reserved power provided no basis for sustaining a
corporation's utilization of permissive post-incorporation legislation
to effect a change in shareholder rights existing under the charter
contract; and, absent some other sustaining basis, the state court
could be expected to enjoin (at the behest of a complaining
shareholder) any effort to effect such a change pursuant to such
legislation.
This, however, left matters in an unsatisfactory state. It meant
that a single dissenting shareholder could block any effort of the
majority to make use of permissive post-incorporation legislation,057
unless some other basis could be found to sustain the making of a
change pursuant to the enabling statute. This led some courts to
resort, for a time, to a bizarre "public interest" doctrine.
(a) Emergence of Doctrine
There emerged the doctrine that a corporation could avail itself
of a post-incorporation enabling statute, enacted pursuant to a
reserved power, if the enabling legislation had been enacted in the
public interest. This doctrine appears to have had its origin in New
Jersey where, in the absence of a statutory right of appraisal, there
was no other basis upon which to sustain an action taken by the
holders of some specified majority of the shares (less than all) under
an enabling statute enacted subsequent to incorporation.'0 s
purpose of the reservations made by the states is to meet that decision and
counteract its effects. If this be true, it necessarily follows that such reservations
were made for the purpose of affecting the relation of a corporation to the state
which created it, and for that purpose only, and must be construed accordingly.
Pratt, 1 Colo. N.P. Dec. at 175.
1057. It was this concern that led New Jersey's highest court, in Brundage v. New Jersey
Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585 (NJ. 1967), to abandon that state's century-old Zabriskie
doctrine. The court said:
[W]e ... believe that the time has come for express disavowal of Zabriskie as
having no proper place in modem corporate law. Its notions as to unanimity
may have had some force in the days when commerce was conducted largely
through individuals and small partnerships or closely held corporations; they
have no force in today's society of large corporate enterprises such as [the two
corporations involved in a merger] with their thousands of stockholders spread
throughout the nation.
Id. at 595.
1058. Gibson colorfully stated the matter as follows:
Once committed to this [Zabriskie] line of approach there was no escape
except by completing the tunnel at the other end. The New Jersey Courts came
out into the open again by inventing a formula that the contract among the
stockholders, while not normally subject to the reserved power to amend,
"would be so considered if in the public interest" to do so.
[Vol. 76946
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The doctrine appears to have derived from a misunderstanding
of something that New Jersey's highest court had said in its 1902
decision in Berger v. United States Steel Corp.,10 59 namely, that "the
rights of the stockholders inter sese can in no respect be impaired
[pursuant to the reserved power] except in so far as impairment may
result from an alteration required by the public interest."'1  To the
extent that this statement indicated that post-incorporation
legislation (enacted pursuant to a reserved power) could validly
compel-in the public interest-an alteration of the rights of
shareholders as embodied in their charter contract, this was a correct
statement of then-prevailing law." 6 However, no one familiar with
New Jersey law, as it had evolved up to that time, could take the
statement by the Berger court to mean that permissive enabling
legislation, enacted under a reserved power but unaccompanied by a
statutory right of appraisal, could be utilized by a pre-existing
corporation to allow some specified shareholder majority (over the
objection of minority holders) to effect a significant change in
shareholder rights embodied in the charter contract.1' Indeed, the
Berger decision itself drew the distinction between compulsory and
permissive legislation.'1 3
Nonetheless, for a time in New Jersey, there blossomed the
notion that enabling legislation enacted pursuant to that state's
reserved power could be utilized by a pre-existing corporation to
alter rights of its shareholders so long as the legislation had been
enacted in the public interest.' 0" The most thorough espousal of this
doctrine came in the 1953 decision of A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co.
v. Barlow, °65 in which the court sustained a corporate donation to
Princeton University made pursuant to post-incorporation enabling
legislation. 1'0
Gibson, supra note 943, at 604-05.
1059. 53 A. 68 (N.J. 1902).
1060. Id. at 74; see supra note 1041 (first paragraph) (quoting Berger).
1061. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
1062. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 and 136-52.
1063. See supra note 950 (first paragraph) and accompanying text.
1064. See Murray v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 82 A. 1038,1040 (NJ. 1912); Bucsi v. Longworth
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 194 A. 857, 860 (NJ. 1937); In re Collins-Doan Co., 70 A.2d 159,
163-65 (NJ. 1949).
1065. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
1066. See Id. at 587-90. The court said:
In the early case of Zabriskie v. Hackensack & New York Railroad Company,
the court was called upon to determine whether a railroad could extend its line,
above objection by a stockholder, under a legislative enactment passed under
9471998]
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(b) Flaw in Doctrine
This doctrine had grave deficiencies. Certainly the Impairment
Clause of the Constitution contains no exception for state laws that
are enacted in the public interest. Indeed, one may assume that all
state laws are enacted in what the legislature perceives to be the
public interest. But, if one takes the position that no law passed in
the public interest runs afoul of the Impairment Clause and if one
accepts the proposition that all state laws are enacted in the public
interest, then the Impairment Clause becomes a nullity.
The "public interest" doctrine seems to be nothing more than a
case of confusion with the police power of a state.1° 7 As noted
above,"68 the police power does, indeed, override the Impairment
Clause. 69 But the police power has limits.107° Traditionally, it has
the reserve power after the incorporation of the railroad. Notwithstanding the
breadth of the statutory language and persuasive authority elsewhere (Durfee v.
Old Colony & Fall River Railroad Company), it was held that the proposed
extension of the company's line constituted a vital change of its corporate object
which could not be accomplished without unanimous consent. The court
announced the now familiar New Jersey doctrine that although the reserved
power permits alterations in the public interest of the contract between the state
and the corporation, it has no effect on the contractual rights between the
corporation and its stockholders and between stockholders Inter se.
Unfortunately, the court did not consider whether it was not contrary to the
public interest to permit the single minority stockholder before it to restrain the
railroad's normal corporate growth and development as authorized by the
Legislature and approved, reasonably and in good faith, by the corporation's
managing directors and majority stockholders. Although the later cases in New
Jersey have not disavowed the doctrine of the Zabriskie case, it is noteworthy
that they have repeatedly recognized that where justified by the advancement of
the public interest the reserved power may be invoked to sustain later charter
alterations even though they affect contractual rights between the corporation
and its stockholders and between stockholders inter se.
Id. at 587-88 (citations omitted).
1067. See id. at 589 ("The legislative function recognized here may be considered
somewhat akin to that under the police power generally where private interests
frequently are called upon to give way to the paramount public interest.").
1068. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
1069. In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), the Court said:
First of all, it is to be accepted as a commonplace that the Contract Clause
does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States. "It is the settled
law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of
contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested
in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general
good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals
may thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known
as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to
protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and
is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals."
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related essentially to the public health, safety, and morals; and, when
it has been extended to economic necessity, the necessity generally
has arisen from an emergency situation.1 71
There is little wonder that, in 1967, New Jersey's highest court
elected to pursue a different tack in attempting to avoid the
restrictions of the century-old Zabriskie doctrine.' 2
Id. at 241 (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473,480 (1905)).
In Indiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), the Court said:
Our decisions recognize that every contract is made subject to the implied
condition that its fulfillment may be frustrated by a proper exercise of the police
power but we have repeatedly said that, in order to have this effect, the exercise
of the power must be for an end which is in fact public and the means adopted
must be reasonably adapted to that end ....
Id. at 108-09.
See generally Note, Power of the State to Alter Corporate Charters, supra note 966
(discussing the power of the states to alter contractual relations despite constitutional
restrictions).
1070. See New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 670-73 (1885);
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
It has been specifically held that the police power does not sustain a post-
incorporation change in the mode of voting at corporate elections. See State ex rel.
Haeussler v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188, 194-95 (1883) (holding that, when the charter provided
for straight voting in the election of directors and a post-incorporation constitutional
provision mandated cumulative voting, the latter was inapplicable).
1071. The leading case is Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-
48 (1934).
Cases holding that economic legislation impairing contractual rights can be sustained
as an exercise of the police power, when an economic emergency exists, include the
following: Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38-41 (1940); and
Bucsi v. Longworth Building & Loan Ass'n, 194 A. 857,863-65 (N.J. 1937).
Cases holding that economic legislation impairing contractual rights cannot be
sustained as an exercise of the police power, in the absence of an economic emergency,
include the following Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 194-98 (1936);
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1934); and Sonoma County
Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1,10-11 (Cal. 1979).
In City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), the Court upheld the application
of a 1941 Texas statute that imposed a five-year limit on the right of reinstatement of a
forfeited land contract entered into in 1910 under an 1895 statute that imposed no such
limit. See id. at 498-501. In so doing, the Court reversed a ruling of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit "that the right to reinstate was a vested contractual right and that the
[Impairment Clause] prohibited the application of the 1941 statute to the contract here in
question." Id. at 501. In reaching its result, the Supreme Court relied on the concept that
protection of the "vital interests" or "general welfare" of the people is within the
sovereign power of a state. See id, at 508. On that basis, the Court, after noting that
"[t]he general purpose of the legislation enacted in 1941 was to restore confidence in the
stability and integrity of land titles and to enable the State to protect and administer its
property in a businesslike manner," id at 511-12, concluded that "a statute of repose was
quite clearly necessary," id at 516.
1072. In Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585 (N.J. 1967), the court said:
Judge Waugh noted below that the exercise here of the reserve power was
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
c. Switching from Restrictive to Expansive Reading
If one discarded the public interest doctrine as being flawed, the
restrictive reading of the reserved power precluded any reliance on
that power to sustain a change in shareholder rights pursuant to
permissive post-incorporation legislation. Thus, under the restrictive
reading (and in the absence of a right of appraisal for dissenters),
such a change in rights could be effected only with the unanimous
consent of shareholders; and, in the case of a widely held corporation,
it was virtually impossible to obtain such consent." 3  This
requirement of unanimity came to be seen as an intolerable state of
affairs, and the perception grew that there was a need for greater
flexibility in the modem corporate era.1074 This led the highest courts
of some states, where the restrictive reading had been adopted at an
earlier time, to switch their allegiance to an expansive reading of the
reserved power.
(1) Examples of Switching
The most noteworthy instance of such a switch came in New
Jersey in 1967. Until their resort to the public interest doctrine
earlier in this century,1 75 the courts of New Jersey-from Zabriskie in
1867 through Allen in 1921-had been steadfast in their adherence to
the restrictive reading of the reserved power7 6 Then, in Brundage
v. New Jersey Zinc Co.,1077 believing "that the time has come for
justified by the public interest in providing for orderly corporate growth and
development through fair and democratic processes. While we believe this to be
entirely sound, we also believe that the time has come for express disavowal of
Zabriskie as having no proper place in modem corporate law.
Id. at 595.
1073. In Seattle Trust & Savings Bank v. McCarthy, 617 P.2d 1023 (Wash. 1980), the
court said:
The defendant contends ... that preemptive rights, once accorded,
become a vested and contractual right and cannot be divested without the
unanimous consent of the shareholders. It is not disputed that as a practical
matter, where corporate stock is widely held, it is virtually impossible to secure
the participation of all stockholders in an election. Therefore, if the defendant's
view is correct, a corporation in the position of the plaintiff cannot amend its
articles to deny preemptive rights.
Id. at 1025.
1074. See supra note 1057. For a well-researched article containing a good depiction of
the movement of the law toward greater corporate flexibility, see William J. Carney,
Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 69.
1075. See supra text accompanying notes 1064-66.
1076. See supra note 1041 and text accompanying notes 94-95 and 136-52.
1077. 226 A.2d 585 (NJ. 1967).
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express disavowal of Zabriskie as having no proper place in modem
corporate law,"'1 78 New Jersey's highest court embraced the
expansive reading of the reserved power'079-- to the delight of some
observers.1m
The State of Washington provides another example. In State ex
reL Swanson v. Perham,'08' decided in 1948, the court refused to apply
a 1933 statute, providing for cumulative voting, to a corporation
organized in 1919 under a statute providing for straight voting. As an
alternative ground for its decision,''o the court embraced a restrictive
reading of the reserved power contained in the state's constitution.10m
107& Id. at 595; see supra notes 1057 and 1072.
1079. The court said:
The power reserved in our organic and statutory law was broadly phrased
and broadly intended. It should liberally be viewed as part and parcel of the
tripartite arrangements between the State, the corporation and the stockholders,
and thus viewed, as permitting reasonable corporate charter amendments having
legitimate business ends.
Brundage, 226 A.2d at 595 (citations omitted).
1080. In Asarco Inc v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985), the court said the
following:
There was a time when the New Jersey courts limited severely the extent
to which legislation could permit directors and stockholders to alter or readjust
the rights and powers of stockholders inter sese or to expand the powers of the
Board of Directors. This limitation on legislative power, and thus on corporate
power, was forcefully espoused in the ancient and now unlamented case of
Zabriskie v. Hackensack and New York Railroad Co. Unanimous stockholder
consent was required to effect substantial changes in the corporate structure and
relationships, and the Legislature was held powerless to decree otherwise, for to
do so would impinge upon the basic contractual rights of stockholders.
This doctrine eroded over the years, and Zabriskie was finally laid to rest
in Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co. After Brundage it was clear that under New
Jersey law the power which the state had reserved over corporations was a part
of a tripartite arrangement between the State, the corporation and its
stockholders, permitting the Legislature to expand and modify the powers of
corporations as the needs of society or sound corporate governance dictated.
The Legislature has wide powers to change and expand the power of
corporations. A corporation may exercise fully the powers conferred by the
Business Corporation Act, and is in no way inhibited by the rejected principles
set forth in Zabriskie.
Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
1081. 191 P.2d 689 (Wash. 1948), overruled by Seattle Trust & Sav. Bank v. McCarthy,
617 P.2d 1023,1027 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
1082. See id. at 693-94. The decision was based, in part, on the court's conclusion that
the right to straight voting constituted a vested right acquired before enactment of the
1933 statute and was therefore protected by the saving clause of that statute. See id
1083. The court said:
Even where there is no saving clause in the constitutional or legislative
reservation of power, the reserved power of the state to alter or amend charters
of existing corporations is not unlimited. The state may still not pass laws
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However, in Seattle Trust & Savings Bank v. McCarthy,1084 decided in
1980, it was held that a corporation organized in 1905 could avail
itself of a statute enacted in 1979 authorizing the elimination of
preemptive rights by charter amendment. Believing it "manifest that
flexibility is vital to the functioning and growth of corporations, as is
the democratic concept of majority rule,"'01° the court overruled
Perham, 80 embraced the expansive reading of the reserved power, 08
and rejected the contention that the preemptive right was vested and
therefore protected from divestment without the unanimous consent
of shareholders.1088
Alabama is a third state whose highest court changed from a
restrictive to an expansive reading-although purportedly on the
ground of a difference in the wording of the reserved power as
contained in that state's constitutions of 1875 and 1901.1089 In
Avondale Land Co. v. Shook,10n3 decided in 1911, it was held that
majority shareholders could not amend the corporate charter
pursuant to post-incorporation enabling legislation enacted under a
reserved power contained in the state's constitution of 1875. This
decision was based on a restrictive reading of the reserved power.1091
altering or amending charters of such corporations in such a way as will change
their fundamental character or impair the object of the grant or rights vested
thereunder, or in such way as will impair the contractual relations or rights of
stockholders among themselves or existing between them and the corporation.
Id. at 696.
1084. 617 P.2d 1023 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
1085. Id. at 1027.
1086. See id.; State ex reL Swanson v. Perham, 191 P.2d 689 (Wash. 1948), overruled by
McCarthy, 617 P.2d at 1027.
1087. The court, after referring to Kummert, supra note 943 (first paragraph), at 209-
12, stated:
As he said there, the majority of courts which have considered the problem have
found the reservation of the amendment power to be a part of the shareholder's
contract, with the result that the shareholder is deemed to have consented in
advance to the State's exercise of a power to amend the charter or to authorize
the corporation to do so.
McCarthy, 617 P.2d at 1026-27.
1088. The court did not consider that a vested right might be exempt from the impact of
an expansive reading of the reserved power. Rather, it appears to have taken the position
that the expansive reading prevented a right from becoming vested. See id. at 1027.
1089. Alabama's 1875 constitution provided: "All general laws and special acts passed
pursuant to this section [providing for the formation of corporations] may be altered,
amended or repealed." ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. XIV, § 1. Its 1901 constitution
provided: "The charter of any corporation shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal under general laws." ALA. CONsT. of 1901, art. XII, § 229.
1090. 54 So. 268 (Ala. 1911).
1091. In this case, when neither the corporation's charter nor the statute under which it
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In Randle v. Winona Coal Co.,lm decided ten years later, the court, in
upholding a charter amendment made by a corporation organized
after adoption of the state's 1901 constitution, appears to have
treated the case as one involving the reserved power question (even
though the enabling legislation had been enacted in 1919 and the
corporation was not organized until 1921). While the court (almost
incidentally) gave voice to an expansive reading of the reserved
power,1093 it did not disavow Avondale but, instead, seemed to
proceed on the ground that the reserved power contained in the 1901
constitution was broader than that in the constitution of 1875.1094
Then, in Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin,10 95 it was held that a
corporation organized in 1932 could avail itself of post-incorporation
legislation, enacted in 1951 pursuant to the reserved power contained
in the state's 1901 constitution, to effect a charter amendment that
eliminated the shareholders' common-law preemptive right. The
was organized (in 1884) contained any authorization for charter amendments, and
majority shareholders proposed to amend the charter (in 1909) pursuant to enabling
legislation enacted (in 1907) under a reserved power contained in the state constitution
(since 1875), the court concluded that the charter could not be amended over the
objection of minority shareholders. See id at 269-70. The court quoted with approval,
and based its decision on, the following excerpt from Cook's treatise:
"The extent of the power of the Legislature to amend a charter, where it
has reserved that power, is not yet fully settled, and is full of difficulties. There
is a strong tendency in the decisions, and a tendency which is deserving of the
highest commendation, to limit the power of the Legislature to amend a charter
under this reserved power. It should be restricted to those amendments only in
which the state has a public interest. Any attempt to use this power of
amendment for the purpose of authorizing a majority of the stockholders to force
upon the minority a material change in the enterprise is contrary to law and the
spirit of justice. Under such reserved power the Legislature has only that right
to amend the charter which it would have had in case the Dartmouth College
Case had decided that the federa' Constitution did not apply to corporate
charters. In fact, the historical oriCa of this reservation of the right to amend
was due to the effort of the various states of the Union to escape from the
decision in the Dartmouth College Case. By this reserved right the restraint of
the federal Constitution is done away with. But the power to make a new
contract for the stockholders is not thereby given to the Legislature. The
Legislature may repeal the charter, but cannot force a stockholder into a
contract against his will."
Id. at 270 (alterations in original) (quoting 2 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK § 501, at 1314-16 (6th ed. 1908),
with Cook's footnotes omitted and minor changes in capitalization).
1092. 89 So. 790 (Ala. 1921).
1093. See i. at 797 ("The Legislature may, under its reserved power, authorize
corporators or members to amend the corporate charter or articles in compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements." (citations omitted)).
1094. See id. at 798.
1095. 124 So. 2d 812, 820 (Ala. 1960).
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court embraced the expansive reading of the reserved power,t 96 and
it, too, placed emphasis on the difference in the 1875 and 1901
reservations of power.""9  Moreover, the court rejected the
complainants' contention that their preemptive right amounted to a
vested right, and it did so on the ground that its reading of the
reserved power precluded any such contention."98
(2) Flaw in Switching
But there was a problem in all of this. It appears to be accepted
doctrine that, when a contract (including a corporate charter) is
entered into, all existing laws that are relevant become part of that
contract.1m This includes not only applicable statutes"0 but also
1096. The court said:
Hence, when the stock held by appellees was issued the corporation's charter
and each certificate of stock contained, as effectually as if actually written
therein, the provision from [the 1901 constitution] that the charter of the
corporation "shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal under general
laws." In legal effect, this power to amend under general laws was consented to
by the stockholders when they purchased their stock. Consequently, the
exercise of this power by the corporation pursuant to general laws would not
impair the obligation of a contract. Any contractual rights the stockholders
might have acquired incident to their stock ownership were subject to the
condition that such rights could be changed in accordance with general laws
thereafter enacted by the legislature. In other words, the stockholders may be
said to have been put on notice that changes, such as here proposed, might later
be authorized by general laws.
Id. at 821 (quoting ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. XII, § 229).
1097. The court said:
It seems to us that one significant distinction between the reservations in
the two Constitutions is this: The power reserved in the 1875 Constitution
authorized the state, acting by and through the legislature, to alter, amend, or
repeal laws affecting corporations, in contrast to the additional reservation in
the 1901 Constitution that "the charter of any corporation shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal under general laws." Thus, the right of the
corporation to amend its charter so as to affect the contract relationship
between the corporation and its stockholders and the stockholders inter se was
not clearly reserved in the 1875 Constitution as we think it is in the 1901
Constitution.
Id. at 823 (quoting ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. XII, § 229).
1098. See id. at 823-24.
1099. See Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866) ("It is also
settled that the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and
where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly
referred to or incorporated in its terms."); McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige Ch. 102, 109
(N.Y. Ch. 1828) ("[A] general law of the state where the contract was made, and which
was in force at the making of such contract, is to be taken as a part of the contract.").
1100. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. In State ex reL Swanson v. Perham, 191
P.2d 689 (Wash. 1948), overruled by Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. McCarthy, 617 P.2d
1023, 1027 (Wash. 1980) (en bane), the court said:
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pertinent court decisions."" In a fairly recent decision of the
Supreme Court," °2 the doctrine was stated as follows:
The laws of the state in which a corporation is organized, whether such
laws be of constitutional or statutory origin, enter into and become a part of its
articles of incorporation. As expressed by the authorities, the charter of a
corporation organized under general law consists of its articles of incorporation,
the existing state constitution, the particular statute under which the corporation
is formed, and all other general laws applicable thereto.
Id. at 693; see also Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 64 A.2d 644, 647 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1949); Salt Lake Auto. Co. v. Keith-O'Brien Co., 143 P. 1015, 1017 (Utah 1914)
("That section [of the corporation statute under which the company was organized] is as
much a part of the articles of incorporation as though it were specifically referred to or set
forth at large therein.").
1101. Although it did not involve a charter contract, the case of Muhlker v. New York &
Harlem Railroad Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905), illustrates the point. In this case, it was held
that, when decisions of the state's highest court antedating plaintiff's 1888 acquisition of
real property in New York City had construed contracts of conveyance as according
easements of light and air to owners of land abutting city streets, it constituted a violation
of the Impairment Clause when the same court (reversing its earlier position) gave effect
to an 1892 statute making provision for operation of an elevated railroad over the street
fronting on plaintiff's property without making provision for compensation for the taking
of plaintiff's easement rights. See id at 570-71. The Court said:
When the plaintiff acquired his title those cases were the law of New York, and
assured to him that his easements of light and air were secured by contract as
expressed in those cases, and could not be taken from him without payment of
compensation.
And this is the ground of our decision. We are not called upon to discuss
the power or the limitations upon the power, of the courts of New York to
declare rules of property or change or modify their decisions, but only to decide
that such power cannot be exercised to take away rights which have been
acquired by contract and have come under the protection of the Constitution of
the United States. And we determine for ourselves the existence and extent of
such contract. This is a truism; and when there is a diversity of state decisions
the first in time may constitute the obligation of the contract and the measure of
rights under it. Hence the importance of the elevated railroad cases and the
doctrine they had pronounced when the plaintiff acquired his property.
Id.
There were other pronouncements by the Supreme Court to the effect that
interpretative decisions of state courts, existing at the time of the making of a contract,
entered into and formed a part of the terms of the contract. In Warburton v. White, 176
U.S. 484 (1900), the Court said:
[W]here it is asserted that a contract has been entered into on the faith of the
state laws, existing at the time when it was made, the construction of such laws,
which was settled at the time of the making of the contract, by the court of last
resort of the State, will be adopted and applied by this court in considering the
nature of the contract right relied upon.
Id. at 495; accord Eunis Water Works v. City of Ennis, 233 U.S. 652, 657-58 (1914); Great
S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1904); see also Jones v. Missouri-
Edison Elec. Co., 144 F. 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1906) ("The statutes, the charter and the by-
laws of the corporation, as well as the settled law of the land at the time he takes his
stock, are read into, and become a part of [a shareholder's] agreement.").
1102. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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The obligations of a contract long have been regarded
as including not only the express terms but also the
contemporaneous state law pertaining to interpretation and
enforcement. "This Court has said that 'the laws which
subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract,
and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part
of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in
its terms.'" This principle presumes that contracting parties
adopt the terms of their bargain in reliance on the law in
effect at the time the agreement is reached." 3
Under this doctrine, it would seem that, when a corporation was
organized in a given state, the resulting charter contract would
include, not only the pertinent provisions of that state's constitution
and its corporation statute including of course its reserved power
(whether contained in the constitution or the statute), but also any
existing judicial interpretation of the state's reserved power. And, if
prior to such incorporation a restrictive reading of the reserved
power had been adopted, the result would be a charter contract
providing that resort could not be had to the reserved power to
sustain a utilization by such corporation of permissive post-
incorporation legislation to effect a material change in the rights of
its shareholders."10
Applying this analysis, one would have to conclude that, while
there was a valid basis for sustaining the merger in Brundage v. New
Jersey Zinc Co. (namely, the presence of appraisal rights for
dissenters), the case was wrongly decided on the ground employed by
the court in reaching its decision. This case involved a 1966 long-
form merger of Zinc into its parent corporation, approved by the
two-thirds shareholder vote specified by the merger statute then in
effect. But Zinc had been organized in 1880-thirteen years after the
Zabriskie decision adopting New Jersey's restrictive reading of that
1103. Id. at 19-20 n.17 (citation omitted) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,429-30 (1934) (quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 535,550 (1866))).
1104. Gibson stated this concept as follows:
[New Jersey's] judges developed the view that a charter was a bundle of
contracts, first between the corporation and the state, second between the
corporation and its stockholders, and third among the stockholders themselves,
and that only the first of these was within the purpose of the reserved power to
amend. What this really meant was that for the purposes of a charter
amendment changing the relative participation of two classes, it was as if there
were no reserved power to amend, and the Dartmouth College case still bound
the future to the past.
Gibson, supra note 943, at 604 (footnote omitted).
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state's reserved power, 0 5 and thirteen years before the adoption of
New Jersey's first merger statute of general applicability."'
Plaintiffs sought to invalidate the merger on the ground that its
consummation required the unanimous consent of Zinc's
shareholders because, under the Zabriskie doctrine, the corporation
could not avail itself of permissive post-incorporation legislation
authorizing mergers with less than unanimous shareholder approval.
Instead of following New Jersey precedents and validating the
merger on the ground that the merger statute accorded appraisal
rights to dissenters," °7 the court elected to base its decision on the
reserved power and made this case the occasion for switching to an
expansive reading of that power. 108 But, if one accepts the thesis
embodied in the quotation from United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey
set forth above, 1°9 the court's analysis in Brundage was clearly
flawed: it was the law at the time of Zinc's 1880 incorporation that
one corporatioii could not be merged into another in the absence of
legislative authorization,"' 0 and no such authorization (applicable to
Zinc) then existed in New Jersey;"" it was also the law in New Jersey
at the time of Zinc's incorporation-as established by Zabriskie' 2 -
that the reserved power could not be extended "to giving a power to
one part of the corporators as against the other, which they did not
have before";" 3 and, because this reading of the reserved power
became part of the Zinc shareholders' charter contract protected by
the Impairment Clause from change," 4 it follows that there was no
1105. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
1106. See Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585, 593 (N.J. 1967) ("Zinc was
incorporated in 1880 before the passage of New Jersey's first merger enactment. That
enactment authorized the merger of corporations 'organized or to be organized under any
law or laws of this state.'" (quoting Act of Mar. 8, 1893, ch. 67, § 1, 1893 N.J. Laws 121,
121)); supra text accompanying notes 174-75 (describing the origins of this 1893 statute).
1107. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100 and 136-52.
1108. See Brundage, 226 A.2d at 593-96; supra text accompanying notes 1075-80
(discussing Brundage).
1109. See supra text accompanying notes 1102-03.
1110. See Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25, 39 (1863) ("The power of the
legislature to confer such authority [to merge and consolidate] cannot be questioned, and
without the authority, railroad corporations organized separately, could not merge and
consolidate their interests.").
1111. See supra note 1106 and accompanying text.
1112. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
1113. Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y. R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 186 (Ch. 1867), overruled
by Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585,594-95 (N.J. 1967).
1114. In Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907), the Court explained the
rationale of Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905) (see supra
note 1101 (first paragraph) (discussing Muhlker)), as follows:
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basis (aside from the right of appraisal) upon which to justify Zinc's
utilization of the post-incorporation statute authorizing mergers upon
a two-thirds shareholder vote. While the expansive reading of the
reserved power adopted by the Brundage court may-as a matter of
state law-be applicable to New Jersey corporations organized after
the date of that decision (January 23, 1967), the foregoing analysis
brings into question any effort to aPly Brundage's expansive reading
(absent a right of appraisal) to any New Jersey corporation organized
during the preceding hundred years (that is, since the 1867 decision in
Zabriskie).
The analysis would be different in the case of the switch to the
expansive reading of Washington's reserved power made in Seattle
Trust & Savings Bank v. McCarthy."" The reason is that State ex rel.
Swanson v. Perham,1'6 in which the restrictive reading was adopted,
was not decided until 1948; and, therefore, that reading could not
have been a part of the charter contract of the 1905 corporation
involved in McCarthy. The question remains, however, whether (in
the absence of a right of appraisal) Washington's new expansive
reading of the reserved power can be applied validly to a Washington
corporation organized between the 1948 decision in Perham and the
1980 decision in McCarthy.
The switch made in Alabama raises an interesting question for
Alabama corporations, organized after the 1911 decision in Shook
and before the 1921 decision in Randle or (possibly) the 1960 decision
in McGowin, m7 when and if they attempt to utilize post-
incorporation enabling legislation to alter rights of their shareholders
(in the absence of appraisal rights for dissenters).
When Muhlker acquired his title the elevated railroad cases had declared the
law of New York and it was here held that he had the right to rely upon his
contract as in them it had been interpreted.... This court, in order to obtain
jurisdiction and to declare that a Federal right was violated, was obliged to hold,
and did hold, that the two cases were identical, and that in deciding the Muhlker
case the Court of Appeals had in effect overruled the Elevated Railroad Cases
.... The theory upon which the Muhlker case stands and upon which it was put
in the opinion of the court, is that in deciding against Muhlker the state court
had overruled its own decisions, and changed the interpretation of the contract
upon which he had the right to rely.
Sauer, 206 U.S. at 555-56.
1115. 617 P.2d 1023 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see supra text accompanying notes 1084-88
(discussing McCarthy).
1116. 191 P.2d 689 (Wash. 1948), overruled by Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. McCarthy,
617 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); see supra text accompanying notes 1081-83
(discussing Perham).
1117. See supra text accompanying notes 1089-98.
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C. Appraisal Right Solution
The foregoing discussion concerning limitations on the utility of
the reserved power does not imply a necessary enshrinement of the
rule of unanimity. There is another-and better-means by which
the utilization of enabling legislation by pre-existing corporations can
be sustained. It is simply a matter of according appraisal rights to
dissenting shareholders.
Even in a state whose highest court had adopted an expansive
reading of the reserved power, a court (state or federal) could
nevertheless invalidate a fundamental change in the charter contract,
made under post-incorporation enabling legislation, by applying the
vested right doctrine." 8  If a state's highest court had adopted a
restrictive reading of the reserved power (and if it was recognized
that the public interest antidote was flawed"'), it followed that the
reserved power would not sustain a fundamental change in
shareholder rights made pursuant to permissive post-incorporation
legislation. In either case, some other basis was needed to avoid the
prohibition of the Impairment Clause and thus to sustain any change
so fundamental that the de minimis doctrine" ° would not be
applicable.
The needed basis was supplied when dissenting shareholders
were accorded a right of appraisal."' A statutory right of appraisal
avoided the Impairment Clause problem under either of two
rationales.
1. Alteration of Remedy Rationale
The first rationale, under which the granting of a statutory right
of appraisal for dissenters could sustain an alteration of minority
shareholders' contract rights pursuant to post-incorporation enabling
legislation, is based on the doctrine-recognized by the Supreme
1118. See supra text accompanying notes 1001-18 and 1028-37.
1119. See supra text accompanying notes 1064-72.
1120. See supra text accompanying notes 953-64.
1121. In Pratt v. South Pueblo Building & Loan Ass'n, 1 Colo. N.P. Dec. 171 (Dist. Ct.
1901), the question was whether a corporation organized in 1881 for a period of 20 years
could avail itself of post-incorporation enabling legislation (enacted in 1899 pursuant to a
reserved power) that authorized corporations to extend the period of their existence with
the approving vote of a majority of the outstanding stock. See id. at 173-74. The court,
having concluded that the reserved power must be given a restrictive reading, saw that
the only way to allow the majority shareholders to extend their corporation's existence
was to accord a right of appraisal to the complaining shareholder. See ia at 182; supra
note 1051 (discussing Pratt).
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Court in the nineteenth century112 and also in the twentieth
century"---that a state legislature could change the remedy for
enforcing a contract without impairing the obligation of such
contract.Il 4 In other words, if a shareholder was given the right to
receive the fair value of his stock in lieu of his right to veto or enjoin
a transaction that would be contrary to his charter contract, it could
then be said that there had been no impairment of the obligation of
his contract."12
1122. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 327-28 (1827) ("[A] great
variety of instances may readily be imagined, in which the legislature of a State might
alter, modify, or repeal existing remedies, and enact others in their stead without the
slightest ground for a supposition that the new law impaired the obligation of contracts.");
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819) ("The distinction between
the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that
obligation.... exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the
contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall
direct.").
The distinction between invalid alteration of the substantive terms of a contract and
valid changes in the remedy for its enforcement was discussed also in Von Hoffman v.
City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550-54 (1866), in which the Court said: "It is
competent for the States to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as
they may see fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby
impaired." Id. at 553; accord Read v. Frankfort Bank, 23 Me. 318, 321-22 (1843) ("A
remedy for a party may be changed or wholly taken away by the legislature without
contravening the constitution of the United States."); McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige Ch.
102, 108 (N.Y. Ch. 1828) ("The decision of the court in The Bank of Columbia v. Oakley
[17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819)] was only an assertion of the ... well settled principle of
constitutional law, that a state may pass a law materially altering the remedy of one of the
parties to a contract, although it cannot pass a law impairing the obligation thereof .... ).
1123. See Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S.
124, 128-31 (1937); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439 (1903),
followed in National Sur. Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co., 226 U.S. 276,283 (1912).
1124. The doctrine and cases are discussed in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 19-21 n.17 (1977), Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-34
(1934), and Woodbine Savings Bank v. Shriver, 236 N.W. 10, 12-13 (Iowa 1931).
For general discussion of this subject, see THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON
THE RULES WHIcH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTONAL LAW 643-64 (1857), and Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and
the Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 HARV. L. REv. 852,872-84 (1944).
1125. This is an appropriate place to consider the implications of a provision of New
Jersey's constitution. The provision, as it read in 1844 and continues to read today, is as
follows: "The Legislature shall not pass any.., law impairing the obligation of contracts,
or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the
contract was made." N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 3. The prohibition against any law
"depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract
was made" would seem to preclude, as a matter of New Jersey state law, any argument
that a statute impairing the obligation of a pre-existing contract could be sustained-
under the alteration of remedy rationale-by according a right of appraisal to dissenters.
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2. Eminent Domain Rationale
The second rationale is based on the doctrine that, when an
enabling statute accorded a right of appraisal to dissenting
shareholders, this constituted an exercise of the state's power of
eminent domain, and therefore a pre-existing corporation could
utilize such enabling legislation notwithstanding the Impairment
Clause. As had been the case in the nineteenth century, 26 this
continued to be accepted doctrine in New Jersey in the twentieth
century."m  Moreover, the doctrine found acceptance in a 1906
1126. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
1127. In New Jersey & Hudson River Railway & Ferry Co. v. American Electric Works,
81 A. 989 (N.J. 1911), a merger was effected, not pursuant to post-incorporation
legislation, but pursuant to the merger provisions of the act under which the merger
partners had been organized-merger provisions that accorded appraisal rights to
dissenters. See id. at 989-90. The court said:
It is, of course, familiar and well-settled law that a majority of the
stockholders of a corporation cannot effect a consolidation with another
corporation without unanimous consent, unless the right of consolidation has
been conferred by legislation that may be read into the contract of
incorporation. And on familiar principles a consolidation that is attempted to be
made in violation of the rights of minority stockholders may at their instance be
restrained by injunction, on the ground that it would violate their contract rights,
and thus, in effect, take their property without their consent. We may concede,
for the purposes of the argument, that the Legislature, in furtherance of a public
use, might authorize a consolidation to be made at the will of a majority of the
stockholders, notwithstanding the objection of the minority in interest, and
without previous legislative authority that could be read into the contract of
incorporation, provided provision were at the same time made for compensating
the dissenters. And we might in such a case regard the action of the majority as
amounting in effect to a taking of the property of the minority stockholders for
public use, and deal with it as strictly and technically as would be proper in the
case of proceedings taken to condemn the lands of an outside party for public
use.
Id. at 991 (citation omitted); see also Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp., 143 A. 729, 732 (N.J.
Ch. 1928), aff'd per curiam, 146 A. 916 (N.J. 1929) (referring to the right of appraisal as
"the statutory grant of eminent domain in this limited form"); infra note 1161 and
accompanying text (discussing the treatment of a statutory right of appraisal as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain).
In Group No. 23 of the Ass'n of the Sons of Poland v. Association of the Sons of
Poland, 187 A. 356 (N.J. 1936), in which a non-profit New Jersey corporation had been
organized (in 1911) under a statute (of 1898) that permitted mergers only with other
corporations organized under the same statute, it was held that complaining shareholders
could enjoin the New Jersey corporation from merging into a New York corporation
pursuant to a post-incorporation statute (enacted in 1932 under New Jersey's 1846
reserved power) that authorized non-profit corporations to merge with foreign
corporations. See id, at 356-58. The court based its holding, in part, on the fact that the
non-profit corporation statute, unlike the business corporation statute, accorded no right
of appraisal to persons dissenting from a merger. See U at 359. The court said:
"When complainants became members of the defendant and accepted its
certificate of insurance, a reciprocal relation arose between complainants and
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decision by the U.S. Supreme Court,112 in a 1927 opinion by the
highest court of Massachusetts, lm in a 1929 decision by Rhode
Island's highest court, 30 in a 1936 dictum by West Virginia's highest
court,"13 in a 1940 decision by New Hampshire's highest court,113' and
in twentieth-century commentaries."3 3 Additionally, a 1904 decision
defendant on the one hand, and between complainants and their fellow members
on the other hand.... In associating together under defendant's charter,
defendant's members became bound in equity to refrain from combining
together and, by a majority vote over the objection of a substantial minority,
take advantage of permissive legislation to merge, if thereby a material change
would result in the enterprise in which all had mutually agreed to embark and
the contracts or status of the minority would be impaired.
... When a corporation organized under our general corporation act
merges with another, its stockholders are not compelled to exchange their shares
for stock in the merged corporation or, in case of dissenting stockholders, to
accept what the merged corporation decides should be paid them. Dissenting
stockholders may apply to our courts for an appraisement to determine the full
value of their stock and to have such value paid them. But not so under the
terms of the proposed merger. Complainants will be compelled to become
members of the merged corporation ......
Id. at 358-59 (quoting affirmed opinion of court below) (citation omitted); see also In re
Paterson & Hudson River R.R. Co., 94 A.2d 657 (N.J. 1953) (treating a provision of
appraisal rights for dissenters as a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain); supra
text accompanying note 110 (discussing In re Paterson).
1128. Offield v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 203 U.S. 372 (1906),
involved a Connecticut statute authorizing any railroad company that acquired more than
three-fourths of the capital stock of another such corporation to purchase the minority
shares at their appraised value upon a finding by a judge that such purchase was for the
public interest. See id. at 376. Treating the taking of the minority shareholder's stock as
an exercise of the state's power of eminent domain, the Court rejected the plaintiff's
contention that the statute impaired his contract rights as a shareholder. See L at 378.
1129. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 159 N.E. 55, 67-68 (Mass. 1927).
1130. See Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co. v. Sabre, 146 A. 777, 784 (RI. 1929); infra
text accompanying notes 1185-86 (discussing Sabre).
1131. See Swan v. Barnes, 184 S.E. 257,259 (W. Va. 1936).
1132. Perkins v. New Hampshire Power Co., 11 A.2d 811 (N.H.), affd on reh'g, 13 A.2d
475 (N.H. 1940), involved a sale of assets by one utility company to another pursuant to
legislation that authorized such transfer and provided an appraisal right for dissenting
shareholders of the transferor. See id. at 812-13. The court viewed the granting of
appraisal rights to dissenters as a valid exercise of the state's power of eminent domain.
See I. at 812.
1133. In 1915, the state of the law was summarized as follows:
In England since Parliament is unhampered by any written constitution
and has full and complete control over the affairs of corporations it may
authorize the consolidation of corporations without regard to the consent of
their stockholders. In this country, however, as heretofore shown, the
organization of a corporation creates a contract between the stockholders of the
corporation, which is entitled to the protection of the provision of the federal
constitution prohibiting the several states from enacting any statute impairing
the obligation of contracts. The consolidation of one corporation with another is
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by the North Carolina Supreme Court applied this doctrine to
validate a corporate merger effected pursuant to post-incorporation
enabling legislation even though there was no reserved power in
effect when the merging corporation was organized.1134 And, as
recently as 1975, the Delaware Chancery Court said that "[tihe power
of a stockholder majority to override minority dissenters and remit
them to the cash appraisal remedy is 'analogous to the right of
eminent domain.' "1135
a fundamental change in the purposes of the constituent corporations; and it is a
general principle controlling consolidation that such action must receive the
assent of every stockholder in the consolidating bodies, unless the power to
consolidate has been conferred by legislation that may be read into the contract
of incorporation. However, it seems to be settled, according to the better view
at least, that under the power of eminent domain a state may authorize the
consolidation of quasi-public corporations without the assent of all of the
stockholders, upon making provision for the payment to dissenting stockholders
of the value of their stock. The title to this species of property is no more secure
against invasion, where the public use requires it, than is the ownership of real
estate under this paramount right in the public.
7 RULING CASE LAW § 140, at 165-66 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds.,
1915) (footnotes omitted). For a general discussion, see Annotation, Power to Condemn,
or Authorize the Condemnation of, Capital Stock of a Public Utility, 81 A.L.R. 1071
(1932).
1134. See Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 137 N.C. 107, 119-23,49 S.E. 96, 101-
02 (1904); supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing Spencer).
1135. Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 343 A.2d 629, 634 (Del.
Ch. 1975) (quoting FOLK, supra note 459, at 331). A similar statement had been made in
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940):
While [the right of dissatisfied shareholders] to dissent is admitted, the public
policy of the state declared by the [appraisal] statute, somewhat analogous to the
right of eminent domain, does not permit a dissenting shareholder, as against an
affirmative vote of two thirds, to veto a merger agreement if its terms are fair
and equitable in the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 338-39.
However, the lower court's decision in Meade v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 51
A.2d 313 (Del. Ch. 1947), affd, 58 A.2d 415 (Del. 1948), can be taken as a holding that
the statutory right of appraisal is not the equivalent of an exercise of the power of
eminent domain. In this appraisal proceeding following a merger, the lower court
rejected the shareholder's contention that he should receive interest on the appraisers'
award from the effective date of the merger because the right of appraisal is analogous to
the right of condemnation and, in a condemnation proceeding, interest is allowed (as a
part of just compensation) from the date of the taking. See id. at 315-20. The appellate
court sustained the denial of interest from the date of the merger, but it did .not discuss
the analogy of the right of appraisal to the right of condemnation in reaching its decision.
See Meade, 58 A.2d at 417-18.
Reference should be made to a statement by the lower court in the Meade case
(above). By way of dictum, the chancery court stated that "[a] merger statute
unaccompanied by an appraisal statute in favor of dissenters is not only constitutional (no
vested right being involved), but lawful action thereunder gives dissenters no cause of
action to recover the value of their shares." Meade, 51 A.2d at 317. However, it is clear,
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3. The Public Use Question
The argument has been made that the granting of a statutory
right of appraisal to shareholders dissenting from a corporate
transaction does not meet the eminent domain requirement that the
taking be for a "public use."113 6  However, most courts have
abandoned the notion that use by the public is required to sustain an
exercise of the power of eminent domain, and they have come to the
view that public advantage or benefit is sufficient.113 7 Moreover, it
has come to be recognized that a substantial public interest is served
by facilitating desirable corporate changes"" including corporate
from other passages in the opinion, that the court had in mind a pre-incorporation (rather
than a post-incorporation) merger statute. See id at 316-17. This point is underscored by
the court's citation of Mayfield v. Alton Railway, Gas & Electric Co., 65 N.E. 100 (Il1.
1902) (involving a merger effected pursuant to pre-incorporation enabling legislation).
See Meade, 51 A.2d at 317; supra note 28 (third paragraph) (discussing Mayfleld).
1136. For example, Levy states:
The suggestion is made that, if there is a provision for paying dissenters in
the proposed corporate plans or if they are given the right to demand payment,
the action under the amendment becomes less harsh and should lead the court to
permit the majority move "as a sort of eminent domain." The fallacy of this
argument seems to be the need to resort to the concept of eminent domain in
situations where no public enterprise or purpose is necessarily involved and
where the rule is therefore inapplicable.
Levy, supra note 332, at 424 n.18 (quoting Fuller, supra note 966, at 89); see also Spencer
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 137 N.C. 107, 129, 49 S.E. 96, 104 (1904) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the right of eminent domain cannot be invoked in favor of a
railroad consolidation because it does nothing for the good of the public).
1137. This position was arrived at by a New Jersey court more than a century and a half
ago in Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 726-30 (Ch. 1832) (holding
that the legislature could constitutionally grant the power of eminent domain to a
corporation whose purpose was to build a raceway to supply water power to others for use
in manufacturing, and considering it adequate that a "public benefit" be anticipated by
the legislature in granting the power). See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229,241 (1984) ("[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.").
The matter is discussed in the following: Lawrence Berger, The Public Use
Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978); Philip Nichols, Jr., The
Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615 (1940); and
Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE LJ. 599 (1949).
1138. In Pavis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928), the court
said:
Even conceding, if need be, that the power of amendment reserved by the
Legislature can extend only to those matters that are of public concern, yet it
does not follow that the amendment here under debate [authorizing a stock
reclassification] is to be condemned. This is for the reason that the problem of
financing corporate needs is so vital to the continuance in existence of
corporations created under the act, the matter of stock, its kinds, classifications
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combinations generally and mergers in particular." 9
Ill. TREATMENT OF POST-INCORPORATION ALTERATIONS IN
COMBINATION LAW
Having examined the differing ways in which the courts have
resorted to the reserved power solution or the appraisal right solution
in addressing-in other contexts-the issue of whether the
Impairment Clause of the Constitution prevents a corporation from
utilizing post-incorporation enabling legislation, the next matter to be
examined is how those solutions have been applied in the context of
post-incorporation statutes that either authorize new modes of
corporate combination or modify the requirements for effecting a
combination.
A. Post-Incorporation Authorization
One is not likely to find in a general corporation statute-even
an early one-any express prohibition against a corporation's being
and relative rights, is so intimately associated with that problem, that it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the character of the statutory regulations
defined by the Legislature for the meeting of that problem might very well be
regarded as affected with a public interest and concern.
Id. at 658.
1139. In Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A.2d 583 (Del. 1945), the court said:
At common law it was within the power of a single stockholder to prevent a
merger. It was when the idea became generally accepted that in the interest of
changing economic conditions mergers should be permitted despite the
opposition of minorities that statutes were enacted in many states, as in this
State, which took away from the individual stockholder, the power to defeat the
consolidation, and in return offered him compensation in money if he elected to
sever his connection with the corporation. Merger statutes are enacted, not in
aid of dissenting shareholders alone, but are as well in aid of majority
stockholders, and also in aid of the public welfare if the notion is not entirely
outmoded that healthy business corporations are in some degree conducive to
the general good.
Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
In Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 137 N.C. 107, 49 S.E. 96 (1904), a case
in which the court validated a merger effected pursuant to post-incorporation enabling
legislation (enacted without benefit of a reserved power) on the ground that the
legislation's provision of a right of appraisal for dissenting shareholders constituted a
valid exercise of the state's power of eminent domain, the court said: "We find no more
difficulty in holding that the condemnation of [the dissenting minority shareholder's]
stock is for a public use than did [the court in Raleigh & Gaston Railroad Co. v. Davis, 19
N.C. 451 (1837)] in finding that the railroad was originally constructed for such use."
Spencer, 137 N.C. at 125, 49 S.E. at 103. The Davis case, cited by the court, was the
seminal decision in North Carolina holding that the power of eminent domain could be
conferred by the legislature upon a private corporation for the purpose of acquiring land
needed to build a railroad. See Davis, 19 N.C. at 468-70.
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merged into another, against its selling all of its assets while
prosperous, or against a class of its stock being the subject of a share
exchange. This does not mean, however, that an unwilling
shareholder has no contractual right-protected under the
Impairment Clause-against consummation of such a transaction
pursuant to post-incorporation legislation. A shareholder may have
contractual rights with respect to what a corporation is not
authorized to do as well as rights relating to what it is empowered to
do.11
40
1. Decisions in Merger Cases
Because a merger-at least from the perspective of shareholders
of the disappearing corporation-clearly entailed a fundamental
change, there was the inevitable question whether a corporation
could constitutionally avail itself of post-incorporation legislation
authorizing mergers."4 Absent either a reserved power or a right of
appraisal, it was clear that the answer to this question was in the
negative. 42 Thus, the question was whether either a reserved power
or a right of appraisal was sufficient (or necessary) to remove from
1140. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
In Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., 138 A. 659 (NJ. Ch. 1927), involving
a merger, the court said:
[The cited cases], relied upon by the complainants, settled the law in this state,
that articles of incorporation constitute a contract between stockholders to
engage only in the enterprise stipulated to be undertaken, and for the
prosecution of which they contributed their capital for mutual gain, and that any
radical change in the object for which the corporation was formed, even by
legislative permission or mandate, violates the obligation of their contract.
Id. at 659-60.
In Central Railroad Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869), in which it was said that a
railroad corporation could not, without the consent of every shareholder, avail itself of
post-incorporation legislation to justify its purchase of a large block of stock in another
railroad corporation, the court pointed out (with respect to the argument that the post-
incorporation legislation authorized the purchase):
To this it may, in the first place, be replied, that any such power, though
expressly granted, does not bind any of the stockholders who do not consent to
it. Each stockholder has rights in the nature of contract, rights in the limitations,
as well as in the grants to the corporation, and even the Legislative will cannot,
under the Constitution of the United States, impair those contract rights by
making him, against his will, an adventurer in an enterprise not contemplated by
the original charter.
Id. at 632.
1141. The matter is discussed in Annotation, Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Relating to Consolidation, Merger, or Reorganization of Corporations as Applicable
Retrospectively to Corporation Previously Chartered, 131 A.L.R. 734 (1941).
1142. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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the prohibition of the Impairment Clause a utilization of enabling
merger legislation by a pre-existing corporation.
a. Nineteenth-Century Cases
While there were several nineteenth-century cases involving the
reserved power question in the context of corporate mergers, there
was little in the way of a pattern to their holdings.
Some of those cases looked in the direction of sustaining the
utilization of post-incorporation merger legislation on the basis of a
pre-incorporation reserved power. Thus, in an 1859 Connecticut
case, 43 the court validated the consolidation of a Connecticut
corporation with a corporation of Rhode Island on the ground that
the Connecticut legislature's subsequent ratification of the
consolidation constituted a valid exercise of the reserved power
contained in the Connecticut corporation's special-act charter. In an
1894 Massachusetts case,"" it was held that, because of a pre-
incorporation reserved power, a corporation could enter into a
consolidation upon receiving the approving vote of a majority in
interest of the shareholders as prescribed in post-incorporation
legislation authorizing such consolidation. Also, in an 1895
California case,1" 4 it was held, on the basis of an expansive reading of
the reserved power,""4 that a corporation could avail itself of a post-
incorporation statute authorizing consolidations with a less-than-
unanimous vote of shareholders.
Decisions in other early merger cases looked in a different
direction. In a federal case involving an Indiana corporation, decided
in 1866,1 41 the court (at the behest of a complaining shareholder)
enjoined the consummation of a consolidation pursuant to post-
incorporation legislation, the court noting that the enabling statute-
being permissive rather than mandatory-could be utilized by the
pre-existing corporation only with the consent of every shareholder,
notwithstanding the fact that the corporation's special-act charter
contained a reserved power to alter or amend. In an 1888 Kentucky
case, 148 it was held that the consolidation of two corporations could
1143. See Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289,296-99 (1859).
1144. See Hale v. Cheshire R.RL Co., 37 N.E. 307,307 (Mass. 1894).
1145. See Market St. Ry. Co. v. Hellman, 42 P. 225,229 (Cal. 1895).
1146. See supra note 80.
1147. See Mowrey v. Indianapolis & Cincinnati R.R Co., 17 F. Cas. 930,932-33 (C.C.D.
Ind. 1866) (No. 9891); infra notes 1299-1300 and accompanying text (discussing Mowrey).
1148. See Botts v. Simpsonville & Buck Creek Turnpike Co., 10 S.W. 134, 134-35 (Ky.
1888).
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be accomplished only with unanimous consent of the shareholders,
notwithstanding post-incorporation legislation authorizing such
transaction to be effected upon the approval of "a majority of the
stockholders of the two companies," and that such a consolidation
could not be effected even when the enabling legislation was enacted
pursuant to a reserved power unless it could be shown that the
complaining shareholders would not be harmed by the consolidation.
In none of these nineteenth-century merger cases did the
opinion refer to a statutory right of appraisal. Reference should be
made, however, to another nineteenth-century merger case, Lauman
v. Lebanon Valley Railroad Co.,"49 in which it was held (with no
reference in the opinion to any reserved power) that a merger
pursuant to post-incorporation legislation could not go forward
unless security was given for payment to the dissenting shareholder
of the value of his stock-a kind of judicially mandated right of
appraisal." 0
b. Twentieth-Century Cases
As indicated by the cases outlined below, 15' state courts in the
twentieth century have generally held that a corporation organized
prior to enactment of a merger statute could avail itself of the post-
incorporation legislation to effect a merger with the less-than-
unanimous shareholder vote specified in the enabling statute.'"
While all but the first of the outlined cases involved enabling merger
legislation enacted pursuant to a pre-incorporation reserved power, it
is interesting to note the degree to which the outcome in several of
the cases was influenced by the fact that the post-incorporation
enabling legislation accorded a right of appraisal to dissenters.15 3
1149. 30 Pa. 42 (1858).
1150. See id. at 49. This doctrine continued to be followed in Pennsylvania well into the
twentieth century. See Barnett v. Philadelphia Mkt. Co., 67 A. 912, 913 (Pa. 1907); Nice
Ball Bearing Co. v. Mortgage Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 166 A. 239,240 (Pa. 1933).
1151. The case of Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills Co., 75 S.E. 309 (Va. 1912), is
omitted from the outline because, while the merger involved in this case was effected
under legislation enacted in 1903 by a corporation organized in 1882, the 1903 merger
statute was held to be applicable (under the analysis of the court) by reason of a charter
amendment made in 1904 and a provision of the state constitution to the effect that any
corporation electing to make any amendment of its charter would be presumed thereby to
have agreed to subject itself to all applicable laws then in effect. See id. at 311.
1152. See Norton v. Union Traction Co., 110 N.E. 113, 118 (Ind. 1915) ("Where the
Legislature has reversed [sic reserved?] the right to alter or amend a corporation charter,
and, after its incorporation, authorizes a consolidation, it is held by the greater weight of
American authority that a dissenting stockholder may not prevent consolidation.").
1153. Even in Winfree, one of the factors alluded to by the court, in holding that a
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In 1904, in Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 1154 the
court upheld a merger pursuant to post-incorporation legislation
authorizing the merger to be effected upon approval by a majority
shareholder vote. The merger was validated even though the
corporation utilizing the enabling statute had been organized before
the state adopted its first reserved power. The reason for its
validation was that the enabling statute accorded the right of
appraisal to dissenting shareholders, which the court considered to be
a valid exercise of the state's power of eminent domain.155
In 1908, in Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 56 it was held (over the
protest of a minority shareholder seeking injunctive relief) that a
corporation could be merged into another, pursuant to post-
incorporation legislation, upon the two-thirds vote of shareholders
prescribed in the enabling legislation. While this result was based on
the existence of a pre-incorporation reservation of the power to alter
or repeal corporate charters,"11 the court also placed emphasis on the
fact that the enabling merger statute accorded the right of appraisal
to dissenting shareholders 58 (though it did not characterize this as an
corporation could avail itself of post-incorporation merger legislation, was the right of
appraisal accorded to dissenters by that legislation. See Winfree, 75 S.E. at 312. The
court said:
While under the provisions of [the enabling legislation] the Riverside
Cotton Mills Company had the right to consolidate with the Dan River Power &
Manufacturing Company by a majority vote, any stockholder of either
corporation who did not give his assent to such consolidation and was
dissatisfied therewith had the right to refuse to become a stockholder in the
consolidated corporation, and was entitled to receive from such consolidated
corporation the fair cash value of his stock as of the day before the vote for
consolidation was cast, and a summary remedy was provided for ascertaining the
value of such stock and to secure its payment to the dissenting stockholder.
Id.
1154. 137 N.C. 107,49 S.E. 96 (1904).
1155. See id. at 119-23, 49 S.E. at 101-02; supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text,
and note 1130 and accompanying text (discussing Spencer).
1156. 108 N.Y.S. 978 (App. Div.), affdper curiam, 84 N.E. 1111 (N.Y. 1908).
1157. See i at 980-81. On this point, the court relied (in part) on the decision in
Hinckley v. Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 95 N.Y.S. 357 (App. Div. 1905). See infra
text accompanying notes 1240-44 (discussing Hinckley).
1158. The court said:
Here the merger of the Equitable Trust Company, if the merger be
permitted to take place, will result in the extinction of that corporation, and the
transfer of its assets to the new corporation, but its property is not confiscated,
nor is the corporation deprived of vested property rights. The property is sold to
the merged corporation upon the terms provided in the merger agreement, and
ample provision is made under the statute authorizing the merger by which any
stockholder who is unwilling to assent to the terms can obtain the value of his
stock in cash. The act provides that any stockholder who does not agree to the
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exercise of the power of eminent domain).
In 1927, in Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co.,"59 when
a corporation (organized in 1890) sought to merge two other
corporations into itself pursuant to post-incorporation legislation
(enacted in 1925), authorizing such a merger with a two-thirds vote of
shareholders and providing an appraisal right for dissenters, minority
shareholders sought to enjoin the transaction on the ground that the
corporation could not avail itself of the post-incorporation legislation
(over the objection of the complainants) "because to do so would
impair the obligation of the corporations' contract with its
stockholders, and the undertaking inter sese of the stockholders, in
violation of the fundamental law."'1 60  The court denied the
injunction, in part on the ground that a merger does not impact on a
shareholder of the surviving corporation in the way that it does with
respect to a shareholder of the disappearing corporation, but
principally on the ground that the enabling statute provided
compensation to dissenters by way of the appraisal right in the nature
of an exercise of the power of eminent domain.1161
terms of the merger agreement may object to it and demand payment of his
stock, and, if not paid, he may apply to the Supreme Court for the appointment
of three appraisers to fix and determine the value of his stock, and the expenses
of such determination have to be borne by the corporation itself.
Colby, 108 N.Y.S. at 981.
1159. 138 A. 659 (NJ. Ch. 1927), af'd, 140 A. 321 (NJ. 1928).
1160. Id. at 659.
1161. The court said:
Kean v. Johnson, Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. Co., Black v. Delaware &
R Canal Co., and Mills v. Central K. Co., relied upon by the complainants,
settled the law in this state, that articles of incorporation constitute a contract
between stockholders to engage only in the enterprise stipulated to be
undertaken, and for the prosecution of which they contributed their capital for
mutual gain, and that any radical change in the object for which the corporation
was formed, even by legislative permission or mandate, violates the obligation of
their contract.... They are authority for the proposition that a majority of the
stockholders cannot alter their contract inter sese, though the Legislature
authorized it; i.e. that the reserve power of the state over corporate grants was
not intended to authorize a majority of stockholders to change the contract. The
doctrine is, of course, to be applied subject to the police power of the state, and
it has no place if the articles of incorporation or the statute under which
corporations come into being permit such changes. The power of the state,
however, under its reserve power, to alter or amend charters, in respect of the
contract created between the state and the corporation, is absolute, to protect the
rights of the public, carry into effect the original purposes of the grant, and to
promote the due administration of corporate affairs; and if, incidentally, injury
to stockholders ensues, they must submit under their implied contract with the
state to suffer it. The office of the reserve power, in our organic and statutory
law, is to safeguard the public interests in corporate grants, which without the
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In 1931, in Kirby v. Saginaw Hotels Co.,1162 the court denied
relief to a complaining shareholder who sought to set aside a
consolidation effected pursuant to post-incorporation enabling
legislation. The decision was based on the fact-of dubious
relevance-that the plaintiff had acquired her shares (from her
husband) after the enabling legislation had been enacted.1"
reservation would, under the rule in the Dartmouth College Case, be an
irrevocable contract.
Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted). The court said further:
The legislative expression predicates the Merger Act to be in the public
interest-peculiarly a legislative function-and also to be within the reserve
power over corporate contracts. The reserve power to repeal charters is
absolute. Every corporation accepts the corporate privilege with notice that it
may be withdrawn at the will of the Legislature. The extinction of a charter by
merger is nothing short of a repeal of the charter to a stockholder unwilling to go
along with the merger. As to him the merger is not an alteration or amendment
of the grant, but a complete destruction of it. Destroying, the state has a care
not to take away or destroy the stockholder's investment and safeguards it by
providing compensation by appraisal at fair value. With the compensation
provision present, there can be no longer any question as to the power of the
state under the reserve power to repeal, alter, or amend the charter of any
corporation in any respect, if the change be in the public interest.
This view was entertained by the New York Supreme Court, and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, in Colby v. Equitable Trust Co. It finds support in the
almost uniform legislative practice of the states, of providing compensation in
corporate consolidations, and in the approval by our Court of Appeals, as being
in the nature of an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Id. at 661 (citation omitted).
1162. 235 N.W. 153 (Mich. 1931).
1163. See id. at 153. Courts have differed on the question whether the contract rights of
a shareholder should be determined on the basis of the law in existence at the time of the
corporation's organization or at the time the shareholder acquired his shares. See John K.
McNulty, Corporations and the Intertemporal Conflict of Laws, 55 CAL. L. REV. 12, 31-32
n.65 (1967).
In Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 44 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1943), when
complaining shareholders attacked a merger, the court did not consider "whether the
correct rule is that stockholders take subject to such statutes as exist when they acquire
their stock or subject only to such as existed when the corporation issued the stock." Id.
at 36.
In Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 280 N.W. 688 (Wis. 1938), the court considered a
shareholder to be bound by statutes in effect at the time of his becoming a shareholder.
See id. at 692; accord Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corp. v. Martin, 91 N.W.2d 525, 530-31
(Mich. 1958); see also Luce, supra note 943, at 22-24 (arguing for the determination of
shareholders' rights as of the time they acquire their stock).
It would seem that the better rule is the one followed in Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co.,
112 A. 887 (NJ. 1921), in which the court said:
Because it appears in the present case that the complainant did not
acquire his shares of stock until after the passage of the [post-incorporation
enabling legislation], the contention of counsel of appellant [i.e., the corporation
that sought to avail itself of the enabling legislation] is that the complainant is
not in the position of a stockholder who had acquired his shares of stock before
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In 1940, in Bamett v. D.O. Martin Co.,1164 the court refused to
enjoin the merger of two corporations even though both had been
organized prior to enactment of the enabling merger statute. While
that statute accorded appraisal rights to dissenters,1165 the opinion
made no reference to that fact. Rather, the court's decision was
based on the fact that a power of amendment or repeal had been
reserved to the legislature prior to organization of the corporations
the act was passed, and therefore he must be considered as one whose "rights"
as a shareholder were fixed by the statute at the time he bought his stock.
It seems to us that to adopt the contention of counsel of appellant to the
effect that the "rights" of the stockholder are fixed at the time he purchased his
stock, and not by the original charter of the corporation, would be to lay down a
rule which would tend to inextricable confusion. There would be as many varied
and distinct rights of stockholders depending upon the time of purchase as there
were alterations in the charter affecting such rights.
A person proposing to buy stock could only properly protect himself
against imposition of terms not warranted by the original compact, by having a
sort of title search made to every stock certificate purchased. To impose such a
burden on stock would destroy its value in the business world. It would detract
from its negotiability. The sound rule must therefore be that the buyer of stock
whenever purchased comes into the original compact. He buys a share in that
compact as well as in the property.
Id. at 889; see also Loewenthal v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 28 A. 454,456 (N.J. Ch. 1894)
("Each new holder of stock by transfer becomes a party to the original contract between
the stockholders, and entitled to all its benefits.").
Schramm v. Done, 293 P. 931 (Or. 1930), involved a banking corporation organized,
with capital of $15,000, in 1907, at which time the state's constitution provided that
shareholders of all corporations would be liable for corporate indebtedness only to the
extent of the amount subscribed but unpaid on their stock. See id. at 931-32. In 1912, the
state constitution was amended to impose double liability on shareholders of banking
corporations for the benefit of bank depositors. See id. at 932. Thereafter, on three
occasions (1914, 1919, and 1924), there were stock increases aggregating $25,000--all
subscribed and fully paid. See id. at 931. The bank failed in 1926, and the superintendent
of banks proceeded to assess every shareholder an amount equal to the par value of the
shares held by such holder. See id. at 932. Because there was no reserved power in effect
when the corporation was organized (such a power not having been adopted by the
legislature until 1915), it was held that the original issue of stock could not be subjected to
the liability imposed by the post-incorporation constitutional amendment without
impairing the obligation of the subscription contracts in violation of the Impairment
Clause. See ad at 933-35. As to the stock issued in the 1914-1924 period, it was held that
the double liability could be imposed validly, because the 1912 amendment of the state
constitution became a part of the subscription contracts for the increases in stock. See Id.
at 935-36. The result of this decision was that there were two classes of the same stock-a
matter not addressed in this case but one alluded to in the case of Haberlach v. Tillamook
County Bank, 293 P. 927,930 (Or. 1930), decided by the same court on the same day.
1164. 11 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. 1940).
1165. See Act of Jan. 28, 1938, [no chapter number], § 20, 1937-38 Extra Session Ga.
Laws 214,233-35.
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involved." 6
In 1949, in Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co.,1167 the court
upheld a short-form cash-out merger effected pursuant to post-
incorporation enabling legislation, the merger having been
challenged by dissenting shareholders of the disappearing subsidiary.
While the opinion does not equate the statutory grant of appraisal
rights with an exercise of the state's power of eminent domain, it
does make clear that the availability of appraisal rights for dissenters
played a determinative role in the outcome of the case."15
In 1967, in Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co.,1169 the court refused
to set aside the merger of a subsidiary into its parent (upon a two-
thirds shareholder vote) even though the subsidiary had been
organized prior to enactment of legislation authorizing such a
merger. Because the post-incorporation enabling statute accorded a
right of appraisal to dissenters, the court could have proceeded on
the basis of the eminent domain analysis that the New Jersey courts
had applied from Black in 18731170 to Bingham in 1927.1171 Instead,
1166. The court said:
The authorities above referred to and the reasoning on which they are
based demonstrate, in our opinion, the correctness of the proposition that where
the reserved power existed at the time of their creation, the General Assembly
may authorize pre-existing corporations to merge or consolidate upon the
affirmative vote of less than all of the stockholders.
Barnett, 11 S.E.2d at 216; accord Baugh v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 281 S.E.2d 531, 532-
33 (Ga. 1981) (following Barnett).
1167. 87 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1949).
1168. After stating that the reserved power "authorizes the Legislature to make
appropriate non-confiscatory statutory provisions for mergers," il at 564, the court
continued as follows:
It is ... well settled that if the merger ... is duly consummated in accordance
with the statutes, the remedy of appraisal and payment is the only one available
to dissenting shareholders, and that such dissenters on such an appraisal are
entitled to receive fair and full compensation for all their rights.... In short, the
merged corporation's shareholder has only one real right; to have the value of
his holding protected, and that protection is given him by his right to an
appraisal.
Id. (citations omitted); accord Willcox v. Stem, 219 N.E.2d 401, 404 (N.Y. 1966) (stating,
in the context of an unsuccessful Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a short-form cash-
out merger, that "[s]o long as the value of petitioner's interest is compensable [by way of
the right of appraisal], he has no constitutionally protected right to continue as a
stockholder").
1169. 226 A.2d 585 (N.J. 1967); see supra text accompanying notes 1075-80 (discussing
Brundage). There is a discussion of this case in Neill G. McBryde, Comment,
Corporations-Reserved Powers and Fundamental Corporate Changes-Protection of
Minority Stockholders' Interests, 46 N.C. L. Rv. 931 (1968).
1170. See Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 24 N.J. Eq. 455 (1873); supra text
accompanying notes 96-100 (discussing Black).
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the court decided to disavow New Jersey's century-old Zabriskie
doctrine and to embrace an expansive reading of the state's reserved
power."u 2 Nonetheless, it did so "bearing in mind" (among other
things) "the broad appraisal rights afforded to dissenters" under the
statute.
In 1969, in Bove v. Community Hotel Corp.,1173 the court refused
to enjoin a proposed merger of a corporation into its newly created
wholly owned subsidiary, when the sole purpose of the merger was to
eliminate the parent's preferred stock and dividend arrearages
thereon, when such a recapitalization by charter amendment would
have required a unanimous vote of the preferred shareholders, and
the enabling merger statute (requiring a vote of two-thirds of the
shares of that class) was enacted after the parent's incorporation.
Noting that some courts had adopted a restrictive reading of the
reserved power while others had adopted an expansive reading,11 74
this court opted for the expansive reading to the effect that
"alterations [in the stockholder's contractual rights] are permitted by
the stockholder's contract into which the law reads the reserved
power to amend or repeal."'" 75
2. Decisions in Sale-of-Assets Cases
There has been a split in the decisions involving the validity of
sale-of-assets transactions effected pursuant to post-incorporation
legislation authorizing such transactions upon a favorable vote of
some specified majority of the shares of the selling corporation.
1171. See Bingham v. Savings Inv. & Trust Co., 138 A. 659 (N.J. Ch. 1927), affd, 140 A.
321 (N.J. 1928); supra text accompanying notes 1159-61 (discussing Bingham).
1172. The court said:
The power reserved in our organic and statutory law was broadly phrased
and broadly intended. It should liberally be viewed as part and parcel of the
tripartite arrangements between the State, the corporation and the stockholders,
and thus viewed, as permitting reasonable corporate charter amendments having
legitimate business ends. Under this approach there can be no question with
respect to the application here of the two-thirds vote provision of our present
merger statute, bearing in mind not only the broad appraisal rights afforded to
dissenters, but also the broad protection afforded to them under the settled and
continuing New Jersey doctrine that a merger, even though it complies
procedurally with the statutory requirements, must also satisfy basic equitable
requirements of good faith and fair treatment.
Brundage, 226 A.2d at 595-96 (citations omitted).
1173. 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969).
1174. See iL at 96; supra note 980 (quoting Bove).
1175. Bove, 249 A.2d at 97.
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a. Cases Not Permitting Sale or Lease of Assets Unless
Provision Made for Right of Appraisal
In New Jersey, as early as 1873, it was held that a corporation
could avail itself of post-incorporation legislation authorizing a lease
of all of its assets only when such enabling legislation accorded a right
of appraisal to dissenters." 76 And, in 1886, a New Jersey court
invalidated a 999-year lease of a railroad corporation's line to
another company because the post-incorporation enabling legislation,
though enacted pursuant to a pre-incorporation reserved power, gave
no right of appraisal to dissenters. u 77
This nineteenth-century doctrine continued to be followed in
New Jersey well into the twentieth century. In Allen v. Francisco
Sugar Co.,11 78 decided in 1921, the court-adhering to the restrictive
reading of the reserved power 79-refused to allow a corporation to
enter into a ten-year lease of practically all of its revenue-producing
property pursuant to a post-incorporation statute that authorized
such leases but made no provision for dissenters' appraisal rights."'
In In re Paterson & Hudson River Railroad Co.,"' decided in New
Jersey in 1953, it was held that a corporation (which had been
granted a perpetual charter in 1831 with no reservation of a power to
alter or repeal) could validly sell all of its assets to its parent
corporation because, even if action under the post-incorporation
enabling statute (which accorded appraisal rights to shareholders
dissenting from such a transaction) were to be considered an
impairment of the contractual rights of minority shareholders, such
impairment would not be unconstitutional for the reason that the
statute represented a valid exercise of the state's power of eminent
domain."l
This doctrine-that the validity of a corporation's utilization of
post-incorporation legislation authorizing a sale or lease of corporate
assets depended, not upon the question whether there was a pre-
1176. See Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 24 N.J. Eq. 455,468-73 (1873); supra
text accompanying notes 96-100 (discussing Black).
1177. See Mills v. Central R.R. Co., 2 A. 453, 454-55, 460 (N.J. Ch. 1886); supra notes
147-48 and accompanying text (discussing Mills).
1178. 112 A. 887 (NJ. 1921).
1179. See i at 889; supra note 1041 (third paragraph) (discussing Allen).
1180. See Allen, 112 A. at 888-89; Act of Mar. 24,1899, ch. 150, § 1,1899 NJ. Laws 334,
334; supra note 182 and accompanying text (quoting and discussing the statute).
1181. 94 A.2d 657 (NJ. 1953).
1182. See id. at 659-60; supra text accompanying note 110 (discussing In re Paterson &
Hudson River Railroad Co.).
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existing reservation of power to alter or amend, but upon the
question whether dissenters were accorded appraisal rights-was not
confined to New Jersey. In Dow v. Northern Railroad,"" a railroad
corporation, whose special-act charter (granted in 1844) contained a
reserved power of amendment or repeal, was enjoined-at the behest
of two minority shareholders-from carrying out a 99-year lease of its
property to another railroad company, when such lease had been
entered into pursuant to post-incorporation legislation (enacted in
1883) that authorized such leases to be made upon approval by a two-
thirds vote of stockholders but "contain[ed] no provision for the
compensation of dissenting stockholders."1' 4 In Narragansett Electric
Lighting Co. v. Sabre,"5 when a special-act charter authorized the
corporation to acquire all of the assets of another utility corporation
upon the approval of two-thirds of the outstanding stock of the
selling corporation and with appraisal rights accorded to the seller's
dissenting shareholders, it was held that the provision of appraisal
rights for the seller's dissenters constituted legislative authorization
of a taking by eminent domain with the result that there was no
violation of the Impairment Clause of the Constitution.118 6
The lesson of Dow"'1 was not overlooked in New Hampshire.
Two years after that 1887 decision, the statute authorizing a railroad
corporation to lease its property to another such corporation was
amended to provide appraisal rights for dissenters,"" and this change
was characterized by New Hampshire's highest court as an exercise
of the state's power of eminent domain.189 Nor did the teaching of
Mills in 1886111 go unnoticed in New Jersey. When that state, in
1893, authorized the leasing of property by one street railway
corporation to another, the statute included a provision according
appraisal rights to dissenters.119 On the other hand, it was the failure
1183. 36 A. 510 (N.H. 1887).
1184. Id. at 511.
1185. 146 A. 777 (R.I. 1929).
1186. See id. at 784; supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (citing and quoting cases
holding that exercise of the power of eminent domain does not violate the Impairment
Clause).
1187. See supra text accompanying notes 1183-84.
1188. See In re Laconia St. Ry., 52 A. 458,459 (N.H. 1902).
1189. See Perkins v. New Hampshire Power Co., 11 A.2d 811,812 (N.H.), affd on reh'g,
13 A.2d 475 (N.H. 1940); supra note 1128 (discussing Perkins).
1190. See Mills v. Central R.R. Co., 2 A. 453, 454-55, 460 (N.J. Ch. 1886); supra text
accompanying note 1177 (discussing Mills).
1191. See Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 114 F. 232,250-55 (C.C.D.NJ. 1902),
aff'd, 119 F. 871 (3d Cir. 1903).
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of New Jersey's 1899 leasing statute (applicable to corporations other
than railroad and canal companies) to make provision for appraisal
rights that led to the result in Allen."'
b. Cases Permitting Sale of Assets Under Expansive Reading
of Reserved Power
There were at least two cases-decided early in the twentieth
century-that took the different approach of validating a sale of
assets under post-incorporation enabling legislation simply on the
basis of an expansive reading of the reserved power. In Allen v. Ajax
Mining Co.,"93 the court refused to enjoin a proposed sale by a
prosperous corporation of all of its assets to another corporation,
when the only authorization for such sale was found in post-
incorporation legislation authorizing such transactions with the
approval of two-thirds of the outstanding stock. While the enabling
statute accorded appraisal rights to dissenters,"4 that was not the
basis of the decision; rather, the decision was based on an expansive
reading of a pre-incorporation reserved power." 95 Similarly, in
Germer v. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 96 it was held that a
corporation could sell all of its assets under the terms of a post-
incorporation enabling statute enacted pursuant to a pre-
incorporation reserved power. There was no mention in the decision
1192. See Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 112 A. 887, 888-89 (N.J. 1921); supra text
accompanying notes 1178-80 (discussing Allen).
1193. 77 P. 47 (Mont. 1904).
1194. See 1d. at 48.
1195. See id. at 48-50. The court said:
[Tihe plaintiff [minority shareholder], when he subscribed for stock in this
company, did so, charged with the full knowledge of the constitutional and
statutory provisions then existing, under which the Legislature might at any time
alter, amend, or repeal the provisions of the law which was made a part of its
charter; and he must therefore be treated as having given his tacit consent that
such changes might be made at any time as in the wisdom of the Legislature
might be necessary, and this as fully as if he had signified such consent by a
writing duly subscribed by himself.
It cannot be said, then, that the enforcement of the provisions of [the
post-incorporation statute authorizing a sale of assets] will impair the obligation
of any contract which the plaintiff entered into when he became a stockholder of
this company, for the reason that the reservation of this authority to alter,
amend, or repeal the law under which the company was organized became as
much a part of the law of its creation as any other provision respecting it, and
became a part of the charter, modifying what would otherwise have been an
absolute grant.
Id. at 49.
1196. 54 S.E. 509 (W. Va. 1906).
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of a right of appraisal; the outcome was based entirely on an
expansive reading of the reserved power.""
c. Special Problem That Arises Under Statutes of Delaware
As noted above, the current statutes of both New Jersey and
North Carolina provide appraisal rights for shareholders dissenting
from a sale-of-assets transaction 1 ---with exceptions 1 9 discussed
earlier.1m Delaware, on the other hand, has never provided a
statutory right of appraisal for shareholders dissenting from a sale-of-
assets transaction. 201
The question arises, therefore, whether a Delaware corporation
organized prior to 1917-when that state first enacted its sale-of-
assets legislation'S--could lawfully avail itself of such post-
incorporation enabling legislation." Two years before that
1197. See id. at 513. The court said:
When the Triple-State stock was subscribed for by the stockholders, they
did so charged with a full knowledge of the statutory provisions then existing
under which the Legislature might, at any time, alter, amend, or repeal the
provisions of the law which were made a part of the charter. The powers
reserved to the Legislature are plain and distinct, and any amendment or
alteration made subsequent to the formation of the corporation, and made
within the scope of the reserved powers, were written into the charter as
certainly as the restrictions and rights and powers of the stockholders and the
corporation itself existing at the time of the incorporation....
The broad reservation to the Legislature to "amend, alter or repeal" the
provisions of the statute under which corporations operate are as though written
into every charter issued thereunder, and every subscriber to the stock of any
such corporation is charged with full knowledge of the provisions of the law then
existing, under which the Legislature might, at any time, amend, alter, or repeal
the provisions of the law which were so made a part of the charter, and such
subscriber must be held to have given his consent that such change might at any
time be made by the Legislature. This being true, it cannot be claimed, with
good reason, that by such action the Legislature would be impairing the
obligation of any contract the subscriber entered into when he became a
stockholder.
Id. at 513.
119& See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(b) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted and discussed
supra in note 858 and accompanying text); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(3) (Supp. 1996)
(quoted and discussed supra in note 841 (first paragraph) and accompanying text).
1199. See supra text accompanying notes 841-42 (North Carolina) and 859-60 (New
Jersey).
1200. See supra text accompanying notes 773-76 and 884-85.
1201. See supra text accompanying notes 880-83.
1202. See supra notes 810-11 and accompanying text.
1203. This question was raised on appeal in Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 128 A.2d 225
(Del. 1956); however, the court declined to consider the question because it had not been
raised in the court below. See iU at 233.
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legislation was enacted, a Delaware court, in Butler v. New Keystone
Copper Co.,1' had said that, in the absence of charter or statutory
authorization, a prosperous corporation could not sell all of its assets
over the dissent of a single shareholder.125 Could this veto power be
taken away by applying Delaware's 1917 enabling statute to a pre-
existing corporation without violating the Impairment Clause of the
Constitution? The decisions in Allen v. Ajax Mining Co. 12 6 and
Germer v. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co.1m would answer this
question in the affirmative-on the ground that the reserved power
became part of the charter contract of all corporations organized
after reservation of the power and, therefore, no action taken under
enabling legislation enacted pursuant to that reserved power could
have the effect of unconstitutionally violating rights of shareholders
of corporations in existence at the time of enactment of such
legislation. But query whether this applies in the case of Delaware's
reserved power statute.
When the Delaware sale-of-assets statute was enacted in 1917,
that state's reserved power statute contained a provision that "this
Act and all amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter of
every such corporation except so far as the same are inapplicable and
inappropriate to the objects of such corporation. '' 1208 The obvious
question is whether a statutory amendment authorizing a corporation
to sell all of its assets upon approval by less than all of its
shareholders-something that could not be done in the absence of an
enabling statute-is "inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of
such corporation."m2 9
1204. 93 A. 380 (Del. Ch. 1915).
1205. See i at 383; supra notes 11 (first paragraph) (quoting Butler) and 810
(discussing Butler).
1206. 77 P. 47 (Mont. 1904); see supra notes 1193-95 and accompanying text (discussing
Allen).
1207. 54 S.E. 509 (W. Va. 1906); see supra notes 1196-97 and accompanying text
(discussing Germer).
1208. Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch. 167, § 140, 22 Del. Laws 286, 353; see supra note 53
(second and third paragraphs).
1209. In 1917, the Delaware corporation statute provided: "The Certificate of
Incorporation shall set forth: ... (3) The nature of the business, or objects or purposes
proposed to be transacted, promoted or carried on." DEL. REV. CODE § 1919 (1915).
The same provision (except for the comma after the word "business") appeared in
section 7 of the 1899 Delaware corporation statute. See supra note 251 (first paragraph).
It was not until Act of July 3,1967, ch. 50,56 Del. Laws 151, that the statute provided: "It
shall be sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the
purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations
may be organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware .... ." Id. sec. 1,
§ 102(a)(3), 56 Del. Laws at 153.
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In a number of cases, it has been held or stated that the reason
why (absent charter or statutory authorization) all of a prosperous
corporation's assets could not be sold over the dissent of a single
shareholder was that such a transaction would be contrary to
accomplishment of the objects of the corporation. 210  This truism
would seem to lead to the conclusion that Delaware's 1917 sale-of-
assets statute would be "inapplicable and inappropriate to the
objects" of a pre-existing corporation. And this, in turn, would seem
to mean that Delaware's reserved power would not (by itself) sustain
the utilization by a pre-1917 corporation of that post-incorporation
sale-of-assets legislation.
The lesson to be derived from this seems clear. Any Delaware
1210. In Kean v. Johnson, 9 NJ. Eq. 401 (Ch. 1853), the defendants argued that a sale
of the corporation's assets was valid, notwithstanding the dissent of minority
shareholders, because the corporation's charter provided that it "'shall be capable of
purchasing, holding and conveying any lands, tenements, goods and chattels whatever,
necessary and expedient to the objects of this incorporation.'" Id. at 417 (quoting the
charter). In rejecting this argument, the master said:
[Tihe whole argument falls by simply restating, in terms, the propositions
contained in the words cited. They are these: ... when it is necessary or
expedient to the objects of the incorporation that it should convey any particular
property, it can do so. So that it is only when the objects of the incorporation
require it that any lawful conveyance can be made. Can it be pretended that the
objects of the incorporation require that the necessary source of its profitable
existence should be sold and conveyed away?
Id. at 418.
In Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861), it was
held, as to the complaining shareholder, that the sale of a corporation's operating assets
for promissory notes was ultra vires. See id. at 588-93. The court said:
An act which, to all intents, terminates the corporation, by taking from it its
power to fulfill the purposes of its organization, is not consistent with the
purposes of its constitution. That which changes the nature and business of a
corporation from that for which it was created, does effectually destroy it for all
the purposes for which it was formed.
Id. at 592.
In Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921), the Court said:
The rule that owners of a majority of the stock may not authorize the sale
of all of the property of a going and not unprofitable company, rests upon the
principle that exercise of such power would defeat the implied contract among
the stockholders to pursue the purpose for which it was chartered.
Id. at 596.
In Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 120 A. 486 (Del. Ch. 1923), the
court said:
It is doubtless generally true of any going, money-making corporation that it
would be not to its best interests to sell all of its assets. Indeed, is not this the
consideration underlying the old rule ... that the assets of a going, prosperous
concern could not be sold except by the consent of all the stockholders?
Id. at 490.
CORPORATE COMBINATION LAW
corporation organized before 1917 should, prior to entering into a
sale-of-assets transaction, take steps to provide in its charter that
shareholders dissenting from such a transaction would have appraisal
rights.1211
3. Decisions in Share Exchange Cases
Reference has been made above to the relatively new share
exchange statutes of New Jersey and North Carolina. 2  Action
under those statutes could certainly affect shareholder rights, because
they enable one's fellow shareholders (through action by holders of
the prescribed majority of shares) to determine that one's stock is to
be disposed of regardless of the holder's wishes in the matter.
No case has been found on the question whether a dissenting
holder of shares of a class as to which a share exchange is attempted
could enjoin such transaction on the ground that the dissenter's class
of shares was outstanding prior to enactment of the share exchange
statute and that application of such statute to those shares would
unconstitutionally impair the obligation of his charter contract.
However, if there is validity to the appraisal right argument advanced
above, 3 the constitutional question would be disposed of by the fact
that the share exchange statutes of both states accord a right of
appraisal to dissenting shareholders.2 4
B. Post-Incorporation Changes in Requirements for Combinations
The twentieth-century changes in the requirements for effecting
a corporate combination have been outlined above under the
headings of director action, shareholder approval, permissible
consideration, and right of appraisal. Whenever a change in those
requirements could lead to an adverse alteration of the rights of a
shareholder, the question would arise whether permissive legislation
authorizing such a change could be utilized by a pre-existing
1211. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (1991) (quoted supra in note 766).
1212. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-9 (West Supp. 1997) (discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 920-25); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-02 (1990) (discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 926-33).
1213. See supra text accompanying notes 1121-39.
1214. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:11-1(2), 14A:11-2(5) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted
supra in note 925 (second paragraph)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(2) (Supp. 1996)
(quoted supra in note 932 (first paragraph)). However, for an exception in North
Carolina with respect to marketable shares, see Act of June 9, 1997, ch. 202, § 1 (effective
Oct. 1, 1997) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(c)) (quoted supra in note 759
(first paragraph)). It appears that, in a New Jersey share exchange, there is no denial of
appraisal rights with respect to marketable shares.
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corporation notwithstanding the Constitution's Impairment Clause.
1. Changes Concerning Director Action
As noted above, director action is a prerequisite for a
corporation to be merged into another1215 (except in the case of the
subsidiary involved in an upstream short-form merger1 2 6), for it to
sell all or substantially all of its assets, 21 7 or (in North Carolina) for a
class of its shares to be acquired in a share exchange.1218 As also
noted above, directors are normally subject to fiduciary duties when
acting on such transactions. 1219
The most significant change made in this context has been the
adoption of statutes authorizing the inclusion in corporate charters of
exculpatory provisions. 2 And the most far-reaching of those
statutes in the three subject states is the one now contained in North
Carolina's Business Corporation Act.1221 That, then, will be the focus
of attention in what follows.
If a person had become a minority shareholder of a North
Carolina corporation organized under that state's 1955 Business
Corporation Act (in effect from July 1, 1957, through June 30, 1990),
one of the terms of the shareholder's charter contract (embodying all
applicable statutes in effect at the time of incorporation) would have
been that "[o]fficers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its shareholders. '' 22m
Moreover, if such incorporation had occurred prior to October 1,
19 87 ,1i there would have been no statutory authorization for
1215. See supra text accompanying notes 390 (North Carolina), 392 (Delaware), and
394 (New Jersey).
1216. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 457); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-5.1(1) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note 482 (fast
paragraph)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-04(b) (1990) (as amended in 1997) (quoted supra
in note 496).
1217. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991) (quoted supra in note 813); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:10-11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in note 845); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-12-02(a) (1990) (quoted supra in note 826 (first paragraph)).
121& See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-02(a) (1990) (quoted supra in note 927 (fast
paragraph)).
1219. See supra text accompanying notes 405-32.
1220. See supra text accompanying notes 433-43.
1221. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 437).
1222. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 412-
13. Under then-established judicial doctrine, such "fiduciary relation" meant that
directors owed duties of both care and loyalty to the shareholders as well as to the
corporation. See supra text accompanying notes 414-15.
1223. This was the effective date of Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 626, § 1, 1987 N.C. Sess.
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inclusion in the corporate charter of an exculpatory provision
"eliminating the personal liability of each director arising out of an
action ... for monetary damages for breach of his duty as a
director."'" If, thereafter, such a provision were to be added to the
charter (pursuant to the 1987 enabling statute), not only would it
eliminate director liability for monetary damages for breach of duty
but, in the process, a basic deterrent to director wrongdoing would be
removed.
If those in control of the hypothetical North Carolina
corporation (organized between 1957 and 1987) should now propose
to amend the corporate charter to include such an exculpatory
provision, could the minority shareholder enjoin adoption of such an
amendment on the ground that action under this post-incorporation
legislation would violate the Impairment Clause of the Constitution?
This question would be especially pertinent in a situation in which the
directors were themselves the majority shareholders and therefore in
possession of the votes needed to approve the charter amendment.12
No case has been found on this point; however, if such a charter
amendment were about to be submitted to a shareholder vote with
no provision of an appraisal remedy for dissenters, 12 a shareholder
Laws 1113, 1113-the predecessor to section 55-2-02(b)(3) of the North Carolina General
Statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 437).
1224. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1989). This provision, derived from
the 1987 statute, was virtually the same as the comparable provision now contained in
section 55-2-02(b)(3). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in
note 437). The phrase "breach of his duty as a director" was changed to read "breach of
any duty as a director" when the new Business Corporation Act was enacted by Act of
June 8,1989, ch. 265, sec. 1, § 55-2-02(b)(3), 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566,576 (effective July
1, 1990). The phrase "personal liability of each director" was changed to read "personal
liability of any director" by Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 552, § 6, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2912,
2915 (effective Oct. 1,1993).
1225. See supra text accompanying note 443.
1226. The North Carolina statute permits a voluntary granting of appraisal rights. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(5) (Supp. 1996) (quoted supra in note 768 (first
paragraph)). However, the statute does not mandate a right of appraisal for the kind of
charter amendment now under consideration; it provides as follows:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 [the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act], a shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and
obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of, any of the
following corporate actions:
i4) *An amendment of the articles of incorporation that materially
and adversely affects rights in respect of a dissenter's shares because it (i)
alters or abolishes a preferential right of the shares; (ii) creates, alters, or
abolishes a right in respect of redemption, including a provision respecting a
sinking fund for the redemption or repurchase, of the shares; (iii) alters or
abolishes a preemptive right of the holder of the shares to acquire shares or
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opposed to the amendment should be able to bring suit in a state
court or a U.S. district court to enjoin consummation of the
amendment.122
2. Changes Concerning Shareholder Approval
As noted above, earlier statutes requiring a two-thirds vote of
shareholders to approve (in New Jersey and Delaware) a long-form
merger,1 " or (in North Carolina) a sale of assets, 912 9 have been
amended to require only a majority vote.12 3° If a pre-existing
corporation sought to avail itself of the amended statute when a vote
of only 60% of the shares supported a particular corporate
combination, could a complaining shareholder successfully enjoin
consummation of the transaction?
a. Under Restrictive Reading of Reserved Power
If this question arose in a state whose highest court had adopted
the restrictive reading of the state's reserved power, the complaining
shareholder would be able to obtain injunctive relief. There were
two nineteenth-century decisions in which the New Jersey courts
held-under that state's restrictive reading-that voting rights of
shareholders could not be altered pursuant to post-incorporation
legislation12- 3 Moreover, in Berger v. United States Steel Corp.12 32
other securities; (iv) excludes or limits the right of the shares to vote on any
matter, or to cumulate votes; (v) reduces the number of shares owned by
the shareholder to a fraction of a share if the fractional share so created is
to be acquired for cash under G.S. 55-6-04; or (vi) changes the corporation
into a nonprofit corporation or cooperative organization;
Id. § 55-13-02(a).
1227. Such a suit would bring into question the constitutional efficacy of the broad
provisions of the reserved powers contained in North Carolina's 1955 Business
Corporation Act. See supra note 969 (fourth paragraph).
The U.S. Code provides as follows: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution... of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
1228. For New Jersey, see supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text, and notes 557-58
and accompanying text. For Delaware, see supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text,
and notes 553-54 and accompanying text. As to North Carolina, see supra text
accompanying notes 299-301 and 565-66.
1229. See supra notes 824-25.
1230. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in text
accompanying notes 560-64) (as to mergers); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-02(e) (1990)
(quoted supra in note 826 (first paragraph)) (as to sale-of-assets transactions); supra text
accompanying notes 555-56 (Delaware as to mergers).
1231. See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
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decided in New Jersey in 1902, the court (while not required to
decide the question) clearly intimated that it would not give effect to
a provision of a post-incorporation statute prescribing a lesser
shareholder vote for a particular kind of corporate transaction. 3
During the period when the New Jersey courts resorted to the public
interest doctrine as an antidote to that state's restrictive reading of
the reserved power,'23 it was held in In re Collins-Doan Co.12 5 that
resort could be had to a post-incorporation statute (enacted in 1938)
authorizing dissolution of a deadlocked corporation when approved
by shareholders having half of the voting power, although the statute
in effect when the corporation was organized (in 1916) required a
two-thirds shareholder approval for dissolution.'2 6 However, once it
is recognized that the public interest doctrine is flawed, 7 only one
basis remains-where the restrictive reading of the reserved power
has been adopted-to sustain a change in shareholder voting
requirements by way of post-incorporation legislation. Only the
provision of a right of appraisal would sustain the corporation's
utilization of such post-incorporation legislation.128
1232. 53 A. 68 (NJ. 1902); see supra note 950 (first paragraph) (discussing Berger).
1233. The court said:
It is not necessary to discuss the validity of the provision of the [post-
incorporation] act of 1902 "that two-thirds in interest of each class of the
stockholders, present in person or by proxy, may authorize the retirement of
shares," which is a departure from the act of 1896 [which required approval by
two-thirds in interest of each class of the stockholders having voting powers,
rather than just two-thirds in interest of those present]. If that provision is
inimical to the supreme law, it is well settled in this court that it does not taint
the entire act. It may be rejected, and the remainder of the act will stand,
subject to be availed of when the proposed retirement receives the vote of
shareholders required by section 27 of the act of 1896, which it did receive in this
case.
Id. at75.
1234. See supra text accompanying notes 1058-66.
1235. 70 A.2d 159 (NJ. 1949).
1236. See id at 163-66. The two-thirds requirement in the pre-1916 statute is made
clear in the opinion of the court below. See In re Collins-Doan Co., 67 A.2d 353, 355 (N.J.
App. Div.), rev'd, 70 A.2d 159,167 (NJ. 1949).
The supreme court said: "If the [post-incorporation] statute has no efficacy here,
then it can have no practical utility or meaning. Such interposition is justifiable in the
public interest where, as here, corporate action cannot be had. Apart from other
considerations, the act constitutes legislative action within the cited reserved power." In
re Collins-Doan Co., 70 A.2d at 165.
1237. See supra text accompanying notes 1067-72.
1238. See supra text accompanying notes 1121-39.
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b. Under Expansive Reading of Reserved Power
The analysis would be different in a state whose highest court
had adopted the expansive reading of the reserved power. Such a
reading would mean that shareholder voting requirements could be
altered pursuant to post-incorporation legislation-unless, of course,
the vested right doctrine was interposed to preclude such a result.'29
The most pertinent case is'that of Hinckley v. Schwarzschild &
Sulzberger Co.12 ° In this case, a corporation had been organized in
1893 under a statute providing that "'[e]very domestic stock
corporation may have preferred and common stock ... if the
certificate of incorporation so provides or by the unanimous consent
of the stockholders.' "I" In 1901, the statute was amended to change
the requirement for shareholder approval from unanimous consent to
"'consent of the holders of record of two-thirds of the capital
stock.' "1242 The corporation proposed to issue preferred stock, and
the consent of the holders of more than 90% of the corporation's
outstanding stock (all common) was obtained. However, the
plaintiff-shareholder sought to enjoin consummation of the
transaction on the ground that the corporation could not (over his
objection) avail itself of the post-incorporation enabling statute. New
York's reserved power being applicable and that state having
previously adopted the expansive reading of that power, the court
correctly perceived that the only question requiring decision was
whether the voting requirement embodied in the statute at the time
of incorporation gave rise to a vested right.124 3 Expressing the wish
that it could rule otherwise but believing itself bound by what it
thought to be the weight of authority against the contention of the
1239. See supra text accompanying notes 1001-37; see also Bernhard von Falkenhausen,
Note, Corporations: Alteration of Voting Right by Amendment Faunce v. Boost Co., 15
NJ. Super. 534, 83 A.2d 649 (1951), 37 CORNELL L.Q. 768, 771-74 (1952) (discussing the
vested right doctrine in the context of voting rights); Note, Corporate Charter
Amendments and the Impairment of Voting Rights, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1368, 1369-71
(1941) (suggesting factors a court should consider when labeling voting rights as vested).
1240. 95 N.Y.S. 357 (App. Div. 1905), appeal dismissed, 86 N.E. 1125 (N.Y. 1908).
1241. Id at 358 (quoting Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 688, § 47, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1824,
1837).
1242. Id. (quoting Act of Apr. 16, 1901, ch. 354, § 1, 1901 N.Y. Laws 961, 969
(amending § 47)).
1243. After quoting a passage from Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900), indicating
that a reserved power would not sustain the abrogation of a vested right, see Id. at 52, the
Hinckley court said: "The case would therefore seem to be brought within the [reserved]
legislative power in every aspect, unless its enforcement upon corporations existing prior
to its passage can be said to interfere with contract or vested rights. If it does, then it
would not be authorized." Hinckley, 95 N.Y.S. at 361.
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plaintiff-shareholder, the court held that the corporation could avail
itself of the post-incorporation legislation.1"
A similar result was reached in French v. Cumberland Bank &
Trust Co.1US In this case, the plaintiff-shareholder owned slightly
more than 10% of the corporation's outstanding stock, which was
enough to enable him to elect one director under cumulative voting
(if cumulative voting was in effect). During the 1930s, as a
prerequisite to obtaining financing from the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation through the sale of voting preferred stock, the
corporation's charter had been amended to provide for cumulative
voting; and a state statute provided that " '[n]o corporation ... shall,
without the consent of ninety per centum in interest of the class or
classes of stockholders affected thereby, have the power to change
the voting rights ... of any stockholder.' "'" Thereafter, in 1952, a
statute was enacted authorizing elimination of the cumulative voting
provisions that had been adopted in connection with the RFC
financing, such elimination to be effected by way of a charter
amendment approved by vote of two-thirds in interest of the
stockholders; and such an amendment was approved by a vote of
83% of the outstanding stock of plaintiffs corporation. Not
unnaturally, the plaintiff contended that the 1952 statute was
unconstitutional and void as to him; however, on the basis of an
expansive reading of the reserved power, the court rejected his
contention.A 7
1244. See Hinckley, 95 N.Y.S. at 360, 365. It is regrettable that the appeal in this case
was dismissed on the ground "that the appellant had died and that no order of
substitution had been made within three months." Hinckley, 86 N.E. at 1125. Had the
appellant not died, the appellate court might well have applied the vested right doctrine
that was later applied in Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 291
N.Y.S. 932 (App. Div. 1936), aJfd per curiam, 7 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y. 1937). See supra text
accompanying notes 1004-05 (discussing Breslav).
1245. 74 S.E.2d 265 (Va. 1953).
1246. Id. at 270 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13-90 (Michie 1950)).
1247. The court said:
The General Assembly, by enactment of [the 1952 statute] has, it is true,
authorized cumulative voting for directors of the banks of the class named to be
abolished by the approval of 66-2/3% in interest of shares of stock instead of
90% in interest. But appellant [plaintiff] acquired and held his stock with full
knowledge that the voting rights of his shares of stock for directors might be
changed by general law, with or without his consent. Section 158 of the Virginia
Constitution provides that every corporation holds "its charter and franchises,
and all amendments thereof, under the provisions and subject to all the
requirements, terms and conditions of this Constitution and of any laws passed
in pursuance thereof, so far as the same may be applicable to such corporation."
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A third such case is Miller v. Magline, Inc.,2 involving a
Michigan corporation. At the time of the corporation's organization
in 1947, the state constitution limited the initial term of corporate
existence to thirty years and provided that such term could be
extended only upon the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds
of the outstanding shares. The constitutional limitations on the
duration of corporate life were eliminated in 1963; and a new
corporation statute, enacted in 1972, provided that a corporation
could amend its charter to change its duration by vote of a simple
majority of the outstanding shares. In 1975, the corporation's charter
was amended by a majority vote to extend the corporation's life to
perpetuity, with two minority shareholders-owning together 41% of
the outstanding shares-voting against the amendment. When the
minority shareholders challenged the corporate action, the court held
that, under the state's reserved power and notwithstanding the vested
right doctrine, the plaintiffs had not suffered an unconstitutional
impairment of a contractual right.1 49
In all three of these cases, the shareholdings of the complainants
were such that they could have vetoed the challenged transactions
under the voting requirements that were embodied in their charter
contracts prior to enactment of the post-incorporation enabling
legislation.210 Moreover, in none of these three cases was a right of
appraisal accorded to dissenting shareholders. It is difficult to
conceive of a situation in which a right is more "vested" than the
right-based on one's shareholdings-to veto a particular kind of
Id. at 269 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1902, § 158).
1248. 306 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
1249. The court concluded as follows:
The present case is distinguished by the nature of the expectation that has
allegedly been impaired. We do not characterize any belief the plaintiffs might
have had that the corporation would expire, absent a two-thirds vote for
extension, as a vested contractual right. The fact that plaintiffs initially had the
power to prevent extension by virtue of their substantial minority holdings does
not give rise to a right to have the corporation expire. The power of plaintiffs to
cast their votes in opposition to an amendment to extend the corporate
existence was continuously subject to the power of the Legislature to alter the
rights and privileges granted in the corporate charter. Plaintiffs have not
suffered an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual right.
Id.
1250. In Hinckley, see supra text accompanying notes 1240-44, a single share was
enough to defeat an action requiring "unanimous consent"; in French, see supra text
accompanying notes 1245-47, ownership of slightly more than 10% was enough to defeat
an action requiring "consent of ninety per centum in interest"; and in Miller, see supra
text accompanying notes 1248-49, ownership of 41% was enough to defeat an action
requiring "two-thirds of the outstanding shares."
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corporate action. And, given the many pronouncements by the
Supreme Court to the effect that a reserved power does not sustain
the abrogation of a vested right,' one would have to conclude that
these three cases were wrongly decided.
3. Changes in Permissible Consideration
If a corporation was organized under a corporation statute
whose provision for mergers permitted nothing but stock of the
surviving corporation to be used as merger consideration, 122 a
shareholder of such corporation would have reason to expect that, if
the corporation should become the disappearing corporation in a
merger, the holder at least would be assured of a continuing equity
interest in the combined enterprise resulting from the merger. If,
thereafter, the corporation statute was amended to permit the use of
cash as merger consideration," 3 the shareholder would face the
prospect of being cashed out if a move was made to merge his
corporation into a controlling corporation (or its subsidiary). If such
an effort were to be launched, the question would arise whether,
notwithstanding the Impairment Clause, those in control of the
corporation could avail themselves of the post-incorporation
enabling legislation.
This question was answered-if only incidentally-in Beloff v.
Consolidated Edison Co.,121 the earliest of the reported cases
involving a cash-out merger. Plaintiffs had become shareholders in
Brooklyn Edison in the 1920s, and no later than the mid-1930s more
than 99% of that company's stock had come to be owned by
Consolidated Edison. In 1936 and 1937, legislation was enacted
authorizing electric and other specified utility companies to effect a
short-form merger when a parent corporation had come to own 95%
or more of the stock of its subsidiary corporation. Pursuant to that
post-incorporation enabling legislation, Brooklyn Edison was merged
into Consolidated Edison, and the terms of the merger called for
payment by Consolidated of $135 in cash for each of the minority
shares of Brooklyn. Instead of pursuing their statutory right of
appraisal, plaintiffs challenged the validity of the merger on
constitutional grounds; but the court ruled against the plaintiffs and
1251. See supra note 971 and text accompanying notes 975-78.
1252. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (Delaware), and note 319 and
accompanying text (North Carolina).
1253. See supra text accompanying notes 322-23 (North Carolina), 592, and 595
(Delaware).
1254. 87 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1949).
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sustained the merger. While stating that New York's constitutional
reserved power authorized the legislature "to make appropriate non-
confiscatory statutory provisions for mergers," the court relied
heavily on the statutory right of appraisal, which it stated to be the
exclusive remedy.'215
The question was presented squarely in Coyne v. Park & Tilford
Distillers Corp.,1' 6 which also involved a short-form cash-out merger.
The plaintiffs had acquired their shares prior to the 1957 adoption of
Delaware's short-form merger statute, the earliest statute of that
state permitting cash to be used as consideration in a merger.12
Each of them contended that "[tlhe right to demand in a merger
conversion of his shares into other shares became vested, and no
subsequently enacted statute could destroy it."1258 While the short-
form merger statute gave appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders
of the subsidiary corporation,219 the court did not make this the
stated basis for its holding that the corporation could avail itself of
the post-incorporation legislation permitting the use of cash as
consideration in a short-form merger. Rather, the court cited Davis
v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.1 0 for the proposition that the state's
reserved power "authorize[s] the enactment of statutes changing the
rights of stockholders in respect of shares acquired prior to such
enactment."1' 1  Interestingly, however, when the court cited
"authority elsewhere in accord with the general rule of the Davis
case," the two cases cited were Bingham v. Savings Investment &
Trust Co. and Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co. 126 2 And, as pointed
1255. See id. at 564-65; supra notes 1167-68 and accompanying text (discussing Beloff).
1256. 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959).
1257. See supra text accompanying notes 460-62.
125& Coyne, 154 A.2d at 897.
1259. See supra text accompanying notes 469-70.
1260. 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928); see supra notes 970 (third paragraph) and 997 (first
paragraph) (discussing Davis).
1261. Coyne, 154 A.2d at 897.
1262. The court said:
Such provisions have been construed in our courts. They are held to
authorize the enactment of statutes changing the rights of stockholders in
respect of shares acquired prior to such enactment. Davis v. Louisville Gas &
Electric Co. We do not read the comments on the Davis case by the Supreme
Court in the Keller case as weakening its force. On the other hand, the broad
holding in the Keller case was certainly modified by the Havender case.
For authority elsewhere in accord with the general rule of the Davis case,
see Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co. and Beloff v. Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York.
Id. at 897-98 (citations omitted).
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out above, each of those cases made the availability of appraisal
rights the basis for permitting a corporation to avail itself of post-
incorporation merger legislation. 1263
Given the Supreme Court's view that the reserved power does
not sustain the abrogation of vested rights,' 4 this would seem an
ideal context in which to apply the doctrine. What right could be
more "vested" than the right not to be cashed out-by a controlling
shareholder acting under permissive post-incorporation legislation-
from a corporation in whose stock one has chosen to invest a portion
of his capital?
4. Changes in Right of Appraisal
When a corporation was organized under a general corporation
statute that accorded a right of appraisal to shareholders dissenting
from specified transactions, the provision concerning the appraisal
right became part of the charter contract.126 If subsequent legislation
took away the right of appraisal (as in Delaware in 1967,'1 in New
Jersey in 1968 and 1974,1267 and in North Carolina in 19971m) and a
corporation thereafter attempted, pursuant to a post-incorporation
enabling statute, to effect a transaction that previously would have
given rise to appraisal rights, two questions would emerge. First,
could the appraisal right-treated as a "vested" right-be validly
eliminated by post-incorporation legislation? Second, with no
appraisal right available for dissenters, could the corporation effect
the transaction in reliance on the post-incorporation enabling statute
notwithstanding the Impairment Clause?
1263. See supra notes 1159-61 and accompanying text (discussing Bingham), and notes
1167-68 and accompanying text (discussing Beloff).
1264. See supra note 971 and text accompanying notes 975-78.
1265. In In re Janssen Dairy Corp., 64 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1949), the
court said:
This [appraisal] proceeding flows from a contract between the parties. The
dissenting stockholders and the corporation by virtue of the statute made the
provisions for the appointment of appraisers, and their appraisement of the
stock, a matter of contractual obligation. This is because the provisions of the
statute became a part of the contract existing between the corporation and these
preferred stockholders at the time of the issuance of the preferred stock
involved in this matter.
Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
1266. See supra text accompanying notes 748 and 751-54.
1267. See supra text accompanying notes 749,755-57, and 761-62.
1268. See supra text accompanying notes 750 and 759-60.
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IV. QUESTIONS FOR SUPREME COURT
Only the U.S. Supreme Court can provide definitive answers to
the questions involved in the issue of whether there is a violation of
the Impairment Clause of the Constitution when shareholder rights
are altered adversely by corporate action taken pursuant to
permissive post-incorporation legislation.1269 The thesis of what
follows is that such an alteration of shareholder rights cannot be
sustained under the reserved power analysis but can and should be
sustained under the appraisal right analysis.
A. Court's Jurisdiction and Granting of Certiorari
For almost a century and a half, there has been a split among the
highest courts of various states over the question whether the
reserved power does or does not sustain a corporation's utilization of
permissive post-incorporation legislation in altering the rights of
shareholders. One of the most interesting aspects of this whole
subject is that the Supreme Court has never squarely resolved this
question.12 0
1269. The Supreme Court has addressed the Impairment Clause in several cases in
fairly recent years. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
502-06 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 187-94 (1983); Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 409-19 (1983); Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240-44, 250-51 (1978); United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14-17, 21-32 (1977); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497,
503-09 (1965). However, none of these cases involved any alteration of shareholder rights
or any reserved power to alter or repeal a corporate charter or corporation statute. For
discussion of these cases, see the following- Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, State
Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 611, 628.42 (1988);
Clarke, supra note 55, at 193-211, 238-55; Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of
the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 717-23, 735-40, 750-51 (1984); and Note, A
Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1639-51 (1980).
1270. This statement is made notwithstanding the case of Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n, 207 U.S. 310 (1907), and the following view expressed by the late Professor
Dodd:
The Supreme Court of the United States early adopted a liberal
construction of the reserved power with respect to compulsory amendments
even where the effect of such amendments was to change the internal structure
of the corporation rather than its relations with the outside public. It has now
taken a similar position with respect to statutes empowering the majority of the
stockholders or directors to amend. Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Assn. of
N.Y.
Dodd, supra note 966, at 156 n.33 (citations omitted).
With much respect for Professor Dodd, this writer (who was first exposed to
corporate law in Professor Dodd's classroom) takes a different view of the Court's
holding in Polk. While it is true that, in this case, a pre-existing insurance association was
allowed to take on for itself the expanded powers permitted by modernizing legislation,
the essence of the opinion was simply that no contract right of the complainants had been
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1. Restrictive Reading of Reserved Power
Adoption of the restrictive reading of the reserved power by a
state court led to a decision that charter rights of shareholders could
not be altered through utilization of permissive post-incorporation
legislation. Such a decision was based-implicitly if not explicitly-
on the view that, notwithstanding the reserved power, application of
such legislation in derogation of such rights would contravene the
Impairment Clause of the Constitution.
Until 1914, such a decision could not be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, because the enabling statute (as sought to be
applied) would have been invalidated.1 71 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as
it existed for some years prior to 1 98 8 ,1217 a state court decision that
invalidated a state statute on constitutional grounds was not
reviewable by the Supreme Court by way of appeal, 1273 but such a
impaired when the corporation availed itself of the post-incorporation enabling
legislation. As the Court said: "[I]t is impossible to say that any of the contract
obligations of the Association to the complainants have been impaired by the
reorganization." Polk, 207 U.S. at 324. And the Court said further: "[lit has been shown
that the contract rights of the complainant have not been affected by the
reincorporation." Id. at 327. Thus, the case can hardly be viewed as a holding by the
Court that, notwithstanding the Impairment Clause, contractual rights of shareholders
can be altered adversely pursuant to permissive post-incorporation legislation enacted
under a reserved power.
Cf. von Falkenhausen, supra note 1239, at 772 n.24 ("The United States Supreme
Court has yet to conclusively adopt one or the other [narrow or liberal] interpretation [of
the reserved power].").
1271. Wright explains:
From 1789 to 1914 the jurisdiction [of the Supreme Court] over state courts was
limited to cases in which the state court had held some federal act invalid, or had
upheld the validity of a state act against a claim based on the federal
Constitution or laws. The Supreme Court could not review a state-court
decision that upheld the federal claim and found a state act invalid.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 779 (5th ed. 1994).
1272. Prior to 1988, the U.S. Code provided as follows:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
follows:
i2i By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of
any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution ... of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari.... where the validity of a State statute is
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution
... of the United States ....
Former 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
1273. See id. § 1257(2).
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decision could be reviewed (and reversed) by that Court by way of a
writ of certiorari.1274 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) as it exists today,
such a decision can still be reviewed via the certiorari route lz75
However, the granting of a writ of certiorari may be less likely in a
case in which a state statute has been invalidated than in a case in
which a state statute has been upheld.2 76
2. Expansive Reading of Reserved Power
Adoption of the expansive reading of the reserved power by a
state court led to a decision that charter rights of shareholders could
be altered through utilization of permissive post-incorporation
legislation. Such a decision was based-implicitly if not explicitly-
on the view that, because of the reserved power, application of such
legislation in derogation of such rights would not contravene the
Impairment Clause of the Constitution.
It seems clear that the Supreme Court today would have
jurisdiction to review (not by appeal but by writ of certiorari) a
decision by a state's highest court adopting the expansive reading of
the reserved power.lrn The complaining shareholder would be
contending that a contractual right (derived from terms of the
corporate charter, including applicable provisions of the corporation
law under which the corporation had been organized) was being
1274. In Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941), on a writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed a decision by New York's highest court that had held a state
statute, as applied to mortgage contracts previously made, to be violative of the
Impairment Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 228-29, 234-36. The effect of the
statute was to lessen the rights of mortgagees and to enlarge the rights of mortgagors with
respect to the measure of deficiency judgments following foreclosure sales. See 1L at 230-
31. The Court stated that it had granted the petition for certiorari "because of the
important constitutional question which was raised." Id. at 229; see also Voeller v.
Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941) (reversing, on a writ of certiorari, a decision
by Ohio's highest court that had invalidated a state appraisal statute on the ground that it
constituted a denial of procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
1275. Currently, the U.S. Code provides as follows:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ
of certiorari ... where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution ... of the United
States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994).
1276. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 697 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[A]lthough this Court now has the power to review decisions defending federal
constitutional rights, the claim of these cases on our docket is secondary to the need to
scrutinize judgments disparaging those rights.").
1277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994) (quoted supra in note 1275).
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abrogated through the corporation's utilization of a post-
incorporation enabling statute and that such abrogation constituted
an unconstitutional impairment notwithstanding the reserved
power-thereby drawing into question the validity of the enabling
statute (as applied by the state court decision) on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Impairment Clause of the Constitution.
Moreover, such a case would seem to be a prime candidate for a
writ of certiorari under the Supreme Court's Rule 10.278 The
question whether a reserved power can or cannot free a state
legislature from the prohibition of the Impairment Clause-when it
comes to permissive legislation authorizing a specified majority to
alter shareholder rights, as distinguished from mandatory legislation
regulating corporate behavior in the public interest-is surely "an
important federal question." Moreover, as this Article makes clear,
courts of last resort in various states have arrived at conflicting
answers to this question; and, now that the state courts have wrestled
with it-inconsistently and inconclusively-for almost a century and
a half, surely the question is one that should be settled by the
Supreme Court.1279
1278. That Rule provides as follows:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling
reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the
Court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of
last resort... ;
(c) a state court ... has decided an important question of federal law
that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of
this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law.
Sup. Cr. R. 10.
1279. In Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1877), the Court said:
There is no more important provision in the Federal Constitution than the
one which prohibits States from passing laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, and it is one of the highest duties of this court to take care the
prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frittered away. Complete effect must be
given to it in all its spirit. The inviolability of contracts, and the duty of
performing them, as made, are foundations of all well-ordered society, and to
prevent the removal or disturbance of these foundations was one of the great
objects for which the Constitution was framed.
Id. at 448-49.
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B. Constitutional Invalidity of Expansive Reading
The case most likely to be reviewed by the Supreme Court is one
in which a state's highest court has applied an expansive reading of
the state's reserved power to validate the utilization of permissive
post-incorporation legislation whereby charter rights of minority
shareholders have been materially altered through an action taken by
a specified shareholder majority.1 m Such a case would present the
question whether a state can constitutionally reserve to its legislature
the power to enact a subsequent statute that authorizes some of the
parties to a private contract-already in existence (under the
corporate charter) at the time of the statute's enactment-to alter the
rights of other parties to that contract without their assent.,,'
1. Reasons for Invalidity
The thrust of the Supreme Court's reserved power
jurisprudence1m is summarized in Coombes v. Getz1m to the effect
that "neither vested property rights nor the obligation of contracts of
third persons may be destroyed or impaired" in reliance on a
reserved power.12 It is against this backdrop that one should
1280. Normally, a minority shareholder would be the one complaining about an
impairment of rights resulting from an expansive reading of the reserved power.
However, in some circumstances, a corporation might have occasion to complain about
the effect of such a reading. The case of Schroeter v. Bartlett Syndicate Building Corp., 63
P.2d 824 (Cal. 1936), involved this unusual twist. When the corporation was organized,
the statute permitted directors to levy assessments on stock, but this statute was later
amended to permit such assessments only to the extent authorized by a corporation's
charter. See id, at 825. Thereafter, plaintiff's stock was assessed even though the
corporate charter did not then authorize such an assessment. See id, When plaintiff
recovered the amount of the assessment, the corporation appealed, contending that the
Impairment Clause precluded application of the post-incorporation legislation. See Ud
However, the court-on the basis of a pre-incorporation reserved power-held the post-
incorporation legislation to be applicable and affirmed the lower court's judgment in
plaintiff's favor. See idU at 825-26. Thus, this was a case in which an expansive reading of
the reserved power was applied to uphold a statute giving a shareholder a right not
previously enjoyed and depriving the corporation of a power previously held. See id.; see
also In re Adair v. Orrell's Mut. Burial Ass'n, 284 N.C. 534, 537-41, 201 S.E.2d 905, 907-
10 (1974) (employing an expansive reading of the reserved power to validate a post-
incorporation statute that imposed new requirements on a corporation and enlarged the
rights of its members).
1281. The question almost answers itself. It is tantamount to asking whether a state can
reserve the power to violate the Impairment Clause.
1282. See supra note 971 (citing and quoting cases setting forth the Supreme Court's
view of the reserved power).
1283. 285 U.S. 434 (1932); see supra note 1030 (discussing Coombes).
1284. Coombes, 285 U.S. at 442; see supra note 971 (seventh paragraph) (quoting in full
the relevant passage from Coombes).
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examine the constitutional validity of the expansive reading of the
reserved power.
Since the decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,m it has come to be accepted doctrine that a corporate
charter, in addition to being a contract between the state and a
corporation, is a contract between the corporation and its
shareholders and also a contract among the shareholders." 6 Under
these latter two aspects of the charter contract, there are numerous
rights that a shareholder derives upon investing in the stock of a
corporation.1  These are clearly contractual rights,lm and they arise
from private contracts-the one between the corporation and its
shareholders and the one among the shareholders. While the Story
dicta in the Dartmouth College case provide the basis for a state to
reserve the power to amend the charter contract between the state
and a corporation organized under its laws,'2 9 there appears to be no
basis on which a state can reserve the power to amend (or to
authorize a shareholder majority to amend) private contracts
between parties other than the state.129 Despite authority to the
1285. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see supra text accompanying notes 33-35
(discussing Dartmouth College).
1286. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
1287. Rights derived from provisions of the statute under which a corporation was
organized stand on the same footing as rights arising from terms of the corporation's
articles of incorporation. See Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 127 P. 464,
466 (Mont. 1912).
1288. See In re Janssen Dairy Corp., 64 A.2d 652, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1949)
(quoted supra in note 1265); Calvert v. Capital Southwest Corp., 441 S.W.2d 247, 255
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (quoted supra in note 38 (first paragraph)); Swan v. Barnes, 184
S.E. 257,259 (W. Va. 1936) (quoted supra in note 974).
1289. The reason why a state-acting under its reserved power-can validly enact post-
incorporation legislation, altering terms of the charter contract existing between the state
and a corporation organized under its laws, is that the state is a party to that contract and
(by reason of the reserved power incorporated therein) is authorized to make unilateral
changes in its terms.
1290. This, of course, was the nub of the restrictive reading of the reserved power-
voiced in many state court decisions. In Snook v. Georgia Improvement Co., 9 S.E. 1104
(Ga. 1889), the court said:
It is also held that the charter of a corporation is a contract of a dual
character,-First, a contract between the state which grants the charter and the
corporation; and, secondly, a contract between the corporation and its members;
and while the state, if it reserves the power to do so, can alter and amend the
charter, and the corporation itself cannot object to the alteration or amendment,
yet the state has no power to make any material or essential alteration in the
contract between the members themselves and the corporation.
Id. at 1105 (quoted more fully supra in note 90); accord McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond &
Mortgage Co., 147 S.E. 102, 103-04 (Ga. 1929) ("[W]hile the state, in its reserved power
to do so, can alter and amend the charter, and the corporation itself cannot object to the
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contrary,1291 it would seem appropriate-on the basis of both fact and
alteration, even the state has no power to make any material or essential alteration in the
contract between the members themselves and the corporation.") (quoted more fully
supra in note 1049); see also Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 112 A. 887, 889 (N.J. 1921)
("Nor does [the reserved power] authorize the state to authorize one part of the
stockholders, for their own benefit, at their mere option, to change their contract with the
other part.... .. ") (quoted more fully supra in note 1041 (third paragraph)). In Garey v.
SL Joe Mining Co., 91 P. 369 (Utah 1907), the court said:
[Tlhe right [of amendment or alteration of the charter] is reserved for the
benefit of the state and of the public and for public purposes. The power can
only be exercised to the extent that the state is interested. It can alter or modify
any right, privilege, or immunity granted by it. It cannot, however, reach out
and impair the obligations of contracts existing between the corporation and its
members, or among the corporators themselves, any more than it can impair the
obligations of contracts existing between other individuals.
Id. at 374 (quoted more fully supra in note 1052); accord Wheatley v. A.I. Root Co., 69
N.E.2d 187, 195 (Ohio 1946) (" 'Such power is not reserved in any sense for the benefit of
the corporation, or of a majority of the stockholders, upon any idea that the Legislature
can alter the contract between the corporation and its stockholders, nor for the purpose of
enabling it to do so.'" (quoting 13 FLETCHER, supra note 1053, § 5776, at 87)) (quoted
more fully supra in note 1053 (first paragraph)); Yukon Mill & Grain Co. v. Vose, 206
P.2d 206, 209 (Okla. 1949) ("[T]he reservation of power to amend corporate charters is
applicable only to those features of the contract affected with public interest, and the
private rights of the stockholder as against the corporation or his fellow stockholders are
protected from alteration by the inhibition against the impairment of contracts.") (quoted
more fully supra in note 1054); Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 87 A.2d 227, 232 (Pa. 1952)
("[The reserved power] can properly be exercised only to amend a charter so far as it
represents a contract between the corporation and the State, and not in respects as to
which it constitutes a contract between the corporation and the shareholders or between
the shareholders themselves.") (quoted more fully supra in note 1055).
In Yoalcam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533 (D.R.I. 1929), the court
said:
The state has no power to impair the obligation of contracts to which it is not a
party. No reservation, however artfully worded, can give it that power.
Ia state were to pass an act reserving the right to alter or amend all
contracts subsequently entered into, whether between individuals or
corporations, would any one seriously urge its validity? Could a state by its own
act invalidate the clear intendment of article 1, § 10, of the Constitution, by the
theoretical reasoning that all contracts thereafter would be made with this
reservation read into them as a term and condition, and would not, therefore, be
impaired?
Id. at 545,546; see supra notes 1036-37 and infra note 1305 (quoting other portions of the
Yoakam decision). The point was made as follows in the dissenting opinion in Miller v.
State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478 (1872):
Whilst the legislature may reserve the right to revoke or change its own grant of
chartered rights, it cannot reserve a right to invalidate contracts between third
parties; as that would enable it to reserve the right to impair the validity of all
contracts, and thus evade the inhibition of the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 499 (Bradley, J., dissenting), quoted with approval in Yoakam, 34 F.2d at 545.
1291. In Schroeter v. Bartlett Syndicate Building Corp., 63 P.2d 824 (Cal. 1936),
involving post-incorporation legislation enacted under a reserved power, the court, after
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logic-to consider shareholders as third persons and to treat the
shareholder rights arising under the private aspects of a charter
contract as "the obligation of contracts of third persons" which,
according to Coombes v. Getz, may not be impaired in reliance on a
reserved power. 12 Because the expansive reading of the reserved
power says that these private contract rights of shareholders can be
abrogated pursuant to permissive post-incorporation legislation, it
follows that that reading of the power is constitutionally
impermissible.
Not only are the shareholder rights arising from the corporate
charter contractual in nature, they are also vested rights.1293
Moreover, it is appropriate to describe them as property rights. 29"
quoting from Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441-42 (1932), made the following
pronouncement: "The legislative change here considered affects only the interrelations
of the corporation and its stockholders. No rights of third persons are involved."
Schroeter, 63 P.2d at 826.
In Stockholders v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175 (1937), the Court affirmed the application to
shareholders of a Maryland banking corporation (organized on January 24, 1910) of a
post-incorporation statute of that state, enacted (on June 1, 1910) pursuant to a reserved
power contained in the banking statute of 1870 under which the corporation was
organized, specifying a new remedy for the enforcement of the liability of shareholders
(imposed by the Maryland Constitution of 1867 and by the banking statute of 1870) for
the debts of any banking corporation to the amount of their respective shares of stock in
such corporation. See id. at 178-84. When appellants relied upon the passage from
Coombs v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441-42 (1932), to the effect that "neither vested property
rights nor the obligation of contracts of third persons may be destroyed or impaired" in
reliance on a reserved power, the Sterling Court noted that Coombes involved a complaint
by creditors, see Sterling, 300 U.S. at 184, and stated that "[t]he complaint comes to us
from stockholders, who took their stock with notice that the remedies against them might
be changed from time to time." Id. at 185. To this statement, the Court added a footnote
quoting the passage from Coombes with the words "of third persons" italicized. Id. at n.*.
That italicization can certainly be taken as an indication that the Sterling Court was
expressing doubt that shareholders should be considered "third persons" as referred to in
the passage from Coombes. However, in Sterling, it was of no real moment whether the
Court considered shareholders to be such "third persons" or not; the basic liability for
debts of the bank was imposed on the Sterling shareholders, not by the post-incorporation
statute of 1910, but by the pre-incorporation constitution of 1867 and the banking statute
of 1870. Moreover, the changes in the remedy for enforcing that liability, as wrought by
the post-incorporation statute of 1910, were of little significance, given the fact that both
the 1867 constitutional provision and the 1870 statute stated that shareholders" 'shall be
liable to the amount of their respective share or shares of stock in such [bank] for all its
debts and liabilities.'" See Sterling, 300 U.S. at 178,178-79 (quoting MD. CONST. of 1867,
art. I, § 39; Act of Apr. 4,1870, ch. 206, § 11, 1870 Md. Laws 339,349).
1292. See supra text accompanying notes 1282-84.
1293. Rights are vested when the right of enjoyment has become the property of a
person as a present interest, and thus vested rights differ from rights that are expectant or
contingent. See Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646,673 (1896).
1294. In Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882), the Court said:
Hence it is that a vested right of action is property in the same sense in
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Thus, it is proper to treat these shareholder rights as "vested property
rights" which, according to Coombes v. Getz, may not be destroyed in
reliance on a reserved power.1295 Because the expansive reading of
the reserved power says that these vested rights of shareholders can
be abrogated pursuant to permissive post-incorporation legislation, it
follows, again, that that reading of the power is constitutionally
impermissible.
It comes down to this. Under the Supreme Court's view of the
Impairment Clause, the reserved power cannot sustain either the
impairment of contractual rights of third persons, or the destruction
of vested property rights, pursuant to permissive post-incorporation
legislation. Shareholders are third persons enjoying contractual
rights under the corporate charter, and those rights amount to vested
property rights. Therefore, the reserved power does not sustain the
abrogation of a shareholder's charter rights through the utilization of
permissive post-incorporation legislation, and-because it says
otherwise-the expansive reading of the. reserved power is
constitutionally impermissible. 1296
which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary
interference. Whether it springs from contract or from the principles of the
common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away [because of
the prohibition of the Impairment Clause].
Id. at 132.
In Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 87 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1909), the court
considered a shareholder's right to vote to be a property right. See id, at 448-49. The
majority opinion on this point was characterized in the dissenting opinion as follows: "[I]t
is in substance held that the power given the original stockholders to vote for all of the
directors is a vested property right of which they cannot be deprived .... " Id. at 453
(Bartlett, J., dissenting); see also Page v. American & British Mfg. Co., 113 N.Y.S. 734,
735 (App. Div. 1908) ("[Tlhe right of a stockholder to a voice in the management of a
corporation in which he has invested money is a property right and vested interest
entitled to protection under the Constitution.").
1295. See supra text accompanying notes 1282-84.
1296. The most fervent espousal of this view is probably that contained in Part II of
Stem's article, The Limitations of the Power of a State Under a Reserved Right to Amend
or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, which says (in its penultimate paragraph) the
following:
What is contended, then, in this paper is, briefly summarized, this: That
the reserved power clauses were inserted in the constitutions and general
statutes of the states only in order that the states might retain power over
corporations in so far as the grant of franchises-that is, the contract between
the state and the corporation-is concerned, being intended to give to the states
control over the corporation in the nature of a supervisory police power, and to
prevent a legislature from giving away irrevocable property rights in the nature
of exemptions from public duties. That the reserved power was not introduced
to enable the state, either directly or by way of permission given to some of the
corporators as against the others, to alter the contract of association existing
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There are at least three decisions by federal courts'1 7 that
support this view of the matter.129 In Mowrey v. Indianapolis &
Cincinnati Railroad Co.,1299 a shareholder succeeded in his suit to
enjoin an impending consolidation of his railroad corporation with
among the stockholders of the company, even though that contract might be
formally expressed in the charter over which the power was reserved. That
whatever, however, may have been the intention of the reserved power clauses,
the state has not the constitutional power to reserve to itself a right to alter or
repeal the contract of the corporator any more than it could reserve such a
power over the contracts of partners, of unincorporated associations, or of
private contracts in general. That, therefore, although it may be admitted that
the state, without thereby releasing dissenting stockholders, can make
immaterial changes, changes which are not radical or important, in regard to the
charter contract even in so far as it represents the contract among the
corporators, yet this power derives no additional force from the reserved power
clauses, but exists independently of them; and whatever changes of this kind
cannot be made where there is no reserved power of amendment or revocation
of the charter cannot be made by the state where such a reserved power exists.
That the state cannot gain power over a contract over which it otherwise would
have none merely because such contract is, by an accident of history and legal
procedure, formally embodied in an instrument over which, in a different aspect,
the state can legally reserve rights of amendment or repeal; for, if it were
otherwise, the states could acquire for themselves any otherwise forbidden
powers, merely by having them, or the subjects which they are intended to
concern, inserted in some form in the charters of incorporation thereafter
granted. In short, that the stockholders are, as a group, subject in their
corporate capacity to the reserved power of the state, but that their contract
among themselves is as much under the protection of the Constitution
forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts as is any other contract.
Therefore the state may, under the reserved power, say to a corporation, "We
enact certain amendments qualifying your original privileges;" but it cannot say,
"We enact amendments changing the organization and nature of the enterprise
of your company as originally determined upon by your members;" or to some
of the stockholders, "We give to you the privilege, if you desire to use it, of
changing the contract into which you have entered with your fellow
corporators."
Stern, supra note 70, at 109-11.
1297. Another federal decision denied the reserved power's efficacy to sustain post-
incorporation legislation limiting the power of corporations to hire certain categories of
workers. See In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481,491-93, 513-14 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (holding,
after reviewing the history of the reserved power and limitations on its use, that
California's reserved power could not sustain legislation prohibiting corporations of that
state from employing Chinese or Mongolian workers).
1298. Federal cases permitting corporate combinations pursuant to pre-incorporation
legislation are not on point here. Among such cases are the following: Hottenstein v.
York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 953 (3d Cir. 1943) (upholding a merger with a
shell subsidiary for the purpose of eliminating preferred stock and its dividend arrearage);
In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., 277 F. 455, 457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (upholding a
consolidation); and Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 114 F. 232, 250-54
(C.C.D.NJ. 1902) (upholding a 999-year lease of the properties of complainants'
corporation), affd, 119 F. 871 (3d Cir. 1903).
1299. 17 F. Cas. 930 (C.C.D. Ind. 1866) (No. 9891).
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another company to be effected (upon a majority vote of
shareholders) pursuant to post-incorporation legislation that
authorized railroad companies generally to consolidate, and this
result was reached notwithstanding the fact that the corporation's
special-act charter reserved to the legislature the right at any time to
alter or amend it." In Hill v. Glasgow Railway Co.,""1 it was held
that majority shareholder/directors could be enjoined from making
use of post-incorporation legislation, enacted under a reserved
power,1312 when such post-incorporation legislation, in addition to
authorizing a lease of the company's railroad to another corporation,
specified that rental income was to be applied toward payment of
bonds executed by the majority shareholders in payment of their
stock (and negotiated by the company to outside parties) with the
result that minority shareholders were to receive none of the rental
income until the bonds had been retired.1303 In Yoakam v. Providence
1300. See i at 932-33. The court said:
We may well suppose that the only object of the reservation in ... this special
charter was to retain in the legislature a power, which, without the reservation,
could not be exercised,-a power to amend the charter authoritatively and
without the consent of the railroad company. On the contrary, the consolidation
act ... is a mere privilege, allowing-not obliging-railroad companies to
consolidate if they please to do so. Such a privilege the legislature doubtless
could have offered, and perhaps did offer, by the [consolidation] act ... to the
[corporation involved here], just as well, and with exactly the same effect,
without the said reservation in its charter, as with it. Besides, the privilege thus
offered would be utterly inoperative as an amendment of the charter, till it was
accepted by the company. Now the acceptance of this offered privilege would
involve a fundamental change in the charter of the company accepting it,--a
change which ... could not be effected in the case of a corporation subsisting
under a special charter, but by the consent of every stockholder.
Id. at 933.
1301. 41 F. 610 (C.C.D. Ky. 1888).
1302. The applicable reserved power, enacted by the Kentucky legislature in 1856, was
quoted by the court as follows:
"All charters and grants of or to corporations or amendments thereof,
enacted or granted since the 14th of February, 1856, and all other statutes, shall
be subject to amendment or repeal, at the will of the legislature, unless a
contrary intent be therein plainly expressed; provided, that, whilst privileges and
franchises so granted may be changed or repealed, no amendment or repeal
shall impair other rights previously vested."
Id. at 615 (quoting the then-existing statute).
1303. See U. at 615-17. The court said:
The [reserved power] statute in express terms limits and confines the power of
amendment or repeal to the "privileges and franchises granted" the corporation,
and provides that, in dealing with such privileges and franchises, "other rights
previously vested" shall not be impaired. In the absence of this clearly
expressed intent of the legislature not to affect or impair other rights previously
vested, in dealing with the privileges and franchises of corporations by way of
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Biltmore Hotel Co.,13 it was held (with respect to a Delaware
corporation) that, notwithstanding a pre-incorporation reserved
power, a corporation could not avail itself of post-incorporation
enabling legislation to sustain a charter amendment, approved by the
specified vote of shareholders, to eliminate a mandatory sinking fund
provision included in the charter for the benefit of preferred
shareholders.1 5
amendment or repeal, it is well settled by the authorities that the power of the
legislature, under a reservation of the right to alter, amend, or repeal charters, is
not unlimited, and that under such authority changes and alterations cannot be
constitutionally made by the legislature which disturb private contracts or rights
acquired under such charters before the power of amendment or repeal was
exercised....
Thie principle of these [cited cases] and other decisions upon the subject of
amending or repealing charters under a reservation of power so to do, is that the
legislature may change or modify the privileges and franchises which the state
has granted to the corporation, and which concern the interests of the public; but
dealing with what it has bestowed, either by way of withdrawal or of alteration,
the state may not go further, and so legislate as to disturb, affect, or impair
rights either of the corporation or of its shareholders, previously acquired, while
the corporate functions were being lawfully exercised. All rights thus acquired,
of whatever character, are surrounded and protected by constitutional sanctions
and guaranties higher and superior to the legislative power of amendment or
repeal....
The right reserved by the General Statutes to amend or repeal privileges
and franchises conferred by the charter is one thing, but the power to take from
the stockholders or others rights or property interests, acquired or vested before
such repeal or amendment, is another and quite a different thing. The first
comes within the legislative authority; the second lies beyond the limits of such
authority, because the legislature cannot defeat or impair other rights previously
vested, which have sprung up or grown out of such corporate privileges and
franchises while the corporation was allowed to exercise the same.
Id.
1304. 34 F.2d 533 (D.R.I. 1929).
1305. The court said:
The case also involves a consideration of how far the Legislature of the
state of Delaware may, under the reserved power in its General Corporation
Law in effect when the respondent was incorporated, confer by subsequent
enactment upon the majority of stockholders the power to adopt charter
amendments which will be binding upon a dissenting minority....
The decisions of the Delaware courts have been studied with the greatest
deference. I am compelled, however, to the conclusion that they do not settle
the point here involved.
A federal court may be bound by the interpretation placed upon a state
statute by a court of last resort of that state, but is not bound by the decision of
the state court as to whether so interpreted there is a resulting impairment of
the "obligation of contracts" or the taking of property "without due process of
law," within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States....
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There is, however, federal case law looking in the other
direction. In C.H. Venner Co. v. United States Steel Corp.,1 6 the
court-in denying a motion for a preliminary injunction-held that
the reserved power sustained a New Jersey corporation's utilization
of a post-incorporation statute that authorized the use of bonds (in
lieu of cash) to retire preferred stock. The court based its holding on
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in three cases to which reference
has been made previously: Sherman v. Smith,1307 Miller v. State,13°3
and Looker v. Maynard.1301 While it is true that, in each of these
cases, it was held that shareholder rights could be altered by post-
incorporation legislation enacted pursuant to a reserved power, a
close examination of the three decisions reveals that they do not
undermine the thesis advanced herein. In Sherman v. Smith, the
post-incorporation legislation imposed upon all shareholders of
banking corporations liability for subsequent debts of those
corporations (to the extent of the par value of their respective
holdings).13 This was an instance of mandatory legislation enacted
for the purpose of providing added security for depositors of the
state's banking corporations. In Miller v. State, the post-
incorporation legislation mandated a change in representation on the
board of directors of a railroad corporation for the purpose of
ensuring that the corporation would not be controlled by its minority
shareholders.3  This was a case of the legislature rectifying by
subsequent legislation what had come to be recognized as a mistake
made by earlier legislation because an assumption on which the
earlier legislation was based had turned out to be erroneous. In
Looker v. Maynard, the post-incorporation legislation mandated
To say that a general reservation on the part of the state of a right to
repeal or enact future amendments to the corporation law gave to the state a
power to authorize the cancellation of this [sinking fund] agreement, is to
disregard every sound principle of law and to misconstrue legal history....
I am, therefore, compelled to the conclusion that the charter amendments,
in so far as they purport to eliminate the sinking fund obligation, are invalid, and
the complainant is entitled to have his interest therein protected.
Id. at 535,544,547.
1306. 116 F. 1012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902).
1307. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 587 (1861); see supra note 1000 (first paragraph) and text
accompanying note 67 (discussing Sherman).
1308. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478 (1872); see supra notes 69 and 1000 (second paragraph)
(discussing Miller).
1309. 179 U.S. 46 (1900); see supra note 1000 (third paragraph) and text accompanying
note 68 (discussing Looker).
1310. The case is stated more fully supra in note 1000 (first paragraph).
1311. The case is stated more fullysupra in note 1000 (second paragraph).
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cumulative voting for any corporation organized under a general law
of the state.3  The statute instituted what was deemed (by that
legislature at that time) to be a desirable policy of ensuring the
potential for minority representation on boards of directors.
It should be noted that in none of these three cases, Sherman,
Miller, and Looker, did the post-incorporation legislation have the
effect of extending to majority shareholders the power-exercisable
at their option and over the protest of minority holders-to effect a
transaction not previously authorized or to effect an authorized
transaction with a lesser shareholder vote than previously required.
Moreover, the force of these three cases as precedents is limited at
best. The Miller case can be put to one side as involving nothing
more than the validation of a post-incorporation statute that rectified
a mistake to prevent an injustice.313 The Sherman case-aside from
the fact that it appears to have been wrongly decided-did not
involve any alteration of the rights of shareholders vis-h-vis one
another.3  And, while the Looker case did involve such an
1312. The case is stated more fully supra in note 1000 (third paragraph).
1313. The Court concluded its opinion as follows:
All parties supposed, when the charter was formed, and when the
subscriptions to the stock were paid, that the capital stock would be eight
hundred thousand dollars, and that the right conceded to the city to elect four
out of the thirteen directors would give the city a fair proportion of the whole
number, but circumstances have changed in consequence of the failure of a large
class of the subscribers to the stock to make good their subscriptions. Payments
being refused, the corporation found it necessary to reduce the capital stock, and
to shorten the route ....
These changes from the original design made new legislation necessary to
the ends of justice, and the amendatory act was passed to effect that object, and
the court is of the opinion that the amendatory act is a valid law ....
Miller, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 499.
1314. The Court failed to recognize (or acknowledge) that the shareholders derived a
contractual right, not just from the articles of association, but also from the provision of
the 1838 banking statute (under which the corporation had been organized in 1844)
stating that "'[n]o shareholder of any such association shall be liable in his individual
capacity for any contract, debt, or engagement of such association.'" Sherman v. Smith,
66 U.S. (1 Black) 587, 592 (1861) (quoting Act of Apr. 18, 1838, ch. 260, § 23, 1838 N.Y.
Laws 245, 250 but adding the comma after "debt"). Moreover, while the 1838 statute
contained a reserved power of alteration or repeal, the Court did not directly address the
question whether, under that power, the state-by its post-incorporation imposition upon
shareholders of liability for bank debts-should be permitted to speak to members of the
investing public with what the apocryphal Native American referred to as a "forked
tongue."
In A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 92 P.2d 1057 (Idaho 1939), the
court said:
Assuming but not conceding the legislature, under [the state]
Constitution, has reserved power to, and that it did and could, authorize
1006 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
alteration of shareholder rights, the Court advanced no support for
its holding beyond the thin reeds provided by Miller and Sherman,
and the reach of this case as a precedent can well be limited to the
reach of the Court's conclusion. 3
1 5
2. Mistakes Made by Proponents of Expansive Reading
a. Failure to Acknowledge Supreme Court's Vested Right
Doctrine
The argument made most frequently in support of the expansive
reading of the reserved power is that, because the reserved power
becomes a part of the charter of every subsequently organized
corporation, the charter of such a corporation can be altered
pursuant to post-incorporation legislation in any respect deemed
appropriate by the legislature.1316 There may be some validity to this
corporations to change non-assessable to assessable stock, without impairing the
obligation of a contract that the stock should be non-assessable .... that could
not possibly vest a corporation with authority to commit fraud by inducing
investors to purchase its stock upon the false representation that its shares were
not assessable. If so, it puts the Constitution['s reserved power] to a new and
strange use.
Id. at 1061.
1315. The Looker Court concluded its opinion as follows:
Remembering that the Dartmouth College case, (which was the cause of
the general introduction into the legislation of the several States of a provision
reserving the power to alter, amend or repeal acts of incorporation,) concerned
the right of a legislature to make a change in the number and mode of
appointment of the trustees or managers of a corporation, we cannot assent to
the theory that an express reservation of the general power does not secure to
the legislature the right to exercise it in this respect.
Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46,54 (1900).
1316. Sometimes the argument goes further by saying that shareholders are put on
notice by the reserved power, and thereby are even deemed to have agreed, that the
charter contract can be amended pursuant to post-incorporation legislation. See Mobile
Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin, 124 So. 2d 812, 821 (Ala. 1960) ("In legal effect, this
[reserved] power to amend under general laws was consented to by the stockholders when
they purchased their stock."); Allen v. Ajax Mining Co., 77 P. 47,49 (Mont. 1904) (quoted
supra in note 1195); Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. McCarthy, 617 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Wash.
1980) (en banc) ("iTihe majority of courts ... have found the reservation of the
amendment power to be a part of the shareholder's contract, with the result that the
shareholder is deemed to have consented in advance to the State's exercise of a power to
amend the charter or to authorize the corporation to do so."); Germer v. Triple-State
Natural Gas & Oil Co., 54 SE. 509,513 (W. Va. 1906) (quoted supra in note 1197).
Initially, however, the reserved power informs a shareholder of nothing more than
the fact that the legislature can impose on the corporation or its shareholders post-
incorporation conditions deemed to be in the public interest. Until a court in the state of
incorporation has decided whether it will adopt the restrictive or the expansive reading of
the reserved power, the shareholder has no way of knowing whether (by that decision) his
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proposition when the post-incorporation legislation has no real
impact on shareholder rights;1317 but, when utilization of a post-
incorporation enabling statute has an adverse effect on the vested
contractual rights of shareholders, the Supreme Court's reserved
power jurisprudence 318 comes into play. State courts that have
adopted the expansive reading appear to have proceeded on the
assumption that they have a free choice in the matter.3 19  But the
matter is not one of preference; it is one of constitutionality. While it
lies within the province of a state's highest court to construe that
state's reserved power (whether contained in the state's constitution
or in its corporation statute),' t ° the Supreme Court is the final arbiter
of whether that construction can stand muster under the Impairment
Clause of the Constitution.' What the Supreme Court has said, of
course, is that "neither vested property rights nor the obligation of
contracts of third persons may be destroyed or impaired" in reliance
on a reserved power. 3 1 And, as pointed out above,1323 this means
contractual rights under the corporate charter will be protected from change, or be
subjected to alteration, pursuant to permissive post-incorporation legislation.
1317. In Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 167 F. 721 (6th Cir. 1909) (involving
Michigan corporations), it was held that a corporation could avail itself of post-
incorporation legislation, enacted pursuant to a reserved power, that authorized mining
corporations to acquire stock in other mining companies. See id. at 723-24. However, this
legislation did not involve any alteration of the rights of shareholders.
1318. See supra note 971 and text accompanying notes 972-78.
1319. Whether or not influenced by a desire to uphold statutes enacted by the
legislatures of their respective states, courts adopting the expansive reading of the
reserved power have generally opted for corporate flexibility over protection of the rights
of minority shareholders. See, e.g., Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585, 594-
96 (NJ. 1967) (disavowing the century-old Zabriskie doctrine in favor of the flexibility
afforded by an expansive reading of the reserved power) (quoted and discussed supra in
notes 1057 and 1072, and text accompanying notes 1075-80); Seattle Trust & Say. Bank,
617 P.2d at 1026-27 (reversing an earlier adoption of the restrictive reading and
embracing the expansive reading in the interest of corporate flexibility) (discussed supra
in text accompanying notes 1081-88).
1320. See Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536,545-47 (1907). The point was made
in Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 30 Pa. 9 (1858), in the following language:
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, on the
construction of the constitution or laws of the United States, are binding on the
state courts. The decisions of the supreme courts of the several states, on the
construction of the constitution and laws of their respective states, are, in like
manner, binding on the Supreme Court of the United States. That court has no
more right to overrule a judgment of a state court, on a question of state law,
than the state court has to overrule the United States court on a question of
United States law.
Id. at 31-32.
1321. See supra note 1028 and accompanying text.
1322. Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442 (1932); see supra note 971 (seventh
paragraph) and text accompanying notes 1282-84.
1008 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
that the expansive reading of the reserved power is constitutionally
impermissible.
There certainly are those who do not like the vested right
doctrine.131 And, in an effort to avoid the implications of that
doctrine, the expansive reading of the reserved power has been
pushed to its logical extreme. It has been held that a pre-
incorporation reserved power makes it impossible for any
shareholder right to become vested-that, because the reserved
power becomes a part of any corporate charter subsequently granted,
the shareholder's charter rights are necessarily subject to alteration
by post-incorporation legislation.13 5 But this stands the matter on its
head. What the opponents of vested rights would like to be able to
say is this: If a right is subject to change under the reserved power, it
cannot be vested. But what the Supreme Court has said is this: If a
right is vested, it cannot be subject to change under the reserved
1323. See supra text accompanying notes 1282-1315.
1324. For judicial criticism of the doctrine, see the following: Davison v. Parke, Austin
& Lipscomb, Inc., 35 N.E.2d 618, 622 (N.Y. 1941) ("So it seems that only confusion
results from saying that 'vested rights' are not within the contemplation of the
[amendment] statute."); McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 259 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
("Decisions in other states and scholarly ... articles pointed out that the term 'vested
right' ... was ... a 'deceptive label.' To characterize dividends, accumulating through
lapse of time, but never declared, as a 'vested' interest is but to argue from a
conclusion."); McCallum v. Gray, 542 P.2d 1025, 1028-29 (Or. 1975); Dentel v. Fidelity
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 539 P.2d 649,651 (Or. 1975) ("The 'vested rights' terminology has
been attacked as being confusing and meaningless."); and O'Brien v. Socony Mobil Oil
Co., 152 S.E.2d 278,285 n.11 (Va. 1967).
For other criticism of the doctrine, see Gibson, supra note 943, at 605-08, and Dale
W. VanWinkle, Comment, Corporations-Charter-Change of Voting Right by
Amendment, 54 MICH. L. RBv. 279,280 (1955).
1325. An example is provided by Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin, 124 So. 2d
812 (Ala. 1960), in which the court said:
We have given due consideration to appellees' contention that "a
stockholder's preemptive right is a vested property right entitled to the same
protection by law as other property rights and may not be taken away by the
officers, directors or other stockholders without his consent." But can it be said
that such right, when acquired, became "vested", that is, cannot be "destroyed,
impaired, or divested" without the consent of the holder of such right, in the face
of the fact that the corporation's charter and the certificates of stock contained,
in legal effect, at the time such right was acquired, the mandatory constitutional
prescription that it "shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal under
general laws"? We think not. This reserved right to amend, in such manner as
the legislature may prescribe by general laws, became, as already noted, a part
of each stockholder's contract. That is, the preemptive right, when acquired,
was acquired subject to the express condition that it could, in effect, be
"destroyed, impaired or divested by an amendment of the charter under general
laws."
Id. at 823-24 (citation omitted).
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b. Fallacy Concerning Multiple Categories of Corporations
It has been argued that there is a practical necessity for holding
that enabling legislation be available for use by pre-existing
corporations as well as by those subsequently organized.132 The
argument is that, otherwise, a state would have multiple categories of
corporations-with older corporations governed by one set of rules
and newer corporations governed by a different set of rules.32 7 The
argument loses its force, however, when one recognizes that such a
state of affairs already exists-with no discernible adverse
consequences. 3' In North Carolina, for example, there are
(depending on their date of incorporation) multiple categories of
corporations with respect to the right of cumulative voting329 and
more than one category with respect to preemptive rights. 3"
Similarly, in New Jersey, there are two categories of corporations
with respect to the shareholder vote required for a long-form
merger 311 or for a sale-of-assets transaction.332
There is a far more compelling argument to be made. It is much
more important that we not have two categories of states: those
adhering to the restrictive reading of the reserved power, and those
adhering to the expansive reading. If the expansive reading were to
be invalidated by the Supreme Court, shareholders throughout the
nation would have the satisfaction of knowing, without regard to the
1326. See Gibson, supra note 1023, at 292 ("Since these [modernizing] statutes were
enacted to keep the agencies of business healthy and adaptable to changing business
conditions, it is important that the same rules apply uniformly to all corporations, without
regard to the time of their organization and financing.").
1327. In Allen v. Scott, 135 N.E. 683 (Ohio 1922), the court said:
The principle contended for by counsel for [shareholders of a banking
corporation] would immediately create two classes of corporations, those
organized between 1903 and 1913 [when there was no constitutional provision
imposing double liability on shareholders of such corporations], and those
organized before and after that period [when there were such constitutional
provisions]. This would be conducive to the greatest confusion and would
destroy the uniform operation of laws applicable to private corporations.
Id. at 685; accord Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., 122 S.E.2d 436, 445-46 (W. Va.
1961).
1328. Different rules for different categories of corporations are often the result of
"grandfathering" provisions of a prior statute when a new corporation statute is adopted.
1329. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-28 (Supp. 1996).
1330. See UL § 55-6-30.
1331. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14Az10-3(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1997) (quoted supra in text
accompanying notes 560-64).
1332. See id. § 14A:10-11(1)(c)-(d) (quoted supra in note 845).
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domiciles of the corporations whose stock they own, that their
shareholder rights could not be altered pursuant to permissive post-
incorporation legislation-unless dissenters were accorded a right of
appraisal.
C. Sustaining Effect of Appraisal Right
Disagreements between adherents of the two readings of the
reserved power involve a tension between the arguments, on the one
hand, that there is a need to promote corporate flexibility and, on the
other hand, that there is a need to protect shareholder rights. One
can applaud the protection given to shareholder rights in cases such
as Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co.1333 and
Yukon Mill & Grain Co. v. Vose,'3 4 which held that the reserved
power did not sustain utilization of post-incorporation legislation to
make non-callable preferred stock subject to redemption,133 5 Sutton v.
Globe Knitting Works,336 which held that the reserved power did not
sustain utilization of post-incorporation legislation to postpone the
date for mandatory redemption of preferred stock,'1337 Keller v.
Wilson & Co.'33 and Wheatley v. A.. Root Co.,339 which held that the
reserved power did not sustain utilization of post-incorporation
legislation to eliminate dividend arrearages on preferred stock,'1
and Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.,1341 which held that the
reserved power did not sustain utilization of post-incorporation
legislation to eliminate a sinking fund for preferred stock;'3 2 at the
same time, however, one can regret the fact that the will of the
holders of a majority of the voting stock was thwarted in each of
those cases. And one can regret the alteration of shareholder rights
in cases such as Hinckley v. Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co.,1343
French v. Cumberland Bank & Trust Co.,'3 4 and Miller v. Magline,
1333. 291 N.Y.S. 932 (App. Div. 1936), affdper curiam, 7 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y. 1937).
1334. 206 P.2d 206 (Okla. 1949).
1335. See supra notes 1005 (discussing Brestav) and 1054 (discussing Vose).
1336. 267 N.W. 815 (Mich. 1936).
1337. See supra text accompanying notes 1010-12 (discussing Sutton).
1338. 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936).
1339. 69 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1946).
1340. See supra notes 1018 (discussing Keller) and 1053 (first paragraph) (discussing
Wheatley).
1341. 34 F.2d 533 (D.R.L 1929).
1342. See supra text accompanying notes 1033-37 and 1304-05 (discussing Yoakam).
1343. 95 N.Y.S. 357 (App. Div. 1905).
1344. 74 S.E.2d 265 (Va. 1953).
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Inc.,'345 which held that the reserved power sustained utilization of
post-incorporation legislation to change the voting power of
shareholders, 131 and Seattle Trust & Savings Bank v. McCarthy'4 7 and
Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin,'m which held that the
reserved power sustained utilization of post-incorporation legislation
to eliminate preemptive rights;349 at the same time, however, one can
applaud the fact that effect was given to the will of the holders of a
majority of the voting stock in each of those cases. What is needed is
a way of giving effect to the will of majority shareholders while
according protection to the rights of minority shareholders.
Such a harmonizing device is to be found in the provision of
appraisal rights for dissenters. With appraisal rights available,
dissenters can withdraw the value of their investment from the
enterprise, and effect can be given to the will of majority
shareholders. As outlined above, there are two grounds on which the
Supreme Court can base a decision that post-incorporation
legislation can be utilized to alter shareholder rights so long as a right
of appraisal is accorded to dissenters. The first of those grounds is
that a state can change the remedy of a party to a contract (provision
of a right of appraisal in lieu of a power to veto or enjoin) without
impairing the obligation of the contract.35 0 The second ground is that
statutory provision of a right of appraisal constitutes a valid exercise
of the state's power of eminent domain '3 --a sovereign power whose
exercise is not precluded by the Impairment Clause. 32
What is needed is a decision by the Supreme Court establishing
two points. The first point is that the reserved power cannot
constitutionally sustain an abrogation of shareholder rights pursuant
to permissive post-incorporation legislation.353 The second point is
that, when appraisal rights are accorded to dissenters, a corporation
can utilize post-incorporation legislation notwithstanding the
Impairment Clause.sT 4
1345. 306 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
1346. See supra text accompanying notes 1240-44 (discussing Hinckley), 1245-47
(discussing French), and 1248-49 (discussing Miller).
1347. 617 P.2d 1023 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
1348. 124 So. 2d 812 (Ala. 1960).
1349. See supra text accompanying notes 1084-88 (discussing McCarthy) and 1095-98
(discussing McGowin).
1350. See supra text accompanying notes 1122-25.
1351. See supra text accompanying notes 1126-39.
1352. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64 and 101-06.
1353. See supra text accompanying notes 1280-1332.
1354. See supra text accompanying notes 1121-39 and 1350-52.
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A double-edged holding by the Supreme Court, along these
lines, would have two salutary consequences. The first desirable
result would be that, whenever a corporation sought to alter
shareholder rights pursuant to permissive post-incorporation
legislation, appraisal rights would have to be accorded to dissenting
shareholders. The other desirable result would be an end to the
controversy that has swirled for almost a century and a half around
the "reserved power question."
D. A Final Observation
This discussion can be concluded by examining a provision
contained in the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act and in North
Carolina's 1989 Business Corporation Act (based thereon). Included
as part of the section authorizing charter amendments, it states: "A
shareholder of the corporation does not have a vested property right
resulting from any provision in the articles of incorporation, including
provisions relating to management, control, capital structure,
dividend entitlement, or purpose or duration of the corporation. 1355
Because this is such a bizarre platform from which to invite
members of the investing public to purchase equity securities, some
comments are in order. The Model Act's Official Comment states
that the quoted provision "rejects decisions by a few courts" that
have applied the vested right doctrine because the effect of such
decisions is to create the "tyranny of the minority" inherent in a
requirement of unanimous shareholder consent.1356 But the means of
eliminating that "tyranny of the minority" should not be by way of a
statutory declaration-which, incidentally, may itself entail a
violation of the Impairment Clause if applied to a pre-existing
corporation 13 7---that shareholders have no vested right in the terms
1355. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-01(b) (1990) (omitting comma after "dividend");
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 10.01(b) (1996) (containing erroneous comma after
"dividend").
1356. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 10.01 commentary at 10-4 to -5 (1996).
1357. North Carolina's 1989 Business Corporation Act contains the following:
The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to every corporation for profit
... now existing or hereafter formed, and to the outstanding and future
securities thereof, except to the extent the corporation is expressly excepted by
this Chapter from its operation or except to the extent that there is other
specific statutory provision particularly applicable to the corporation or
inconsistent with some provisions of this Chapter, in which case that other
provision prevails.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17-01(a) (1990); see also State ex rel. Howes v. W.R. Peele, Sr.
Trust, 876 F. Supp. 733, 738 (E.D.N.C. 1995) ("The current North Carolina Business
Corporation Act [adopted June 8, 1989, effective July 1, 19901 applies to corporations
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of their charter contract. Instead, the way to eliminate that
"tyranny," when it is proposed that shareholder rights be altered
pursuant to post-incorporation enabling legislation, is to ensure that
(after the proposal has been adopted by directors subject to a
rigorous fiduciary duty and approved by an appropriate vote of
shareholders following full disclosure) dissenters are given the
opportunity to receive the fair value of their stock through the
exercise of appraisal rights.135
The vice of the expansive reading of the reserved power is
evident if it permits the application to a pre-existing corporation of a
statutory provision that attempts to undermine the charter rights of
shareholders in the cause of corporate flexibility. At the same time,
the rule of unanimity, if not abated by provision of a right of
appraisal for dissenters, forecloses corporate flexibility for the sake
of protecting shareholder rights.
It is not necessary to approach the need for corporate flexibility
and the need for shareholder protection on an either/or basis. Both
needs are important, and both needs should be met. As one court
said in 1925:
[W]hile it is quite desirable that corporations organized
under the laws of [the state] should have ample proper
latitude in making readjustments to meet new and
unexpected business conditions, it is even more important
that the contractual rights of stockholders of all classes of
stock shall be upheld by the courts under all
circumstances. 359
And another court said in 1936:
It may be conceded, as a general proposition, that the
State, as a matter of public policy, is concerned in the
welfare of its corporate creatures to the end that they may
have reasonable powers wherewith to advance their
existing prior to its enactment.").
1358. The Model Act's Official Comment includes the following:
Minority shareholders are protected from the power of the majority to
impose onerous or objectionable amendments by two basic devices: the right to
vote on amendments by separate voting groups and the right to dissent [and
appraisal]. In addition, courts have held that a decision by majority
shareholders to exercise the powers granted by this section in a way that is
arguably detrimental or unfair to minority interests may be examined by a court
under its inherent equity power to review transactions for good faith and fair
dealing.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 10.01 commentary at 10-6 to -7 (1996) (cross references
omitted).
1359. General Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 129 A. 244,249 (N.J. 1925).
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interests .... The State is concerned also with the welfare of
those who invest their money, the very essence of
generation, in corporate enterprises. Some measure of
protection should be accorded them.3 60
A decision by the Supreme Court that a change in shareholder rights
pursuant to permissive post-incorporation legislation can stand
constitutional muster, not on the basis of a reserved power but only
through the provision of appraisal rights for dissenters, would help to
achieve both objectives.
1360. Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115,124 (Del. 1936).
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